^
c^d ai..i?.au^
PURCHASED FROM
B^
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, EVIDENCE,
AND CIECUMSTANCES OF THE
KATYN FOEEST MASSACEE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGKESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF
POLISH OFFICERS IN THE KATYN FOREST
NEAR SMOLENSK, RUSSIA
PART 7
Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation
of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre
JUNE 3, 4, AND NOVEMBER 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS, EVIDENCE,
AND CIECUMSTANCES OF THE
KATYN FOEEST MASSACEE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
INVESTIGATION OF THE MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF
POLISH OFFICERS IN THE KATYN FOREST
NEAR SMOLENSK, RUSSIA
PART 7
Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation
of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre
JUNE 3, 4, AND NOVEMBER 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93744 WASHINGTON : 1952
SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTS,
EVIDENCE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KATYN FOREST
MASSACRE
RAY J. MADDEN, Indiana, Chairman
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania GEORGE A. DONDERO, Michigan
FOSTER FURCOLO, Massachusetts ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Wisconsin
THADDEUS M. MACHROWICZ, Michigan TIMOTHY P'. SHEEHAN, Illinois
John J. Mitchell, Chief Counsel
ROMAN C. PuciNsKi, Chief Investigator
II
d^
rji.>.
CONTENTS
Statement of — Page
Bi.ssell, Gen. Clavton 1839, 1864, 2298
Brown, Ben H., jr 2056, 2218
Carter, John F 2246
Cranston, Alan 2174, 2272
Davis, Elmer 1979
Earle, George Howard 2196
Epstein, Julius 2266
Harriman, W. A 2103
Holmes, Julius C 2226
Hopkins, James F 2008
Jackson, Justice Robert H 1945
Kreutz, Jan Marion 2012
Lane, Arthur Bliss 2216, 221»
Lan,^, Josepli 2002, 201 9-
Lantaff, Hon. William C 1827
Lyon, Frederick B 2241
Meeres, Mildred 1833
Melby, John F 2149
M ikolajczyk, Stanislaw _ _' 2155
Mortimer," Kathleen H 2132
Olshansky . Boris ^_ 1939
Phillips, Joseph B 2255
Richards, Robert K . 2035
Shea, Mrs. Hilda 2022
Simon, Arthur 2007, 201 9
Soron, Casimer . 2020
Standley, Adn iral William H ._ 2042, 2060
Welles, Hon. Sumner 2075
Yeaton, Col. Ivan 1916, 2293
EXHIBITS
1. Letter to Mr. Madden from Gen. J. Lawton Collins 1826
2. Metnorandum to the Secretary of Defense from Maj. Gen. Clayton
Bissell ' 1 _ _ _ 1839
3. Memorandum from General Bissell (Roger Kent, general counsel for
Charles A. Coolidge) 1840
4. Lett<3r from General Bissell to Julius C. Holmes. Assistant Secretarv of
State ;_ . _ 1867
5. Letter from Julius C. Holmes to Generfl Bissell 1894
6. Statement by Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson to the congressional
committee 1971
7. Letter to Mr. Justice Jackson from Polish Government in Exile in
London 1 975
8. Mr. Elmer Davis' radio broadcast of May 3, 1943--- 1987
8A. State Department memorandum, with stamp mark, showing it had
been deli\ered to Mr. Berle on April 22, 1943 _ _ . 198S
9. Telegram from Ambass?.dor Standley to Department of State 2045.
10. Portion of message from Secretary of State Hull to American
Ambessador at Kuibyshev of August 19, 1942 2046.
11. Portion of message from Secretary of State to American .Ambassador
dated September 5, 1942 2048
12. Portion of mess.^ge from American Ambassador to State Department
dated Sertember 10, 1942 2052:
13. Report from A-nerican Ambassador Pt Moscow regarding Willkie's
convers: tion with Stalin concerning the Poli.sh situation- 2054
nx
IV CONTENTS
14. Letter and one enclosure forwarded to State Department by American Page
Ambassador to Moscow on February 17, 1942, detailing search for
Polish officers.. L . 2057
15. Telegram from Moscow dated April 26, 1943 2062
16. Stalin's personal letter to President F. D. Roosevelt 2063
17. Message from President Roosevelt to Stalin dated April 26, 1943 2064
18. Telegram from Ambassador in Moscow to Department of State 2066
19. Telegram from Ambassador in Moscow to Department of State 2068
20. Letter from Under Secretary Sumner Wells to President Roosevelt — 2076
21. Letter to General Watson from Under Secretary Welles 2082
22. Report and evidence compiled by Poles regarding discovery at Katyn
forwarded to Under Secretary Sumner Welles by Ambassador Biddle
on May 20, 1943 2092
23. Message from Mr. Harriman to Stalin dated November 7, 1941 2112
23A. Mr. Harriman's dispatch to Washington 2112
23B. Stalin's reply to Mr. Harriman 2113
23C. Stalin's second reply to Mr. Harriman 2113
23D. Polish Embassy letter to Ambassador Harriman 2113
24. Telegram to United States Embassy in Moscow dated January 25,
1944 2124
25. Ambassador Harriman's letter forwarding reports on their ^•isits to
Katvn bv Mr. Harriman's daughter and an Embassy attache in
January 1944 2132
26. Ambassador Earle's letter to President Roosevelt dated June 11, 1944. . 2199
26A. Mr. Roosevelt's reply 2200
27. Mr. Roosevelt's letter to Ambassador Earle 2202
28. President Truman's letter to Ambassador Earle 2210
29. Ambassador Lane's letter to Mr. Justice Jackson at Nuremberg dated
December 16, 1945 2218
30. Ambassador Lane's letter to State Department official 2220
31. General Holmes' letter of June 9, 1945, to General Bissell 2228
32. Colonel Van Vliet's statement regarding his treatment at Katyn by
the Nazis 2230
32 A. Memorandum from Mr. Carter regarding the Katvn Massacre pre-
pared on May 31, 1944 J 2252
33. Letter to Mr. Stone from Mr. Epstein 2267
34. Letter to Mr. Epstein from Charles W. Thayer, Chief, International
Broadcasting Division 2267
35. Letter from Epstein to Mr. Allen 2268
36. Letter from Mr. Kohler to Mr. Epstein 2269
37. (Appendix) Excerpt of House Un-American Activities Committee
hearing 23-'^ 1
38. (Appendix) Teheran- Yalta-Potsdam agreements 23 9
39. Major General Bissell's diary certificate 23 2
40. Major General Bissell's commendations 23l5
41. Message sent to Department of State by Ambassador Harriman (see
Mr. Harriman's testimony) 2350
42. Dispatches describing Polish-Soviet relations . 2357
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACEB
TUESDAY, JUNE 3, 1952
House of Representatives,
The Select Committee on the Kattn Forest Massacre,
Washhigton, D. C.
The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 336,
House Office Buildino;, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding.
Present: Messrs. Madden, Flood, Furcolo, Machrowicz, Dondero,
O'Konski, and Sheehan.
Also present : John J. jNIitchell, chief counsel to the select committee.
Chairman Madden. The select committee will come to order.
I might say for the record that tliis meeting of the Select Committee
on the Katyn Forest Massacre is the sixth in a series of hearings which
the committee has held. The committee returned a few weeks ago
from hearings in England, where it heard the testimony of 32 wit-
nesses, and also from Germany, where it heard the testimony of 28
witnesses.
As far as the testimony is concerned, the proceedings of the com-
mittee to determine the responsibility as to who committed the Katyn
massacre are practically concluded. The testimony today will lead
up to the committee's desire to try and determine what happened to
certain reports that were submitted to the Government departments
regarding the Katyn massacre.
The record may also show that all members of the committee are
present.
Counsel may now j^roceed. Have you a statement that you wish to
make ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
You will recall that sometime ago you requested the Army Depart-
ment Counselor, Mr. Francis Shackelford, to obtain a statement from
General of the Army J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff, relative
to his interview with Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr. Yesterday after-
noon, at approximately 5 : 15 p. m., I received that statement, which is
addressed to you, and I herewith hand it to you.
Chairman Madden. This is a letter dated June 2, 1952, addressed
to the chairman of this committee and signed bj^ J. Lawton Collins,
Chief of Staff of the United States Army.
Will the counsel please read the letter for the record ?
Mr. Mitchell. The letter is headed "United States Army, the Chief
of Staff." The letter is dated June 2, 1952. [Reading :]
Dear Mr. IMadden : Referring to your conversation witli Mr. P. Sliackelford,
Department Counselor, Department of the Army, I am submitting herewitli my
recollection of the facts concerning Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet's passing visit to
my headquarters early in May 1945. At that time I vpas the commanding general
of the Seventh Corps, with headquarters at Leipzig, Germany. My corps was still
in action and in contact with the enemy along the Elbe River.
1825
1826 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Colonel Van Vliet had been released or had escaped from a German prison
camp and happened to reach our lines on the front of one of my divisions. I had
known him when he was a boy at Fort Benning. When he heard that I was in
command of the Seventh Corps, he asked to see me.
Colonel Van Vliet showed me his pictures of Katyn and told me in a broad
way the conclusions he had come to as a result of his visit to the graves of Polish
officers at Katyn. As I recall it, he told me he was anxious to get home and report
to the War Department. I suggested that he proceed at once to Headquarters,
First Army, so that he could make appropriate reports. Accordingly, I made the
necessary arrangements to send Colonel Van Vliet back to First Army Head-
quarters, which was then at Weimar, Germany.
Colonel Van Vliet at no time made any written or formal statement to me,
and I have no personal knowledge of any report he made in Washington.
Sincerely yours,
J. Lawton Collins.
The letter is addressed "Hon. Ray J. Madden, House of Repre-
sentatives."
Chairman Madden. Hand it to tlie reporter and have it marked
"Exhibit 1."
(The document referred to above was marked "Exhibit 1" and made
a part of the record. Exhibit 1 is as follows :)
Exhibit 1
United States Army,
The Chief of Staff,
June 2, 1952.
Hon. Ray J. Madden,
House of Representatives.
Dear Mk. Madden : Referring to your conversation with Mr. F. Shackelford,
Department Counselor, Department of the Army, I am submitting herewith my
recollection of the facts concerning Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet's passing visit to
my headquarters early in May 1945. At that time I was the commanding general
of the Seventh Corps, with headquarters at Leipzig, Germany. My corps was
still in action and in contact with the enemy along the Elbe River.
Colonel Van Vliet had been released or had escaped from a German prison
camp and happened to reach our lines on the front of one of my divisions. I
had known him when he was a boy at Fort Benning. When he heard that I
was in command of the Seventh Corps, he asked to see me.
Colonel Van Vliet showed me his pictures of Katyn and told nie In a broad
way the conclusions he had come to as a result of his visit to the graves of
Polish officers at Katyn. As I recall it, he told me he was anxious to get home
and report to the War Department. I suggested that he proceed at once to
Headquarters, First Army, so that he could make appropriate reports. Accord-
ingly, I made the necessary arrangements to send Colonel Van Vliet back to First
Army Headquarters, which was then at Weimar, Germany.
Colonel Van Vliet at no time made any written or formal statement to me, and
I have no personal knowledge of any report he made in Washington.
Sincerely yours,
J. Lawton Collins.
Mr. ]V[iTCHELL. Mr. Chairman, the first witness this morning is
Hon. William C. Lantaff, a Representative in Congress from the
Foni-th District of Florida.
Chairman Maddex. Cono;rpssninn, do yon solemnly swoar the testi-
mony you will give licre in the hearing now being conducted will
be the truth, the whole ti'iith, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Congressman Lantaff, I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1827
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. LANTAFF, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Mitchell. CoiigTessiiiun, will you state your full name for the
record, please '(
Congressman Laxtaff. William C. Lantaff.
Mr. Mitchell. And your present address?
Congressman Lantaff. House Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the conmiittee what 3'our official posi-
tion was in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, during the
years 19M and 1945, to the best of your knowledge?
Congi-essman Lantaff. I was assigned as Chief of the G-2 Secre-
tariat in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Depart-
ment, General Staff. I was on duty as Chief of the Secretariat in
May of 1945.
My cUities there in that office were essentially administrative in
nature, to administer the administrative Office of the Assistant Chief
of Staff. G-2, and to comply with certain other missions which had
been assigned to me in that office. As such, I was on duty when
Colonel Van Vliet reported to the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff',
G-2, in May of 1945.
Of course, it is rather difficult at this time, some 7 years later, to
recall everything that transpired ; but, as I recall it, and to the best
of my recollection. Colonel Van Vliet wanted to report to General
Bissell, and upon inquiry as to the nature of his visit and why he
wanted to see General Bissell
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Lantaff', may I interrupt you for a
moment ?
Congressman Lantaff. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. jNIr. Chairman, in part 2 of the hearings held in
Washngton, D. C. on February 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1 refer you to page 48.
Mr. Lantaff', I would like to read something here for the record
now. Mr. Flood is asking the question. [Reading:]
Mr. Flood. Were you directed by anybody ovei'seas to report to the office of
G-2 or did you from your Army experience decide that was where you should
report?
Colonel Van Vliet. That is where I decided to go. I went to the Office of G-2
and told enough of my story to convince
Mr. O'KoNSKi. To whom?
Colonel Van Vliet. Sir. I don't remember. It was in one of the outer oflSces
of G-2. I don't know wiiom I spoke to. It was one or two down from the
G-2.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. AVhat was his rank, a colonel?
Colonel Van Vliet. I believe it was a lieutenant colonel, sir ; but I am unable
to say who or what. They said I should see General Bissell
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You mean to tell me when you came in there he did not
introduce himself to you or tell who he was? He did not tell you what his
position was, nor did you inquire?
Colonel Van Vliet. His position was known* to me at the time, sir; but that
has been 7 years ago. and it wasn't at the time important to me to remember
whom I talked to in that office. I am sorry I don't remember.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Isn't it customary in military —
1828 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Congressman, I would like to ask yon at this time: Were you that
lieutenant colonel ?
Congressman Lantaff. I believe I was; yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you proceed with your statement from there,
please ?
Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall it, Colonel Van Vliet
told me enough of the incident that he had observed while a prisoner
of W'ar that 1 determined that he should see General Bissell and, ac-
cordingly, took him in to see General Bissell. I don't recall whether
General Bissell was in the office at that time ; but, as well as I recall it,
it was the same day that he reported that I took him in there.
After some time — exactly how long I don't recall — General Bissell
told me to arrange for a stenographer to take down the testimony of
Colonel Van Vliet and to arrange for quarters for him to do it in.
Accordingly, I arranged for stenographic assistance and for a space
for him to dictate his statement about the Katyn Massacre.
After that was completed, the report was taken by the secretary
to General Bissell.
As I recall. Colonel Van Vliet and General Bissell had a further
conference on that report, and that is about all I remember about
the incident about which Colonel Van Vliet has testified.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall the name of the stenographer?
Congressman Lantaff. I do now. It was Mrs. ISIeeres.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall if Colonel Van Vliet showed you any
photographs that he had of Katyn ?
Congi-essman Lantaff. I recall seeing one or two photographs, to
the best of my memory.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know if they were attached to his report or
not'^
Congressman Lantaff. I do not recall for a certainty, but I believe
they were.
Mr. IMitchell. Did you ])ersonally see such a report and read it?
Congressman LanTxVff. I personally saw the report.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you read it ?
Congi-essman Lantaff. As well as I re.call, I read the report or I
had seen it, because I think the notes were returned to me for safe-
keeping prior to the time Colonel Van Vliet had planned such a
report.
Mr. Mitchell. Then there Avas such a report?
Congressman Lantaff. I recall the report.
Mr. Mitchell. At the time that the secretary returned the report, ,
did she return it to you or did she return it to Colonel Van Vliet and
you and General Bissell ? Do you recall the details ^
Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall specifically. To the best of
my recollection, when the report was finished, (\)l()nel Van Vliet re-
viewed it. Whether he did it in my office or the office that I had made
available for him, I don't recall; but, to the best of my memory, after
the report was transcribed, he took it in to General Bissell.
Mr. Mitchell. He personally delivered it to General Bissell?
Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall. I think that he was to
review tlie re])ort and, as I recall, sign it.
Ml". MrrciiKi.L. Do you recall wlio was iu tl\e imiuediate office of
General Bissell at that time?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1829
Congressman Lantaff. I know who was assigned in the immediate
office.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you give the connnittee the names of those in-
dividnals.
Congressman Lantaff. Yes. There was a Lt. Col. Jack Earman.
]\Ir. Mitchell. How do you spell it?
Congressman Lantaff. E-a-r-m-a-n.
There was General BisselPs secretary, Mrs. Doris Jepson. There
was a warrant officer, Carulli. Then there were several other per-
sonnel assigned to the office but who were not in the immediate office
next to the general, and the other personnel would have no knowledge
of this incident.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall if General Bissell had a safe in his
office (
Congressman Lantaff. Yes. There was a safe just outside of
General BisselPs office, alongside of Mrs. Jepson's desk. Then, of
course, there were numerous combination file cabinets, with combina-
tion locks.
Mr. Mitchell. Then Mrs. Jepson was not located in the office with
General Bissell, nor was the safe ?
Congressman Lantaff. No.
I say "safe.*- I don't recall. I think it was one of these combination
lock safes, three combination safes, which were prescribed for the
storage of "Top secret" papers.
Mr. Mitchell. Was this document or report of Colonel Van Vliet's
labeled "Top secret," to your knowledge?
Congressman Lantaff. As well as I recall it, it was. I could not
swear to that, though.
Mr. Mitchell. Is there any other individual who was connected
with the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at that time, from
whom a statement should be taken by this committee?
Congressman Lantaff. I think those are the only people in the
office who would have had any knowledge of this incident.
Mr. Mitchell. To your personal knowledge, do you know if any-
body had access to this safe or combination safe which was the prop-
erty of General Bissell, other than his secretaiy and himself?
Congi'essman Lantaff. Everyone in the immediate office did.
Mr. Mitchell. The individuals you have named ?
Congressman Lantaff. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Earman, Jepson and Carulli ?
Congressman Lantaff. That is correct, and myself.
Mr. jMitchell. Did yon see this report at any time after Colonel
Van Vliet had signed it?
Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall that.
Mr. Mitchell. Was it customary for General BisselPs office to keep
a log of all documents that were sent out of that office ?
Congressman Lantaff. All documents that came in through the
mailroom or cable section, which were retained in the office, were
signed for by either Colonel Earman or myself, including Joint Chiefs
of Staff papers and Combined Chiefs of Staff papers. All those
papers were logged in and recorded; and, of course, if they left the
office, were logged out ?
Mr. Mitchell. Who did the logging out ?
1830 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Congressman Lantaff. That was done by various personnel
assigned to the office under a captain.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall the captain's name ?
Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall his name.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall ever having logged out the Van Vliet
report to any other division of G-2 or to any other governmental
agency or department?
Congressman Lantaff. No. It was not logged in because, actually,
the report originated in the office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
and I don't recall ever having logged it out.
JNIr. Mitchell. But the report, even though it originated in General
Bissell's office, if it had left the office, the standard procedure was for
it to be logged out ?
Congressman Lantaff. Not necessarily; no. General Bissell could
have originated a "Top secret" paper and could have taken that paper
to another office or to an authorized recipient, and have left that paper
with that particular individual.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall whether there was one copy, or just
the original, or several copies of this Van Vliet report?
Congressman Lantaff. I only recall an original.
Mr. Mitchell. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Did I understand you to say that this original
report was placed in this safe in Bissell's office ?
Congressman Lx\ntaff. As well as I recall it. I don't recall having
seen this particular report after Colonel Van Vliet reported in to
General Bissell with the report to review it with him and to sign it.
But it could very well have been placed in that particular safe.
Chairman JMadden. Did the other employees in the office, including
those that you named in your testimony, have access to the safe where
the secret files were kept ?
Congressman Lantaff. Those four people had access to all docu-
ments in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, because it was
our function, of course, to work there whenever General Bissell was
there; and General Bissell would be there from early in the morning
until late at night. Many times there would be only one of us there
in the office with him. So, the people that were assigned to his imme-
diate office had the combinations of all the safes.
Chairman Madden. Are there any questions?
Mr. DoNDERo. Can you fix the time, Congressman, when Van Vliet
came into the office to dictate that report ?
Congressman Lantaff. I think it was in the morning, but that is
as well as I remember.
Mr. DoNDERO. 1 mean, the day, the month, and year.
Congressman Lantaff, No, I cannot.
Mr. DoNDEKO. Was it in 1945?
Congressman Lantaff. May of 1945, as well as I recall it.
Mr. Sheehan. Congressman, did I understand you correctly to say
that you did review Van Vliet's report before he signed it.
(/ongi'ossman Lantaff. No. Colonel Van Vliet came into the office
and wanted to see General Bissell. Before I would let him see the
general I wanted to know what he wanted to see him about.
Mr. Sheehan. After he dictated it to Mrs. Meeres, did you see the
report ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1831
Cono^ressnian Lantaff. I don't recall. I believe that I did, but I
don't remember.
Mr. Sheehan. There was something said about his turning over
some notes to you.
Congressman Lantaff. As I recall, I had Mrs. Meeres bring back
her stenographic notes and the portion she transcribed, to me, to put
in the G-2 safe that night.
Mr. Sheehax. But were they put in separate from the original
report, or were they put in with the general's report ?
Congressman Lantaff. That was before the original report was
completed. It is a security measure. I had Mrs. Meeres bring them
back and kept them under our control.
Mr. Sheehan. Congressman, I have another thought. You men-
tioned before they had a system of logging out reports in the office,
and you said it could be possible for General Bissell to take the top-
secret report out of the office, to vour knowledge, over to some other
dej^artment or some other Government agency.
Congressman Lantaff. It would be very possible. I did not say
other Government agencies.
Mr. Sheehan. Or some other department of the Army, say. Well,
let us say that he could take it out of the office, as you understood.
Congressman L\ntaff. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. "Was there anything in the Army regulations that
required him to get a receipt under such a procedure, or could he just
take it out under his own free will ?
Congressman Lantaff. Under the ARCs, the file receipts were,
of course, to be taken for top-secret documents.
Mr. Sheehan. That is what I mean. In other words, if General
Bissell had taken out the report and turned it over to someone else,
he should have a receipt, under Army regulations?
Congressman Lantaff. I think you will find considerable dispute
about that even today in the Department of the Army, as to what
is required with reference to the handling of top-secret documents.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Congressman, when this report came into your di-
vision and General Bissell's, there was pretty good evidence that
here was a case that involved the murder of almost 15,000 Allied
soldiers. Could yoa give us any hint as to what discussion or what
impression that created? Was there any discussion about that
ghastly crime after the report was made, or was it just passed off
as another report?
Congressman Lantaff. I don't know. If there would have been
such, it was beyond the scope of my duties in that office to evaluate it
or to discuss it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I understand.
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman, you were not in any way connected
with the evaluation of intelligence reports or responsible for the
evaluation of intelligence reports in that assignment that you had,
were you ?
Congressman Lantaff. No. I would say that my assignment there
was comparable to that of an administrative assistant in one of our
offices.
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman, were you there during the entire
period of General Bissell's regime as Assistant Chief of Staff for
G-2?
1832 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Congressman Lantaff. No, I was not. I was ordered to duty
there after he had been designated as ACofS. G-2, and I was dis-
charged from the service prior to the time that he was succeeded.
Mr. JNIrrcHELL. In other words, you left before he was relieved
of the responsibility of the G-2 assignment?
Congressman Lantaff. That is correct.
Mr. Mitciip:ll. Thank you, sir. I have no furtlier questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Furcolo.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Wliere was the report physically, the last time you
ever saw it, if you remember who had it and where it was ?
Congressman Lantaff. Congressman Furcolo, it is hard for me to
say for a certainty. As I recall — I am trying to remember what hap-
pened 7 years ago — the last time I saw the report was when it went
in with Colonel Van Vliet to General Bissell's office. If there was
some way I could refresh my memory, it could very well have been
that that report was in the safe there in General Bissell's office. But
I am not certain about it.
Mr. FuRCoi-o. In your best recollection, have you ever seen the repoit
itself since that time?
Congressman Lantaff. No. Since May of 1945 I have not seen it.
Mr. FuRcoLO. In other words, your best recollection would be that
the last time you saw that report physically was in the hands of
Colonel Van Vliet walking into the office of General Bissell?
Congressman Lantaff. As well as I can recall — the reason why I
have some reservation is that I know that I saw the report and read
the report, and I don't recall whether I did it before he took it in, or
afterward.
Mr. Furcolo. Would it be safe to say that the last time you physi-
cally saw that report, it was in the G-2 offices there ?
Congressman Lantaff. Tliat is correct.
Mr. Furcolo. With reference to the notes, the shorthand notes,
where were they the last time that you saw them, if you did see them?
Congressman Lantaff. I don't recall that. With reference to the
notes, Mrs. Meeres can testify better than I can, but I would pi-esume
that they were destroyed.
Mr. Furcolo. And from that time on, your best recollection is that
you have not physically seen the report or the notes ?
Congressman Lantaff. No. There were many documents which
were in possession of the G-2, which were kept m his personal pos-
session.
Mr. Furcolo. At any time, did you ever discuss the report with
General Bissell in any way, or with any superior of yours there?
Congressman Lantaff. No.
Mr. Furcolo. That is all I have.
Cliairman Madden. Congressman Lantati', on behalf of the com-
mittee, we wish to thank you for coming here this morning to testify.
Congressman Lantaff. Is that all ?
Chairman Madden. That is all.
Mrs. Mi hired Meeres.
Mi's. Meeres, will you just stand and be sworn, please?
Do you solenndy swear that in tlie lioaring now being hekl you will
tell the trutli, tlie whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mrs. Meehes. Yes, I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1833
TESTIMONY OF MILDRED MEERES, WASHINGTON, D. C, ACCOM-
PANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY
Chairman Madden. Just state your name to the reporter.
Mrs. Meeres. Mrs. Mildred Meeres.
Chairman Madden. And vour address ?
Mrs. Meeres. 2012 O Street NW, Washington.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. Mi-s. Meeres, how long were you assigned in G-2
of the Army '( Wlien did the period begin, and how long were you
connected with G-2 of the Army 'I
Mrs. Meeres. From 1941 to 1948.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee what your position was
in the Army during 1944 and 1945 in the G-2 division?
Mrs. Meeres. I worked for Captured Personnel and Material. I
was secretary to Col. J. Edward Johnston, who was Chief of the X
section in that division.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you describe to the committee what the X
section's duties were ?
Mrs. Meeres. The X section was a secret committee, and I did
secretarial work along with the secret work that I did for Colonel
Johnston.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, if it was a secret committee, I
think she probably should be excused from any further answers to
that question.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee what connection you
had with the report given by Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., in May
1945 i
Mrs. Meeres. Colonel Van Vliet dictated the repoit to me.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you describe in detail to the committee how
you were selected, where your office was physically located, as con-
nected with General Bissell's office ?
Mrs. Meeres. We were about two corridors down the hall from
General Bissell's office, and it was Captured Personnel and Material,
which has to do with prisoners of war. So General Bissell's office
called to have a girl come up to take a statement from a returning
prisoner of war, and I was asked to go up and take the statement.
Mr. Mitchell. Who did you first see when you went to General
Bissell's office?
Mrs. Meeres. I saw Colonel Lantaff.
Mr. Mitchell. What did Colonel Lantaff say to you?
Mrs. Meeres. He briefed me on security and told me I was to take a
top-secret report.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the connnittee what happened after
you were briefed.
Mrs. Meeres. Then he took me into General Bissell's office and intro-
duced me to Colonel Van Vliet, and then Colonel Van Vliet and Colonel
Lantaff and I went across the hall, and Colonel Lantaff left us there
alone and locked the door and Colonel Van Vliet dictated the state-
ment to me. Then I took the report back to my own office and typed
it up. And then — my memory is a little hazy on it — I believe I took
the report back, and I believe that both General Bissell and Colonel
Van Vliet dictated to me further, in General Bissell's office. But I
1834 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
specifically remember taking the report and a letter up to General
Bissell's office.
But, apparently, I hadn't completed the job, because I remember
locking the papers up, or giving them to Colonel Lantaff to lock in
his safe at night, and got them again the next morning. So I can't
remember exactly whether I finished the report that night, that after-
noon, or the next morning.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. Does the committee desire to ask any questions at
this point?
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. Dondero, Did you make any copies?
Mrs. Meeres. I have been trying to remember. I don't recall mak-
ing any copies, and I don't think I did, because I did it in draft and it
was top secret, and usually a top secret is only one copy, until its final
form.
Chairman Madden. Until what?
Mrs. Meeres. Until it is typed in its final form.
Mr. Dondero. What did you do with your stenographic notes?
Mrs. Meeres. I put them in double envelopes, and all my mistakes
and everything, the paper that had to be destroyed, and returned
everything to Colonel Lantaff when I was finished with the job, the
notes and everything.
Mr. Dondero. To whom did you hand the report after it was
written ?
Mrs. Meeres. I think I handed it to Colonel Lantaff, but I am not
exactly sure, sir, whether I took it into General Bissell's office, or not.
Mr. Dondero. Did you see it after that?
Mrs. Meeres. The report ?
Mr. Dondero. Did you see it?
Mrs. Meeres. No ; I never saw the report after that.
Mr. Dondero. You were not present when it was signed ?
Mrs. Meeres. I don't remember that.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you take any other dictation from either Colonel
Van Vliet or General Bissell, or Colonel Lantaff ?
Mrs. Meeres. From General Bissell, I believe, and Colonel Van
Vliet.
Mr. Mitchell. I show you an exhibit on page 51 of the part 2
hearings of the committee of February 4. There is a letter of the
War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
Washington. Could you identify this letter for the committee, please ?
Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Yes, sir. I believe I typed that memorandum. It
was dictated to me by General Bissell in his office.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that this
letter is the letter that Colonel Van Vliet specifically requested from
General Bissell relative to his keeping silent in connection with the
report he had rendered to G-2. The witness this morning has said
that General Bissell dictated this letter. And also the part 2 of the
hearings held on February 4 will reveal that Colonel Van Vliet him-
self specifically requested such a letter.
Tluit is to clarify the record.
Chairman Madden. On what page of part 2 is that ?
Mr. Mitchell. Page 51.
Mr. FuRcoLo. AAHiat did the witness say that General Bissell
dictated ?
THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1835
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Meeres just stated tliat General Bissell dic-
tated tliis letter to lier.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mrs. Meeres, you typed other top-secret reports, did
you not ?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Was there anything unusual about this particular
report? Was there more furore or was there more of a tendency to
create an impression on you, as to this particular report, that it must be
top secret ? Was it handled with a little more flush and flurry than
any other top-secret report that was made ?
Mrs. ]VIeeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. In other words, it sort of struck you that here was
a report that had great significance because it was impressed upon
you more than any other top-secret report that you typed that this
was something unusual, something different, that really must be top
secret ; was that the impression that you got ?
Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Siieeiiax. Mrs. Meeres, you stated before that in a top-secret
document, you only typed one copy, and you said something about
"until it is typed for final form." AMiat did you mean by "final
form" ?
Mrs. Me:erj!:s. Well, this was a statement that I took verbatim from
Colonel Van Vliet, and usually a statement of that type is corrected
and written in final form after it is corrected.
Mr. Sheeiian. Do you mean that usually your procedure was that
it was corrected, to do it over?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. And in this particular instance you never got it back
to do it over ?
Mrs. Meeres. That is right.
]Mr. Sheehan, And in previous documents that you had typed and
returned to you with corrections, what was the procedure on the
number of copies that you would make ?
Mrs. JSIeeres, It would depend on the report and how many were
needed.
Mr, Sheehan. Did you ever before make a single copy and never
any more ?
Mrs. Meeres, Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. DoNDERO. Whatever became of your stenographic notes? What
was the procedure in the office ?
Mrs, Meeres. On this particular job, I returned my stenographic
notes to Colonel Lantaff. But when I was working in my own office,
we had our own security there, where it was burned by our own security
officer.
Mr. Mitchell, Will you explain to the committee what the secu-
rity procedure was in your office relative to stenographic notes ?
Mrs. Meeres. Well, after our notes were finished, we saved them in
the top-secret safe for a little while in case we would have to refer to
them, and then they were burned. We had a regular procedure for
that. The security officers took care of it.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
1836 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. FuRCOLO. Mrs. Meeres, you said, as I understood you, that after
Colonel Van Vliet had dictated to you, you took the report and a letter
up to General Bissell's office. Did 1 undeistand that correctly i
Mrs. Mei:res. Yes, sir.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Then I understood you to say tliat you did not knt)\v
if it was finished or not. Is that right ?
Mi-s. MiiERES. That is right, sir.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Ordinarily, if any person dictated something to you,
would you, after it had been coin})leted, not show it to that person, or
would the ordinary procedure be to take it to General Bissell ^
Mrs. Meeres. Well, I never did a job just like this before. This was
out of my regular routine. So I took it back to General BisselFs office.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Was Colonel Van Vliet in the office at that time {
Mr. Meeres. Well, that is what I can't remember.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You brought the report physically, the typed report,
to the best of your knowledge, the only copy ; is that right.
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir; to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. FuRCOLo. You brought that sole re})ort to General Bissell's
office ?
Mrs. Meeres. I don't know whether I gave it to Colonel Lantaif and
he brought it in, or whether I brought it in.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Your best recollection is that the last you saw of that
report, where was it?
Mrs. Meeres. I can't recall where it was, because I am not sure
whether I gave it to Colonel Lantaff or
Mr. FuRCOLO. Would youi- best recollection be tiiat the last you saw
of that report, it was either in the hands of CoU)nel Lantatl' or in the
hands of General Bissell?
You see, what we are trying to do is trace this report down as best
we can.
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, I know.
Mr. FuRCOLO. And we do not want any more than your best recol-
lection.
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
I am positive it was in that office. I am positive I left it up there.
Mr. FuRCOEO. Where, and with whom ?
Mrs. Meeres. I gave it to either Colonel Lantatf or Colonel Van
Vliet, or General Bissell.
Mr. FuRCoLo. In other words, you are reasonably certain that the
last you saw of that report, you left it with one of those three men.
Colonel Lantaff, Colonel Van Vliet, or Geneial Bissell?
Mi's. Meeres. Yes, sir; that is right.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Did you evei", at any time from that day to this, see
that I'eport again ^
Mrs. Meeres. No, sir.
Mr. FuRCOLO. With reference to yom- note-:, 1 nnderstood you to
say that your best recollection is tliat you U'ft those with Colonel
Lantaff or someone there; is that right?
Mrs. Meeres. That is right.
Mr. PuRCOLO. At the present time are you emi)Ioyed by any de-
I)ai-tment or agency of the United States Government^
Mi-s. Meeres. Yes, sir; I am; the Interior Department.
Mr. FuRcoLO. I just want to ask you one moie question.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1837
I jiatlier from your testimony tliat apparently this was the first
time yon had been ca-lled in for a job or some work for General Bis-
sell, or that office.
Mi-s. Meeees. Yes, sir.
Mr. FuRCOEO. Was there any reason for that, that yon know of '^
Mrs. Meeres. The only reason was that we v.ere the prisoner of
war branch, and it had to do with onr branch. We handled all the
woi-k in connection with ])risoners of war.
Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, do I understand that Colonel Van
Vliet Avas retnrnino; as a former prisoner of war ^
Mrs. Meeres. That is what I understood at the time.
Mr. Furc'Olo. Let me ask you this questioii : Assuming that Colonel
Van Vliet did return as a jn-isoner of war, would there be anything
umisual about your de})artment's handling it rather than some otlier
de[)artment '.
^Irs. Meeres. I believe that usually our department would have
handled it, except that he went to General Bissell instead.
Mr. FuRcoLO. I think you partially answered this in answer to a
question of Congressman O'Konski, but I would be interested in get-
ting your general opinion as to whether there was anything at all
about this case, right from the very begining, that impressed itself
upon your mind as being handled any differently than the ordinary
to]>-secret case Avould be handled ^
Mrs. Meeres. Xo, sir. I don't think it was handled any differ-
ently, except that I was the one to do it. I wouldn't ordinaiily do
a job for treneral Bissell.
Mr. FuRroLo. This connnittee is extremely interested and we in-
tend to track down, of course, an}- evidence that there may be indicat-
ing that there was some sort of a cover-up or a hushing up of any facts
in connection with this entire case. xVre you aware, in any way at all,
of any acts or statements on the part of anyone to try and cover up
or hush n]> something in connection M-ith this^
Mrs. ]\Ieeres. Xo, sir. In fact, evei- since the investigation, I have
Ijeen told to tell evei'vthing I can remember about the report. The
only thing tliat was top secret was the content of the report, at the
time.
Mr. FuRcoLO. That is all.
Chainnan Madde'x. Do you have any questions, Mr. ISIachrowicz ?
Mr. Maciiroavicz. Yes, sir.
I believe you said you had been working for the G-2 since 1941?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Maciirowicz. And you were working in a secret section of
that G-2?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. MAt'iiowicz. Had you taken quite a number of secret reports
prior to tliis one '\
]Mrs. Meeres. I took several.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were you briefed before you went upon your
duties, as to the security precautions?
Mrs. Meeres. Well,_ in that particular division, they are very
security-conscious. We Avere constantly being told and briefed, but
not for a particular job like that, because
Mr. Maciirowicz. Xot for the particular job?
93744— 52— pt. 7 2
183S THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Were you always briefed particularly before every secret report
that you took ?
Mrs, Meekes. No, sir.
Mr. Maciirowicz. You were not?
Mrs. Meekes. Ko.
Mr. Machrowicz. In this case, I believe a'Ou testified that you were
briefed specially ?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir,
Mr. Machrowicz. Did that impress upon you the particular im-
portance given to these reports, as compared to the others in which you
were never briefed separately ?
Mrs. Meeres, No, sir, I didn't think much of that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were there any special security precautions given
to you on this report that were not given to you in the others?
Mrs, Meeres, No. It was just the same as the others.
Mr. Machrow^icz. But this is the only report that you know of,
from the time you were in the G-2, where you were given special,
particular security precautions?
Mrs. Meeres. For a particular job.
Mr. Machrowicz. This is the only particular job in the course of
your experience at G-2 where you were given the special, particular
precautions?
Mrs. Meeres, No.
May I take that back, sir, because I told you I worked with the X
section, and I did some jobs there also that I was specially briefed on.
I just forgot. You just recalled it to my mind,
Mr, MACIIR0w^cz. Can you recall any special precautions that were
given to you in this case that were not given in other cases?
Mrs. Meeres. No, sir; I can't.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Mr. DoNDERO, When you returned your stenographic notes, were
they in the form of the ordinary stenographer's notebook?
Mrs, Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. DoNDERo. And you simply handed the book over?
Mrs, Meeres, I believe I tore my notes out of the book.
Mr. Dondero. And then they were put into an envelope?
Mrs. Meeres. I put them in a double envelope.
Mr. DoNDERO. They were put in an envelope?
Mrs. Meeres. That is right.
Mr. Dondero. Did you ever see those notes again?
Mrs. Meeres. No, sir.
Mr. DoNDERO, Do you know what was done with them ?
Mrs, Meeres. I assume that they w^ere burned ; but I don't know.
Mr. Dondero. Was that the procedure?
Mrs. Meeres. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dondero. To burn the notes?
Mrs. Meeres, Yes, sir,
Cliairman Madden. Are there any further questions? Mrs. Meeres,
on behalf of the committee, I thank you for coming here to testify.
Mivs. Meeres. Thank you.
Chairman Madden, Major General Bissell.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1839
General Bissell, do you solemnly swear that in the hearing- now
being held you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God ?
General Bissell. I do.
TESTIMONY OF CLAYTON L. BISSELL, MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
(RETIRED), ACCOMPANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Chairman Madden. Just state your full name to the reporter,
General.
General Bissell. ISIaj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, Air Force, United
States, retired.
Chairman AIaddeint. And your present address?
General Bissell. Signal Mountain, Tenn. ; 102 River Point Road.
Chairman JNIadden. Will counsel proceed?
General Bissell. With your permission, I would like to hand you
two letters at this time. I am handing the counsel two letters at
this time because I think I should do it at this moment. You judge
whether you want them, or not.
Chairman Madden. Yes.
I have here a letter dated May 21, 1952, written by Clayton L.
Bissell, major general, USAF, retired, to the Chief of Staff, United
States Air Force.
Will you have the reporter mark it "Exhibit 2" ?
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 2" and made a
part of the record as follows :)
Exhibit 2
Signal Mountain, Tenn., May 21, 1952.
Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.
Through : Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
Subject : Testimony for Select Committee of the House Investigating Katyn
Massacre.
The United Press about May 16, 1952, stated that Chairman Roy J. Madden
of the select committee of the House currently investigating the Katyn massacre
announced that I would be the first witness l)efore the committee on June 3,
1052, at a public hearing in Washington.
I will be very glad to cooperate fully with the committee. Published reports
of the committee hearings indicate that not only the Katyn matter itself but
matters directly or indirectly related to Katyn may become the subject of ques-
tioning. There are many asi^ects of the matter that, as of the date of my retire-
ment, were still classified. Since my separation from the service, I have had no
means of knowing which, if any, of these matters have been declassified.
Written instructions are requested as to what matters I may and may not
testify about in connection with the Katyn affair, and what action it is desired
I should take in answering questions relating to State or Defense Department
material the classification of which I am no longer aware.
If called, and the committee follows its usual procedure, it is expected they
will ask me if I have received any instructions from National Defense or other
sources as to what I should or should not testify. If such a question is asked,
and there is no olijection, I should like to lay liefore the committee a copy of this
letter and its reply. If no instructions are received, I will have no alternative
1840 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
but to lay this letter before the committee and so state, thereafter, answeriiifx
auy questions asked without regard to security classification of material of
which I naturally cannot now be aware.
Clayton L. Bisseix,
Major General, USAF (Retired).
A certified true copy :
Frederic H. Miller, Jr.,
Colonel, USAF.
Chairman Madden. I have liere a letter headed "Memorandum foi-
Chiyton L. Bissell, major general, USAF (retired)'' written by Roger
Kent, general counsel for Charles A. Coolidge, in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. This letter is dated June 2, 1952, and is in
answer to the letter set out as exhibit 2.
Will you have the reporter mark this '"Exhibit 3" ?
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 3*' and made a
part of the record as follows:)
Exhibit 3
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D. C, June 2, 1952.
Memorandum for Clayton L. Bissell, major general, USAF (retired).
Subject: Testimony for Select Committee of the House Investigating Katyn
Massacre.
In answer to your memorandum of May 21, 1952, to the Secretary of Defense,
I can advise you, after consultation with the Department of State, that neither
the Department of State nor the Department of Defense knows of any matters
connected with the Katyn massacre which now need to remain classified. These
Departments, therefore, know of no reason why you should not testify freely as
to all matters connected with the Katyn affair. In doing so, you should not
disclose sources of intelligence which from your general experience you will
realize would thereby be jeopardized.
Testimony concerning official matters not connected with the Katyn massacre,
the curreut'security classification of which you may not be aware, will be with-
held pending determination of its current classification status.
Roger Kent,
General Counsel for Cliarlen A. Coolidge.
Chairman Madden. Proceed, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. MrrcnELL. Genei-al. where were you born?
General Bissell. In Kane, Pa.
Mr. MrrniELL. When were vou born?
General Bissell. July 29, 1896.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee your educational back-
gi'oun.d, j)lease i
(ienoral Bissell. liegulai' grammar school, high school, law school.
Mr. MrrciiELL. Where did you go to grannnar school and high
scliool ?
(jeneral Bissell. (ii-annnar school in Kane, Pa., and liiuh scliool in
Kane, Pa., ami Glean, N. Y.
]Mr. INIrrcjiELL. Where did you go to law school?
General Blssell. Vali)ai'aiso TTniversity, Indiana.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you attend the United States Military Academy ?
(Joneral I^lssell. I never attended Military Academy.
Mr. MrrciiELL. What did you do after law school ?
(leneral Bissell. 1 left law school j)i'ior to graduation, a few months
before graduation, to enter the first ollicers training camp.
Mr. AlrrciiELL. AA'hen was this?
General Bissell. 1917, very early.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1841
Mr. Mitchell,. Were you later admitted to the bar of Indiana ?
General Bissell. I was.
I was criticized for leavino: the school without finishino; the course
so close to the end, but my pjrades were ^rood and they asked me to
come back and receive my diplonla in uniform.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you receive your diploma?
General Bissell. I did, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. When?
General Bissell. At the orraduation of the class in lOlT.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you admitted to the bar of Indiana?
General Bissell. That is rig-ht, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. ^Y[\en ?
General Bissell. I couldn't give you the date because I was back
in training camp, but it went through the usual procedure. It would
have occurred sometime during the next few months after that, the
papers being completed and my admission certified.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you discharged from the xVrmy after your
service in World War I ?
General Bissell. I stayed on until the 1020 Reorganization Act
went into etfect, and at that time left the service for a brief period
and went to work for the Galludet Aircraft Corp., then located in
Connecticut.
]Mr. Mitchell. What date was that approximately ?
General Bissell. Sometime in the summer of 1920, probably the
date that the law became effective, which was sometime in June, as I
recall, 1920; probably June 30 at the end of the fiscal year, would
have been the most normal period.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you return to Army service ?
General Bissell. Sometime late that fall. I had met General
Mitchell by coincidence in New York, and he asked me to come back
and do a specific job.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you an aviator in World War I ?
General Bissell. I was an aviator in World War I on the British
front, as a fighter pilot, for about 51^ months.
Mr. Mitchell. You stated to the committee that you returned to
military service approximately the fall of 1920; is that right?
General Bissell. I was out just a few montlis. and I think it was
either the fall of 1920 or just after the first of the new year. I think
I met General Mitchell at the Armistice Day dinner in Xew York,
and he wanted me to come back and do a certain job, and I did go back.
Mr. Mitchell. On this next question you may refer to notes if
you would like to.
Could you tell the committee the various assignments you have had
from 1920 until September 1, 1939? What was your rank in the fall
of 1920?
General Bissell. I was a captain at the time I left the service. I
had been recommended for a majority, but the promotions were
frozen at a certain period when the winning of the war was certain.
There was no use commissioning additional officers. Under the re-
organization, not being a West Pointer, I would have had to accept
a first lieutenancy. I did not want to do that because I did not see
that it was in the national interest at that time. I didn't think I knew
1S42 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
enough of the military. I knew enougli of the civilian side to go into,
that.
After I came back in the service, the job that I was brought in for
was to assist in the setting up of a school that became known as the
Air Service Field Officers' School, subsequently the Air Corps Field
Officers' School, now the Air War College.
No such thing had ever existed. I had recommended it prior to my
separation from the service ; and General Mitchell, following through,
wanted me to come back and assist in getting it going. The purpose
of it was to give those considerable number of Regular officers who
did not get overseas because of their training — they were kept over
here; that is, training others, the West Pointers — they had missed
the combat side of the war and it seemed to me that a school was the
only opportunity to pass it on to them while the information was fresh.
I went to Langley Field for that purpose.
Mr. Mitchell. How long were you there ?
General Bissell. I was connected with that school, with short
breaks, a good deal of time. I started in, I think, in 1920 or early
1921. I w^as with it through the formation period of the school.
I was then selected by General Mitchell as an aide to go to Euro])t'
and visit all European countries, testing and examining aircraft. Wf
visited most of the countries of Europe that had any air forces. Our
relationship became very close during that period ; and when I got
back — shortly after that — I was ordered away from the school and
imade his aide and was his aide for the following 4 years, and also
as a direct assistant as Assistant Chief, Army Air Service, as it was
called in those days.
Mr. Mitchell. When was your first assignment in the Army in con-
nection with Military Intelligence?
General Bissell. When I returned from World War II, after 2
years in India with Stilwell.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any Military Intelligence background
at any period of time from 1917 until your return from StilwelT-
theater ?
General Bissell. Yes; a rather considerable amount.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee about it?
General Bissell. Before setting up this school, it was necessary to
determine what the courses should be; and, naturally, there had to be
Intelligence in it. My specialty was operations. I didn't deal much
with Intelligence, but I knew the relationship of Intelligence to Oper-
ations, and learned more as the years passed.
When I left the Air Corps school, I attended Leavenworth, where
there was a 2-year course. There was a considerable amount of em-
phasis on Intelligence. And I believe Colonel Van Vliet's father
taught the class out there. I am not sure of that.
Mr. Mitchell. But you yourself never had a specific assignment
in the capacity as Military Intelligence officer until your assignment
after that with General Stilwell ?
General Btssef.l. Yes: I did. I had one in Air Force immediately
after my return, with the idea of expanding and reorganizing the
Air Corps Intelligence. It was the Air Corps Intelligence at that
time.
Mr. Mitchell. When you say "Air Corps Intelligence," at that
time
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1843
General Bissell. It is Air Force Intelligence now.
Mr. MrrcHELL (contiiuiing). It was then part of the Department
of the Army ?
General Bissell. That is correct, part of the Department of the
Army.
Mr. Mitchell. When was that assignment?
General Bissell. I left India on the 1st day of September, with
instructions to visit various fronts.
Mr. Mitchell. What year 'i
General Bissell. 1943.
And after visiting various fronts and England, I arrived back here,
and probably within 30 days took over the duties as A-2, it was called,
or Air-2 section of the staff, under General Arnold.
Now, you understand, I had Intelligence oflicers working under me,
numerous ones, in India, where I commanded the Tenth Air Force
and all American aviation for a considerable period, as well as initiat-
ing the first work on crossing the Hump. I had been with the Chinese
theater in charge at StilwelPs headquarters during the time he was
cut off in Burma, and I knew much of intelligence from the practical
user's end, and I had a little of the school or academic background on
the Intelligence side.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the exact date on which you took over
the position to which you have referred, in A-2 ?
General Bissell. I would have to refer to orders. But I would
say within 30 to 45 days after my departure from India, which was
on the 1st of September .1943.
Mr. Mitchell, You say "30 or 45 days." That would make it
approximately October 15, 1943; would it?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you become Assistant Chief of Staff for
G-2, or was there any assignment in between this A-2 assignment
and your assignment as Assistant Chief of Staff?
General Bissell. No. It was effective, I think, by order on 5 or
4 January 1944. The thing that led up to it was that I had worked
under General Strong, my G-2 predecessor. When he was head of
the Ai-my War Plans Division, I handled the Air Force plans in
that office at that time.
Mr. ]\Iitciiell. Who is General Strong?
General Bissell. Gen. G. V. Strong, deceased, my predecessor in
G-2 and a former head of the War Plans Division, the War Depart-
ment General Staff.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you are telling the committee that you as-
sumed the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Chief of Staff
of G-2 on the 4th of January 1944 ; is that correct ?
General Bissell, Yes; I think that is correct. I would have to
verify it if I have gone wrong, but I don't think I have. I left India
in 1943 in September, and the following January the order came out,
I would like to make that clear, because I think you want some-
thing— and I know what it is — but I would like to cover the whole
field,
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record show
that I have never talked to General Bissell, and I don't believe any
member of the committee has talked to him before.
General Bissell. That is correct.
1844 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. I have never asked him a question before this par-
ticular time.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
General Bissell. The reas(m for my interrpution — and I want to
apologize — is not any implication whatever, except that I am trying
to give you everything-, and we are moving rapidly over a lot of
territory.
General Strong was ill. I was in the A-2 receiving a considerable
amount of Intelligence through G-2.
Chairman Madden. What time are you referring to now?
General Bissell. Between the period I returned from India, in
1943, and the time I took over as head of G-2, in January 1944.
In that period I was convinced we w^ould never get, during the war,
an effective Intelligence organization in Air Forces. It started too
late; it did not have sufficient experienced personnel in Intelligence,
and it wasn't going to work too well, and it was going to be very costly
and we would get a good set-up, but the wnir Avould be over by the
time we got it. So I told General Arnold exactly how I felt about
it and told him I thought a better working arrangement could be made
with G-2 whereby we w^ould send Air Force officers down there in some
numbers and they would specialize on the Air Force end of it and we
wouldn't have to.
He took that thought to General Marshall. General Marshall had
some contacts w^ith General Strong. I think I made the suggestion
on a Saturday morning. I think that afternoon I was informed that
I would be the next G-2 and go see General Strong. I think physi-
cally I took over G-2 the next Monday morning because of General
Strong's condition and that he promptly went to the hospital at
Walter Reed.
That was not wdiat I had originally intended at all. I had no
thought of any such thing and expected to go back to o[)erations, which
was my specialty.
The order confirming me in G-2, I think, is dated January, but I
think I actually went to work there nearly a month earlier, because
I don't think General Strong was I'elieved until they had given him
a thorough check at Walter Keed and determined it was not expedient
to send him back to G-2. His physical condition Avould not stand it.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your rank at that time, (jeneral^
General Bissell. Major general.
Mr. Mitchell. You stated that from the time you left the Chiiui-
Burma-lndia theater you made several visits to other stations. Could
you briefly sketch for the connnittee some of those visits, because it
covered the period
Mr. Mac^likowicz. Just a minute, if you will pardon me.
Mr. Chairman, I understand some of the committee have unavoid-
able appointuients this afternoon. AVe probably have other matters to
discuss. I think we should leave Buruia to some other investigation.
Let us get to the Katyn matter. I do not think it is particidarly
importaut to us whiit his other assiguments were.
Mr. MrrciiKLL. Katyn happened in April 194;), it was disclosed, and
he evidently came from the Near Fast area.
('hairinan Madden. Does this have some connection with Katyn?
Mr. Mttciiell. Yes, sir; my line of questions has.
I will make the qtu^stions more direct if the connnittee so desire.s.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1845
In April 1943, the Katyn affair was disclosed to the world by the
Germans. The general left the China-Burma-India theater. I be-
lieve, on September 1, 1943. The Katyn alfair had become known to
the world then. I do not know how the general returned to the
States, but lie did state here this morning that he came through certain
areas. I vvould like to have him now tell the committee if he had
heard about the Katyn affair, at what stations. Colonel Szymanski
was militaiy attache in Cairo, Egypt, at the time.
Chairman Maddex. Proceed.
General Bissell. I flew from India, departing from Karachi, in an
airplane which was furnished to me to proceed as far as Casablanca.
I was directed to proceed by the usual transport route to Cairo, with
some diversions authorized to see strategic points en route. I landed
at Cairo and had a few days there.
I knew something of Katyn while on duty in India and loaned
Polish-speaking personnel in my command for use of the British in
India. There they had families, I think, of some of the Polish
Army housed somewhere outside of Karachi under pretty terrible con-
ditions. It was nobody's fault; just there they were. Food was
scarce in India; Englishmen were scarce, and English, Indian, or
American people Avho spoke any Polish were still more scarce. So,
w^e were very glad to help. It was a tricky thing to do. It was not
my job to take care of Polish refugees but to fight the Japanese. But
I felt that the small number of Polish people we had who could be
of assistance wouldn't hurt us and could be of great assistance. So
that was done.
I knew where they were camped and saw it from the air. While I
don't recall it too much in detail, I remember talking to one or two
of my people who were there, and they painted a picture of distress
and privation and poverty and suffering and broken families and
lives and lack of homes and everythino; that was pathetic. They
didn't know where they were going. They were worn out, and the
Britisli couldn't move them any farther because they couldn't then
stand more travel.
Yes; I knew something of Katj-n, but not the detail probably that
was available in America, because our messages were pretty short.
I had heaid of it.
, When I got to Egypt, I was much more concerned with the Poleski
operation, which had just been finished. It was one of the brilliant
Air Force operations of the war. I was very much concerned with
lend-lease and supply arrangements because we in India were sup-
posed to get certain supplies to that theater, I wanted to help Stilwell
every way I could.
Mr. MricHELL. Did you see Colonel Szymanski while you were in
Cairo?
General Bissell. I saw a lot of people in Cairo. I could have seen
him. I liave no recollection of him. While I have heard his name,
I have never met the man to remember who he was. I may have met
him in Cairo. He would be the best judge of that. He would remem-
ber me much better than I would remember him, because there were
not many Air Force people passing through there who had been much
interested in Intelligence, and I w^as.
1848 THE katyjst forest massacre
Mr. MiTciiKi.L. You are now tellin<i- tlie comniittee tlmt you had uo
specific discussions in Cairo with anyone in direct connection with
the Katyn affair?
General Bissell, Only that I knew from discussions at headquar-
ters there that there were Poles in that area and that formation of a
Polish Army was progressing — not too rapidly, but progressing — and
that problems of every nature Avere involved.
Mr. Mitchell. The problems of the forming of the Polish Army
had no connection with the Katyn affair.
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Mitchell. What I would like to know is this : You had no
discussions at all with anyone at the headquarters at Cairo relative
to Katyn ; is that correct?
General Bissell, Not specifically.
Mr. Mitchell. You do not recall anyone?
General Bissell. No, sir; not to my recollection. It could have
happened, but I don't tliink so.
Mr. Mitchell. You have just stated to the committee that you
assumed the position of Assistant Chief of Staff as a major general
for G-2 on or about the 4th of Januar}^ 1944. Will you now relate
to the committee what happened when a Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet,
Jr., was brought to your office in May 1945?
General Bissell. Yes.
I was told, probably on Monday, the 21st of May, that Colonel
Van Vliet wished to see me but that, for some reason, probably be-
cause of my schedule that day, he was not set up for that day. I had
a hearing up here, I think, in this House, with some connnitt«e, at
about that time, and I was preparing for that, and there were many
urgent things. I had been away from the 16th, the day before
Colonel Van Vliet arrived in W^ashington, and was away on official
business until the Sunday, which would have been the 20th, as I re-
call, when I returned dead-tired from a very long, hard trip.
I used Monday on very urgent things that had piled up during my
absence, and on Tuesday I saw Colonel Van Vliet. I cannot tell you
who brouglit him into my office. I lieard Colonel Lantaff's state-
ment. He could well have done it. It would have been normal.
I have prepared some notes which will give in a little more chrono-
logical order what happened after Colonel Van Vliet came in. I will
talk from them, if you wish, or I will talk in answer to your questions
as you present thenu
Chairman Madden. If you care to refer to your notes, that is sat-
isfactory.
General Bissell. I think it will be quicker.
(chairman Madden. That is all right.
General Bissell. If I digress or conunent on things that you are not
interested in, please sto]) me, because I don't want to take the com-
mittee's time unnecessarily.
Mr. FuiKOLO. Before you start: When did you prepare those notes?
(Jeneral Bissell. I have been working on them since I heard I was
to come u]) here, to get the IhiuLTs down so I would get the chronology
of the. (hing and arranged the details that way.
Mr. Fi KcoLo. in other words, these are not notes that you pre-
pared then?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1847
General Bissell. Xo; only penciled notes bein*^ revised from day
to day and as I recall things.
Mr. FuRCOLo. They are not notes made at that time?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. FtTJCOLO. They are notes you made in the last 2 or 3 weeks?
General Bissell. Some of them were made a little earlier than
that. All were prepared since your committee was formed. There
was no part prepared pi'ior to that time that is in those notes at all.
You are interested in 1945. I have it right here. I think it will
be quicker to read it.
Colonel Van Vliet, who had been liberated from a German prisoner-
of-war camp south of Berlin when it was overrun by the Russians,
reached the American lines about May 5, 1945. He reported to me
in Washington on May 22, 1945. In my office, with only Colonel
Van Vliet and myself ])resent, he told me the story of the POW
visit — that is, prisoner-of-war visit — to Katyn. Although he showed
the effects of his years of imprisonment less than many officers, he
was tired, tense, and thin. Nevertheless, he told the story of the
assembly of the American-British prisoner-of-war group and of the
visit to Kaytan in such a calm, direct, and conservative manner that
there was iio doubt in my mind that he was telling the truth about
these events exactly as he remembered what had occurred 2 years
earlier.
As was to be expected in such a case, a few of his oral statements
conveyed a somewhat different meaning after a few questions were
askecf than as origiPxally made. This is not the slightest implica-
tion he was not completely honest and straightforward. It was prob-
ably because he had lived with the story and his reaction to the
unpleasant experiences so long that he assumed more background
detail was known to me than actually was the case.
As I recall, this interview lasted about half an hour. Very early
in his interview I realized Colonel Van Vliet must be given an oppor-
tunity to put his report in writing in a way that would be easiest for
him and that he should be afforded an opportunity to make such cor-
rections, additions, or deletions as he considered essential for com-
plete accuracy. I so informed him near the end of our first conference.
With Colonel Van Vliet's complete agreement, I arranged at once
for a Mi-s. Mildred Meeres, a competent, experienced and trustworthy
secretary, to take his dictation and type his report. I also arranged
for a private security room where they could work undisturbed, to
be at Colonel Van Vliet's disposal. Either with Colonel Van Vliet
present oi' i)iomptly after my first conference with Colonel Van Vliet,
I insured that ^Irs. Meeres knew the security classification of her
work, would be available exclusively to Colonel Van Vliet, and would
receive no instructions from anyone that would conflict with these
arrangements.
Thereaftel^ the preparation of the report was handled entirely by
Colonel Van Vliet without suggestion or influence by me or by anyone
else.
I then have a reference here in my notes which I think will not fit
here. I talked to someone in State at that point.
Do you want it as it came ?
Mr. Maciirowicz. Do you mean you talked to someone in the State
Department ?
1848 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. Yes. On May 23 I talked to Mr. Fred Lyon,
of the State Department, about another matter in the State Depart-
ment's interest. G-2 works in very close cooperation with the State
Deparment on all matters of joint interest.
General Holmes and Mr. Lyon were my closest State Department
contact at this particular time. I am not positive, but it is my
impression that on May 23, 1945, I told Mr. Lyon of Colonel Van
Vliet's arrival, that the Colonel Van Vliet report was being pre-
pared, and that I requested Mr. Lyon to inform General Holmes,
and assured General Holmes he would receive the report promptly.
Mr. Machrowicz. Pardon me, but could you tell the committee who
General Holmes was, what his position was 'i
General Bissicll. General Holmes, you will have him identified
very accurately on the letter that I wrote him, which describes his
position by its exact name. But he went over there to head the
Intelligence of the State Department, and then they gave him other
jobs, and he became an Assistant Secretary. I think he probably
was one at that moment, but I am not sure just when his appointment
came through.
Mr. Machrowicz. What is his first name ?
General Bissfxl. Julius.
He had been a general with General Eisenhower. "\^Tien I went over
to England, I met him there.
I may have passed the information direct to General Holmes on
the 24th of May 1945, when I had one or two conversations with
General Holmes. But 7 years have passed since the occurrence of
these events, and I cannot say with certainty which procedure I used
to inform General Holmes. I feel certain I took the steps to inform
him.
I understand General Holmes has denied any recollection of the
Van Vliet report. It would be quite understandable. The volume
and pressure of work in General Holmes' State Department office had
greatly increased by the ending of the German war a very short time
before that and no man in his position could be expected to remember
everything that passed through his office. It is possible that the
matter slip])ed Mr. Lyon's mind and that General Holmes was not
informed. Mr. Lyon was also yjushed to the limit in those days.
I have known both General Holmes and Mr. Lyon over a period of
years and am confident they are both loyal, honest, and able Americans.
In my opinion, any implication that either of them would knowingly
take any action inimical to the United States interests to assist com-
munism or Russia is absurd.
The Alger Hiss-Chambers incident makes it appear Ihat classified
papers considered of interest to (he Conuuunists could and did leave
the State Department without authority, record, or knowledge of
res])onsible State Department authoritu^s. Disappearance of the
Colonel Van Vliet report would have been of interest to.the Russians
Avhether or not thev were responsible for the K-.ityn killings. As far
as I know, the State Department has made no statement that Colonel
Van Vliet's report was ever received, but only that G-2 had no receipt
from the Stale Department for it.
I am not fully informed ou State Dei)artment actions in this respect
because there is lots going on that I don't know anvthino- about.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1849
When Colonel Van Vliet's report was completed, he a<»;ain came to
my office. He assured me that he had read over his report carefully
and that he was satisfied that it represented, to the best of his recol-
lection, what he knew of the Katyn matter and his connection witli it.
With Colonel Van Vliet seated in a comfortable chair in my office,
I read Colonel Van Vliet's completed report. It was a good report,
which I thought presented the picture more clearly than his previous
oral report. Colonel Van Vliet's typed report did not differ in any
fundamental, however, from the previous story told to me.
I directed the report be classified top secret. Colonel Van Vliet
signed it, and it was authenticated by him so that no substitution of
pages would be possible.
Mr. FuRCOLO. By "authenticate," do you mean he initialed it?
General Bissei.l. Initialed every page with his own initials. There
is nothing unusual about that. That is prescribed in the regidations
some place. It is routine.
But he hadn't done it, and I understood why he was a prisoner of
war. He wasn't very fresh on his regulations, and I saw to it that he
went through that procedure. I remember him initialing the pages.
The classification "top secret" had been authorized by the United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 11)44 for use in the United
States Armed Forces. It became effective March 15, 1944, while I
was in G-2.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Do you have a definition of that phrase, "top
secret" ?
General Bissell. Yes. It is in the Army regulations.
Mr. Mitchell. Is it the same one in existence today ?
General Bissell. I will show you a copy of the one in effect, then, if
I may, if you will just make a note and have me come back to it.
Mr. IVIiTCHELL. Surely.
General Bissell. It was more than a year after Colonel Van Vliet
was captured by the Germans in Tunisia, in February 1943, before the
United States Armed Forces used the top secret classification for
American military material or documents.
After his liberation from POW camp. Colonel Van Vliet had been
returned to the United States with dispatch. I was not certain he
understood the top secret classification in its accepted sense in our
service, due to lack of opportunity for much, if any, experience in its
use. As he had been cut off from much information for 2 years in a
prisoner-of-war camp, I could not expect him to know the possible
political significance of his report, even though he recognizee! it had
political implications and was of State Department as well as War
Department interest.
It is my recollection that at our first contact, Colonel Van Vliet
asked me what he should do if questioned about Katyn, and I told
him to say nothing, that I considered the matter very important and
top secret.
I cannot recall exactly when or to whom I dictated my memorandum
to Colonel Van Vliet. I have heard the testimony of INIrs. Meeres. I
wish the committee would see if your copy has on it a number 920. If
so, it was done in her section ; if not, I would be interested to know.
You will find that papers done by her bear the number 920.
Mr. Mitchell. It is 907.
1853 THE KATYN FOREST RL\SSACRE
General Bissell. Someone else wrote it, or someone else (•0})ie(l it,,
or somethin«T.
JVIr. Mitchell. It is an exhibit on pn^e 51 of tlie i)art 2 hearings.
General Bissell. Her work was 020, if my memory serves me cor-
rectly. I am sure she is mixing something up, and I wnll be glad to
answer your questions on that, if you want it, and I am sure it was
inadvertent on her part.
I cannot now recall exactly when or to whom I dictated my memo-
randum to Colonel Van Vliet. It was not dictated before our first
conference. It was probably dictated after our conference as it bears
the date of May 22, 1945. It could have been ty])ed on the 28d and
still bear the date of May 22, 1945, as it was to confirm verbal orders of
that date and to be binding therefrom.
I believe either that I dictated this memo in Colonel Van Vliet's
presence or asked if he suggested any changes before he signed it,
because my recollection is clear that Colonel Van Vliet was entirely
satisfied and happy about the memorandum.
For the various reasons I have stated, it appeared to me proper,
prudent, and expedient to furnish Colonel Van Vliet with the brief
memorandum i-eferring to his report in language that would be clear
and specific to him but meaningless to anyone into whose hands it
might fall inadvertenth'. The memo sets forth the restrictions im-
posed on Colonel Van Vliet for the security of the information con-
tained in his report. It also stated clearly the procedure to be fol-
lowed subsequently should he desire to have the restriction removed.
The reason for imposing the restriction was included.
After reading the memorandum and indicating he understood it, he-
signed the memorandum to make his understanding a matter of record.
He has complied with the letter and spirit of his instructions.
Also, I may ])ossibly have been infiiienced to be particularly careful
with the security of the Colonel Van Vliet report by the fact that at
that time I was pre])aring for testimony before the House Military
Affairs Conunittee investigating subversive activities within the Arnnv
before Avhich 1 a})peai-ed on the moi'ning of ^lay 24, 1945. Also, at
that time, United States security agencies were threatened with Bi
security leak on anotlier unrelated matter which was important. I
do not know how many copies, if any, other than the original, were
made of the Colonel Van Vliet report. Mrs. Meeres, who typed the-
report, informed me in 1950 she did not know^ positively, but she
believed she had made only an original. I hope that you will
secure — well, you have done it — her first-hand statement.
I didn't know whether you would have her come. If you hadn't,.
I would Avant you to.
She gave her reasons for believing she made oidy an original. Since-
you didn't ask her why, I will tell you what reasons she gave me..
She said if she had made copies she would have remembered putting
carbons in the envelo])e for destruction, because carbons for top-
secret things had to be desti'oyed as well as stenographer's notes, and
she said she had no such recollection.
Mr. Mitchell. You say that was in 1950. On what occasion was-
it that you were talking about that? You were retired then, were
you not^
(ieneral liissELL. I had not tlicn vet retired. I was assisting
Mr. Shackelfoi-d.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1851
I can give that to you in detail, if you like. I have notes on that,
on whom I contacted and why 1 saw Mrs. Meeres and what I said
and more of it.
Mr. Mitchell. We can come back to that later, unless the com-
mittee decides otherwise.
(Tcneral Bisseli.. All right ; any time you want to break in, go ahead.
She gave me her reasons for believing why she made only an
original. And there were several other reasons. She said she didn't
remember that her hands got dirty on the job, and they would have
if she had been handling carbons. That was one of the reasons the
original came out so clean, that she never corrected any carbons, and
some very minor corrections were made by Colonel Van Vliet on the
report — made, as I recall, in ink and initialed. Those, of course,
would have to be made on the carbons had there been any.
Mr. FuRCOLO. When did she tell you these things?
General Bissell. She told me those in 1950 when I was assisting
Mr. Shackelford, trying to help him get in touch with everybody who
might know anything about the Van Vliet re])ort.
And those were repeated in his office, as I recall. They were told
to me upstairs when I contacted her. I saw her in the section she was
then working and then recommended to Mr. Shackelford that she
appear at his office, whicli she did. I sat in when he questioned her.
Chairman Maddex. We can come back to that later, if you will
complete your statement.
General Bissell. Right, sir.
Normally at least one copy, plus the original, would have been
made of a report. There were good reasons why, in this case, this
might not have been done.
My recollection is that Colonel Van Vliet's report was dated May 24,
1945, and that it was on May 23 or 24, 1945, when he submitted it and
when I last saw hiuL 1 know I saw Mrs. Meeres about the report
and a directly related matter on the afternoon of May 24, 1945. My
recollection is that Mrs. Meeres was in my office for part of the time
Colonel Van Vliet was w^ith me for our second conference.
i\ly normal procedure would have been to afford an opportunity
for Colonel Van Vliet to speak to me alone if he wished and subse-
quently have a secretary present for the period slie might be needed.
Then I have a paragraph : Capt. Donald B. Stewart, a Regular
Army Artillery officer, did not report to me in person or make any
report to me on his ]^artici]:)ation in the ])risoner-of-war visit to Katvn
with Colonel Van Vliet. I did not direct Captain Stewart to make
a written report. Colonel Van Vliet's reiiort covered the part taken
by Captain Stewart because Colonel Van Vliet stated Captain Stewart
was in complete agreement wnth Colonel Van Vliet's statements and
conclusion, because Colonel Van Vliet stated that he and Captain
Stewart had talked about Katyn and Captain Stewart ])ossessed no
information mdmown to Colonel Van Vliet, and because if the State
Department or any other United States Government agency wanted
a statement from or a conference with Captain Stewart, the War
Department could make him available.
I had com])lete confidence in Colonel Van Vliet's integrity and hon-
esty. Had Captain Stew^art reported to me in Washington, as I
expected he would do, I would have had him prepare a written report.
1852 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
One best learns from experience. I now believe it wo; d have been
preferable had I directed Captain Stewart to report t. le in Wash-
ino;ton upon his return to the United States from "World War II.
I do not remember positively many details of the Colonel Van Vliet
report. I do not recall whether it was on long or short sheets, single-
or double-spaced, how many pages it contained; whether or not there
were carbon copies, whether Colonel Van Vliet or Mrs. ]Meeres per-
sonally carried the report into my office, or specifically in whose hands
the report was after Colonel Van Vliet signed it. Neither does he or
Mrs. Meeres. All of us at that time were primarily interested in its
contents and security rather than in its format or in its physical ctetails.
I can assure you its importance was fully recognized by me, and my
intent was its prompt transmittal through a secure channel either to
the activity handling war crimes data, or to the State Department.
G-2 liacl been sending anything received in connection with war
crimes or atrocities to the agency holding it for the War Crimes Com-
mission. I do not rememl)er definitely to which agency we sent such
material for them. I know we had some definite verbal instructions
from my predecessor. General Strong, which we carried out implicitly.
I have a distinct recollection of having seen previously the photo-
gra])hs which are exhibits 3 to 7, both inclusive, of Colonel Stewart's
testimony; but if such photographs were attached to the Colonel Van
Vliet report, the Captain Gilder report, or other reports of Katyn I
handled, I do not remember.
Chairman Madden. You speak of Colonel Stewart's testimony.
What do you mean by that ?
General Bissell. I read what is in the book when he talked to you,
and he gave you the pictures and I had a chance to see what the pictures
were.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
General Bissell. I believe I had previously seen the photographs
also that are exhibits 1 and 2, both inclusive, of Captain Stewart's
testimony, but I do not have as distinct a recollection of those.
Mr. Mitchell. May I interrupt a minute?
Mr. Chairman, those exhibits are in part 1. The hearing was held
October 11, 1951.
Mr. Sheeiian. Counsel, the general mentioned the Captain Gilder
report. What was that^
General Bissell. I ^;.\.ii^ come to it, if you want me to, and other
reports I mentioned, if you would like to, on Katyn.
I cannot be positive what happened to the Colonel Van Vliet report,
but it is my recollection, confirmed by some available documentary
material, which I believe has been made available to this committee,
that the letter of transmittal for the Colonel Van Vliet report was
dated May 25, 1945, and that it, the Colonel Van Vliet report, and
the related matter were transmitted to the State Department repre-
sentative. Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes, on May 25, 1945.
The available documentary material confirming transmission of the
first Colonel Van Vliet re])oi't — [addressing Mr. Shackelford] and I
say first as coiuiterdistinguislied from tlie one that was secured by your
auspices — the one that I i-emeniber as the Hrst one
Mr. Maciiuowicz. Pardon me, })ut might I just interrupt.
You referred now to a letter of transmittal from your department
to the Department of State, which you say also disappeared. If I
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1853
remember yd '^^ statement a few moments before that, you, I believe,
said that yotvi tvere not sure whether you transmitted it orally or by
letter.
General Bissell. No. I said I didn't know where it had gone. In
other words, State says they didn't receive it. I can't say they did
receive it.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think if you will refer to the notes from which
you read, you previously said you are not sure whether you referred
to it orally or by transmittal ; is that right?
General Bissell. Of course; it is in the record. I would like to
give it to you again.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. General, I have just one question.
In your experience in that particular position, do you know of any
reports besides this one disappearing?
General Bissell. I don't know that this one disappeared, frankly;
but, specifically, what you are after is another case.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I use that term advisedly.
General Bissell. No ; I don't believe I do.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. As far as you know, to your knowledge, in your
experience in that department, this is the only report that you know
of that cannot be located ?
General Bissell. No. That is not so. There are thousands of them
that can't be located, that have been destroyed ; thousands of them.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. But there is a record of them that they have been
destroyed.
General Bissell. Sometimes there will be and sometimes there will
not.
And I have that covered in my notes here some place and the reason
for it. There was good reason for it.
Chairman Madden. I think we will make better progress if you
complete your statement and then the members of the committee can
cross-examine.
General Bissell. As you wish il, sir.
The available documentary confirming transmittal of the first Colo-
nel Van Vliet report is my secret letter dated August 21, 1945, to
Frederick Lyon, Acting Director, Office of Controls, room 115, Depart-
ment of State, Washington, D. C, which reads :
Dear Mb. Lyon : Transmitted for the informatio.^ "^e of the State Department
is a report on Katyn by Stanley S. ,B. Gilder, captain, EAMC (Medical Corps),
British officer. This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van
Vliet, Jr., forwarded to General Holmes 25 May 1945, and generally substantiates
all material facts in Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's report.
Sincerely,
Clayton Bissell,
Major General, G-2,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
The identifying reference on this letter is 700,00061WBA.CSLE.
This is a decimal identification and a decimal file date.
The letter also carried the identification MIL920, which w^as a
G-2 identification. The G-2 identification was for the section in
which Mrs. Meeres worked.
This communication shows, by State Department stamps, that it
was in their Office of Controls August 23, 1945, in their Division of
Foreign Activities Correlation on the same date, in their Special War
93744— 52— pt. 7 ^3
1854 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Problems Division on October 2, 1945, and in the Office of European
Affairs on October 5, 1945.
Other entries on the letter indicate that it was probably seen or
processed by the individuals or activities in the State Department
identified thereon as F131.ETB.WHM.AVMF.SWP.CE.EE, and that
the letter was received in State Department confidential file October
16, 1945, after only 5 days less than 2 months of processing in the
State Department.
During this entire period, I continued as G-2. Had the Colonel
Van Vliet report not been available in the State Department, I woidd
have received a letter or a telephone call asking for it. because, ob-
viously, it would have been impossible to compare the Gilder report
with the Van Vliet report had knowledge of the Colonel Van Vliet
report not been available in the State Department.
The Captain Gilder secret report referred to in my August 21, 1945,
letter, and its enclosure was a British War Office document identified
by the reference MI-9/BM/973. MI-9 means British Military Intelli-
gence Office, section 9, and the BM/9T3 was a reference for Britl^h
itlentification and file location.
The Captain Gilder report was a history of a visit made to Katyn
in 1943, consisting of three standard-sized typed pages, written very
full, and divided into only two paragraphs. It is my understanding
that the Captain Gilder report has been made available to the com-
mittee. If not, it should be in State Department files.
There is also a notation placed in the letter by the State Depart-
ment. It is 711.62114-A, just written on it. This was the decimal
file reference number to the matter related to Colonel Van Vliet's
report, to which I previously referred and will refer again. This
shows that State had gone into the Katyn report carefully and thor-
oughly enough to locate the related matter also. It was tied together.
It has been possible for me to be so specific on details about the
August 21, 1945, letter because in the fall of 1950, Mr. Shackelford,
then and now Department Counselor, Department of the Army, was
conducting an investigation into the Katyn affair, showed me my letter
which he had secured from the State Department files.
He (juestioned me about it and authorized me to make a longhand
copy of the letter to facilitate the location of the file copy which should
have been back in the G-2 files.
Chairman Maddp:n. Pardon me. Your letter that you referred to
was the letter that accompanied tlie Gilder report, was it (
General Bissfxl. The one that carried the Ciilder report, referring
to the Van Vliet report, and asked them to compare the two and
telling them there was no fundamental dill'erence.
I was able to locate the file copy of my letter on the Gilder report —
it was an identical carbon copy — that is, it was in the G-2 files —
of the text, but, of course, it did not show the State Department
processing, because it had never been away from G-2.
Mr. MrrcnKLL. When did you locale' that ^ This is 1950, is it ^
Geneial liissKU.. 1950, yes. 1 went down, and Mr. Shackelford had
the originnl letter, the one that I sent to State.
ISIr. MrrciiKLL. He got it from Stated
General Bisseij.. He got it from State.
Mr. Mitchell. You say now that you found the identical copy
of it?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1855
General Bisseix,. Yes.
Mr, Mitchell. This was September, 1950?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you find it ?
General Bissell. In G-2.
Mr. Mitchell. Where in G-2 ? Maybe we can find the Van Vliet
report there yet.
General Bissell. I hope so, but I don't think you will, because I
tliink we have tried every way we could to locate it.
A young man who was a captain was acting as a sort of liaison
officer between you (addressing Mr. Shackelford) and G-2 at that
time. I gave it to him and then he said it had not enough importance.
The war was going on in Korea at that time, I went to General Weck-
erling at that time, who had been my deputy in G-2, during the war
and asked him to put some pressure on it. General Boiling came in
while we were talking and I asked him to put some pressure on it.
It came up.
When it came up, it carried the following file information, that
had not been on the original Jetter to the State Department. It read :
"AC of S, G-2/72577, General Bissell. MM. CPM."
The 72577 was a reference number. The rest meant that the letter
originated in my office, that I dictated it personally to MM, who was
Mrs. Meeres. The (CPM.) meant the "Captured Personnel and Ma-
terial Section" to which she belonged.
Mr. Mitchell. What Avas the date on tliat ?
General Bissell. 21 August, 1945.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
General Bissell. It also contained an entry "Courier Service,
senders Number C-601, date 22 xiugust, 1945". This meant the letter
was hand-carried to the State Department.
There is also a self-explanatory note on the file copy, which reads,
"Received back in MIS Administrative Records, August 24, 1945".
The significance of that is to keep people informed when the file
copy was sent to somebody sometime, and then they got it back and
made the record.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was there any acknowledgement of receipt by the
Department of State ?
General Bissell. That particular copy we are talking about, this
file copy, never got out of G-2, so there would be no receipt any place.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was there any indication in the Gilder report
that the letter of transmittal was received?
General Bissell. It wouldn't be on the letter. All that was on the
file copy in G-2 was an indication how it had been sent.
Mr. Machrowicz. Have you found any acknowledgment of re-
ceipt by the Department of State of the Gilder Report ? I am talking
about the Gilder Report.
General Bissell. I didn't look for a copy of a receipt from State
of the Gilder Report.
Mr. Mitchell. Why not ?
General Bissell. Because they answered to that.
Mr. Sheehax. But you did see the letter from the State Depart-
ment ?
General Bissell. I saw the letter I sent to State, my own personally
signed letter, which Mr. Shackelford had gotten from them. That
1856 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
was a clue how we might have gotten some more Katyn data, maybe
put in our files. For one thing, that would be the right place. So I
took a copy in longhand and checked the files on it through G-2.
I didn't do it physically. Up came the copy, and it showed you how
the letter was sent off.
Mr. Machrowicz. What do you mean, it was the right place? You
know we had to go to the warehouse in Alexandria to find the right
place on the Szymanski report.
General Bissell. Yes ; I imagine you would have to go a lot farther,
to Kansas City and other places, to find a lot of stuff that happened
in the war. The paper work got too big and they needed the offices
for something else. They had either to destroy it or send it away.
Mr. Machrowicz. On important documents?
General Bissell. What becomes important is a matter of history
and development. No one suspected that this one would be of any-
thing like international significance.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you say you recognized the importance of
the document?
General Bissell. Yes; I did, you bet — but not the kind of signifi-
cance it has in today's world, because nobody could have foreseen the
situation that we have today. I did recognize it.
I have told you what the mention of the entries on the paper meant,
and what was on it. I now refer to the related matter previously men-
tioned, which was dated and directed to the State Department May
25, 1945, the same date. I believe as Colonel Van Vliet's report. It
is my letter to Brig. Gen. Julius C Holmes, Assistant Secretary,
Department of State, and reads :
Dear General Holmes : A Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., Infantry, and a
Captain Stewart, while prisoners of war at Oflat No. 684, are reported to have
been given a letter by the Swiss Protecting PovA^er, dated about October 1943,
which asked them to reply to certain questions. These questions were :
1. Had Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet gone to Katyn?
2. How had they been treated?
3. Were any photographs taken?
4. Had they made a statement?
Colonel Van Vliet believes that a copy of this letter, together with his reply.
are in State Department files. It is requested that this be verified, and if the
records referred to are in the files of the State Department, that copies be made
available for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Sincerely,
Clayton Bissell,
Major General GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Mr, Machrowicz. Can we get the date of that letter?
General Bissell. The date of that letter was May 25.
Mr. FuRCOLO. 1945 ?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. FuRCOLO. May I interrupt just a minute to ask a question, Mr.
Chairman ?
Chairman Madden. Yes.
Mr. FuRCoLo. On page 67 of the hearings, at the bottom of the
page, it refers that the only letter sent on May 25, 1945, from General
Bissell to General Holmes", was on another ])hase of this subject, and
it contains no reference to transmitting the Van Vliet memorandum.
Mr. Mitchell. That is in part II.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1857
Mr. FuRCOLO. Now, is it your testimony that you did transmit the
Van Vliet memorandum in that ?
General Bissell. No. I say that this letter tends to indicate that
I did one of the two things I intended to do with it. Now, I didn't
personally ever take any — well, yes, sometimes I did take papers and
deliver them myself. But all I did in my position there was to make
decisions, establish policies, and had procedures set up so that I didn't
do the things myself. Other people did them.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Wliat I am anxious to find out if I can is : From the
letter that you have read, and having in mind this comment that was
made on the bottom of page 67, would you be willing to say that you
did not transmit the Van Vliet memgrandum in that letter ?
General Bissell. Well, nomenclature is causing a lot of trouble. I
think we better get straight.
Mr. FuRCOLO. All right.
General Bissell. The thing that has caused most of the trouble with
most of the people that have talked to the committee, in the small
amount of testimony made available to me in sections 1 and 2, have
not known that there were two Van Vliet reports written at the same
time of the first visit.
The result is they are going in big circles. Now, one of them will
call a report a letter, another will call it a report.
Mr. FuRcoLo. What I want to find out on this is : Did you transmit
any enclosure with this letter of May 25, 1945, whether it is called
Report No. 1 or 2, or something else ?
General Bissell. This letter is part of what Colonel Van Vliet said
occurred, but I don't think it was put in his report of Katyn, because
it wasn't part of the description of Katyn.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Here is what I am getting at. General — and I do not
mean to be technical about it. But I understand that you sent a letter
of May 25, 1945. Now, was anything enclosed in that letter? I am
not refering to the words and body of that letter of May 25, but did
you send any enclosure of any kind in that letter?
General Bissell. I don't believe so because, had it been done, there
would be written on the lower left-hand corner what the enclosure was.
And the Van Vliet big report of his story of Katyn wouldn't be at-
tached to. that thing, because the purpose of this was different, which
I will explain as I go along.
Mr. FuRCOLo. That is the point I was getting to. In your letter
transmitting the Captain Gilder report, I notice as you read it, that
at the bottom you mentioned "one enclosure."
General Bissell. Which was the Gilder report.
Mr. FuRcoLo. You also mentioned it in the letter.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FrRcoLO. I notice in the letter of May 25, 1945, there apparently
is no reference made to an enclosure, and also no reference made at
the bottom of the letter to an enclosure.
General Bissell. There shouldn't have been, because it doesn't men-
tion an enclosure in the text.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Your testimony now, as I understand it, with refer-
ence to this letter of May 25, 1945, from you, General Bissell, to
General Holmes is, to the best of your knowledge, that there was no
enclosure of any kind in that letter?
1858 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, there was not. You
have put a thought in my mind that had never entered it before, and
that is whether by accident or mistake, the Van Vliet repoit could
have been put there, but I don't think it is possible.
But this is the thing some i^eople speak of as the Van Vliet report,
in good faith, and think they are talking about the thing that you have
been investigating.
Mr. Mitchell. You say what people think — you are referring here
to the letter concerning the Swiss protecting power, are you not?
General Bissell. Well, that is the deal, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, I never knew, to my personal knowl-
edge since I have been on this investigation, that there were two re-
ports by Van Vliet concerning Katyn. I would not phrase it that
way. I would say there was a report specifically concerning Katyn,
which was rendered to you by Colonel Van Vliet. This is a subse-
quent request, as I get it, which may have occurred at the same time,
which concerned a request by the Swiss protecting power, which he
is merely reporting for your record, that he was asked these questions,
about going to Katyn, and so forth. This does not refer in any way
to what happened at Katyn other than there were photographs taken;
is that correct ?
General Bissell. There is quite a lot to it more than that. I would
like to make my point clear, that people have said it. Mrs. Meeres,
in her testimony this morning, said, "I took two Van Vliet reports."
Well, this is the other one. She took this letter, too.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't recall her having said that — maj^be she did.
General Bissell. It is in there — I think it is — that is the way I
understood it.
Mr. Sheehan. For the benefit of us members here, I am confused
on this idea of the two Van Vliet reports. I wish counsel would ques-
tion him on it and get it straight.
Mr. Mitchell. All right.
General, there was a report, as I understand it, written by Colonel
Van Vliet, at your request, which concerned his visit to Katyn when
he was accompanied by Captain Stewart and several other Allied
officers. Is that correct?
General Bissell. There Avas such a report, and this is also the same
incident.
Mr. Mitchell. But there was such a report?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. That w\as specific ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. There was no mention in that rei')ort, was there, of
anything received from the Swiss protecting power ?
General Bissell. I cannot recall Colonel Van Vliet's original report
well enough to tell you whether this was also mentioned in it, or
whether we handled it separately. I think we handled it separately,
and I have the reasons in my notes here, if you want them.
Mr. MrrciiELL. All right, we have it fixed, then, Mr. Sheehan, that
there was only one real report at this stage of the investigation, namely,
the Katyn affair, and the visit by Captain Stewart and Colonel Van
Vliet. What he did at Katyn has been related to the committee by
both Captain Stewart and Colonel Van Vliet, and it has always been
THE KATYISr FOREST MASSACRE 1859
my impression that that was the report that General Bissell ordered
him to document for the record, as a top-secret document.
Mr. Sheehan. As of May 21 or May 22, 1945?
Mr. Mitchell. Right.
Now, the general is bringing forth another item which specifically
concerns the Department of State, because it refers to the Swiss pro-
tecting power, which was then the power in control of the German
prison camps where Captain Stewart and Colonel Van Vliet were,
and I believe that a subsequent conversation — the general is trying to
tell the committee now that Colonel Van Vliet reported this item of
being called in by the Swiss protecting power. And we have never
considered that as being a report.
Mr. Sheehan. Did the Army ever release that rejiort to us? It
should be in their files.
General Bissell. I think you have it.
Mr. Mitchell. I don't believe we have it.
General Bissell. If you haven't, I can tell you where to get it.
Mr. Maciiroavicz. Do you mean tiie Gilder report?
General Bissell. No ; this is not the Gilder report we are discussing
now,
Mr. Machrowicz. Does the SavIss report have anvthing to do with
Katyn ?
General Bissell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Could we have for the record — will the general report for the
record the letter, and what the letter specifically refers to? I am
sure it will clear it up to the committee.
When Van Vliet and Stewart returned from Katyn, about 4 or 5
months later, the Swiss protecting power asked them for some data
in comiection with it.
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. Flood. Let me make this observation — this is all veiy interest-
ing, the Swiss report and the inquiries the Swiss made of Van Vliet
and Stewart, but, nevertheless, it has nothing to do with the thing
Ave all know we are talking about. There may be something here we
do not IniOAv we are talking about, but this investigation is concerned
Avith the Katyn massacre. The one thing AA^e do knoAv that Ave are
talking about is the Van Vliet report.
Now, Ave have heard Van Vliet, we haA^e heard everybody else that
Ave know about.
At this point I want to read into the record, from part II of our hear-
ings, page 67, this statement :
The Department of State has no record of haAang received the memorandum
of Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet on May 25, 1945.
I Avant to insert this in parentheses: That refers to the Van Vliet
report that we all knoAv we are talking about.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Flood. And the Department of the Army has so far found
no receipt for it and no covering letter of transmittal. Noav, that
refers to the Van Vliet report that we all knoAv we are talking about.
The only letter sent on May 25, 1945, from General Bissell to General
Holmes, was on another phase of this subject, and it contains no refer-
ence to transmitting the Van Vliet memorandum.
1860 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Holmes has been contacted with reference to the matter,
and does not recall having ever seen Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's
memorandum.
My parentheses again at this point is Van Vliet's memorandum
is the report that we all know we are talking about, although General
Bissell remembers having sent it to him.
My understanding is — I know exactly what everybody means by
Colonel Van Vliet's memorandum or Colonel Van Vliet's report. This
thing that just came in here now about a second Van Vliet report
has to do with this inquiry by the Swiss, It is very interesting, but
it is not concerned with any mystery about the disappearance of
the Van Vliet report that we all know about.
I do not see why anybody has to be mixed up or concerned or con-
fused about two Van Vliet reports. The one we are talking about
is the one that we all know about — which is my phrase of identity
here.
Mr. Sheehan. The Army did not turn it over to us ; that is what
1 am looking for.
Mr. Flood. For the record, I am having no colloquy with any of my
friends in the committee.
If you have any statements to make, make them on the record.
I understand what I understand. If anybody else is uncertain about
what is going on, say so.
Mr. Sheehan. I asked a question.
Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. I merely want to state that I asked the question for
the simple reason that it is my understanding the Army has turned
over all the files they have on Katyn, and if they have not turned over
this report, apparently they have not turned over all the files.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Sheehan, they have not turned over what is
referred to in the quotation Congressman Flood has just made for the
record, which appears on page 67 of part II, under the title "Another
Phase." I have never seen such a document. It has never been re-
ceived from the Army, to the best of my knowledge, and I don't believe
any member of the committee, you or I or anybody else, has seen such
a document.
Mr. Machrowicz. Has the committee requested it ?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe we requested many times of Mr. Shackel-
ford and everybody else, any paper connected with Katyn.
Mr. Flood. Let me say this again :
General, when I say "the Van Vliet report," I am not talking about
this Swiss business. You know what I am talking about — the Van
Vliet report that we all know about.
To your best recollection, a letter was dictated by you to the State
Department, a letter of transmittal to them, enclosing or attaching
thereto the Van Vliet report; is that correct? Did you dictate such
a letter to the State Department?
General Bissell. I don't know.
Mr. Flood. Will you say you did ?
(Jeneral Bissell. No.
Mr. Flood. Will you say you did not?
General Bissell. No.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1861
Mr. Flood. Then, at this point you do not know Avhether or not you
ever dictated a letter of transmittal to the State Department, having
to do with the Van Vliet report?
Mr. FuRCOLO. Let us get your answer on the record. You shook
your head.
Mr. Flood. Just a moment. I will yield to you in about 30 minutes.
Now, just a minute. General. You answered my question that you
do not know ; did you not ?
Geneval Bissell. I previously answered also the same thing.
]Mr. Flood. My colleagues are concerned only that your answer does
not appear on the record, and that you merely shook your head in
the negative.
General Bissell. I am sorry.
Mr. Flood. The answer is : You do not remember whether you did
or not ?
General Bissell. That is correct.
]\Ir. Flood. If General Holmes said or says that he does not recall
ever having seen a letter from you or the Van Vliet report, you will
not say that General Holmes is making a misstatement ?
General Bissell. I have previously made the answer to that question
in the record.
Mr. Flood. This is out of an abundance of caution and for repeti-
tion and for an emphatic purpose.
General Bissell. All right, sir. I consider General Holmes an
honorable, forthright, honest man, and he would say what he believed
to be the truth, under any circumstances.
Mr. Flood. That is very interesting, and we are glad to have your
estimate of General Holmes, but what is the answer to my question ?
Well, I will repeat it for you :
If General Holmes said or says that he does not recall ever having
seen Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliefs report, and if General Holmes
says that he does not recall ever having seen a letter of transmittal
from you, you will not say that he is wrong, will you ?
General Bissell. I will say that I am convinced he is right or thinks
he is right.
Mr. Flood. Now, there are a number of other things along this very
detail I want to ask you, but my brothers here are very anxious on
that point, so I yield to them, only for the purpose of examining on
that point, on what I am leading to.
Chairman Madden. Before we proceed on cross-examination, let
me ask the general :
Have you completed your statement yet?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Chairman Madden. You proceed with your statement, and then we
will proceed.
Mr. Flood. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. I prefer, if there is no
violent objection, to clearing up this detail at this moment, and I
want to yield to any member of the committee who wants to examine
him on what I just introduced.
Chairman Madden. We will dispose of this detail.
Mr. Flood. I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Furcolo.
1862 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. FuRCOLO. General, perhaps I was confused, or did not hear your
answer correctly, but I understood you just a moment ago, in answer
to a question by Congressman Flood, to leave your testimony, in effect,
that you could not say whether or not any enclosure had been sent
in the letter of transmittal — referring to the letter of May 25, 194r» —
from General Bissell, from you, to General Holmes.
When I was questioning you about 5 or 10 minutes ago, I was under
the impression that you very definitely told me that your best recollec-
tion was that you did not send any enclosure of any kind in that letter.
My recollection is that you and I had some discussion about it, and
during the discussion I pointed out that your letter did not contain
any reference in the body of the letter to a transmittal, and also there
was no notation at the bottom of the letter referring to an enclosure.
We discussed the fact that in your letter of transmittal of the Gilder
report, there had been a reference in the bod,v of tlie letter, and also
the end of the letter referred to an enclosure. After going over that,
I thought that we had concluded the matter.
Could you finally leave it that your best recollection is that there
was no enclosure of any kind in the letter of May 25, 1945 ?
Now, I also thought that your answer to Congressman Flood was
somewhat at variance. I do not want to be unfair or confusing to
either you or me. My mind is not clear now on whether your final
answer was that you do not know whether there was an enclosure or
not, or whether your final answer is that there was no enclosure. I
wonder if you could clear that up for us ?
General Bisseix. My best recollection is that there was no enclosure
in the letter, and none listed on it, and there seems, in the body of the
letter, no reason for an enclosure to have been with it.
Mr. Flood. I will not yield any further now, but 1 will in a moment,
to Mr. Machrowicz.
Pursuing Congressman Furcolo's interrogation on the letter of ^lay
25, and enclosure, that has to do with another phase of the subject,
that is, the Swiss thing. I am not talking about that.
I am concerned only with two or three very simple details on this
report and your connection with it.
We know the whole story about Van Vliet preparing the report in
your office and that you got it, and all that kind of business — every-
body understands that.
Now, I ask you if you ever dictated a letter to the State Department
transmitting this Van Vliet report to them, to the State Department?
You said you do not remember whethej- you did or not. I presume
you made a search to find out if there was such a letter of transmittal,
did you not?
General Bisseix. I asked G-2 to do so. That was in 1950.
Mr. Flood. In 1950 you asked (i-2 to see whether or not there was
any such a letter of transmittal from you? Did G-2 ever find it, so
far as you know ?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Flood. State so, one wa}' or the other.
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Flood. So G-2 produced no co]:)y of such a letter ; is that correct,
General ?
General Bissell. That is correct, sir.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1863
Mr. Flood. General Holmes said that he never saw such a letter
from you and that he never saw a copy of the report. I asked you
about that and you said that if he says so, you would not say he is
wrong?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I have
only one question that I have been trying to ask, that I think will clear
up this whole point.
Mr. Flood. I will yield to you on it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Just one question : Are you prepared now to tell
tliis committee definitely that the Van Vliet report we were discussing
all the time was transmitted by you to the Department of State?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. You are not ?
That is all.
Mr. SiiEEHAisr. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Flood. If you want to follow that up I will yield.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Machrowicz asked him whether or not the State
Department had it. The general said "No." But a little while ago,
if you go into the record, you will see that from the exchange of cor-
respondence on other matters, that they must have had it ; otherwise
they would have written him asking where was this report.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is correct.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. Did you not say that, General.
General Bissell. I did say that.
Mr. Flood. Just a minute. I am yielding to Mr. Sheehan for a
question. Will you ask the question?
Mr. Sheehan. In response to Congressman Machrowicz's question
as to whether or not he thought the State Department had the Van
Vliet report, the general just said "No." Is that right or wrong?
Mr. Flood. That is right.
Chairman Madden. Who is testifying here now ?
Mr. Sheehan. Is that true?
General Bisseix. I didn't know you were asking me. I thought
you were asking Mr. Flood. I am sorry.
Chairman Madden. Gentlemen, can we have a little order?
Mr. Flood. I have just yielded to Mr. Sheehan for a question, or any
other observation he wants to make in connection with it.
Will you start from this point?
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you.
Following up from the last question Congressman ]\fachrowicz
asked you, if my memory is right, he asked you your opinion as to
whether or not the State Department received the Van Vliet report,
and you just answered "No." Am I right or wrong?
General Bissell. He didn't ask my opinion.
Mr. Machrowicz. I did not ask his opinion.
Mr. Sheehan. What did he ask you ?
General Bissell. You can get it out of the record ; it was an opinion,
he asked.
Mr. Flood. Just a minute ; I still have this witness.
Mr. Sheehan, if you want the record read after what Mr. Machro-
wicz said and what the general said, let us have it read.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Reporter, can you get the question asked
by Congressman Machrowicz ?
1864 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
(The record was read by the reporter as follows:)
Mr. Machrowicz. Just one question: Are you prepared now to tell this com-
mittee definitely that the Van Vliet report we were disc-ussiug all the time
was transmitted by you to the Department of State?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Your understandiii<2:, then, General, is that you did
not know that this report was transmitted directly to the Department
of State?
Congressman Machrowicz did ask the general whether or not this
Van Vliet report was transmitted to the Department of State. That
was his original question ; to which he said "No, sir."
Now, I am pointing out. General, if my memory is right, previously
in your statements, when you were reading from your notes, you defi-
nitely came to the conclusion that the State Department, because of
various exchange of correspondence, if they did not have it they
would have asked you where it was ?
General Bissell. I believe — and I can answer quickly and clearly —
I stated I did not know whether I had sent the paper to the war-crimes
people or the State Department, but I was inclined to believe I had
sent it to State, because of the supporting documentary evidence
which I have subsequently presented.
Mr. Sheehan. That is all.
Mr. Flood. That is your deduction.
General Bissell. That is just that way. I think it happened for
that reason. That is what I said.
Mr. Flood. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Does anybody else have anj^thing on this par-
ticular point?
All right. Now, proceed with your statement, General.
General Bissell. Thank you, sir.
I had just completed reading the signature on the letter.
Chairman Madden. We will reconvene at 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p. m. of the same day.)
AFTER recess
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order.
General Bissell.
TESTIMONY OF CLAYTON I. BISSELL, MAJOR GENERAL, USAF
(RETIRED), ACCOMPANIED BY F. SHACKELFORD, COUNSELOR,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY— Resumed
Chairman Madden. Before we recessed for lunch I think you were
going to proceed and complete your statement. Now if you will pro-
ceed, unless some of the members have some particular question they
would like to ask regarding some i)articular point in your statement,
I would like to have you complete your statement.
General Bissell. Thank you very much.
For continuity, I had just completed reading a letter. The letter
was also shown to me in the fall of 1950 by Mr. Shackelford, who had
secured it from the State Department hies. I believe its contents
have been available to the committee.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1865
Mr. Mitchell. May the record show that the contents have not been
made avaihible to the committee.
General Bissell. It bears the following notation : 711.62114A, 5-25-
45, which was its decimal file number and date, to which I have pre-
viously referred. It also bears the reference number 81998.
]\Ir. Machrowicz. What report are you referring to ?
General Bissell. The letter I had just read when the questions
started. I had just read the signature of the letter and then the com-
mittee started asking questions.
Mr. INIachrowicz. The letter of May 25 ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Since there has been a dispute between the two
on whether it has or has not been made available, has it or has it not
been made available to the committee ?
General Bissell. I said I believe it had, but Mr. Shackelford had
a copy right here at the table this morning.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the one I showed you a copy of and the
reply by the Department of State.
Mr. Machrowicz. Can you tell us whether the letter of May 25,
which the general referred to has been made available to the com-
mittee ?
Mr. Shackelford. I believe it was made available to the committee
through the Inspector General's report.
Mr. Mitchell. That is incorrect, because there were no exhibits
connected with the Inspector General's report. That is where it is
mentioned. It is referred to in there by date. Mr. Sheeham has the
Inspector General's report. I will have to wait until he returns to get
it.
Mr. Shackelford. That can easily be checked. Mr. Machrowicz
and Mr. Mitchell remember the details. It was referenced in the press
memorandum that was put out.
Mr. Machrowicz. You will see it is made available ?
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir.
JNIr. Doxdero. So there will be no break in the continuity of thought,
General Bissell, the letter of May 25, 1945, to which you referred was
the letter of transmittal to General Holmes? Is that the one you
referred to ?
General Bissell. No, sir. It is the letter asking the State Depart-
ment to verify whether they have received a letter Van Vliet said
had been forwarded to him by the Swiss at our State Department's
request.
Shall I proceed, sir ?
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
General Bissell. It also bears the reference numbers 81998. State
Department stamps indicate it was in the office of the Assistant Secre-
tary, Mr. Holmes, May 30, 1945 ; in State Department Special War
Probes Division May 31, 1945 ; and there was on it an almost illegible
stamp mark, apparentlv of the OCE-UR Unit. There is written in
longhand on the letter "SWP May 31, 1945, AH/ABF." This would
indicate someone in the Special War Plans Division handled the mat-
ter for Mr. Holmes.
This is confirmed by another written notation written on the letter
reading "Answered 6-5-45, W. H. McCahon/EKG." This meant Mr.
McCahon dictated the reply to EKG, the secretary, on June 5, 1945,
1866 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
for Mr. Holmes' signature, which was typed on the letter. I do not
know if General Holmes personally signed this letter. If the original
is in G-2 files, this point can be clarified.
State Department's reply under date of June 9, 1945, was addressed
to me as "G-2, War Department."
Mr. Shackelford also showed me the State Department copy of their
reply, and I understand a copy has been made available to the com-
mittee.
Mr. Mitchell. One moment. This committee has never seen either
the original or the copy of the letter you are referring to now, namely,
the State Department reply which is dated what date, June G, 194r> '.
General Bissell. June 9, 1945.
Mr. Mitchell. The committee or no member of its staff had seen the
original or a copy of it until this morning when Mr. Shackelford
handed me a copy.
Mr. Shackelford. We will be glad to supply it.
Chairman Madden. I wish you would supply it for the record.
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir.
General Bissell. The reply read, "Confidential. In reply refer to
SWP 711.62114A/5-25/45." It is dated June 9, 1945. It follows :
My Dear General Bissell : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May
25, 1945, concerning the report that Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain
Stewart while detained as prisoners of war at Oflag G4, received from the protect-
ing power a letter dated about October 1943, seeking information whether these
officers had been required by the German authorities to visit Katyn. You ask
the Department to verify whether a copy of such a letter togetlier with Colonel
Van Vliet's reply thereto is of record in the Department of State.
The records of the Department reveal that in September 1943, and again in
December of the same year, the American Legation at Bern was informed that
reports reaching the Department indicated that Lt. Col. J. H. Van Vliet and
(\ipt. D. B. Stewart, both of whom at that time were apparently detained at
Oflag 9-A/Z, were being taken to Katyn. The Legation was instructed to request
the Swiss to determine whether these officers actually had made the journey and
if so to learn what kind of treatment was accorded them, whether they made
any statement with regard to the Katyn affair and what use had been made of
any statements made or any photographs taken at the time.
in February 1944, the Department was informed that Colonel Van Vliet ami
Captain Stewart had been transferred to Oflag 64, and that the Swiss inspector
at the time of tlie next visit to that camp would endeavor to obtain the informa-
tion desired. No further communication regarding the matter has ever been
leceived in the Department. In the circumstances it is considered likely that
Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the German authorities
and never forwarded to the appropriate officials of the Swiss Government.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not know whether this is intended or not to
confuse us. Again you are not referring to the original Colonel Van
Vliet report ?
(leneral Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Your answer to me is not changed at all by the
statement made so far?
General Bissell. No, sir; but you would notice in the language used
that they call this second one the report.
Mr. Machrowicz. Yes, but that is not the report we are talking
about.
General Bissell. Yes, that is right. That is my point. I have
caught it.
Chairman Madden. You are confusing me a little here. What has
this got to do with Colonel Van Vliet's original report?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1867
(leneral Bissell. A great deal, sir, because the State Department
had considerable knowledge apparently of this matter before Van
Vliet ever left Germany. They wrote these letters before I ever
took over G-2.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are you inferring now that the State Depart-
ment had information about the Van Vliet report before Van Vliet
came to your office ?
General Bissell. About the Van Vliet visit. They had asked that
long ago, whether there was a report, and Colonel Van Vliet had made
a reply to State. That is the status as I read it. There is a little bit
more to be given to you on it, if you want it.
Chairman Madden. This is a preliminary report that they are
referring to in this letter when they say, "Concerning the report that
Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain Stewart while detained
as prisoners of war at Oflag 64?" That has nothing to do with the
original Van Vliet report ? That is not referring to the original report
that he signed?
(xeneral Bissell. That is not the report that Van Vliet dictated in
Washington.
Mr. Mitchell. May I put that in as an exhibit?
Chairman Madden. Mark that as an exhibit.
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit No. -i.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4" and made
a part of the record as follows :)
Exhibit 4
[Confidentiall
June 9, 1945.
My Dear Gexeral Bissell : The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May
25, 1945, concerning the report that Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., and Captain
Stewart while detained as prisoners of war at Oflag 64, received from tlie pro-
tecting power a letter dated about October 1943, seeking information whetlier
these officers had been required by the German authorities to visit Katyn. You
ask the Department to verify whether a copy of such a letter together with
Colonel Van Vliet's reply thereto is of record in the Department of State.
The records of the Department reveal that in September 1943, and again in
December of the same year, the American Legation at Bern was informed that
reports reaching the Department indicated that Lt. Col. J. H. Van Vliet and
Capt. D. B. Stewart, both of whom at that time were apparently detained at
Oflag 9-A/Z, were being taken to Katyn. The Legation was instructed to request
the Swiss to determine whether these officers actually had made the journey
and if so to learn what kind of treatment was accorded them, whether they made
any statement with regard to the Katyn affair and what use had been made of
any statements made or any photographs taken at the time.
In February 1944, the Department was informed that Colonel Van Vliet and
Captain Stewart had been transferred to Oflag 64, and that the Swiss inspector
at the time of the next visit to tliat camp would endeavor to obtain the informa-
tion desired. No further communication regarding the matter has ever been
received in the Department. In the circumstances it is considered likely that
Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the German authorities
and never forwarded to the appropriate officials of the Swiss Government.
Sincerely yours,
Julius C. Holmes, Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the Army supply the original,
if they have it, please. This is a copy.
Chairman Madden. Yes, we would like to have the original.
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir; we will be glad to supply you with
whatever we can.
186S THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. DoNDERO. General, did you in your official capacity receive
any information from any source affecting the credibility of Colonel
Van Vliet or Captain Stewart 'i
General Bissell. That is in the next paragraph or two, and that
is the reason for my action, in order to get some basis on which to
evaluate the report they made to me by the only thing I could pin
down as a yardstick to measure the accuracy of his memory which
I thought was splendid.
Mr. DoNDERO. I want you to know of my personal interest in
this man, because Captain Stewart was my personal appointee to
West Point.
General Bissell. I am glad to know of your interest.
The State Department reply was very significant. It made it
very clear as early as September 1943, months before I was appointed
G-2, the State Department had reports of the visit of Colonel Van
Vliet and Captain Stewart to Katyn. They say so.
Mr. Machrowicz. That should not be very surprising to you. The
whole w^orld knew it. The Germans broadcast it.
General Bissell. They never broadcast the thing about the Van
Vliet visit. They said that American and British personnel, I think,
had been taken there or w^ould be taken there, but no names were
mentioned in anything I ever saw or know about. I can be wrong-
on this. There is an awful lot of stuff that did not reach G-2 on
this matter.
Mr. Mitchell. To clarify that point, sir; Colonel Van Vliet in
his testimony in part 2 specifically set forth, and so did Captain
Stewart w^ien he testified, that to their knowledge their names had
never been revealed by the Germans about their visit to Katyn.
General Bissell. It is also clear that the instructions from our
State Department to the American Legation at Bern was responsible
for the letter Colonel Van Vliet stated he had been given by the
Swiss protecting power about October 19i3, because the questions
Colonel Van Vliet said were in the letter he received are almost
exactly the questions our State Department had directed our Bern
Embassy to submit. The slight difference in phraseology was prob-
ably due to the requirement for paraphrasing anything that had been
sent classified, so that your code cannot be touched by putting it out
afterward for somebody who had copied the code.
The channel through which the questions reached Colonel Van Vliet
was the one our State Department had directed to be used by our
Bern Legation, and the time factors fitted perfectly. Our State De-
partment instructions issued in September 1948 apparently had re-
sulted in the delivery to Colonel Van Vliet while he was a prisoner
at Oflag 64 of the questions our State Department wanted answered.
Colonel Van Vliet stated that he replied to them. I^nless Colonel
Van Vliet was in error, either as to the date he gave, about October
1943, or about where he was then held prisoner at OHag G4, the in-
formation that our State Department received in February 1944 re-
porting his transfer to Oflag 64 could have had no possible bearing
on the delivery of Colonel Van Vliet's reply, as he had actually re-
ceived the letter at Oflag No. 64 and answered it 4 months earlier.
Also significant is the State Department's conclusion that the reason
no reply was received from Colonel Van Vliet was that it was con
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1869
sidered likely Colonel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted
by the Germans.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am going to have to interrupt you again, because
I am interested in this whole situation, and I think the members of
the committee are. I am trying to tell you I am very much confused.
What was the significance of that letter ?
General Bissell. I read this part of it here.
Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. What was the significance ?
General Bissell. State was proceeding on the theory he had never
received their letter.
Mr. IMachrowicz. Wliose letter ?
General Bissell. Tliis letter sponsored by the Bern Legation. State
had sent word to Bern to have the Swiss Protecting Power get a letter
to Van Vliet asking questions.
Mr. Machrowicz. What has that got to do with the matter we are
investigating ?
General Bissell. If Colonel Van Vliet had answered that at the
time, and I could get my hands on the answers then, I could compare
all or part of them with the statement he made to me 2 years later
to measure his memory, his veracity, or anything else. I did not ques-
tion them, but I had that job as a responsibility to do.
Mr. ISIachrgwicz. Wliat is the significance ?
General Bissell. The significance is that the answer State gave
me that he had changed prison camps had nothing to do with it be-
cause the letter had reached him and he had replied, according to his
statement, so the change of prison camps had nothing to do with it.
]Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. I frankly say I am as much confused as I was in
the beginning.
Mr. Dondero. Perhaps I can answer my colleague from Michigan
by saying I think the significance is that the State Department and the
Government here knew about this thing long before Colonel Van Vliet's
report.
Mr. Machrow^icz. Certainly. So did the Department of Defense
in 1943.
General Bissell. But we didn't know Van Vliet's part in it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Neither did the DeiDartment of State, as you say.
General Bissell. They did.
Mr. Machrowicz. They didn't know what he had to say.
General Bissell. No ; but they knew he had been there.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. It is up to the Department of
Defense to get a statement.
General Bissell. We didn't know about it. We were not asked to get
such a statement. This is the State Department's job in time of war?
IVIr. DoNDERO. They were contacting these two prisoners through
the delegation in Switzerland.
General Bissell. Yes. They acted as American Government repre-
sentatives as a neutral close to Germany.
Also significant is the conclusion that the reason no reply was re-
ceived from Colonel Van Vliet was that it was considered likely Colo-
nel Van Vliet's reply may have been intercepted by the Germans.
Assuming that the Germans had intercepted the Van Vliet reply that
Russia was guilty of the Katyn massacre, as Germany had stated to
the world, and assume that Germany was innocent, is it reasonable
93744— 52— pt. 7 4
1870 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
that, if innocent, Germany, who had gone to such trouble to take
Colonel Van Vliet and a sizable party to Katyn for the very purpose
of having them report German innocence to the world, would not
allow a letter from Colonel Van Vliet accomplishing such purpose to
reach the United States ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you claim the letter was received by the Swiss ;
that it was not intercepted ?
General Bissell, I don't know. It is a funny reason to give.
Mr. Machrowicz. You don't claim it was received ; do you ?
General Bissell. No ; I don't claim State got any answer back.
Mr. Machrowicz. You don't claim that Department of State re-
ceived this information ?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. What is it you claim ?
General Bissell. I don't believe that the reason they gave for not
receiving it — that Germany intercepted it — was sound.
Mr. Machrowicz. What has that got to do with this ?
General Bissell. Because I am still trying to get Van Vliet 's report
to check it.
When the June 9, 1945, reply to my May 25, 1945, letter to State
Department was received, the question naturally occurred : Why had
State not made further ert'ort to secure reply from Van Vliet? State
knew about the Katyn massacre. The State Department did not say
specifically that the September and December 1943 attempts were
the only attempts they made. They might have made other attempts
without tangible results. I considered it purposeless to follow this
aspect of the matter further because I believe that State had been
furnished Colonel Van Vliet's report on May 25, 1945.
Mr. Machrowicz. Because what ?
General Bissell. I believe that State had been furnished the Colonel
Van Vliet report on May 25, 1945.
Mr. Machrowicz. Which report are you referring to ?
General Bissell. The one made in my office.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you not tell me this morning you cannot state
they received it ?
General Bissell. But I believe they did.
Mr. Machrowicz. You believe they did ?
General Bissell. Let us get straight. What I believe is one thing,
and my positive knowledge is another, I believe that they had re-
ceived it because it was my intention to get it there or to another place.
Mr. Mitchell. Where was the other place ?
General Bissell. The other place was the War Crimes people.
Mr. Mitchell. You stated this morning that you had discussed this
matter with Mr. Frederick Lyon. Is that correct ?
General Bissell. I said I either mentioned it to Mr. Lyon or Mr.
ITolmos.
Mr. Mitchell. Over the telephone or in person ?
General Bissell, I s]>oke to Mv. Lyon only on the phone. On the
other hand, I saw or talked to Mr. Holmes twice at approximately the
same day. We had a very hot matter in the Argentine, and I was
dealing witli both of them at the same time on it.
This is off the Katyn thing a little bit, but I think it is all right,
because it is not classified any more.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1871
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to know what were the names of the
people designated by State to be liaison with the G-2 when you were
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. What were the names of those
individuals from the Department of State ?
General Bissell. The two that worked with me most closely were
Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lyon.
Mr. Mitchell. Anybody else at this time that you care to mention ?
Are there any other names 'i
General Bissell. Not that have a bearing of any nature in connec-
tion with Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you are now saying for the record
at this time that there were no other individuals in the Department
of State to your knowledge that had any bearing on the Van Vliet
Katyn report ?
General Bissell. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. You are sure?
Mr, Machrowicz. I want to pursue that line because it is important.
I think it is important to you and it is important to us all as Ameri-
cans, because if the Department of State received a report which it
denies receiving we want to know. Is that not right ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. You told me this morning that you cannot say
that you forwarded that report.
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, as I understand you, you want to qualify
it by saying, although you cannot say you sent it to the Department
of State, you believe you sent it.
General Bissell. I thought I had.
Mr. Machrowicz, You still think you did?
General Bissell. I don't know where it is, and it is pretty difficult
to pin it down.
Mr. Machrowicz. You are not much help to this committee.
General Bissell. I am telling everything I know about people run-
ning down details that in my opinion don't hit it too closely that bear
on it. If I give you too much, stop me.
Mr. MiTCjiELL. General, there is one other question. I asked you
a minute ago who were the people designated by the State Depart-
ment with which you did official business in connection with G-2
matters that State should know about in the line of conunand or
anywhere else ?
You told the committee here this morning and again now that the
two are General Holmes and Mr. Lyon. Is that correct ?
General Bissell. That could know anything about the Katyn
matter ?
Mr. Mitchell. That could know anything about the Katyn
massacre.
General Bissell. I don't think so.
Mr. Mitchell. Who were the individuals in your own organization
who had liaison with the Department of State who might know any-
thing about the Katyn matter ?
General Bissell. Many, many.
Mr. Mitchell. I mean officially designated by you as head of G-2,
General Bissell. A man named Dillingham, a colonel at that time
1872 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
or lieutenant colonel," was my liaison man to handle hot wires that
came into State. If something came in among their stuff that re-
quired military consideration or action, he was there watching. I
don't think he knows a thing about Katyn.
Mr. Mitchell. I specifically nailed my question down. General, to
who in your Department was designated to liaison with the State De-
partment who might know or have any knowledge of the Van Vliet
report on Katyn.
General Bissell. No one.
Mr. Mitchell. No one but yourself ?
General Bissell. I think that is right.
]Mr. Mitchell. You are sure?
General Bissell. I think, as far as Katyn is concerned on this par-
ticular deal, yes, sir; I think that is right. But I had many contacts
in the State at every level.
Mr. Mitchell. At this time will you tell us now who in your De-
partment had knowledge of the Katyn matter ?
General Bissell. Mrs. Meeres and an officer who today was con-
firmed to be Lieutenant Colonel Lantaff. I knew someone in my office
handled it, but I could not tell you which one. His handling of it was
not to be present when anything was being made but in connection
with the papers.
]Mr. IVIachrgwicz. You do not mean those are the only two people
in your department that had knowledge of Katyn ?
General Bissell. I believe they are. Colonel Van Vliet's arrival
and his procedure was not the routine.
Mr. Machrowicz. I can assure you you are wrong. I am not guess-
ing at it. I am stating you are wrong.
General Bissell. I will try to think hard and see.
Mr. Sheehan. You said the Katyn matter. Do you mean the Van
Vliet report ?
Mr. IMiTCHELL. I said the Van Vliet report on the Katyn affair.
General Bissell. I thought you were exploiting his question or ex-
panding it. That is not so. Lots of people had heard of Katyn.
Loads of them. The whole Polish Liaison Section. We had Poles
accredited to us who came to G-2.
Chairman Madden. Everybody knew about Katyn after it was
broadcast and the bodies were found. So, that is not so ini])ortant.
]\rr. Mitchell. General, I think you missed the point of my (jues-
tion. The question I want to get across is: "Who in 3'our staff, as the
head of G-2, did you specifically designate to take this matter up with
the Department of State or any other agency of the (lovernment ?
(jeneral Bissell. I did not designate anybody in my office to take
it \]\) with the Department of State.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you personally handled the matter yourself?
General Bissell. As far as I can recollect. AVhen I say "handled
it," I mean 1 liHudled the direction to be given and what was to be
done.
^fr. ^NfrrcMiKLT,. Thou, if you say you "handled it," you must have
directed somebody to do something about it.
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. MrrcHEi,L. Those are the names I want.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1873
General Bissell. I directed someone, who from this morning^s
testimony I believe to be Colonel Lantaff, to secure a proper room
where this dictation could be handled.
Mr. Mitchell. We know that.
General Bissell. To brief Mrs. Meeres, who was doing her first job
in my office. I think that is about the end of the story.
Chairman jNIadden. General, is it something unusual while you were
connected with this assignment over there for a report of this kind
coming in dealing with the massacre or murder of over 4,000 soldiers?
That was unusual ?
General Bissell. It was unusual from beginning to end.
Chairman Madden. And you were in complete charge of that office?
General Bissell. I am responsible for everything that my people do.
Chairman Madden. You just testified that to your knowledge there
could not be over two people in your office under your supervision
connected with the Van Vliet Katyn report.
General Bissell. That is right.
Chairman Madden. That report that was made by Colonel Van
Vliet was quite important in your mind ?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Chairman Madden. With this responsibility that you had, and as
your testimony showed, it was completely unusual, a case of this kind.
You testified this morning that you could not say whether or not the
Van Vliet report was ever delivered to the State Department.
General Bissell. That is correct, sir. I cannot say that.
Chairman Madden. Do you not think, considering the background
as you already have testified, that that would be very much on your
mind to see that a report like that would be transferred over there if
that was the place it should go ?
General Bissell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Madden. Why did you not know that it was transferred
over there, if it was?
General Bissell. Because I would have given instructions to have
had something done, and I w^ould not have personally been doing it.
Chairman Madden. Did you give instructions to have that done ?
General Bissell. I am positive I gave instructions.
Chairman Madden. To whom ?
General Bissell. I believe now I don't know. I think I could give
3'ou my story.
Chairman Madden. Just answer that. Whom did you give instruc-
tions to?
General Bissell. I do not recall whether it was Congressman Lan-
taff, but if it was not
Mr. Machrowicz. He said it was not.
General Bissell. I know. If it was not, I don't know what other
person.
Mr. Machroavicz. There was only one other person.
General Bissell. She could not have done it. I don't know who
actually got the instruction.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then there were no instructions given.
General Bissell. That is not something I can swear to as a fact.
1874 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. That is the only possible logical conclusion that
anyone can come to.
General Bissell. That may be so, but I don't believe you are giving
me quit-e the opportunity you desire. Katyn, although unusual, was
unusual because Van Vliet, instead of coming in initially and report-
ing to the executive officer and being sent by him to the proper section,
being handled as in every other case coming in, insisted on seeing me.
Mr. Mitchell. Did he do that under anybody's direction ? He said
he had seen General Collins. He had seen other people over there.
When he initially came to you, did he tell you he was sent there by
anybody else?
General Bissell. He did not, but he told me he had seen (xeneral
Collins. He told me the others he had seen. He gave me a straight
story, just about the way he told you here. I think he was right, but
he did get an unusual handling of his case from that minute on.
Chairman Madden. Let me ask you this. General, considering your
testimony that just Colonel Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres were the only two
in your office connected with the Van Vliet report and that you might
have told Colonel Lantaff to deliver the report to the State Depart-
ment or you might have told Mrs. Meeres
(xeneral Bissell. No, I didn't tell her to do any such thing.
Chairman Madden. You might have told Colonel Lantaff, there
would not be anybody outside of Lantaff you to\d(
General Bissell. I don't think so.
Chairman Madden. Let us concede that you told Colonel Lantaff.
General Bissell. All right, sir.
Chairman Madden. Considering the importance of this report deal-
ing with the massacre of over 4,000 soldiers of our allies, had you told
Colonel Lantaff, don't you think the most natural thing would be,
as the head of this department, maybe the next day or the day after,
to inquire from the colonel if that important report was delivered to
the State Department ?
General Bissell. I don't think I would have done that.
Chairman Madden. Don't you think the colonel would have come
back and stated to you, as his superior officer, that he had carried out
your instruction ?
General Bissell. He would not do that, because I would take it for
granted. I knew he would carry out instructions. The only thing
I would have done under the situation you paint there, if I had ques-
tioned the delivery of that, I would have asked Holmes if he got it.
That is the point.
Chairman Madden. Colonel Lantaff testified this, morning that
there was never any order given to him at all to deliver the report.
General Bissell. The only instruction ap|)arently I gave Colonel
Lantalf was to secure, after securing the report, a place for the report
to be dictated and the briefing of Mrs. Meeres.
Mr. ]Maciii{owicz. Are you not contradicting your own testimony?
General Bissei>l. Colonel Lantalf, I think — I have never talked
with him, T never saw him since he left (x-2 until he came in this room
this morning, so that there is no suggestion coming from him, and I
would accept anything he said that he would swear to as being true.
He would not need to swear to it, if he said it. I think he is con-
fused on what ha])pened to the report, as I am confused on what hap-
pened to it. He cannot tell us how it went out of the room, and he
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1875
does not know whetlier he jxot it back or not. He did reply that lie
read it in the preparation stai^e. That could have been done. There is
a strono; feeling in my mind that Van Vliet started one day and fin-
ished another and that the notes had to be put np overnifrht, and the
colonel indicated that was the case because he put them u]).
Mr. Machrowicz. That is not what the colonel says. Colonel Van
A-^liet said he finished the statement in 1 day.
General Bissell. The Conoressman, not Colonel Lantaff. Colonel
Van Vliet says in another ])lace he does not know whether he stayed
over another day or not. If he had completed it the first day, there
would have been no reason to i>nt away stenofrrapher's notes that nio-ht
or anything else or to come back and <ret the papers the next day if he
had brou^rht them to me that day. I mifjht have been busy. He might
have tried to.
Chairman Maddex. Did anybody ever telephone you or call up or
come into your office after the report was signed by Van Vliet re-
garding the report, did a telephone call come in to. request to read it
or anything {
General Bissell. No.
Chairman Madden. Xot a person communicated with your office
regarding it after it was signed ^
General Bissell. No, sir, I don't think so.
Chairman Madden. When did you decide to send it to the State
De])artment then ?
General Bissell. My intention had been to have it go to the State
De]:)artment at once and whether it went, I don't know, as I have
said.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let us stick to that now, because you have made
some very serious and unwarranted inferences which are not at all
in accord with what you are saying right now.
General Bissell. If I had not pointed out these things, I think I
would not have given you all I know on the matter.
Chairman Madden. Was it the next day you sent it to the State
Dejiartment or the week after or a month ?
General Bissell. It would have been done either on the 24:th or
25th, that it would have gone from the office, had it gone to the State
Department.
Chairman Madden. Why do you say it would have gone then ?
General Bisseijl. Because on the twenty-second, the date that
Colonel Van Vliet saw me, there could not have been time in my opinion
to have processed it, and I saw Colonel Van Vliet on two different
occasions.
Chairman ]Madden. You thought it was so important that you im-
mediately sent it over to the State Department the next day?
General Bissell. And I think it was not ready to go the next day,
but it would have been ready the following day.
Chairman Madden. And the following day you sent it over?
General Bissell. The twenty-fifth, I think; if it ever went from
G-2 to State, it prol^ably left G-2 on the twenty-fifth.
Chairman Madden. You don't know whether it went at all or not?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. In your letter to Mr. Lyon you state as follows :
' Dear Mr. Lyon : Transmitted for the information and the file of the State
Department is report on Katyn by Stanley S. V. Gilder, Captain. British Medical
1876 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Officer. This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John Van Vliet, Jr.,
forwarded to (Jeueral Holmes on May 25, 1945.
General Bissell. Written by JSIrs. Meeres,
Mr. Machrowicz. Signed by Clayton Bissell.
General Bissell. I did not put in that date.
Mr. Machrowicz. What date ?
General Bissell. That it was forwarded on a certain date. That
was from something that was found in the office or something of the
kind. I did not put that in.
Mr. Machrowicz. You signed the letter.
General Bissell. I signed the letter, and when I dictated it, I dic-
tated the first paragraph and then I said, 'Tt is the Colonel Van Vliet
report, and get the dope on the thing and send it in."
Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, that only contained one
paragraph.
General Bissell. That is the second thought. The first thought,
here comes a letter, and the second thought, compare it with another
thing.
Mr. Machrowicz. I will read it to you again :
Dear Mr. Lyon : Transmitted for the information and the files of the State
Department is report on Katyn by Stanley S. V. Gilder, Captain, British Medical
Officer. This report supplements statement of Lt. Col. John Van Vliet, Ji'.,
forwarded to General Holmes.
General Bissell. That is the way I remember it. There were two
sentences. The first one I dictated straight out and I left the follow-
ing thing blank.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are you inferring that you as commanding offi-
cer, G-2, signed a letter in blank with your secretary filling it in?
General Bisseij^. It was filled in.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was the date in there. May 25 ?
General Bissell. The date was filled in.
Mr. Machrowicz. What was not in then? You signed the letter,
and May 25 you forwarded it.
General Bissell. When I signed the letter it was exactly the form
in which you read it. When I dictated I dictated what I could, out
of my head, I think in August.
Mr. Machrowicz. August 25.
General Bissell. I could not have pulled that date out of my head
after all that had been happening, with accuracy.
Mr. Machrowicz. How do you account for the fact that you stated
in your letter you did forward to General Holmes the Colonel Van
Vliet report?
General Bissell. That was my belief at the moment of what had
happened. They went back to the files apparently and got something
to set that date up for them. The one that did it I think is Mrs.
Meeres.
Mr. Mitchell. Where is that letter or a copy of that letter today ?
General Bissell. Isn't that one of those you have here ?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not referring to this. I am referring to the
letter where you got the date May 25, 19-1:5' from.
General Bissell. I did not personally do that.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute, (ieneral. You stated to Mr. Mach-
rowicz 1 minute ago that you could not recall this date, so you dic-
tated all the other data that is in this to the best of your knowledge.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1877
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you probably said, as many men do to their
secretaries, "Find out when I transmitted that over to General
Holmes." She inserted this date 25th of May 1945. If she could
find that on August 21, 1945, why can't we find the same copy of the
transmittal today ?
General Bissell. That is what I would like to know. Also, I think
it is very significant because that is what I believed at that particular
time and put in writing and I didn't do it myself.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is what you would like to find out and
that is what we would like to find out. You are inferring the fault
lies with the Department of State. If those letters were lost, they
were lost in the Department of Defense, is that right?
General Bissell. I don't know where they were lost.
Mr. Machrowicz. They never got out of the Department of De-
fense.
General Bissell. I don't know whether they did or not. Wliy
would we have that kind of letter written in my office if it had not
gone out.
Mr. Machrowicz. I mean the original report of Colonel Van
Vliet.
General Bissell. That is what I am talking about, too. Why
would I have referred to it by date if I didn't believe it had gone out?
And why if it had not gone out didn't State, when they got the letter,
call me up on the phone : "How about this thing, we haven't got that."
Mr. Machrowicz. You are inferring you would have let an impor-
tant document go out without some receipt ?
General Bissell. I never got a receipt from anybody on anything in
G-2. I had people who did the receipting for me, and a section in my
office to process in and out those documents. So far as my particular
section of the G-2 office is concerned, we had Colonel Lantaff's group
who did it for me. I never signed one in, I never signed one out.
When I got through with a communication, it went in my out basket.
Those people who were cleared for top secret information brought me
in masses of stuff every day. I acted on it and put it in the out bas-
ket.
Chairman Madden. Did they ever bring you in masses of material
that pertained to the killing of 4,300 soldiers?
General Bissell. At that time I dichi't know and do not know today
exactly how many were killed.
Chairman Madden. You should not classify a report of this im-
portance with the thousands of little details that come in and out of
your office. This was an extraordinary, an important event, as you
testified.
General Bissell. I was very concerned all of this particular time
with events that were even more critical to America's war with Japan,
and this was not going to help win the Japan war one bit except in a
different way. And that was the reason I was so careful about this
thing.
I have a lot of stuff here, and I will spoil it by breaking it up piece-
rtieal. The UNO conference was one. I had been on there the pre-
vious week. Our No. 1 objective, other than defeating Japan at that
time, was to get a UNO going. We didn't know whether we could
get the Russians to come in.
1878 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. You wanted to maintain friendship with the
Hussians.
General Bissell. That Avas tlie policy of our Government.
Chairman Madden. Was that why the report disappeared?
General Bissell. No, sir, it was not why. I don't know what re-
port you are talking about on that. That is a fast one. I cannot
tell you a thing about that.
Mr. DoxDERO. Mr. Chairman, I think I ought to enter this. T
notice that my colleague from Michigan, who is critical of your testi-
mony, even referred to a letter with one sentence in it when there were
two in it, and the letter was right before hiui. So it shows the falli-
bility of human nature.
I want to ask this one question: General, at the time you had this
Katyn massacre subject before you, were you handling other matters
for the Government in your department?
Geueral Bissell. Vast numbei's.
Mr. DoNDERo. You had other items around the world in relation to
the war which we were then in, is that correct?
General Bissell. That is right. I told you I cauie up to this body,
busy as I was, to testify to them about subversive activities in the
service.
Mr. DoNDERO. The Katyn matter was only one of the items that
^ame across your dessk ?
Chairman Madde'n. It was the only massacre you had.
General Bissell. That is not so. It was the ouly one of that magni-
tude. No; it is not so. I was receiving at the same time that the
Colonel Van Vliet report came in, the very time, the Dachau and other
German concentration-camp things where they had wdiolesale mas-
sacres that make this thing look insignificant. It numbers nearly a
quarter of a million that went through Dachau. And there were
Poles in that, lots of them. My driver yesterday taking me from the
station was a Pole whose father was killed in that thing, and who
spent as a child, until he got old enough to come to the United States,
his time in Dachau from 1943 on.
The Japanese balloon thing was cracking on us. We were having
a devil of a time to get the press to hold it. We had had the fatali-
ties in Oregon. We didn't want the American people to know what
was hap])ening in that thing, and, more than that, we didn't want the
Japanese to know how successful they were. I was busy trying to
keep that one from bursting in the press. I had that on my mind.
The same day, when I was out on the tri]>, I had the Minnea]X)lis
newspapers on me and came back here and got Price together with
others of the group that was concerned with it on how we would
handle that particular thing. I was preparing somethino- for General
Marshall to Field Marshal ]\faintland-Wilson at that particular time.
If I racJv my memory, I can show you that the Van Vliet visit took
30 minutes one day and less the next, on days like I had been working!
for many months from 7 a. m. until late every night and Sundavs, on I
everything in the world. I had flown 14 or 15 hours on one day in
connection with this trip, getting in here to meet Colonel Van Vliet.
I didn't know he was hero.
I would like to add just one more thing. Coloiu^l Lantaff is jii-^(
as honest as can be, but he said that Mrs. Jepson was in the oflice
and I had loaned Mrs. Jepson to UNO and she was working out theie
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1879
on that thing. And another lady, whose name slipped his memory,
I am sure Mrs. Bryant, was the secretary on duty. He didn't tell you
anj- thing wrong. He told you what he believed and remembered.
He just overlooked the fact we did loan her out there and she was
not yet back on duty in my office at the time.
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. who?
General Bissell. Miss Bryant. She is now married and living
down here near Hollis some place.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Was she married at that time ?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. SnEEiiAX. General, I have a series of questions; so if you wnll
be patient with me, because some of them might be a little rehashing
of something that has been said, and I do that for the purpose of get-
ting away from the general discussion, so that it will come out and
be either clarified or amplified.
Number one: Mrs. Meeres in her testimony stated that top-secret
reports usually are corrected and i-etyped, and, as you yourself said,
Colonel Lantaff read this report in the preparation stage. Why wasn't
that -report handled this way?
General Bissell. My intention was to have it produced in what we
call draft ; bring it out in draft. That usually means that a thing
is typed on long sheets, double or triple space, just the original im-
pression. Then it is corrected and modified and you do not send a
dirty copy out, so a retyping is essential. That is what I thought
would happen in this case, because I thought when Colonel Van Vliet
got his dictation down and Mrs. Meeres knocked it out the first time,
she would have misunderstood or misspelled or done a number of other
things. They would then bring it in to me and we would talk about
it and I would see if there were any other errors or omissions I could
ask him about that might help him and then it would be retyped.
Mr. Mitchell. Right at that particular stage, was this rough draft
ever converted into an original final draft?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Was there ever a top secret number given to the Van
Vliet report ?
General Bissell. That I would not know, because I didn't handle
that myself. That was done in Colonel Lantaff's office.
Chairman Maddex. I suggest that Mr. Sheehan continue his ques-
tions.
Mr. Sheehan. I had yielded to the gentleman for that purpose.
In other words, once you determined a document was top secret,
you turned it over to Colonel Lantaff or someone else in the office for
the classification?
General Bissell. For the handling in accordance with instructions
that were standard throughout the General Staff.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, the mere fact that this top-secret
document was not handled that way is no fault of yours because you
turned it over to your subordinates?
General Bissell. No; it is partly correct and partly not. That is
the way I wanted it typed up the first time and that is the way I ex-
pected Van Vliet to bring it to me, and that is the way it was brought to
me. The only thing corrected in it was maybe a word or two and it
was not necessary to have a rewrite and it was not rewritten. It was
a very good job, "that report.
1880 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan, Colonel Van Vliet stated that on May 5, 1945, he
showed photographs of the Katyn massacre to a G-2 officer of the
One Hundred Fouith Infantry stationed overseas. Do you recall any
report at all on this instance coming into your office?
General Bissell. I never heard of that except when Colonel Van.
Vliet told about it.
Mr. Sheehan. I understand that a Col. Thomas Drake, who was a
senior American officer at Oflag 64 and was repatriated because of
stomach ulcers in 1944, that he made out reports on the Van Vliet
and Captain Stewart testimony and sent a copy of this report to
G-1, G-2, State Department, Secretary of War Stimson, and to Mr.
Lauchlin Currie, care of Mr. Roosevelt. Did that G-2 report ever
come across your desk ?
General Bissell. I never heard of that phase of it. The only thing
I know is what Colonel Van Vliet told me and what is in his testimony
to you.
Mr. Sheehan. As far as you know, it never came to your attention?
General Bissell. I don't know anything about it. That would have
been before my time, you understand.
Mr. Sheehan. No; you said you came in there in 1944.
General Bissell. I came in 1944, and that was done when?
Mr. Sheehan. Colonel Drake was repatriated late in 1944, which
means he arrived in this country in late 1944 or 1945 to make out
these reports.
General Bissell. My impression was that Colonel Van Vliet had
said shortly after he got back he talked to Colonel Drake on it.
Mr. Sheehan. That is right; but he was not repatriated until a
year later.
General Bissell. I don't know about that. All I have is what is
in the Colonel Van Vliet report and what he may have mentioned
to me.
Mr. Sheehan. In classifying a document top secret, after your
underlings had done so
General Bissell. I don't call them that — my helpers.
Mr. Sheehan. Let us call them subordinates — or any other phase
of secrecy; do the Army Regulations prescribe for any logging or
entering of this in the log book in your office ?
General Bissell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Was that done in this case ?
General Bissell. I don't know, because, as I said, I never wenti
back to those. I asked if it was in the log when I was working
for — I don't believe I asked. I think you did the asking on that;
I suggested to you, Mr. Shackelford, that you have the log checked.
Mr. Mitchell. Who in your specific office had charge of your log?
General Bissell. I thinfe Congressman Lantaff was the senior, and
that Earman was the next, and they both had to do it because my hours
were longer than theirs.
Mr. Sheehan. Counsel, I think the chairman should instruct you
to check with the Army to see if that thing was logged any place.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe you have it right there.
Mr. Sackelford. We have checked tlie logs in regard to that, asi
well as the receipt books. That was the part of the careful search that|
was made by the inspector, and with negative results. I
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1881
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Lantaff this morning said that anyone
in the G-2 immediate staff offices might have access to your personal
safe. Is that correct or is that incorrect ?
General Bissell. It depends on what he says
Mr. Mitchell. What I would like to have you answer is how many
people of your immediate staff had access to your safe.
Genera] Bissell. The safe that he described as my personal safe
was described in that category because in it was a single drawer which
had my personal things like invitations, and so on. It was a classified
routine safe in the G-2 office. Now, the safe he did not mention was
in my office. And in my office, let ns get straight, too, because that is
causing a lot of trouble, I had an office in which I worked, a big room.
On one side was my deputy, on the other side was Colonel Lantaff,
Colonel Earman, normally Mrs. Jepson, and Mrs. Bryant, and a
man named Carulli. They were in my immediate office. They were
all cleared for top secret, and they all know between them if it was
added up, everything I do. So if I were to be hit by a car crossing
the street, there is enough there to carry on. But I tried hard to
keep more people from knowing about important things than needed
to be. So I didn't try to let all of them know everything and they
worked better. They w^ere better on the things that each one
remembered.
Now, the G-2 office is directly spoken of to include the chief, the
deputy, the deputy's stenographers, and this little group that I told
you. However, my office, that is just one room, and I am in there by
myself. When I want a secretary, I call for her. They worked out-
side because all the stuff that I talked about was highly classified, or
maybe General Marshall came in or General Handy, during which
we would discuss some action, and it would be settled. Anybody
might come over. The Secretary of the Treasury has visited me
there, any number of people on all kinds of matters. So I had to
have a place where there was no one in their hair, they could talk
freely.
Now, in my little office I might be called to General Marshall's
office and he would say, "Come on up here." We had a squawk box.
He was a cracker] ack man to work for. When I ran, if I had things
on my desk that were classified, and there usually was nothing else,
practically nothing unclassified came in, I just picked up my basket.
I had a three-combination, two-drawer safe, and I dropped the basket
complete in there, flung the combination, checked it, took down the
red sign that the safe was open that we had on every safe there and
put it on top and was on my way, usually hollering when I went
through I was on my way to General Marshall's office. That safe is
my personal safe. No one in my office knew the combination of that
safe except my deputy. General Wackerling.
Mr. Mitchell. Was the Van Vliet report we speak of put in that
safe the night that Van Vliet completed it ?
General Bissell. No ; it was never put there, so far as I know, be-
cause I didn't put my hands on the thing except to read it. They
brought it in to me ; I sat down ; I gave Van Vliet a chance to cor-
rect it. He didn't want to make any corrections. It was not what
you call authenticated in that there were a number of pages that
were not initialed. I had him do that. I had him sit back in the
1882 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
chair comfortably and I went tlu-ough it. My reason for g'oing
tlirough it primarily was to answer the question whether there was
any discrepancy between this and what he had told me before, and it
w^as a crackerjack report; there were no discrepancies. I then said,
"This is to be classified top secret.'" I can't tell you whether Mrs.
Meeres, Colonel Van Vliet, or myself actually did the top-secret stamp
on the top and bottom of ever}' page.
Mr. Mitchell. Isn't it conventional wdien the secretary is doing
rough draft to use the stamp "top secret" before handing it back to
the individual from whom she took the dictation ?
General Bisskll. Not if she kept it in her possession. She was not
through with the report yet. However, she did say this morning that
the envelope which had the notes taken out of her notebook — any spare
piece of paper tliat was put in, that might carry tlie top-secret infor-
mation, goes in the same envelope. Outside it is marked "Burn.''
And the officer oversaw the burning. 1 don't think you will find
there are many leaks out of G-2. Maybe we have been too tight, but
we never lose them. Nothing got to the ])ublic from G-'2. ■
Mr. SiiEEHAN. General, in these couple of days here in May when
Van Vliet w^as in and you said you had thought
General Bissell. May 22.
Mr. Sheehan. May 21 to 25 when you had talked to General Van
Vliet, if I remember correctly, you stated you did i)hone or you
thought you phoned Holmes and Lyons in the State Department.
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. When you talked to any of these gentlemen or with
Colonel Lantaff about the Van Vliet report did the question come up
as to the political implication of this report at any time?
General Bissell. The only reason I would have mentioned it to
them at all Avould have been its political aspect.
Mr. Sheehan. Did they agree with you it was vital ?
General Bissell. No discussion occurred of the contents of the
re]:)ort at that stage.
Mr, Sheehan. You are talking about the political implications ?
General Bissell (reading) :
There was a man here named Van Vliet who arrived yesterday and who has
information on the political matter, the Katyn massacre, that we will send ta
you as soon as we get through with it.
Mr. Sheehan. You did not discuss the conclusions?
General Bissell. No. It was only incidental to the talk on the
other matter. I remember the other matter quite well, I will be
glad to give it to you in executive session, but it has no bearing on
Katyn whatever,
Mr. Sheehan. This might steal a little thunder from my colleague
over there. This morning Congressman O'Konski asked you a ques-
tion al)out whether or not any other documents had disappeared or
were lost or strayed from G-2. I did not use the word "stolen'' ad-
visedly because tlie Army uses the word "compromise." As I under-
stand it, from the MacArthur testimony, tlie eight colonels Avho sent
a top-secret repor-t from Japan or the Near East in which they tried
to advise the administration of the danger of alining themselves with
Russia in finisliing off the Japanese war, I understand that report
disappeared out of G-2. Is that right or wrong?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1883;
General Bissell. Here is what I don't believe is fully understood
and probably it is just as well that all the American people don't
know about 'all of G-2, but if you didn't have some procedure for
destroying set up with the mass of stuif coming in there, you could not
get the people that would be required to keep track of it in the Penta-
gon. There goes on constantly in any large intelligence organization
a sorting out and a reclassification and a destruction. At the end
of the German war there was a period when that had to be done ex-
tensively. The German war had ended just a few days, a short time
before General Van Vliet's arrival. He got liberated on the 5th of
May. The war was over on the Tth, as 1 recall, the 8th, and this is;
the 22d. Now, also, at the end of the German war, by the plans ar-
ranged in advance, we were to start cutting down personnel drastically.
The biggest fighting part of the war was over, maybe not the most
difficult part, but the biggest fighting part. With that cutting dowm,
your procedure of destruction is weakened because you try to let those
people go who have come in from civil life and given you fine service
in the order in which they want to go, in which they can get a job. If
a fellow got a chance to leave and he was a good man, his boss wants
him right now when the pressure is off. Those people we would let
go. Others were cases where they didn't want to go so quickly, and
Ave tried to be loyal to them, too. During the time I was there, this
procedure and declassification, two things, must go on. You must
destroy the things that are no longer necessary and current, and you
must declassify down and down, as time passes.
Mr. Sheetiax. The Japanese war was still on at the time?
General Bissell. I don't know the instance you are talking about.
I was asked some questions about a report of a number of colonels.
They were not of ]\IacArthur's staff. They were right here in Wash-
ington, that group, and I didn't know MacArthur's connection with it.
Mr. Sheeiian. It came out during the ^NlacArthur hearings that the
Army G-2 was advised by the group of eight colonels.
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. SiiEEiiAX. Of the dangers of alining themselves with Russia.,
Apparently during the MacArthur hearings they thought this was
a very vital document. When they went to look for it, they a]5par-
ently could not find it because it was referred to G-2 and never found
afterward. ^
General Bissell. The way the story came to me was, "Can you tell
us whether such a report was ever made to you ?" Well, it might have
been prepai-ed : those people were in my office, but if they prepared
such a repoi't. it never came to me.
Mr. Machkowicz. That is the question I would like to know about,
since you inferred that the Katyn matter was not so important because
of the tremendous importance of the Japanese affair. Here is a report
bearing exactly on the issue which you considered paramount now.
Now you don't remember those eight colonels filing a report with you.
General Bissell. I have talked to some of the eight colonels and
they told me they never made such a report. I think you will have
one here whom you may ask the questions.
Mr. Mitchell. Was he one of the eight colonels ?
General Bissell. I think he is.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know Col. Truman Smith ?
1884 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you say Col. Truman Smitli did not sign a
report ?
General Bissell. I never got such a report as you described from
him.
Mr. Machrowicz. At any rate the report is missing in G-2 ?
General Bissell. I don't know if it ever left the office where it
originated. I don't know anything about it, because I never saw it.
Don't get the idea that we didn't appreciate that there was danger in
the international political situation or danger in our alinement with
Russia. We had had troubles with the Russians all through the war
trying to help them and keep them out of our hair.
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to know whether the loss of the Van
Vliet report was not one of those attempts to help them.
General Bissell. Do you want me to answer that question ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Yes.
General Bissell. So far as I am concerned, I would be on the other
side of that fight for every inch that was of me. It did not, with my
knowledge or my help, and I would like to say further that no person,
not General Marshall, not the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, not any
member of the General Staff or any member of the military profession
or any member of our diplomatic or legislative or judicial or any
other human, foreign or American, ever suggested to me what to do
or what not to do with the Van Vliet report or anything comiected
with it.
Mr. Mitchell. You are implying you did discuss it with these
gentlemen ?
General Bissell. No; I did not. I said none of them ever mem-
tioned it to me.
Mr. Mitchell. How could they mention it if they did not know
about it ?
General Bissell. Everybody knew about the Katyn affair.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; but you were talking about the Van Vliet
report.
General Bissell. I thought you might want to know that no one
ever influenced my action in any way or tried to.
Mr. Mitchell. How could they influence your action in any way
if they didn't know about the Van Vliet report? You must have
discussed it with these individuals.
General Bi-sell. I di,^ -nt, nor did they uisc ai me.
Mr. Sheehan. We have a lot of ring-ar^-- ...^ on i\\\s question
as to whether or not t^^ '^ta'^p Depa 'imtut gjt this document. I
am not going to go into i. t^d both 'Congressman Machrowicz and
myself have had different variations of your answer this morning.
I want to put a very short bald question to you, and you weigh it
before you decide to answer it. The question I would like to ask is:
Would you state it to be a fact that the State Department did receive
the original Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. Did?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
General Bisseij^. No ; I would not state it as a fact.
Mr. Sheehan. O. K.
On the other hand, he did state when he read the previous testimony
from all the mail he got, the letters, that they referred to the Van
THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1885
Vliet report & . eral times, and he said someone should have asked him
for it if thev didn't have it.
Mr. MAciiRowK z. The answer is, he thinks they must have known
about it, but he will not say they knew about it.
Mv. ^iiEEiiAN. General, in your testimony you stated m drawing
some conclusions that the facts show that the State Department had
gone into the Katvn matter carefully.
General Bissell>. I told you how long they were at my letters, and
how many places it had been. Somebody must have looked at it.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. Would you state they were still going into it in
1945. because previously your testimony was they were trying to get
it through the Swiss when he was a prisoner of war. Was the State
Department still interested in that in 1945^
General Bissell. I would have thought they should have been.
Let me see now, 1945, certainly they would have been interested in
it. They would have wanted anything we had gotten on that subject.
Chairman ]Madden. Did they ask for it?
General Bissell. No. That was not going to influence the outcome
of that war that we were fighting with Germany and Japan.
Xow, I would like to make a point, and this is only— it is nothing
that happened, but it is a consideration. Had there been evidence
positive in the Van Vliet report that any particular nation had been
ouilty, rather than an opinion, and a conclusion formed in a state-
ment by a man who says there is no single thing that proves it, just
a combination of circunistances of the thing makes him believe it, it
probal)ly would have been of very much greater importance to me.
But when I got through with Van Vliet's report I did not feel positive
by any means that he was right. He had reached a conclusion. I
did not feel at all sure he was right. I felt his statements were as he
remembei'ed them.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever see the Kathleen Harriman report
dated January 1944?^
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Mitchell. You never saw it during the period January 1944
and Mav 1945?
General Bissell. I never saw it at all. When you say the ' Kath-
leen" you mean the one that Mr. Harriman would have sent in due
to his daughter's visit?
Mr. MiT'TiELL. Correct.
General ' Wh( ^her that would have been his report or hers,
I don't know. '! n6ver seen the doer/ t anyhow •'
Mr. SHEEHAN.'i'f'' i \now it to be a fact that the State Depart-
ment did receive the^'Br'nTsl. i-epor^^* <? -A, Stanley Gilder on the
Katyn matter? ' >''Jir>odj'
General Bissell. I think tliey have it.
Mr. Siieehax. I think you 'did testify this morning it was referred
to von in G-2 and you sent it on to State.
General Bissell. That is right. I would have to check my notes.
I think there was an ansAver to that.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You said the State Department stamp showed receipt ?
General Bissell. This is not the Gilder one.
^Ir. Shackelford. Mr. Sheehan, the State Department did receive
the Gilder report.
Mr. Sheehan. They did receive it ?
93744— 52— pt. 7 5
1886 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheeiian. Do or do you not know whether or not Gilder men-
tioned about Van Vliet in his report?
General Bissell. Not ])Ositively. I know he said there were British
and Americans in the party.
Mr. DoNDEKO. I think the record will show there were four people
in the party, one from England and one from South Africa and the
two American officers.
General Bissell. But that did not say they were Van Vliet, as I
remember.
Mr. Sheehan. The only reason I thought, if you did know that,
that the State Department was informed in the Gilder report of Van
Vliet, it would seem to me they would take the precautions to go to the
Army to find out what the Van Vliet report was.
General Bissell. Mr. Shackelford has been kind enough to show" me
the copy that w\as released by the War Department of the Gilder re-
])ort, and it shows the name of Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Col-
onel Van Vliet in Gilder's report, a copy of which was contained in the
War Department release on Katyn sometime ago under date of Sep-
tember 18, 1950. They published the Gilder report and the Gilder
report says that Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet and Captain Stewart
of the American Army were in the party. So they did know from
that.
Mr. Sheeiian. In other w^ords, the State Department knew in 194.5
this was the proposition and yet apparently took no steps to run it
down with the Army to find this report; otherwise you would have
had correspondence ?
General Bissell. I would have had correspondence. I made that
point.
Mr. Sheehan. I am trying to emphasize that here. I am going to
ask that at this point in the record — you will have to check with Mr.
Shackelford there whether it is a confidential report from the Inspec-
tor General on the search for the missing document — that ]\Ir. Shackel-
fora see to it that whatever security information is necessaiy to be
deleted is deleted and I would like to have a couple of questions on it.
General Bissell. I had intended to mention that and have done so
under my authority in my notes here.
Mr. Sheehan. These are extracts now from this report in which 1
see no names, so I cannot say whether they are of confidential nature.
Do you want to look at them before I recite them ?
Mr. Shackelford. Go ahead, jNIr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. It seems to me in all candidness and all fairness to
you that the Inspector General's report — I do not lilvc to use the word
"onus" — but seems to put the blame on you for the loss of this right in
3'^our office. I am going to read for you the three conclusions that the
Inspector General lias reached, and I think at this point in the matter
you want to get yourself clear so that for the record it does not stay
as a blot against you. Let me read the three conclusions:
No. 1, tliiU (lip ori.siinal Van Vliot rei)<>rt made to General Bissell on INIay 22,
IMH, and coming into the latter's personal possession on May 27), 104.1. has be-
come permanently lost without trace or reasonable presumption as to its present
existence or location.
No. 2, tliat there is no proof that this document ever left the office wherein it
originated.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1887
No. 3, that under the circumstances it must be assumed that this document
has liee'n subjected to compromise in the event that it was originally given a
security classification.
In other words, tlie Inspector General says everything happened
right smack in your office.
General Bissell. Right. He says it came into my personal posses-
sion on May 25, and you had sworn testimony from Colonel Van Vliet,
from Colonel Lantaff this morning and Mrs. ^Meeres this morning,
that Van Vliet had long since been gone on the 25th, and that it came
into my possession on a different date. I only mention that one small
point because if one is in error, all of it can be in error. It is not all
in error, but I mention that one point. The testimony of Colonel
Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres this morning did not state that it came into
my personal possession. They were very careful not to commit them-
selves. Since no one else knew of it, I do not know from what source
such information could have been obtained, as no one else could know.
The man wlio wrote this is honest and he would not have made that
statement unless he had a reason for doing it. I think the committee
miglit be interested in finding out just ^yhy he picked the 25th, be-
cause it would fit into the rest of this picture.
Mr. Sheeiian. I think when the committee reads the entire testi-
mony they will see his reasons for his conclusions.
General Bissell. Riglit. I tliink he is correct that there is no proof
that the document left the office wherein it originated. I think that
is correct.
Cliairman Madden. What office is that ?
General Bissell. My office, tlie office of G-2, War Department, and
the Secretariat Section; not the rest of the office being responsible
at all.
Chairman Madden. If I get that right, he says it is quite true
General Bissell. "That there is no proof that this document ever
left the office wherein it originated." He found no proof. I think
that is correct.
Mr. Sheeiian. For our information, before you read further
you might define what the Army means by that word "compromise"
there.
General Bissell. A document is compromised when its contents
have become known to an unauthorized person. That is one defini-
tion. There are others. If a document is completely missing and
you can't account for it, you immediately say it is compromised until
you find out what happened to it, if anything. If you do not re-
ceive a document or you do not know what has happened to a document,
or any break in the chain occurs, you immediately say it is com-
promised, to freeze everything on it and get right back on checking
it. But it does not necessarily mean stolen. It does not necessarily
mean an enemy has seen it. I will give you an illustration. We had
one very close to the top of the Government during the war where a
brief case of information disappeared. We immediately put that
in a compromise status. It subsequently all showed up. It had not
been seen by any unauthorized persons. W^e had another case where
part of a plan for the supply of the operations on D-day showed up
broken open in the post office in Chicago and we certainly compro-
mised that in a hurry. It apparently had not reached any unauthor-
1888 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
ized persons. "When the matter M^as clarified, we didn't need to chan<j:e
the date of tlie landing. We went ahead with things.
Mr. Sheeiian. In other words, it is like the Hiss-Chambei"s case
which proves that papers and top-secret documents could have
been copied, could have been photographed, could have been stolen,
could have been lost, and any one of those things could have hap-
pened to it in the State Department. I assume the same thing could be
true in G-2 or any other department of the Army.
General Bissell. It is possible. We tried to be tighter there for
several reasons : First, my office wrote the regulations. Now, that puts
me in an odd position. The authority to write them implies the au-
thority to change them or modify them. That gave me a little latitude.
1 tried not to take advantage of it. The top secret thing was born
while I was in G-2 and I had to put out the instructions that governed
at that time. They governed for 2 years, and then they were changed
in 194G, sometime along there.
Mr. Mitchell. You say that the classification or designation of top
secret in lO-ii was changed or originally put into being during that
period of time ?
General Bissell. Prior to the issuance of the regulation — but the
date I read you this morning is the right one, I would have to check
my memory on it, because we have been throwing dates around here —
March 15, I believe, approved by the Joint Cheifs of Staff approxi-
mately a month earlier and then passed over to the regular shops that
j)ut out the information. Here is the document that came out, Army
Kegulations 380-5, came out on March 15, 1944.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you were then establishing for the
entire Army operations and Air Force
General Bissell. World-wide.
Mr. SiiEEHAX. World-wide, including the Navy
General Bissell. No. Not the Navy.
Mr. Sheehan. The designation "top secret'- for the first time?
General Bisseli.. We were not doing it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
by agreement with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, had done it for the
J^ritish and ourselves, not only for the military services but for cor-
responding services working with them.
Mr. SiiEEifAN. Now^, will you read for the record, please, the des-
ignation of top secret as of the 15th of March 1944, if you have it
in that pamphlet ?
General Bissell Yes, I know it is in here.
(a) Wlien classified "tox) secret," certain secret documents, information and
material, the security aspect of which is paramount and whose unautliorized
disclos\iiv would cause exceptionally grave danger to the Nation, shall l)e classi-
fied "top secret." The following are examples of matter which normally will he
graded top secret :
(1) Plans or particulars of future ma.1or or special operations.
(2) Particulars of imi)i»rtant disi)ositions or impending moves of o\u' forces or
convoys in connection with (1) ahove.
(8) Very inuiortant i>oliti<'al documents dealing with such matters as ally
alliances and the like.
(4) Inforni.ition of the method used or success ohtained hy intelligence services
and counterintelligence service or which imperil secret agents.
(T)) Critical information of ntnv or improved munitions of war. including proof,
scientilic, and technical development.
(6) Important particulars of cryptography and cryptoanalysis.
Mr. Sheehan. This would fall in classification (3) ?
THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE 1889
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL,. I would like to ask a specific question on that point.
Will 3'ou explain to the chairman and the members of this committee
Avhy and to what extent the Van Vliet report fell into the category of
top secret in May 1945, which was after Germany had surrendered,
I believe ?
Mr. DoxDERO. Germany surrendered on May 8.
General Bissell. We had had the Yalta Conference. You have me
on a barrel now. I don't know how much of Yalta has been declassi-
fied. At the time I left the services, part of it was not. I don't know
whether what I had intended to answer is declassified. Does anybody
know ?
Mr. Machrowicz. You had better check before you make the
answers.
Mr. Mitchell. Is Mr. Shackelford the one to check with in regard
to the Yalta ?
Chairman Maddex. I might state that Russia has already declassi-
fied Yaka.
General Bissell. That does not quite hit what I am talking about.
I would like to answer, but I am afraid I am caught on it at the
inoment.
]\lr. Shackleford. Or he will answer in executive session in the
event it is still classified by State.
General Bissell. There is nothing I want to hold from j'ou. It is
just that I am a little hamstrung by the letter I got.
Mr. Mitchell. I want to know why the Van Vliet report on the 22d
of May 1945, after Germany had surrendered on May 8, 1945, was
classified "top secret" and what its importance or significance was that
it had to be so classified as "top secret."
Mr. INIachrowicz. I think probably the statement made by the wit-
ness is a justifiable statement that the answer to that question should
be withheld until he has an opportunity to find out whether it is declas-
sified or not.
Mr. Mitchell. Let the record show that question will be taken up
later, please.
Mr. Sheeiiax. In your capacity as head of G-2 — and I think this
is a little before your time, so you might have to get the time element —
did you ever hear of or see Colonel Szymanski's report on Katyn?
He was a military attache in 1942 and 1943, 1 believe, and was sending
reports, G-2 reports in.
General Bissell. I stated this morning I could not state for sure if
I saw him when I came through Cairo. I never saw the reports while
G-2. The first I knew of them was the report in the press they were
before your committee.
JNIr. Sheehan. Did you have any correspondence or remember any
correspondence or talk with the State Department about the Holmes'
report ?
General Bissell. Not until I saw in the press. I went back and got
permission to read both of them.
Mr. Sheehan. You did see them after this was all over?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. You saw them in the Department of Defense?
General Bissell. Yes; and asked authority and they told me I
could see them if I would come to Washington. I did.
1890 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. When was that, sir?
General Bissell. It is all in the story I am trying to read to you.
It was the 1st to 12th of April I was in Washington and came up to
get this information and other matters. I had other business up here.
Mr. Sheehan. You are positive of the fact that you did classify
the document "top secret" ?
General Bissell. I am positive.
Mr. Sheehan. Is there any possibility you could have changed
your mind afterward ?
General Bissell. That one would have been a little impossible in
a way. I had authority to down grade any document by anybody
else in the military service except General Marshall, but there was
a string to it. We were in business with the British in this war,
and the war was being directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
They had set up an arrangement whereby neither nation would down
grade below the classification, lower classification, of the two nations.
Since the Gilder report — there was no reason for bringing it here,
because it was secret and dealt with the same incident as the Van Vliet
report, so it was not within my independent authority to down grade
below the grade of "secret." To have done that, that wouldn't have
let any human, outside of those who needed to know about it, see it.
Mr. Sheehan. I think that my final question that I am coming to
might have to do with the possibility of leaks in G-2 while you were
there. If you will look at the Inspector General's report, you will
find there is a paragraph which states as follows :
With further reference to General Bissell's letter to General Holmes of May
25, 1945, and General Holmes' answer thereto to General Bissell dated June 9,
1945, a search of the files of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, failed to disclose
copies of either, although both were recorded in the logbook kept in the office
at that time.
Here we have a situation where you have made references in a log-
book to correspondence which you wrote. Yet, they are nowheres to
be found in the Department. However, it turns out, according to
the Inspector General's report, that the copies of these letters were
obtained from the files of the State Department. The Inspector Gen-
eral goes on to say — is it not plausible that some sort of master file —
and I am trying to state that myself — is it not plausible that some sort
of master file or classification number should identify all of these
matters pertaining to Katyn in the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. That was explained in o;reat detail by a man named
Carulli. I don't know whether he testified to them. He was the
man I mentioned in my office. I suggested to Mr. Shackelford he
was the expert and he would be glad to inform the Inspector Gen-
eral whatever went on. He explained our system.
Mr. Machrowicz. He did because he is referred to as one of the
informants.
General Bissell. That is right. We didn't package things. Mr.
Carulli explained why. When I was vacating my personal office,
there were no files in that one. That was not a place for papers to be
filed. In the one next to it there were quite large files, probably five
or six big file cabinets full.
Then the next door to that had a small card index, 10,000, 20,000,
or 30,000 cards, perhaps, which covered G-2, things that had been
handled in a recent period. We had to keep some material right
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1891
there, and we kept that as a quick thing. It worked beautifully. We
could get things very quickly. General Marshall could call down,
and I could have the piece of paper up to him in 5 minutes. I could
never have done that if it were sent to the general files. It is too big.
The security of those general files required that everything went
through a certain way in and out. It is clumsy. It is not a quick
thing. It is a safe thing. You have to compromise between speed and
absolute security.
Mr. Sheehan. There is another thought. You mentioned before
when we were talking about the word "compromise" and your defini-
tion, something about the "day plans" that were forwarded or opened
at the Chicago post office. Will you just, for our general benefit,
elaborate on that ?
General Bissell. It has been published briefly in the press. It ap-
pears that the headquarters in London was moving its G-4 depart-
ment. The individual who had the papers intended to address them
to himself at the next office he was going to. He was writing a letter
home, intending to send something home at the same time, and he
confused them and put them in the wrong envelopes. The plans for
the supply went to Chicago, and the little favors for his family went
to the office he intended to move to. He was so frightened that he
did not report it. By accident the package was broken open in the
Chicago office, and, as I recall it, the inspectors immediately called the
military, and we had someone there very quickly. The papers were
flown up here, and we asked for a man to come from General Eisen-
hower's headquarters quickly to check the papers and see whether they
might need to change the landing date. He had General Crawford
flown over here. I think you will find it mentioned in Top Secrets
very briefly, in that book, Top Secret. It has been in the press from
time to time, but very little on it. No harm came of it, although it
looked very suspicious at first because the boy came from a German
family. It was addressed to a German family. There were several
unusual things about that end of it. They were all right. The whole
thing was all right. No harm was done.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. When you use the phrase "broken up"
General Bissell. By accident in handling when they dumped the
contents of the pouches onto the sorting table. That is the way I
recollect it. There may have been some details I have not described
100 percent accurate in that brief comment.
Mr. Sheehan. The only thing that bothers me is the getting around
this idea of whether the State Department got it or not, because from
some of your correspondence — and I am quoting from that letter you
wrote to Mr. Lyon in which you are talking about the Gilder report
again — your last sentence said :
This report supplements the statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., for-
warded to General Holmes, May 25, 1945, and generally substantiating all
material facts in Col. Van Vliet's report.
It seems to me, from writing a letter like that to the State Depart-
ment so shortly after you were processing or handling the documents,
that you must have sent it to the State Department. They are not
questioning it, saying "We never got such a report."
General Bissell. I wouldn't question them. The fact that I make
that statement is what I believe was the situation when I dictated that
1892 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
letter. I didn't do it all. I couldirt fill in the date out of my head
when that thing had been sent the 21st of Angust which was qnite a
while from the 22d of May, or the 23d or 24th, when this other thing
was going on. It leads me to believe that there must have been some ,
record from Mrs. Meeres processing that letter where she got that
information. She couldn't have gotten it without going to some
place and finding that it had been sent. She didn't know.
Mr. Machroavicz. Is Mrs. Meeres still here ?
General Bissell. I don't know.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. I think the question is for Mr. Lijon to answer. He
got a letter. Did he get it or not ?
General Bissell. He got that particular letter. I told you how
many people handled it. They handled it for 2 months in State.
Many people had a chance to check up on that. I was sitting at my
desk any time they wanted to call me. That doesn't mean that I am
trying to throw stones at State. We were a government fighting this
war. I was getting plenty of help from them and giving them all
I could.
Mr. Sheehan. Except we found there were several governments in
the State Department, you know — Mr. Hiss et al.
General Bissell. I don't want to leave the impression that I am
trying to smear somebody that has been convicted or trying to blame
it on somebody. I can't help but think that it is the kind of document
the Communists would have liked to have a look at. That is as far
as I will go. I won't make any inferences or implications. I will
make the thing the other way : that those two people I worked with —
Holmes and Lyon— you would never get them mixed up with any
Communists. I will tell you that.
Mr. Maciirowicz. You had been making inferences and implica-
tions that Mr. Holmes and Mr. Lyon must have known about this.
General Bissell. I am giving you everything I know — everything
that touches Katyn as far as you had me proceed.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I would like to ask you a couple of questions you may
have answered. If you would refer to your testimony, when the State
Department was working through, I think you said, the Swiss, trying
to get Van Vliet's story, when did you find that out?
General Bissell. Colonel Van Vliet told it to me at the time he made
his report.
Mr. FuRcoLo. That was the first time you knew^ of that ?
General Bissell. The first time I knew of it. It afforded me the
only opportunity I knew for verification of his re])ort. I don't know
why Colonel Van Vliet didn't mention that. I don't recall him having
mentioned it in his statement — oversight. There was no question he
was giving you everything he could think of.
Mr. FuRcoLO. We are interested in finding out what happened to
the report in your office. As I understand your testimony, you have
stated that if that report were to be mailed to the State Department it
would have been mailed by one of three people — Mrs. IMeeres. and you
have testified as I recall that you were positive you did not tell her to
mail it. Am I correct in that?
(Jeneral Bissell. She Avouldn't have had anything to do with out-
going mail.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1893
Mr. FuRcoLO. So, she is out of the picture. Secondly, you testified
that you might have told Colonel and now Congressman Lantaff, but
you were very willing to accept his word that you did not tell him.
So, as you sit there today, you also exclude Congressman Lantaff.
I don't want to be unfair about this. I know you are trying to trace
it just as much as we are ; but, with those two people out of the picture
on your own story, it comes down to the fact that that was mailed
to the State Department, then comes back to you ; is that right ?
General Bissell. If it was what ? Mailed in the State Department?
Mr. FuRCOLO. Yes.
(xeneral Bissell. It is left with me.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Up to now we have got it back to you.
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. FuRCOLO. As I understand it, and I want to be sure about this,
I understand that you have come to the conclusion that it was mailed
to the State Department, and you base it on
General Bissell. Because of that reference.
Mr. Fltrcol;). Because of your letter of May 25, 1945. Do I get
your position correctly that you claim if it was mailed to the State
Department it was mailed in the letter of May 25, 1945 ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Am I fair in stating that u\) to this point, whether
or not the document left your hands
General Bissell. It was never in my hands.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Whether or not the document ever left the office of
General Bissell
General Bissell. Of General Bissell's secretary, because it didn't
stay in my office except while Colonel Van Vliet was in there.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Whether or not the Van Vliet document ever left the
office of General Bissell is determined upon what conclusion this com-
mittee can come to with reference to the letter of May 25, 1945. Is that
your position ?
General Bissell. That and the fact that their having that document
and never calling back for any comment or verification or anything
on the letter would indicate they must have had it, plus the fact that
they knew all about it in advance from other communications.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Well, what you come down to, then, is showing that
the State Department received the Van Vliet document from your
office is No. 1, the copy of the letter of May 25, 1945, and second, the
fact that the State Department never called you back and said, "We
did not get this document." Is that right ?
General Bissell. That is right, plus the fact that they knew about
this Swiss business. That is another one.
Mr. FuRCOLo. In other words, three things.
General Bissell. Then there was another one because they didn't
know about the Van Vliet report but they knew about the Katyn
thing. You are sticking to Van Vliet. Then Lyon. I have a recol-
lection or a feeling that I told either Lyon or Holmes on the telephone.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I am not directing my remarks or attention at the
moment to anyone, but you must have told someone. We are trying
to look specifically at the transmittal. As far as the transmittal is
concerned, coming down to the three things mentioned, first, what-
1894 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
ever that letter of May 25, 1945, may be interpreted as ; and, second,
the fact that the State Department did not call you back ; and, third^
this Swiss business you mentioned. Is that right ?
General Bissell. There was a specific reference to Lt, Col. John H.
Van Vliet's report forwarded to General Holmes on a certain date,
then to Mr. Lyon.
Mr. FuRCOLO. That is in the letter that transmitted the Gilder
report ?
General Bissell. That is right. So, that ties it in, too.
Mr. FuRCoLo. You interpret that as tying it in, too?
General Bissell. Certainly.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Can you think of anything else? I don't want to tie
you down.
General Bissell. I don't believe so at the moment. I have tried to
get everything I could when I w\as working with Mr. Shackelford.
I wasn't involved at all in this thing, except as someone out of the
picture trying to help.
Mr. Furcolo. I want to get it first with reference to that letter of
May 25, 1945.
In view^ of the wording of that letter, in view of the fact that that
letter contains no reference to transmitting Van Vliet's memorandum
and also there is no reference in there to any enclosure, is it not your
position right now that as far as that letter of May 25, 1945 is con-
cerned, as far as any proof there may be in that letter alone that you
transmitted the Van Vliet document in there, that is out of the picture ;
that that is no proof?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Furcolo, we have been talking about this letter
of the 25th of May 1945 all day long. Can we kindly get this memo-
randum into the record since it is not in the record as yet ? This is a
copy that I have, right here. The committee can read it. From there
I think the questions can be asked.
I would like to put it in as exhibit No. 5, with the original to come
at a later date from the State Department, since they obviously have
it.
Mr. DoNDERo. Wliat date is that?
Mr. Mitchell. The 25th of May 1945.
Chairman Madden. Mark it.
(Exhibit No. 5, dated May 25, 1945, was marked and received as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 5
IMay 25, 1945.
Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes,
A.f.sistant Sccrctarif, JJcparfment of State, Washington, D. C.
Dear General Holmes : A Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Ji'., Infantry, and a
Captain Stewart, while prisoners of war at Oflat No. 64, are reported to have
been given a letter by the Swiss Protectinji Power dated about October 1943, which,
asked tliem to reply to certain questions. The questions were :
1. Had Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel ^'an Vliet gone to Katyn?
2. How had they been treated?
3. Were any photographs taken?
4. Had they made a statement?
Colonel Van Vliet believes that a copy of this letter, together with his reply^
is in the State Department's files. It is requested that this be verified and, if
the records referred to ai"e in the files of State Department, that copies be made
available for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Sincerely,
Clayton Bissell,
JiSsistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1895
Mr. FuRCOLo. What is your answer to the question?
General Bissell. I can't phice your question.
Mr. Ftjrcolo. My question is — that you have based your belief
that this was transmitted to the State Department on four different
things, I am now asking you, on the first one of those four, which is
the letter of May 25, 1945, and I have said to you — in view of the word-
ing of that letter, particularly the absence of any reference to a trans-
mittal, in the absence of the word "enclosure" at the bottom of the
letter, is it not your belief that that letter of May 25, 1945, does not
help this committee in any way as far as that alone being proof of the
transmittal?
General Bissell. This one did not carry the Van Vliet report or it
would have to be listed.
Mr. FuRCOLO. So far as that letter transmitting the Van Vliet
report, you yourself say that that is out of the picture?
General Bissell. That did not transmit it.
Mr. ]\Iitciiell. Mr. Chairman, at this stage of the proceedings I
would like to have the record show that we already have, as exhibit
No. 4, the letter from the State Department, signed by Julius C.
Holmes, dated June 9, 1945, addressed to "My Dear General Bissell."
That reply is on the record prior to this exhibit No. 5. There is no
mention of the previous Van Vliet report in either exhibit, either trans-
ferring it as an enclosure in any shape, form, or manner. Therefore
we must deduct that based on these two particular letters, namely,
exhibit No. 4 and exhibit No. 5, there was no enclosure to the letter
or any reference in either letter to the missing Van Vliet report.
Chairman Madden. How long after that was it that Van Vliet
made his report out?
Mr. Mitchell. Van Vliet had made his report reputedly for the
record the 22d of May 1945, or about that time, 3 days previous.
General Bissell. I think he dictated it on the 22d. I think it was
typed on the 23d or 24th. I think I saw him on the 23d or 24th, the
last time when we put his initials on it, and that is all I can tell
you on it.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have the record show in the presence
of Mr. Brown, for the Department of State, that we woulcl like to
have the original of the letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes,
and I would like to have Mr. Shackelford produce the original of
General Holmes' reply to General Bissell dated June 9, 1945.
Mr. DoNDERO. Before you answer I want to ask counsel whether
the State Department has transmitted any papers of any kind to this
committee ?
]\Ir. Mitchell. No, sir. Chairman Madden has designated a sub-
committee of Mr. OT^onski, Mr. Sheehan, and Mr. Machrowicz, to
look at the documents that the State Department has on that. My
understanding is that they will do it within the next 48 to 72 hours.
Mr. Machrowicz. In connection with that, we had agreed that
because there are a lot of documents and the Department of State
does not know which documents we want, a subcommittee would go
there and pick the documents out which we feel we need. They offered
to turn them over to us.
Mr. DoNDERO. Pertinent to this issue.
Chairman Maddex. I might say further, last Thursday and on
Monday I asked the counsel to have that situation in readiness, but
1896 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
the committee members were not available to go over and see the
documents.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct. I did talk to Mr. Machrowicz and
Mr. Sheehan and they asked me to set up that meeting for some
time as soon as we complete this set of hearings now. I will do that
within the next 24 hours.
Mr. FuRCOLO. To continue, I will have to ask you the question once
more. I want to have it in one place. There has been this other
conversation in the meantime.
I have understood your testimony to be that your position is, as
far as that letter of May 25, 1945, is concerned, that because of the
language of that letter your final conclusion is that that letter cer-
tainly didn't transmit the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest?
General Bissell. No, sir.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I also understood your testimony before to be that
after Van Vliet had dictated his report to Mrs. Meeres, which was
probably the 21st or tlie 22d of May, you sent it to the State Depart-
ment, and I wrote down your words. You said you intended to send
it at once and you believed it was either the 24th or the 25th that you
sent it. Is that right ?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. FuRCOLO. By using the words "you sent it" you were referring
to the Van Vliet report ?
General Bissell. I am not referring to this exhibit No. 5, the
May 25 letter.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Let me get to that. By "sent it" you were referring
to the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacred
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I understood vou to say that you sent that report on
either the 24th or the 25th of May 1945.
General Bissell. This one?
Mr. FuRCOLo. I don't know what you mean by "this one." You
sent the A^an Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre, outlining
what he had seen there, including the bodies and the graves ?
General Bissell.. It was my intent that report would have moved
on that date and I didn't see it done myself. I therefore don't know
it did. So you have me there swearing to it.
Mr. FuRcoLo. If you would follow me for a minute I will do my
best if you will answer the questions. Did you say that you sent the
Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre out in a letter either
Ma^ 24 or May 25 ?
(leneral Bissell. I did not.
Mr. FuRCOLO. I understood you to say that.
General IJissell. I said I had reason to believe I did because I
mentioned that date in the letter transmitting the Gilder report.
I described not this paper but the Van Vliet report.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Did you say that immediately after Van Vliet had
concluded his report about the massacre of the Polish oflicers at
Katyn Forest, that it was your intention to send that report at once
out of your oflice?
Genei-al Bissell. I'hat is correct.
Mr. Fuitcoi/). Did you also say that to your best recollection he
had completed tliat rei)ort about May 22 or May 23, approximately?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1897
General Bis.sp:ll. ]My recollection was that he had done the dictat-
ing on the '22d, that it was conii)leted either on the 2;3d or the 24th,
and bronoht to me on one of those two dates.
]Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, yon apparently had the Van Vliet
report of the Katvn Forest massacre on, say, the 23d or the 24th of
May 1945^
(ieneral Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. FuRCOLO. And at that time, on May 23 or May 24, wdien you
had that completed report, the purpose in your mind was to send
that out immediately; is that right?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. FuRCOLO. And at that time, on May 23 or May 24, when you
had that completed report, the i)urpose in your mind was to send
that out immediately ; is that right ?
General Blssell. That is right.
]\Ir. FuRCOLO. The very next letter in connection with it that you
can recall having sent out was the letter of May 25, 1945, to General
Holmes?
General Bissell. Yes. Well. I don't know that is so because there
were lots of other State De})artnient — I can't tell you. I don't know.
On this subject, certainly.
Mr. FuRCOLO. On this subject, your best recollection is that the
very next letter you sent out was to General Holmes on May 25, 1945 ?
(ieneral Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FuRCOLO. And is it for that reason that you believed the Van
Vliet report of the Katyii Forest massacre was sent in the letter of
May 25, 1945 ? '
General Bissell. No; my reason for believing it is because it was
so stated in the letter carrying the Gilder report on the 21st of August,
I think.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Well, the letter carrying the Gilder report does not
indicate wdien they might have received the Van Vliet report from
you, but merely in effect says : "Compare the Gilder report W' itli the
Van Vliet report."
General Bissell. Forwarded to General Holmes May 25, 1945, and
it generall}' substantiates all material facts in Van Vliet's report.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Forwarded to General Holmes May 25, 1945. Now,
does that not completely fix in your mind the fact that if you ever did
send the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre to General
Holmes, it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945, to which this Gilder
report refers?
General Bissell. In a letter of May 25.
Mr. FuRaiLo. In a letter of May 25, 1945.
General Bissell. A transmittal letter.
Mr. FuRCOLo. Have we finally got tied down the fact that you say
that the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest massacre was sent in
a definite letter to General Holmes on a definite date of May 25, 1945?
General Bissell. I said that in this letter.
Mr. FuRcoLo. Is that what you say as you sit here today ?
General Bissell. Today I am not sure it did go because there is no
in.dication it was received. Something could have happened and I
don't know Avhat, if anything, ever did.
Mr. FuRCOix). That is right, but the point is if you did send it, you
are saying that you sent it on May 25, 1945, in a letter to General
1898 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Holmes. Would you be willing to say, in view of that, if it was not in
that letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes, then your position
would be it apparently did not go ?
General Bisseix. Almost that. What I actually say is this : there
were two places it was logical for me to send that, and quick. One
was to War Crimes, which was not so urgent at that time because they
were just getting going. The second one was to State. Van Vliet and
I had both mentioned the State Department aspect of it. I don't
know w^here the paper was sent. Therefore, I tried to figure back
where there is any evidence of it being sent. The only evidence is
that. That is that.
Mr. FuRCOLO. In other words, the only evidence that the Van Vliet
report was sent to the State Department would be the fact that the
Glider letter says that it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945, to
General Holmes?
General Bissell. That is right, plus the fact that the Glider letter
was then processed for nearly months in State and no one ever made
a query as to "Where is this thing you are referring to ?"
Mr. FuRCOLO. That is a separate thing. That is an absence of evi-
dence rather than a positive indication.
In other w^ords, your position as you say now is that tlie only docu-
mentary evidence that the Van Vliet report on the Katyn Forest
massacre was sent to the State Department was the fact that in the
Gilder letter it stated it had been sent in the letter of May 25, 1945,
to General Holmes?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. FuRcoLo. So that is the only documentary evidence. Now, re-
ferring back to your testimony about 10 minutes ago at the beginning
of my questioning of you, you agreed with me that as far as just that
letter of May 25, 1945, is concerned, your interpretation of that letter
would be that there was no enclosure in that. Is that not right ?
General Bissell. In this one?
Mr. FuRCOLO. In the letter of May 25, 1945, to General Holmes. You
stated that about 10 minutes ago and you gave your reasons; is that
not true ?
General Bissell. Yes, but I am not talking about the same May 25
letter. I think there were two of that date.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You think there might be some other letter of ISIay
'25,1945?
General Bissell. Van Vliet was as much a part of getting this
letter over to State as getting over tlie other one. This all came out
of him. It would have gone out together.
Mr. FuRCOLO. The only letter that you have in the files or the only
letter of which you have seen a copy in the files of G-2, your own office,
on May 25, 1945, addressed to General Plolmes, having anything
to do with Van Vliet's report on the Katyn Forest massacre, is this
letter that you hold in your hand and which we have read into the
record; is that correct?
General Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You agree that letter is not any evidence at all of
the fact tliat the Van Vliet report document was sent, because of the
wording of the letter?
General Bissell. That is correct.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1899
Mr. FuRCOLO. So it is fair to summarize your position as being
this: your position is, first of all, that you believe the Van Vliet
report on the Katyn Forest massacre was sent to the State Depart-
ment. You believe that it was sent in the letter of May 25, 1945.
That was your original position ?
General Bissell. In a letter.
Mr. FuRcoLO. You believe it assent in a letter?
General Bissell. Not this one.
Mr. FuRCOLO. Of May 25, 1915. The only letter that you can
find at G-2, or in your office on May 25, 1945, addressed to General
Holmes, is that letter which is now exhibit No. 5, I believe?
General Bissell. That is correct. That is not it.
Mr. FuRCOLO. You state it is certainly no proof it was sent but in
fact from the wording of the letter it indicates very clearly that it
was not sent in that one ?
General Bissell. It was not sent in that letter of May 25.
Mr. FuRCOLO. So what it comes down to, in other words, is that
when you state this Van Vliet report we have been talking about had
been sent to the State Department in a letter of May 25, 1945, you
are basing that upon a letter that is nonexistent as far as you, or this
committee, or anyone in the Government has been able to determine?
General Bissell. That is correct, at the moment.
Mr. Siieehan. Or it could have been sent by a courier directly over
there, without a letter of transmittal ?
General Bissell. It could but I don't think I did. I could have
done that. I had a courier, a special one that I started to mention,
this Mr. Dillingham. He did not follow hardly any of these pro-
cedures in handling State Department material to us or our material
to State. His specialty was bringing to me State Department wires
of certain categories and picking them out over there that I would be
interested in, getting them to me quickly, things that would come to
me again later in the regular channels after reproduction.
On rare occasions, none of which I can remember, I have sent
things back by him because there could not have been any more a
secure way to get them over there quickly. I don't think it was clone
in this case because usually when I sent anything like that, since it
was short-cutting all the rules, I would call Mr. Holmes and ask him
if he got it right away. Or I would do the opposite thing, I would
have Dillingham phone me back, gas line or otherwise and tell me it
was there, either one of which satisfied him.
Mr. FuRCOLo. I wanted to say I know your position is the same as
ours. We are interested in tracing that report. We are not par-
ticularly concerned about whether we trace it to the State Department
or trace it to the Department of the Army, or G-2, or anyplace. Your
position is the same, I know.
With that in mind I wanted to ask you this : In view of your testi-
mony, which I know to be true, and I know that you had so many
of these matters and some at the time were more important than
others. Later on history will show that some which looked unimpor-
tant have turned out to be extremely important.
Might it not appear to you at the present time that actually, with
all the different things you had to do and the hours you had at the
time, and short-handed as you were, and with the testimony that has
1900 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
been developed upon wliich you based your opinion had it been sent,
that actually the Van Vliet report was just lost in the shuflie some-
place alon<>; the line ?
General Bissj:li.. When I started in — Mr. Shackelford is a person
not involved — I said, "Where is this paper?" It is in State, it is in
(t-2, it is in War Crimes, or it is in my own personal office file. I was
no lonfrer in (t-2. We searched every one of those. We p;ot in touch
Avith all of the people that could have seen it. We went further down
the line of files than you did. We went to Miss McKenna and then on
down. When I started down the line, I knew there were some outs
that were perfectly all ri^ht, that mio;ht block us on findino; it in G-2
if it had been left there, and never gone out. These are those outs.
While I was in G-2 we were still cuttino; down files and people to
get smaller. I was only there some 7 months after the Van Vliet
arrival, then I was gone. At that time I turned the whole thing over
to General Vandenberg. I made every assumption that I coidd
against myself. The first one was, "Maybe yon forgot and put it in
your personal safe in your own office, the little one." I never took it
out of there, so if it were taken out of there it had to be taken out
by someone who had the combination.
I asked General Weckerling if he had the combination. He said,
"I might have." I said he did because I had left Washington for as
much as 2 months at a time. He didn't remember a thing about this
matter.
I did not contact General Vandenberg, but it was not appropriate
as he was my boss. It was not appropriate to ask him this question.
So I had it asked through Mr. Shackelford's office. The reply from
General Vandenberg was "Absolutely no." When he opened that safe
and took over from me, it w^asn't there. He doesn't remember, either,
any of the papers, if any, that were there, which did not help me. I
know that the day I left G-2 I had the combination of the safe
changed.
So, after that what was in it w^as not mine. General Vandenberg
did not steal those papers and turn them over to the Commies, or he
did not hold them up for anybody else. I am sure of that. He was
busy taking over G-2, and I know what it means.
Then where could it be? Well, outside the door were these files
they spoke of as my personal safe. That really wasn't a personal safe,
except that it had some personal files in one drawer. The rest of them
were routine safe in the alphabetical number system. It might have
been in some of those. So we found out where the contents of those
had been sent first. The safe outside the door — a man named Gen.
Carter Clark had gone over those with Miss Bryant, who is still
within reach. She is married and down just south of Alexandria.
She said she sorted out every ])a])er in there, saying "I will lake this
one. These are top secret." This is one of the instauces they did not
go through with the red tape. "I will take this one. You send that
one to so-and-so." When they were through there were two piles.
The young lady did not know wdiat was in either pile. She knew she
transmitted these in the pile she was directed to forward.
General Clark was contacted and said he didn't see anything about
Katyn or the Colonel Van Vliet report. We went to the next safe
where the big files were. We went to the files we had in the office,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1901
Avliere we kept them by subject. We ^Yent throuoli those cards. I had
trouble getting- tha: done because those cards were still extant at
that time. The papers to which they referred, for the most part,
were jjone. The reason they were jrone was because they had been
shipped out to various places to clear the office. The Korean business
was on. They needed space. Papers in these files were pushed out
and considerable numbers had been destroyed in the ])eriod between
my departure from (1-2 in 1045 and this period in 1950, 4 years.
G-2 had been com])ressed, in the Penta<2:on into much less space. It
was a smaller machine. It could have been destroyed amonn; those
])apers. The people that did that destroying, a lot of them were not
too well qualified. They did the best they could. But how could it
have gotten into that file? Mr. Lantafi' said it came out to him. He
told you what file he kept it in. He doesn't know what happened to it.
Neither do I. As a matter of fact, neither do I, to absolutely say I saw
ii go there. My ]:)rocedure of having other people do everything ])os-
sible and that is the only way you get any bigger job done, where I did
not actually handle the paper — I did not bring it in. Either Van Vliet
or Mrs. Meeres brought it in. I did handle it a while. One of those
two, or Lantaff, took it out. After that I never saw the paper again.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am not going to repeat some of the matters that
wei-e gone into by my colleagues, but there is one thing that I would
like to find out Avhich concerns all of us, even more than the Katyn
matter. That is the possibility of the loss of these documents at such
frequent intervals.
I would like to find out fi'om you, in view of what you just said, just
Itow you keep those documents. Let me ask you this : suppose someone
comes in and talks to you or brings you information about the Katyn
massacre or Dachau, or some other incident. Do you file that just in
\ our safe, or do you put it under a certain heading ?
General Bissell. I keep nothing in my safe.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have it filed under a certain heading.
General Bissell. A file system is established for the entire office.
It was established before I came there. The same one was in effect
when I left.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am not insisting you were to blame for it. I
want to find out whether there is a system.
General Bissell. Very definitely.
Mr. Machrowicz. It is pretty hard for a INIember of Congress to
break into this wall. It is hard to get information from the Pentagon.
When you receive information on a particular subject, is that infor-
mation ])laced in a master file with that name as a heading?
General Bissell. In G-2, while I was there we had a group called
the Specialist Group, who specialized on Germany and on Japan.
They saw everything on their subject. Unless it required action or
was ready for action, it went to them first and not to me. They had
everything.
Mr. Machrowicz. That does not answer my question.*
General Bissell. They kept a certain amount of this material in
their offices while it was live. As it passed the live stage and became
dead, it was sent down to general files.
Mr. Machrowicz. That does not answer my question. Supposing
you are interested in obtaining information which G-2 possesses on
93744— 52— pt. 7 (!
1902 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
a particular subject, Katyn for example, can you go to the file and
find under "Katyn" all the information which the Department has on
that subject ?
General Bissell. Not now. It has been spread from one end of the
place to the other.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was it at the time you were there?
General Bissell. It would all have been in the Russian section.
Mr. Machrowicz. If you were interested as the head of G-2 to get
all available information on a specific question, was there not a file to
which you could look to find out where all the information available
to G-2 is on that particular subject?
General Bissell. All the live information, yes. There would be lots
more information in other places than G-2, but it would not be live.
Some may be far away.
Mr. Machrowicz. So I presume there was a file labeled "Katyn"?
General Bissell. Probably. I can't say for sure. I didn't check it.
Mr. Machrowicz. You know now, although you probably didn't at
that time, there had been information, and valuable information, re-
quested and received by G-2 on Katyn prior to the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. I found out subsequently about the Szymanski
report and read the letter of transmittal to General Strong.
Mr. Machrowicz, You know G-2 specifically requested Colonel
Szymanski to furnish information relative to the Katyn matter ?
General Bissell. I know that the report came in two ways, one to
General Strong personally, and exactly the same paper sent another
way.
Mr. Macifrowicz. You as the head of G-2 wanted to get all the
available information on Katyn there was, any place where you could
look under a filing system and find Katyn and find Szymanski ?
General Bissell. It would have gone to the Russian specialists, be-
cause that is Russian territory and a Russian problem.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not care where it would have gone, but there
was a place where you could have gone and gotten all the available
information ?
General Bissell. All I would have had to do was to tell LantalT.
He would have gotten the Russian specialists. The Russian specialists
would have gotten the stuff from their office. They would have gotten
the stuff I needed.
Mr. Machrowicz. There was a way of finding out available infor-
mation on any important subject?
General Bissell. Hot stuff.
Mr. Machrowicz. When you were told that Colonel Van Vliet was
coming to see you and make a report on the Katyn massacre, did you
request from anyone under you to get a complete file on that subject?
General Bissell. I didn't get any such warning. Ha was in the
office when I got back from a trip out of town. I wanted to get to
him in a hurry because I understood ho had bi^en waiting.
Mr. Machrowicz. When you did talk to him, did you then request
to ijet that information ?
General Bissell. No; I did not at that time because I had a copy
of this letter of May 25.
Mr. Machrowicz. You did not have it then?
General Bisskll. No; it was written. While I was talking to Van
Vliet I didn't want to be influenced by anylhino; but Van Vliet.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1903
Mr. Machrowicz. He came to see you on May 22. The letter was
May 25?
General Bissell. That is right. I put this letter out.
Mr. Machrowicz. Which letter?
General Bissell. The letter of May 25, addressed to Julius C.
Holmes.
Mr. Mitchell, May ?
General Bissell. May 25, 1945, to Julius C. Holmes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you at either time when you talked to Colonel
Van Vliet, or afterward, refer to the available live information which
was in the G-2, to either check his information with other information
which you received as to his veracity in regard to his observations or
anything at all ?
Did you do anything to find out what other available information
you had in G-2 ?
General Bissell. I did not go to the general files. I didn't mention
it to the Russian specialist.
Mr. Machro\vicz. Did you have anyone else do it?
General Bissell. No, sir. The reason for that was, had anything
come in during the period I was G-2 on a matter of that nature, it
would have been told to me.
Mr. Machrowicz. You say the Katyn report would have been prop-
erly filed under Russian affairs?
General Bissell. The Russian specialist would have had it and he
would have determined where it was going to go.
Mr. MACHRo^vIcz. If I am wrong, I hope Mr. Shackelford corrects
me. It actually was found under Poland ?
General Bissell. It could well have been. Wliere you have three
countries, it would go first geographically to the man who handled
the area. Then he would see that those interested in it would receive
either copies made for them or have a chance through rotation to see it.
Mr. Mitchell. Was it, at the time you were G-2, a fact that Poland
and Russia were in the same area known as eastern Europe ?
General Bissell. There was Eastern Europe Chief. He had sub-
chiefs for different subareas.
Mr. MrrcHELL, The reports would have gone to the Eastern Europe
Section ?
General Bissell, That is right,
Mr, Machrowicz. At any rate no attempt was made by you to
evaluate the Van Vliet report by even trying to compare it with avail-
able information you already had in G-2 ?
General Bissell, I was going to use the reply to this letter as the
starting point for that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you use it as a starting point ?
General Bissell, No.
Mr, Machrowicz. Wliynot?
General Bissell. Because, when it came back, I was just telling you
my reaction, and why I didn't go along with the State Department's
comments or their conclusions. I have just mentioned two of them.
Wlien questions put an end to it,
Mr, Machrowicz. Their conclusions had nothing to do with the
evaluation of the Van Vliet report ?
General Bissell. That is what you say.
1904 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Am I right ? What conchisions are vou referring-
to?
General Bissell. If State, instead of being able to tell me they didn't
actually get this reply, had told me, "Yes, we got it : here is what it
says," and gave me another Van Vliet report, I would have had every-
tliing I needed to evaluate his report, one sent in 2 years earlier, and
then this one. That would have established his memory, accuracy^
detail of a good many kinds.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why didn't you look in your own department to
see what information you had ?
General Bissell. Because, had anything of significance come in
Mr. Machrowicz. How do you know ?
General Bissell. I had a meeting each morning about 7 something,
at which the specialists of each branch told me everything of impor-
tance that came in within the last 24 hours.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you consider the Colonel Szymanski report
filed with your department at the request of your predecessor, and a
report w^hich w^as very lengthy and very important, or did you think
it not important enough to consider ?
General Bisseu^. Had that report been brought to me without evalu-
ation, as it came in, the colonel did not say, "This is true, this is
untrue, this is probably true."
Mr. Machrowicz. You are talking about Colonel Van Vliet's re-
port or Colonel Szymanski's?
General Bissell. Szymanski's. He didn't say "This is based on
people whose veracity and dependability I know well."
Mv. Machrowicz. He did not say that ?
General Bissell. He didn't evaluate it at all. He said, "Trans-
mitted herewith is so-and-so," a very short letter, to General Strong.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are you quite positive of that?
Mr. Mitchell. .Are you referring to the exhibits which are already
on record with this committee?
General Bissell. That is the only thing I know about it, what has
been printed in the press. I read his report in G-2 during that period,
April 1 to 12.
Mr. Mitchell. What year ?
General Bissell. This year. I saw nine exhibits with about this
mncli of letter transmitted [indicating about 3 inches]. That is all
Szymanski contributed. It was someone else's material being for-
warded. I examined each of those. Three of them said they were
hearsay. Some of them said they were hearsay several times re-
moved. Three others did not mention Katyn.
Mr. Machrowicz. What you are referring to is he never got anyone
actually at Katyn when the shooting took place?
General Bissell. It was all hearsay.
Mr. Machroavicz. He never had an eyewitness?
General Blssell. No. He had neitlier eyewitnesses nor other evi-
dence. By evidence I mean something that a lawyer can use. For-
tunately we had lots of lawyers in G-2. They weighed things. They
had to be right.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think you said a few minutes ago that you
never had the Colonel Van Vliet report in your hands.
General Bissell. I didn't say I never had it in my hands. I held it
a while while I read it over with Van Vliet in mv office, and asked
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1905
him if he wanted to make any chancres. He didn't want to make any.
I had liim initial the thing. He did that. I don't think I even picked
it np off my desk.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ever order that to be put in the Katyn
file?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why not ?
General Bissell. Becaiise I didn't want it to get that much circula-
tion at that point.
Mr. Machrowicz. If you ever transmitted to anyone
General Bissell. I would not have needed to say that. If a paper
came into my office and I did not need to take action on it, just infor-
mation, my initial was usually put in on it, but not always. It was
put in the out basket. It went out and was filed properly. I didn't
personally have anything to do with the filing.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was it properly filed ?
General Bissell. Maybe only 99.999 percent thereabouts.
Mr. Machrowicz. If some one subsequent to you, a successor to you,
the next day, wanted to check the Katyn file and asked the head of
the Russian or Polish departments about it, would he have been able
to find the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then you would say it was not properly filed,
was it ?
General Bissell. If he did not find it, he would have come to my
secretary and reported the fact. My secretary would say, "Well, this
is the dope on that."
Mr. Machrowicz. How could he report a fact which he would not
have known about ? How could he have known about the report ?
General Bissell. If he didn't know about it, he couldn't do it.
Mr. Mitchell. You just said in reply to Mr. Machrowicz that you
had a daily briefing session with the members of your staff. Did you
meet these area chiefs at any time and discuss either the Katyn affair,
or Van Vliet's report at that briefing session?
General Bissell. I did not.
Mr. ]\Iitchell. You never have discussed that ?
General Bissell. Never.
Mr. Mitchell. You have never discussed it with any other member
of G-2 except Colonel Lantaff and Mrs. Meeres ?
General Bissell. I didn't discuss it with Lantaff.
Mr. Mitchell. They are the only two people you knew who knew
about it ?
General Bissell. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you have any members designated as liaison
officer with the OWI?
General Bissell. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Who were they?
General Bissell. Many people at many times. I can recall no
names.
Mr. Machrowicz. At that time, in May 1945.
General Bissell. I couldn't tell you.
Mr. Machrowicz. Wlioever they were, did you instruct them to
give this information to the OWI?
General Bissell. No.
1906 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. You did not think the OWI should know this
information ?
General Bissell. I think we are getting in trouble on sources of
information, but I will be glad to tell you in executive session.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Shackelford, does the record of the G-2 office
in the period while General Bissell was in charge of G-2, show who
were the liaison officers to OWI and who were the OWI representatives
to G-2?
Mr. Shackelford. I would be glad to check the records for that
information, and if it is in the records, to supply it to the committee.
Mr. Machrowicz. It would not do any good in view of the testimony
it was not generally discussed, anyway.
General Bissell. I did not.
Mr. Machrowicz. They had no knowledge of the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. I can't say.
Mr. Machrowicz. If they did, they got it improperly?
General Bissell. No. There were other people in the world who
knew that these people had been there. They had many contacts in
many places.
Mr. DoNDORO. Was that a part of your function?
General Bissell. I was on a committee called the Joint Intelligence
Committee. There were meetings once a week where I saw representa-
tives of OSS, State, War, Navy, Air, and sometimes others. This is
not the nature of a question that would have been taken up there.
They were not policy recommendations to the combined Chiefs of
Staff or Joint Chiefs for the conduct of their intelligence arrange-
ments, prior to major operations, or something that we could think
of that would help the prosecution of the war.
I also had conferences with the head of Naval Intelligence and
the FBI, a little different group. We met periodically and took up
everything on the counterintelligence side both in the United States
and world-wide, dividing the duties between us, according to the regu-
lations in effect at that time, which was an Executive order.
Beyond that, I don't think I should go into that one.
Mr. Machrowicz. I presume you read Arthur Bliss Lane's article
in the American Legion magazine?
General Bissell. I don't know who wrote it. It doesn't say. I would
like to have found out.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am not saying this, because I believe statements
contained in here, but I believe you should be given an opportunity
to comment. There is a statement there which states :
We heard that Van Vliet was behind the closed doors of General Bissell's
private office a long time, alone with the G-2 general. When he reappeared in
the reception office we learned Van Vliet was flushed, seemed intensely but
silently angry. He went as directed by Bissell, with the general's personal
security stenographer across the corridor to a smaller office.
Colonel Van Vliet made no such statement to us, that he was flushed
or angry or anything that occurred between you two which Avould give
rise to that statement. I am going to ask you, have you any comment
on that?
GoiuM'nl Bissell. I would welcome you taking Van Vliet's word on
it, but there was not the sliglitest unpleasantness. My only feeling
was, shall we push this fellow for this now? He was off the normal
track. Normally, when some returned person came in, we tried to
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1907
be sure they were fit to make a report. Colonel Van Vliet was, but
he was awfully tired. He was ready to oo, it seemed. I don't know
anything that happened, to my knowledge, that didn't suit him to
a "t."
Mr. Maciirowicz. I want this on the record.
Do you claim that this statement is not justified by the facts?
General Bissell. As far as I know, there is no basis of fact in it at
all. I don't know where it could have come from.
Mr. MrrcnELL. Have you tried to find out?
General Bissell. No. The only thing I was interested in was having
a check made to see if any of those were libelous. Wlien you analyze
them carefully, there is not a firm statement about me in them ; every
one is a quiz, qualification, or implication, or inference.
JMr. Mitchell. Have you discussed the article with Arthur Bliss
Lane ?
General Bissell. No. I do not go to former State Department
people except through War Department channels. I am a civilian.
Mr. Mitchell. So is he.
General Bissell. His status is different from mine. I am on the
Government payroll as a retired officer.
Mr. Mitchell. So is he.
General Bissell. I didn't know that. Mr. Lane is a nice person.
I don't think he would be vindictive about me. He might have lent
himself to something for a purpose, but I don't think he meant any-
thing vindictive.
Mr. DoNDERO. I have two or three short questions.
I try to get in through a crack once in a while between my colleague
from Michigan and counsel for the committee.
Here is something that challenges my attention and may yours:
In the letter that you wrote on August 21, 1945, appears this statement :
Transmitted —
and this goes to Mr. Lyon —
for the information and file of the State Department is the report ou Katyn by
Stanley S. Gilder, captain, EAMC, British medical officer. This report supple-
ments statement of Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., forwarded to General Holmes,
May 25, 194.1, and generally substantiates all material facts in Lientpuant
Colonel Van Vliet's report.
The word "forwarded" is w^hat challenges my attention. Would
it be forwarded by mail or would it be forwarded by a messenger?
General Bissell. I think undoubtedly by top-secret courier.
Mr. DoNDERO. Now, after that letter was written, was it delivered
to the State Department ?
General Bissell. This particular one ?
Mr. DoNDERO. This letter of August 21, 1945.
General Bissell. They got this letter all right.
Mr. Dondero. Did the State Department at any time, from the time
they received it, up to this hour, ever say to you or to your office that
they had not received the Van Vliet report?
General Bissell. No. I pointed out they processed this letter for
just 5 days less than 2 months. So many people handled it. It seemed
to me that would have been almost inevitable.
Mr. Dondero. It goes without saying, if they did not receive it,
some statement should have come from the Department they did not
receive it.
1908 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. I^et's get this correct. Do you say the State
Department never denied receiving the letter of May 25?
General Bissell. I thought the State Department had not. I am
talking about the letter to Lyon carrying the Gilder report, and not
the May 25 letter. This letter is a letter of August 21.
Mr. iilACHROwicz. Head page 2 of the Department of Defense re-
lease in this matter.
General Bissell. "General Holmes, in reference to the matter" —
Which matter ?
Mr. Machrowicz. This is the Department of Defense speaking here.
They say, "The Department of State has no record of having received
the memorandum of Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet on May 25, 1945,
and the Department of Army has found no receipt for it and no cover-
ing letter of transmittal."
Mr. DoNDERO. What is the date of that ?
Mr. Machrov^icz. September 18, 1950.
Mr. DoNDERO. That would have been 5 years
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is the date the Department of Defense gave
the information, not the date from the Department of State.
Mr. Dondero. That is the only statement I have heard as to what
the attitude of the Department of State was, whether they received
that or not.
Mr. Mitchell. I want to say that is not in any letter form what-
soever. That is a comment by the Department of the Army at the
time they passed this memorandum for the press, dated September
18, 1950.
The State Department, to my personal knowledge, is not on record
with this committee or anywhere else.
Mr. Dondero. That they ever received the report or denied or even
answered that letter of August 21, 1945, when they had a chance to do
it, after General Bissell had written this letter to them and said, "This
supplements the material contained in the Van Vliet report."
Mr. Machrowicz. I can't understand your statement.
Mr. Shackelford. The State Department will speak for itself, but
insofar as tliis Defense Department statement was concerned, it was
based on a thoroughgoing cooperation on their part. They were as
anxious. to find it as we were. They gave it the full diligence, when
they were unable to find it. It is on the basis of that information
that this statement is based.
Mr. Machrowicz. Information from the Department of State?
Mr. Shackelford. Yes, sir. When they are before your committee,
they will speak for themselves.
Mr. Dondero. When tlie State Department receives a letter from
General Bissell, or received a letter back in August 1945 that he had
forwarded this report and they did not have it, wouldn't you naturally
suspect they would come out and say then, not 5 years later, "We
never received that report"?
Mr. Shackelford. I l)elieve it would be more satisfactory from
your standpoint and the conunittee's standpoint if State were to speak
to that, since it is outside of my province.
Mr. Dondero. I just wanted to call attention to that. There is one
other matter, and then I am through.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1909
I liave before me here a letter written by Mr. Shackelford to me on
October 6, 1950, in answer to corresi)ondence which I had directed to
either the Department of the Army or the Department of State, inquir-
ing- Avhat had become of the Van Vliet report. You answered me.
In the answer is this statement :
There was a mistake made —
I want to read three or four lines — you say :
Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin in his reply on October 19, 1949, to your letter —
meaning to me —
of October 6. 1949, referred to a Katyn massacre report which was partially
liased on Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's observations.
In making this statement he erroneously thought —
and he, I think, refers to General Irwin —
he erroneously thought that the study entitled "Supplementary Report on Facts
and Documents Concerning the Katyn Massacre'"—
which was the report which the Polish government in exile made, if
I recall correctly —
was based in part on information supplied by Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet.
This was not so, and the supplementary report was an independent and detailed
study made by a Polish committee, which at no time has conferred or consulted
with Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet.
How was it possible in that office for General Irwin to make a mis-
take of that magnitude ?
Mr. Shackelford. It was a very unfortunate job of mislabeling,
as is brought out in the Inspector General's report, and through really
just a plain error.
This supplemental report, which I believe is approximately some
45 to 50 pages in length and prepared by the Polish government in
exile, was incorrectly labeled as partially based on the Van Vliet
report. It was from that clue, as it ultimately came through to
General Irwin, his letter was based.
Mr. DoNDERO. Could it be possible there is some error made regard-
ing the Van Vliet report, so far as it affects this committee?
Mr. Shackelford. We have done everything in our power — and
very aggressively, to try to follow every possible clue that we had, and
to examine every possible file to turn the report up and to find out
any error,
Mr. DoNDERO. I know you have made every effort possible, because
you have been in my office more than once regarding it.
Mr. Shackelford. Thank you.
General Bissell. Mr. Dondero, may I say, when I appeared before
the Inspector General, I pointed out that several letters had been sent
out of the Department of Defense that conflicted with each other, to
Members of Congress and to others, and that I asked the Inspector
General to especially clear that thing up, I think he did. It was
because people didn't know what they were handling, and called it
different names, and because it was handled by different people at
different times, and they didn't coordinate. I did stress that.
If you read the testimony there, given to the Inspector General, you
will find that I especially asked them to go into that and clear it up,
so that the Secretary of Defense would not be in an untenable position
as he was in then.
:1910 THE KA.TYN FOREST MASSACRE
]Mr. Mitchell. I have one question to ask.
When were you relieved as assistant G-2?
General Bissell. In January 1946.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your next assignment ?
General Bissell. Military and air attache, Court of St. James's,
London, American Embassy.
Mr. Mitchell, When did you report for active duty there?
General Bissell. In May, the 8th day of May 1946.
Mr. Mitchell. When were you handed the Polish reports, known
as the facts and documents concerning Polish prisoners of war cap-
tured by the U. S. S. R. during the 1939 campaign ^
General Bissell. I have got that in my story here, I will find it.
Mr, Mitchell, And the supplemental report on facts and documents
concerning the Katyn massacre, which is the one that was just re-
ferred to ?
General Bissell, That is 1946, and the Polish-London report is
page 43.
On November 20, 1947, after a dinner with a small group of Poles,
and during the course of a social evening
Mr. Mitchell. Wait a minute. What is that date? Was that
November 27? What year?
General Bissell. On November 20, 1947 — and I went to London in
1946.
You asked me when I got those papers. I am trying to paint the
picture precisely for you.
On November 20, 1947, after a dinner with a small group of Poles
and during the course of a social evening in the home of one of these
Polish couples in London, arrangements were made for me to meet
with a Polish gentleman who was stated to have assembled all the
available Polish information on Katyn. The meeting occurred on
November 25, 1947.
Again I was told the story of the massacre of thousands of Poles
by the speaker, who stated he believed that it had been committed by
the Russians. He wished the information brought to the attention
of the Americans at Nuremberg. I made a request for all the data
they wished to furnish me.
I agi'eed thereafter that the action would be taken that was con-
sidered appropriate, after a check of the nature of the data furnished
me. I did not know what they were going to furnish me, and I did
not want to be committed to get something into Nuremberg if it
wasn't right.
Arrangements were made for anotlier meeting at which all the
available material would be delivered to me in writing.
Within a week, the material was furnished to me. On December
2, 1947, I telephoned Gen. Telford Taylor at Nuremberg, telephone
Justice 6117, and told him guardedly what I had secured, and that it
was for the United States group at the International ISIilitary Tribu-
nal, that I thought he sliould see it promptly.
He said he would soiul a ])lane for it within 3 daj^s. This arrange-
ment did not eventuate, so other arrangements for delivery were
made.
On December 15, 1947, I talked with General Taylor on the tele-
phone. He then informed me the material had been received, ex-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1911
pressed appreciation, but made no other comment to me then or ever
subsequently.
Following what was routine procedure, G-2 Washington was ad-
vised of the procurement of this London Katyn report, and of its
handling, having been forwarded to General Taylor. I believe no
duplicate copy was available to send to G-2 in Washington, and 1 re-
quested General Taylor to send to G-2 the copy furnished him when
it had served his purposes. I believe this copy was duly received, be-
cause Mr. Shackelford told me he had seen a copy and his comments
concerning it convinced me that he had.
The Katyn report forwarded from London to General Taylor and
subsequently to G-2, consisted of two voluminous reports totaling 529
images. They were in English. I believe they were anonymous,
though — as I recall, there was a statement in them that the Polish
sources had been used; in part the matter w^as repetitious, but it did
contain a most comprehensive account that obviously had involved
a great effort. These papers reached no stated conclusion of guilt,
but tended to build up a case against the Communists. I have rea-
son to believe that one copy of this report had been before the Nurem-
berg Tribunal in June 1946 and was rejected.
Mr. Mitchell. That is the point exactly, right there.
Mr. Sheehan. Is he right on his dates?
Mr. Mitchell. I want to point out the Inspector General's report
is totally inadequate, because it mentions no data as to what the gen-
eral is giving here. Obviously he must have talked to the general, be-
cause he is talking about November 1947 and they leave out wdien he
sent these documents to General Taylor.
The Nuremberg trials were July 1 and July 2, 1946, when the Katyn
affair was involved, and it was on the Goering indictment at that time.
Therefore, the date that was sent to General Taylor in December
1947, was wholly unnecessary. There was nothing that could have
been done with it at that particular time. However, the general has
just made the statement that he had reason to believe that these same
documents were present at the Nuremberg trials.
Could you explain that further?
General Bissell. I never had an opportunity to read the Nuremberg
report until I came up here last month, when I read them and found
what I thought was the same thing.
Mr. Maciirowicz. That is the reason you had to believe they
were
General Bissell. The Russian counsel is quoted in the Nuremberg
reports as describing the paper as anonymous, as in English, as having
been published in London and as not being admissible, because it was
from Polish sources and they were not admitting it at Nuremberg, as
I understood it, in reading it. I did not look at it too carefully.
There is a lot of stuff on Nuremberg. They were not admitting as
evidence anything on this particular case, except official Government
papers.
The Russian paper was an official Government paper, but the Rus-
sians had not recognized that Polish Government that was in London
at this time. They had severed relations with the Poles when the Poles
asked the International Red Cross to intercede.
So, that made the document inadmissible.
1912 THE KATYN FOEEST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. 'Who was offering that document in evidence in
Nuremberg? I frankly have not seen any mention of it. I don't
know if our counsel has or not.
General Bissell. One of the counsel for either
Mr. Machrowicz. Goering?
General Bissell. Or another defendant. Two were being tried
jointly at that particular moment. Now, please don't misunderstand
me at all. I knew about Nuremberg. I visited Nuremberg when the
principal criminals were being tried.
Mr. Mitchell. That was at this time ?
General Bissell. No.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Goering was the principal witness.
General Bissell. But this was 1947, and the time I visited them was
earlier than that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Frankly, I am confused again. I have not read
all of the Nuremberg trial proceedings, although I have some of them,
and frankly I saw no mention of anyone offering in evidence any
documents obtained from the London government.
General Bissell. Yes; I think they tried to get this one in.
Mr. Machrowt:cz. I would like to ask our counsel, who I presume
has checked the Nuremberg trials, Is there any record of anyone offer-
ing them in evidence ?
Mr. Mitchell. If you will recall, when we had Mr. Kempner on
the stand in Frankfurt, several volumes of the Nuremberg trials were
mentioned in the course of that, I believe when they were submitting
documentary evidence, although I have not checked the official docu-
ments because they are not contained in the trial hearings, as yet.
But I intended to do that in the near future, and I will check tliat vei y
point. However, if the general can tell me which volume and where
it is, I will be very appreciative.
General Bissell. Mr. Shackleford can. but I can't. His office made
some references to where things appeared. I didn't have time to
read many of them. I ran into that one and that is the reason tliat I
have it in here, because it seems to be bearing on the Nuremberg
presentation on this particular material. I knew from personally
being at the Nuremberg trial when the principal criminals were under
trial, and talking with Telford Taylor there. They couldn't do that
trial without the electrical set-up for the tiling coming out in many
languages. That broke down so I had a chance for an liour and a half
to talk with Taylor. There was no mention of Katyn at that time.
He was on another case. I was interested in these criminals in the
box, because they left them there and the judges went out. I knew
only tlie details on the Nuremberg thing since last April, and then not
very thoroughly. There is supposed to be a book of document 5. I
didn't look at it at all at that time.
Mr. Machrowicz. Our committee was given the infoi-mation in
Europe that certain documents had been furnished by tlie Polish
Government in London to the j)roper authorities in Nuremberg, and
were never ])resented. Now, the information that you give me seems
to beai- out that that charge is not correct.
General Bissell. Tliey didn't let them present it.
Mr. MAcniRowicz. That is different.
General Bissell. They got tliem ready.
Mr. Machrowicz. They were offered?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1913
General Bissell. And the Russian who was presiding that day
made the decision, "AVe would aaree only to take official documents
and this one is not an official document because it is not of a <rovern-
ment recognized by all of the members of the court."'
Mr. Mitchell. I believe that will be confirmed in our hearings, I
believe, by both Dr. Stahmer and Mr. Kempner. Dr Stahmer was
the German defense counsel on the Katyn indictment on the Goering
trial, and I think you will find that that is correct, except that I do
think there was some mention in the record, which I have not had an
opportunity to check but which we will take np later when we go in
that aspect of the case.
Mr. Shackelford. I will be glad to check our own records with
i-egard to the Nuremberg trials and volumes and supply any pertinent
citations which we may have to the committee.
Mr. Sheehax. Might I ask you to refresh my recollection on the
Xuremberg trials? Weren't they started in November of 1945 and
finished in July or August of 1946?
Mr. Mitchell. What happened was this : They started discussing
the Katyn affair or indictment. They didn't know where to put it.
So they finally selected Goering as a major war criminal. They put
it in his indictment. They came up with the discussion in February
1946 as to how many witnesses each side would be permitted to call,
and they haggled over it for 2 or 3 or 4 months. On June 29, if my
memory serves me correctly, the presiding judge at that time, wdio
was
Ml'. DoNDERO, Lawrence, Judge Lawrence.
Mr. Mitchell. Judge Lawrence, of the British, finally ruled and
told both of them, "You will have three witnesses and only three
witnesses," and they had those people up, cross-examination of both
sides, July 1 and July 2, 1946. There was a summary by Dr. Stahmer,
the German defense counsel, I believe, on July 6. There was no sum-
mary by the Russians or tlie Soviets, and the matter was dropped.
Mr. Sheehan, That is what I am trying to tie up. The general is
quoting November 1947 and the trials were all over.
Mr. Machrowicz. It was not stated by any witness in Frankfurt
that any offer was made to "present any evidence in Nuremberg in the
form of a document from the Polish Government in London.
Mr. Mitchell. There was a slight reference in which he gave us a
reference to a volume, in which I have a reference, and which I intend
to check.
General Bissell. I knew^ all of the time when this fellow came to
me and wanted me to present this particular thing at Nuremberg that
the main criminal trials were finished and the criminals executed long
since, or disposed of. Then the court kept on for a long, long time w^ith
the minor things before they broke it into small particles and it went
on for a long time. When I first went there — I could get it out of
these papers but it is not important — it was approximately a year
earlier, and the main criminals were then on trial. But I knew it was
not going to change the main trial but was going to get to Nuremberg
everything I could get as fast as I could get it there.
Mr. Mitchell. No further questions, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. I have one question, Mr. Chairman.
Counsel, you asked Colonel Van Vliet in his testimony, when he
came back and was in General Bissell's office, if Colonel Van Vliet knew
1914 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
or heard of a Lieutenant Colonel Holloman. Did yon have any par-
ticular purpose in that?
Mr. ]\IiTCHELL, Yes, sir ; that was cleared up yesterday by Mrs. Mil-
dred Meeres when I talked to her. Holloman's identity was mistaken
for Lantaff. In other words, Lantaff in the record there is Holloman,
really. Holloman has taken quite a beating from the Inspector Gen-
eral's office and everything as regards the mistaken identity on the
part of Mrs. Mildred Meeres, and she went back to the War Depart-
ment yesterday after meeting Congressman Lantaff and corrected the
file as far as who the individual was, and it was Congressman Lantaff,
not Holloman. At that time I was merely exploring.
General Bissell. I think I can help you on that. Holloman was
the head of the section for which ]\Irs. Meeres worked, and she only
was in our office for this one thing. That is why Congressman Lan-
taff was the man instead of the colonel in his own section.
Chairman Madden. General Bissell, the committee wishes to thank
you for testifying here today. Considering the extended versions of
the testimony presented in regard to the particular report which the
committee is interested in, there is no doubt but what the committee
will have to explore further as to whether there is any possible avenue
to determine the whereabouts or what happened to that particular
report. We will make every effort by further witnesses which we
will call. There is a possibility that we miglit want further testimony
from you. Of course, our committee is merely interested in concrete
testimony if we can secure it, or proof as to where the original Van
Vliet report went. Inferences or suppositions will not satisfy the
public as to what happened to the report. Of course, the testimony
here today, possibly the highlight of the testimony, was the Inspector
General's report, and I wrote it down as the testimony came out that
in the Inspector General's report it said, in conclusions of it, there is
no proof that the Van Vliet report ever left the office where it orig-
inated. I asked you about that, and you said that is correct.
General Bissell. I confirmed it.
Cliairman Madden. Now, of course, I know that the members of the
committee are not satisfied as to its proposed exploration to determine
the wliereabouts or what hap]3ened to the Van Vliet report. So we
will explore further and possibly we might have you testify again, I
don't know. But nevertheless we are thankful for your presence here
today.
General Bissell. Be assured I not only welcome that, but hope you
will.
Chairman Madden. The committee will meet tomorrow morning at
10 o'clock, in this room.
(Whereupon, at 5 p. m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene at
10 a. m., Wednesday, June 4, 1952.)
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 1952
House of Representatives,
The Select Committee on the
IvATYN Forest Massacre,
Washington^ D. C.
The select committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 362,,
House Office Building, Hon. Eay J. Madden (chairman), presiding.
Present : Messrs. Madden, Flood, Machrowicz, Dondero, O'Konski,
and Sheehan.
Also present : John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select committee.
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order.
]\Ir. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I have a few brief remarks I would
like to direct to the attention of the entire committee.
You will recall that when we were in Chicago taking the testimony
of Col. Henry Szymanski, Colonel Szymanski took out of his personal
file some documents which we put into the record as exhibits. At that
time the staff of this committee had never seen those ; neither had any
member of this committee. Yesterday the same incident occurred
here on the stand when General Bissell was testifying. The War De-
partment counselor, Mr. Shackelford, brought out some additional
letters.
You will also recall that this committee visited with the President
of the United States in January, at which time this committee was as-
sured that all official documents pertaining to the missing Polish
officers and the Katyn massacre would be made available to this
committee.
This committee has repeatedly requested verbally of the War De-
partment counsellor's office all documents connected with it. I am
sorry to say this morning that I have been placed in a rather em-
barrassing position several times in the course of these hearings.
I would like to state openly that all documents in the War Depart-
ment pertaining to the missing Polish officers and the Katjai affair
should be presented to this committee.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, would it not be better to wait
until Mr. Shackelford is here before making that statement ?
Mr. Mitchell. His representative is here and has heard the remark.
I am referring to Mr. Faclier.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is Mr. Shackelford going to be here this
morning ?
Mr. Facher (Jerome P. Facher, assistant to F. Shackelford, coun-
selor. Department of the Army). He will be unable to be here today.
1915
1916 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Maciirowicz. Do you want to make any statein l in connec-
tion with that ?
Mr. Facher. No, sir. We are trying to uncover i> le documents
for the committee and there are several that are going- to be forwarded
hiter in the week.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir.
The first witness this morning is Colonel Yeatoix
Chairman Madden, Colonel Ivan Yeaton. Will you step forward,
please, and raise your right hand and be sworn ?
Do you solemnly swear that in this hearing you will tell the trutli,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help your God ?
Colonel Yeaton. I do, sir.
TESTIMONY OF IVAN DOWNS YEATON, UNITED STATES ARMY,
ACCOMPANIED BY JEROME FACHER, ASSISTANT TO F. SHACKEL-
FORD, COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Yeaton, will you tell the committee your
full name for the record, please?
Colonel Yeaton. Ivan Downs Yeaton.
Mr. Mitchell. And your home address, please?
Colonel Yeaton. My home address at present is Fort Wayne, De-
troit, Mich.
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel Yeaton, will you state the date of your
birth?
Colonel Yeaton. I was born January 2, 1895, at Haverhill, Mass.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state briefly your educational background
for the committee?
Colonel Yeaton. Grammar school in Boston or Allston, Mass.;
high scliool, Pasadena, Calif.
I have a degree in osteopathy from the College of Osteopathic Phy-
sicians and Surgeons in Los Angeles, and I took a year's postgraduate
work in the College of Physicians and Surgeons in San Francisco,
and interned in the City County Hospital in San Francisco.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you attend the United States Military Academv
at West Point?
Colonel Yeaton. I did not, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you first enter the Army ?
Colonel Yeaton. Seventeenth of September 1917.
Mr. Mitchell. How^ long have you been in the United States Army ?
Colonel Yeaton. Ever since, with the exception of 1 year's retire-
ment, wdiich was last year.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your official duty station on September [
1, 19)59, and in wdiat capacity w^ere you serving? j
Colonel Yeaton. September 1, 1939, I was designated as military [
attache to the Soviet Union. I am not quite sure wdiere I was. I
don't tliink I had joined my station, but I was en route. j
Mr. Mitchell. Was your official position at that time in any way i
coiuiected with interpretive duties? I
Colonel Yeaton. At that time I was to be military attache to the {
Soviet Union. It was my duty to collect information and to evaluate ■
it. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you speak the Russian language, or write it, or
read it?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1919
Mr. MiTCHr- ')!(■. Do you remember or recall having seen those docu-
ments coming I'o G-2 from Col. Henry I. Szymanski?
Colonel YE.-pfff. I did, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee what happened to
those documents as they were received, what the procedure was in
connection with such documents?
Colonel Yeaton. At that time, the organization of G-2 had what
is known as a reading panel. There were three officers detailed down
to the records section. Military attache reports came in in 10 copies, I
believe. The original, from which additional copies could be made,
was sent to the records section. Of the 10 remaining copies, the read-
ing panel decided on the distribution.
And as long as I was the responsible section chief, all extra copies
w-ould of necessity come to me. In my office these reports were filed
under my Polish intelligence group.
Mr. Mitchell. Polish intelligence group — how many individuals
were working at that time, and what was their primary duty ?
Colonel Yeaton. My memory doesn't serve me. I am not sure how
large the section was at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. All right; proceed, please.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is one section of the question. But the other
section of the question Avas, What was their primary duty? Could
you answer that part of the question ?
Colonel Yeaton. The primary duty of what, sir?
Mr. Machrowicz. Of tliis particular section, the Polish intelligence
section.
Colonel Yeaton. The Polish intelligence subsection's primary
duties, were to file, evaluate, make such memoranda as they thought
necessary.
And our main interest at tliat time was the size and training and
possible use of tlie Polisli Army in the Far East.
Therefore, the subject of missing officers was one of vital impor-
tance to us, if they were still alive and where they were and what action
it would take, or what help we could give the Poles in getting them
out of prison camps or wherever they were. They were simply listed
as missing officers, and, as such, in the Polish file; there was a section
where reports that dealt with these missing officers were filed sepa-
rately.
You must understand at this time we were getting Polish intelli-
gence from tlie Polish Government in exile and London and through
the Polisli diplomatic group here in Washington. So I had Polish
intelligence coming in from at least two sources.
Hut all reports wound up in the same file.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you sav all the reports wound up in the same
file? ■
Colonel Yeaton. At that time ; yes, sir.
]\Ir. Mitchell. At that time ?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
have never seen any reports, from any other source other than from
Col. Henry Szymanski.
Colonel, you have read the exhibits which are in part 3 of Col. Henry
Szynianski's testimony. Are those all of Col. Henry Szymanski's
reports, to your knowledge, or were there additional reports?
1920 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Colonel Yeaton. I think there were more than that, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You think tliere were more than that?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman at this point of the proceedings,
I would like to ask the representative of the Department of Defense
where the additional reports are. Mr. Facher is here speaking on
behalf of the Department of Defense. Is that correct?
Mr. Facher. That is right.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you identify yourself for the record, please?
Mr. Facher. I am Jerome P. Facher, assistant to F. Shackelford,
Department of the Army counselor.
To the best of our knowledge, we have located all the reports that
Col. Henry I. Szymanski has sent in.
Mr. Machrowicz. Have you turned them all over to the committee ?
Mr. Facher. We have turned all the reports of Colonel Szymanski
that we have located over to the committee.
Mr. Machrowicz. There is evidently a difference of opinion be-
tween you and the colonel.
Am I correct, Colonel, that you made the statement that not all the
reports are included in the list of those which you have seen in the
transcript of testimony ?
Colonel Yeaton. You must understand, sir, that all the reports
that Szymanski sent in didn't have to do with Katyn.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are all the reports of Colonel Szymanski m re-
lation to tlie Polish officers and Katyn included in that list?
Colonel Yeaton. 1 can't say positively.
Mr. Machrowicz. Are there any other reports relating to the miss-
ing Polish officers, or to Katyn, other than those which have been
listed in your testimony before the committee, that you know of?
Colonel Yeaton. That I know of, sir ; no. Not that I know of.
Chairman Madden. Just a moment. Then your statement that you
made a moment ago dealt with Colonel Szymanski's reports not only
concerning Katyn, but as to other matters also ; is that correct?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I believe the record will show that he was also re-
sponsible for liaison with the Czechoslovakians ; is that correct?
General Yeaton. That is true.
Mr. Mitchell. I think he told us that in Chicago.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, is it your pleasure to question the'
witness as he goes along, or to wait until he makes his statement ?
Chairman I^Iadden. Did you have a statement you wanted to makiv
Colonel?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Chairman Madden. You can pursue your questions, Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, there is a distinction that the gentleman tr
your right drew. He said that all the papers of Colonel Szymanski
were turned in. The committee is concerned with all the papers and all
the reports containing the Katyn Forest massacre, from whatevoi
source. Has the Army turned over to the committee all the papers
referring to the Katyn massacre situation, from whatever source^
Coloney Yeaton. I have no way of knowing, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Will Mr. Facher answer that?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1921
Mr. Facher. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Slieelian, that has
been clone. The search for missing papers is still continuing, and we
have several other documents which we are going to forward this week.
I might say that we have forwarded to your committee military
attache reports from Iran and from other countries.
I believe Mr. Mitchell will find from some of our forwarding letters
that we did send some of those reports over.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. The Army turned it over, of course, and it had spe-
cifically to do with the Van Vliet report.
We know that Colonel Hulls — which is one of those debatable
things — made a report, which the Army has refused to declassify,
although they did turn it over to us.
We do know that the military attache in Lisbon in 1942 and 1943
made quite a few reports regarding the Polish missing officers, which
I do not think the Army has officially turned over.
Now, it would seem to me that, on the basis of these reports that we
know about, there must be a lot of other reports.
You mentioned a while ago that you had a separate section or a
separate file folder for the various reports on the missing Polish
officers. Now, could you tell the committee, was this given any par-
ticular number or file name or something?
Colonel Yeaton. That question, sir, can only be answered if you
will put a date to it.
Mr. Sheehan. Let me put the date from 1941 to 1946, inclusive,
all reports concerning the missing Polish officers, from whatever
source.
Colonel Yeaton. On July 1, 1943, the Eastern European Section
became a branch. Any reports coming from Spain would not come
into the Eastern European Section.
Mr. Sheehan. Even if they specifically referred only to Russians
and Polish relations?
Colonel Yeaton. We would be given a copy.
Mr. Sheehan. Certainly.
Colonel Yeaton. But the basic reports would not be in our office,
but we would be kept advised.
Mr. Sheehan. We are interested in anything. Copies. We do not
necessarily want the official reports.
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Then on September 1 I became chief of the unit and no longer
responsible for the files of any of the branches. I was the over-all
chief of Europe, Middle East, and Africa, and, as such, we didn't keep
any files in our office.
Mr. MrrcHELL. What year was that?
Colonel Yeaton. That was on September 1, 1943.
Mr. Sheehan. But Colonel, even if you became chief of the Eu-
ropean Section, someone succeeded you in that Polish-Eussian section,
did he not?
Colonel Yeaton. That is true, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. He would inherit all the papers that were there,
would he not?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right.
1922 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. The files would be continued, would they not ?
Colonel Yeaton. All the files.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we should get after
the Army. There are still reports we do not know about.
May I proceed a little while before we go on that ?
In handling your eastern European end in 1941 and 1943, when
you were in charge of that, did you work closely with the State De-
partment in this respect: Assume the State Department got infor-
mation from the Ambassador or someone directly to the State Depart-
ment concerning, say, missing Polish officers or military problems,
would they refer that to you, a copy of it, or something like that?
Colonel Yeaton. I would say so, normally.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, G-2 was sort of a clearing house
on all phases of the military situation as it affected the political situa-
tion also?
Colonel Yeaton. I would rather say liaison than a clearing house.
Mr. Sheehan. Then you reported your talk with Anders to Am-
bassador Steinhardt — and there must be other Ambassadors to Russia
by this time — who had reports on the missing Polish officers? The
State Department must have referred some of these reports to the
Army, did they not?
Colonel Yeaton. I can only answer that by saying that they at-
tempted to keep us in the picture. Now, I couldn't pin down any
one report.
Mr. Sheehan. No specific one. But by keeping you in the picture
sometimes between 1941 to 1945, State must have referred items of
strictly military interest to G-2 concerning Polish officers and the
Polish-Russian situation.
The Army, so far as. I know, Mr. Mitchell, has not come up with
any of that. Has it ?
Mr. Mitchell. State Department or G-2?
Mr. Sheehan. G-2 has not come up with any State Department
reports.
Mr. Mitchell. No. The only thing I got from G-2 is already on
the record, or whatever they may have given in my absence during
the European trip of the committee. I will search the files and correct
any misstatements that may have been made this morning.
Mr. Machrowicz. And that was only after we informed them of the
Existence of the documents, particularly of the Szymanski report.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. They did not submit them to us until we found
out about them from outside sources.
Mr. Mitchell. I wnll correct the record on that point.
If you will recall, Mr. Machrowicz, you were in town last Decem-
ber. 'We got four of the nine attachments to Col. Henry Szymanski's
report, and then in January we finally got the rest of them after we
were informed from outside sources as to their whereabouts. Correct?
Mr. Machrowicz. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, just to pursue that a minute longer, so I
can finish at this point here : When you were talking about a lile where
all these materials were channeled or sent to, do you recall any par-
ticular designation or file number or file classification given to that,
from memory, or from any facts you might have there?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1923
Colonel Yeatox. That file number would be put on down in the
receiving room by this panel that I spoke about. They determined
where it would be filed and what the distribution would be. That was
not a part of the branch chief's duty.
Mr. Sheehan. Do you remember the names of this panel, for the
record ?
Colonel Yeatox. No. It was constantly changing. I know that
Dave Crist, out of my office, was on it some time, but it wasn't
Mr. :Mitchell. Mr. Sheehan, I would like to interrupt for one
moment.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to ask the War Department coun-
selor for a complete personnel breakdown of all individuals in the
EE section and the Balkan section from the j'ear 1942, when we
became involved in World War II, through ]\Iay 1945.
Mr. Maciirowicz. What is the EE section? Is that the Eastern
European ?
Mr. Mitchell. That includes Poland and Russia.
I would also like to see the names of the individuals connected with
the Balkan section in G-2.
Mr. Sheehan. I might say for the record here — and INIr. Mitchell
and Mr. Madden will agree with this — that when we visited the Presi-
dent, he did not directly say he would have all the executive depart-
ments deliver to us or send to us whatever material they had on Katyn.
Is that right, Mr. ]\Iitchell ? Do you remember that ?
Mr. INIiTCHELL. I do not recall whether he said that they would take
the initiative, or whether we would take the initiative, but I do recall
that when we walked out of that office, I had the very definite under-
standing that anything that was available this committee could have.
My protest this morning was on the fact that twice in official testi-
mony before this committee I have been caught by surprise when wit-
nesses produced documents either from War Department files or their
own personal files.
The latest illustration was General Bissell yesterday, on the letter
of May 25, 1945, about the Swiss protecting power.
Thank you, Mr. Sheehan.
Now, Colonel Yeaton, I would like to show you exhibit No. 12. I
don't think that the exhibit, in part 3, has on it the routing of the
various reports as they came in. This is the top cover sheet of exhibit
No. 12. It comes from the "Military Intelligence Division, WGS,
military attache report, Poland. Subject : Polish Army in England
and the Middle East. From : M. A., liaison officer. November 6,
1942, source and degree of reliability : Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Lt.
Gen. Wladyslaw Anders."
Down in the lower left-hand corner is :
"Auth. : Colonel Yeaton. Date: 11-30-1942. Number of copies:
13."
I would like you to read it. Will you read, for the committee, what
other departments received or were notified of that report?
1924 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Colonel Yeaton. The Office of Naval Intelligence received a copy.
The recording section received the original.
The British Empire section received a copy.
Air Intelligence received a copy.
The Middle East section received a copy and the eastern European
section received six copies.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, I have just one question in con-
nection with that.
What does that report deal with ?
Mr. Mitchell. It is on the record. The balance of the report is in
the record.
Mr. Machrowicz. But just generally, Colonel, can you tell us what
that report deals with ?
Colonel Yeaton. Minutes of the meeting on organization of the
Polish forces in the Middle East, a chart of defensive disposition of
the Polish Corps in Scotland, a chart of the organization of the First
Army of the Motorized Corps, and a chart of the organization of the
territorial units.
Mr. INIachrowicz. Who had charge of routing copies of this re-
port to the various other departments ?
Colonel Yeaton. The reading panel, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you have charge of it?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did the Department of State receive a copy?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir; it is not so recorded on here.
Mr. Mitchell. Just so there will be no misunderstanding, I would
now like to have the War Department counselor's representative, Mr.
Facher, make a note that I would like to have the names of the
various reading panel members in G-2 from April 1942 until Decem-
ber 1943.
I believe it was December 18 that Colonel Szymanski was relieved
of his duty as assistant military attache. Is that correct, Mr. Machro-
wicz?
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not know. I do not remember the date.
Mr. Mitchell. Are there any further questions from the com-
mittee ?
Mr. OT^ONSKi. "VAHiy was he relieved of his duty ?
Mr. Machrowicz. I will tell my colleague from Wisconsin I am
vei'y much interested in bringing that point out, and I will bring
it out later in the cross-examination, if I am permitted to do so.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I shall look forward to it very much.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to ask the colonel about page 418,
part 3, at this time, Mr. O'Konski ?
Mr. OT^ONSKi. No.
Mr. Mitchell. Colonel, I would like to proceed a little further
by asking what was the procedure within the office of G-2 when such
reports Avere received, and how did the information channel up to
the head of G-2 and thence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or wherever
else it may have been sent? How was it done? Who did it? Was
it oral briefing, or was it in memorandum form? What was it?
Colonel Yeaton. The information that came in on these attache
reports was broken down according to subject and could have been
handled in one of several manners. Any intelligence or any informa-
tion on the Polish troops in the Near East was a matter of great
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1925
concern to the G-3 section of the War Department, the plans and
training, because they were responsible for the strategy and the orders
pertaining to the Allied troops that we had anything to do with.
Information on the missing Polish officers was of spot intelligence
value to ns as long as we thought they were alive, because they were
the cream of the Polish Army, and their presence with the new Polish
Army would have been of vital importance. Once we were sure they
were* dead, the question of who killed them, or how, was not of spot
intelligence value ; it was a matter for further investigation.
Now to come back to these reports of Szymanski, certain parts
of the information were broken down into separate reports and sent
upstairs to the Plans and Intelligence Division where they kept daily
account of the strength of that organization, its training, and its
location.
Information on the whereabouts or the death of the missing officers
was handled occasionally by verbal report and other informal mem-
oranda to G-2, so that they could be used as briefing material for the
Chief of Staff on the following morning.
"VMien the Germans released their propaganda blast, that was spot
news for the minute, because we were, as branch chiefs, responsible
that any information coming in over the air would be immediately
evaluated by the chief in question and presented to G-2 or the Director
of Intelligence, so that, if the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff
called down and said, "Wiat does this latest propaganda mean?"
G-2 would be in a position to give him at least the evaluation of his
chief of section.
I think that answers your question.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let me ask you a question in connection with
that. Colonel.
Are you now telling us that Colonel Szymanski's report dealt only
with the death of the Polish ofiicers?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were there sections of that report which dealt
with matters in which your department was concerned ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Were there sections of that report which dealt
with the question of maintaining peace in Eastern Europe?
Let me refer to you one of the statements in his report :
1. Polish-Soviet relations are marked by differences which are in my humble
opinion irreconcilable.
2. These differences are irreconcilable at present because (a) the Soviets did
not carry out their end of the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact; (b) the Soviets
are not carrying out the provisions of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30,
1941; (c) Stalin's promises to Sikorski and Roosevelt are not being kept; (d)
there are still some 900,000 Polish citizens, deportees, in Russia, slowly being
exterminated through overwork and undernourishment; (e) there are still some
50,000 Polish children slowly dying of starvation.
3. If the Soviets forsake their communistic and imperialistic aspirations there
is a good chance that peace may reign in the eastern part of Poland.
4. The Polish Government and Army officials are making a determined effort
to reconcile the differences. The attitude of the Government is realistic.
Would you say that that section of the report and the reports which
preceded it, upon which these conclusions were based, were an im-
portant thing, so far as your department was concerned ?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't want to answer that "yes" or "no," sir.
That report was made by an assistant military attache. His first
1926 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
duty is to bring that matter that you bring up to the attention of
the military attache, wlio, in turn, should have brought it immediately
to the attention of the Ambassador.
That is a matter that the military are not supposed to get into.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Would you say it is a matter in which the Depart-
ment of State should get into ?
Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you or anyone in your department bring this
report to the attention of the Department of State ^
Colonel Yeaton. It should have been done in Cairo, sir, not from
my office.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not care where it should have been done, and
I do not care about technicalities. I care about realities.
Was that report which your department received ever brought to
the attention of the Department of State?
Colonel Yeaton. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you think it should have been ?
Colonel Yeaton. This particular report, sir?
Mr. Machrowicz. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you mean this report we have here, or the one
you read, sir ?
Mr. Machrowicz. This particular report that I read from.
Mr. Mitchell. Which exhibit is it, please?
Mr. Machrowicz. Exhibit 11.
Mr. Mitchell. What page is that on, sir ?
Mr. Machrowicz. Page 458 of part 3.
Mr. Mitchell. "Future Polish-Soviet relations?"
Mr. Machrowicz. That is right.
Colonel Yeaton. Iwould have to see the covering sheet. I am not
sure that wasn't sent to the State Department, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. I might tell you, for your information, that Mr.
Shackelford testified before our committee and said that it had not
been sent to the Department of State.
Now, I am going to ask Mr. Facher, is that correct ?
Mr. Facher. I am sorry, sir ; I can't say.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think the record will speak for itself that Mr.
Shackelford said before the committee that that report had never been
forM'arded to the Department of State for its information.
If you have something to counter it, I would like to know.
Colonel Yeaton. I have nothing to counter it.
Mr. Mitchell. I have the original right here, sir.
Mr. Chairman and the committee, I show you herewith the original
letter transmitting the Szymanski reports, with the exhibits to which
Congressman Machrowicz has referred, one of them he has read into
the record just now. Here is the original letter. It says:
"Legation of the United States of America, Office of the Military
Attache, Cairo, Egypt."
"W. M. S." is up in the right-hand corner, with the "/LS" as the
identifying number, IG No. 3600. The subject is: Polish-Russian
Relations.
It is addressed to the Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War
Department, Washington, D. C.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1927
The letter states :
1. A deferred copy of letter submitted by Lt. Col. Henry I. Szymanski, covering
nine appendixes pertaining to the Katyn affair is forwarded herewith.
It is signed by William S. Ward, colonel, military attache.
Down in the lower left-hand corner it states "Enclosure: Letter
with appendixes."
Mr. Maciiroavicz. Is there anything to show that it was forwarded
to the Department of State ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I was going to ask the witness now.
I cannot see it. There is nothing to show it on here, to my knowledge.
Mr. Flood. Ask the witness if there is any evidence of it.
Mr. Mitchell. By Department of State does he mean the Ambas-
sador in Egypt or here in Washington ?
Mr. Machrowicz. I mean the Department of State. I do not care
who it was in the Department of State.
Colonel Yeaton. There is still missing from this document that
cover sheet, and without that, this can't stick.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am still going to repeat my statement to you,
Colonel. I realize you probably cannot answer that at this time, but
Mr. Shackelford, on behalf of the Department of Defense, has already
verified to this committee that tliat report has never been sent to the
Department of State.
Now, I am going to ask you another question, to refer to page 472
of part 3 of the hearings. That is an excerpt of an enclosure. No. 5,,
in Colonel Szymanski's report. It is entitled as follows: "Will the-
Russians Fight Next Spring?" Was that subject matter of impor-
tance to your department ?
Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was it of importance to the Department of State ?
Colonel Yeaton. I would say more to us than them.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let me read to you what was contained in that
report, which has now been declassified :
Will the Russians Fight Next Spring?
Yes; if they find the Germans very weak. This winter they will conduct
limited offensives in order to straighten their lines. Behind these lines, they
will rest, reorganize, train and equip more divisions. They will wait until the
Allies and Germans annihilate each other. They will wait until the German
Army confronting them is so weak that their own effort will bring easy and huge
results. They will not stop their westward march until the American Army stops
them.
Europe is confronted with what seems to many of the powers an "either/or"
choice ; i. e., either German domination or Soviet domination.
There is little faith that the United States could control a victorious Russia
at any ijeace-table conference.
One of Mr. Willkie's secretaries stated to me in Tehran that Russia and the
United States will dictate the peace of Europe. When I repeated this (without
mentioning the source) to a very prominent Pole in Tehran, he at first begged me
not to jest, and then very suddenly said to me that "In that case Poland has lost
the war and the Allies have lost the war."
The choice in Europe is not merely democracy versus Hitler, as so many Amer-
icans seem to think it is.
That is signed "Henry I. Szymanski, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,
United States Army, Liaison Officer to Polish Army."
Was that information important to your department?
1928 THE KATYN FOREST IMASSACRE
Colonel Yeaton. Decidedly, sir,
Mr. Machrowicz. And to the Department of State ?
Colonel Yeaton. I assume so.
Mr. Machrowicz. And yet not one bit of evidence has been produced
here that that report has ever been brought to the attention of the
Department of State.
If that is true, would you say there was an error made on somebody's
part in the Department of Defense ?
Colonel Yeaton. I can only report, sir, that the channel for this
to get into the State Department was in Cairo. This military attache
is working for his ambassador, and it is up to him to report to his
ambassador anything that even faintly touches a matter concerning
the state.
Mr. Machroavicz. Colonel Szymanski was directly under your con-
trol; was he not?
Colonel Yeaton. Directly under my control.
Mr. Machrowicz. When he reported it to you, and if you were not
the proper source to receive that, was it not your duty to report it to
the Department of State?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Instead of that, you put it in the warehouse in
Alexandria?
Colonel Yeaton. I did not, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is where the committee found it.
I am going to ask you another question.
Mr. Mitchell. Might I interrupt a minute, sir ? I think that is an
unfair statement to the colonel. He has come here voluntarily. I am
sure that these reports were not in the warehouse when the colonel was
in charge of this. We found them there later ; yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Let me ask you whether subsequent to the receipt
of this report you sent a telegram to Colonel Szymanski.
Colonel Yeaton. I sent him many telegrams, sir.
Mr. JVIachrowicz. Did you send him one as a direct result of that
report ?
Colonel Yeaton. I do not remember, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Facher, do you have that telegram with j'Ou?
Mr. Facher. No, sir ; I do not.
Mr. Machrowicz. Where is it?
Mr. Facher. Which telegram are you talking about, sir?
]\Ir. Machrowicz. I am talking about the telegram which was dis-
cussed in executive session of our committee, in which Colonel Szy-
manski was very thoroughly blamed for showing anti-Soviet leanings.
Let me ask the colonel : Do you remember the telegram ? Now
that I have refreshed you as to the text of the telegram, do you re-
member at any time sending a telegram or a cable to Cairo after re-
ceipt of these reports ?
Mr. Facher. Mr. Machrowicz, may I interrupt just a second?
I believe the contents of that telegram are still classified as to the
personal information.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not agi'ee with you. Of course, the only rea-
son it is classified is that it is embarrassing to someone in the Depart-
ment. And I think it is about time we found out.
Mr. Mitchell. To bring us up to date on that particular phase of it,
when we returned to Chicago, we had that executive session with Mr.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1929
Korth. I believe Mr. Shackelford was there, too, at that time. Then
we departed for Europe. I am still waiting to see what they are going
to do about that.
Mr. Machrowicz. I do not think we want to wait any longer.
Did you at that time think that Colonel Szymanski, because of this
report, showed too much anti-Soviet tendencies ?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you ever tell him so ?
Colonel Yeaton. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am going to ask the chairman now that that
wire should be brought to the attention of the committee. I think we
have waited long enough,
Mr. Flood. May I interrupt ? I have no objection to that, but may
I say this : If you will yield for a question on the same thing
Mr. Machrowicz. I will be glad to yield.
Mr. Flood. Do you remember. Colonel, drafting a cable or a wire
or an order to Colonel Szymanski at Cairo, for General Strong or
anybody else to Colonel Szymanski? Do you remember drafting
sucli a statement advising Colonel Szymanski that his attitude was
too anti-Soviet?
If you do not remember doing it yourself, on your own order, do
you remember doing it on the order of General Strong, for General
Strong, to Colonel Szymanski, advising him that, in the opinion of
General Strong, Szymanski's conduct was too anti-Soviet ?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't ever remember that phrase ; no, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Let us fix the date of that now.
Where were you in December 19-lo, and what were you in charge of,
and would you be responsible for drafting such a telegram or cable?
Colonel Yeaton. December 1943 I was chief of the European unit.
That is all of Europe, Middle East, and Africa.
Mr. Mitchell. Europe, Middle East, and Africa. The Middle
East would be Cairo.
Colonel Yeaton. If such a telegram originated in the Eastern Eu-
ropean section — and a draft would have — it would have passed across
my desk as a matter of information.
Mr. Flood. Do you remember?
Colonel Yeaton. I remember there was a telegram sent out at that
time, but the anti-Soviet part of it, I don't remember any such remark
as that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, as I remember, the only reason
Mr. Shackelford did not want to declassify that cablegram was be-
cause he thought it might be injurious to Colonel Szymanski.
_ Colonel Szymanski has advised this committee that he has no objec-
tion to that cablegram being declassified. I think it is important that
we ought to have it.
Chairman Madden. It is my understanding that the Department of
Defense has already gone on record that any matter connected with
the Katyn problem is declassified. Is not that correct ?
Mr. Facher. I believe there are still some aspects of it, sir, which
we furnish you on a classified basis, but we do furnish them.
Chairman Madden. Why would this particular telegram be
classified ?
Mr. Facher. To the best of my recollection, sir, I think, as Con-
gressman Machrowicz stated, it was because of some derogatory in-
1930 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
formation. I Avas not present at the executive session; so I can't
speak first-hand.
Mr. Machrowicz. Colonel Szymanski feels just as I do, and as
overy member of this committee thinks ; that anything derogatory in
there is not derogatory to him ; it is rather complimentary, even though
the Department thought he was too anti-Soviet. And Colonel Szy-
manski is perfectly willing to have it declassified.
Now, if it is embarrassing to the Department, that does not bother
me at all. It should not be classified if it is embarrassing to the
Department.
Mr. Flood. I think it should be declassified, no matter who it em-
barrasses, Szymanski or the Department.
Chairman Madden. What reason does the Department give for not
presenting it to us ?
Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Chairman, I remember that. I can remember
the circumstances. Part of the cablegram had to do with recommen-
dations that Szymanski had made with reference to intelligence, and
the Department did not want to declassify it because they have now
followed his recommendations. They did not want to reveal what
the intelligence was.
Chairman Madden. Could the telegram be presented now?
Mr. Facher. I believe the telegram is still classified, sir; but we
will check it over, and if it can be declassified we will provide it to
the committee. I am not sure the operational aspects were included
in the same telegram.
Mr. Sheeiian. They were not included but referred to.
iNIr. Facher. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. May I ask if there is any reason that you know
why that section relating to the Dei)artment of Defense, relative to
Colonel Szymanski, cannot be declassified if he consents to it?
Mr. Facher. Not to my personal knowledge, sir. "However, I am
not an Intelligence officer.
Mr. Sheehan. May I make an observation, Mr. Chairman ?
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr. Sheehan. Part of the telegram that the "War Department
wanted declassified was the part of the telegram that was derogatory
toward Colonel Szymanski. Without revealing the othei- part of it,
it would put the colonel in a bad light, and the committee members in
executive session felt it should not l)e revealed unless the entire cal)lo-
gram was revealed.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Chairman, who has the authority to classify or
declassify?
May I ask the colonel that question: Who has the authority, who
does the classifying and declassifying?
Colonel Yeaton. The originating officer does the classifying. Any
declassifying must be done by a special branch in the Intelligence
Department.
Mr. DoNDEKO. Does that come from the Chiefs of Staff, or is that
down in a lower echelon ?
Colonel Yeaton. There is another section down in the Joint Staff,
that is also involved in all War Department document declassification ;j
yes, sir.
But matters that pertain only to G-2, they have their own sectionl
that has that jiower.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1931
Mr. Sheehan. Mr, Chairman, if I may make an observation there,
Avliich is not my own, but, as someone else stated, the doctors are able
to bnry their mistakes and the military classify them "Top secret."
Mr. Machrowicz. I think, ]Mr. Chairman, it is abont time now we
make some decision on that cablegram. I think it is important. We
have waited a long time for it.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I will take up the matter with the
War Department Counselor's office and I will straighten it out before
our next set of hearings. We will get it into the record.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, Counsel, that was on March 14. This is now
June 4. March 14 to June 4 seems to me like a sufficient lengfh of time
for them to make up their minds as to what they are going to do with
this.
The problem is very simple. I see no reason why they should be
the sole judges as to whether a cablegram of this type should be
declassified.
]Mr. Mitchell. Sir, if I recall correctly — and I think Congressman
Sheehan can check me on that — I think that in that particular cable
that was referenced, the first part of it had the derogatory remark
about Colonel Szymanski, and then the other part referred to some
memorandum on a military-intelligence subject that he had written.
I think the Department is primarily concerned with the reference to
the military-intelligence scheme or plan that he had recommended
previously in another memorandum, which you recall.
I think that that probably is the reason why they are having dif-
ficulty there on this.
But I agree with you.
yiv. Machrowicz. Thiee months seems to be sufficient time to resolve
the difficulty.
Mr. jNIitchell. I agree, and I will get on it right away, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show here
that whenever the word "derogatory'' with reference to Colonel
Szymanski is used they mean derogatory from the viewpoint of a
pro-Communist and not derogatorj- from the standpoint of personal
beliefs in freedom and justice.
Mr. Mitchell. I stand corrected.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Counsel, may I ask the colonel one or two
questions ?
Just before you were being cross-examined here. Colonel, you said
something to the effect that all the information on the Polish officers
was of spot-intelligence value to you as long as they were alive. Then
you went on and said that when the officers were dead the informa-
tion was not of spot-intelligence value.
Wlien did you or your section determine officially that the Polish
officers were dead and were not worth looking for any more^
Colonel Yeaton. I did not say they "were not worth looking for,"
sir. I said they were not spot intelligence any more.
Mr. Sheehan. No. You stated that when they were dead they
were not of spot intelligence.
Colonel Yeaton. That is right.
Mr. Sheehan. When did you determine they were dead?
Colonel Yeaton. After the investigation that follov\'ed the German
broadcast.
Mr. Sheehan. What investigation?
1932 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Colonel Yeaton. Red Cross.
Mr. Mitchell. The Polish Red Cross.
Mr. Sheehan. The Polish Red Cross?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you took their word for it ; did you ?
Colonel Yeaton. We took their word for it that the officers were
dead. I didn't mean by that that we didn't continue to believe G-2
and the staff on all phases of the massacre end of it, but we didn't
consider that spot intelligence.
Mr. Sheehan. I see.
Mr. Mitchell. What did G-2 do at the time of the revelation of
the Katyn Forest Massacre ?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I have some questions on that.
Was that the time when a communication went out under the name
or signature of George Marshall to Colonel Szymanski asking him
to make a report on the Katyn Massacre ? Do you remember any such
telegram going out?
Colonel Yeaton. I drafted it, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You drafted the telegram ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And you remember it?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. May I pursue another question along this line there?
Yesterday it was brought out that apparently our State Department
had asked the Swiss Government, as a neutral, to find out from Van
Vliet, while he was a prisoner of war, certain information.
Did G-2 take any hand in that ?
Colonel Yeaton. I don't know, sir. At that time I was coordinator
of specialists. I wasn't chief of any branch and it was just before
going overseas.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
Mr. Mitchell. At this time. Colonel, I would like to have you run
down the complete assignments that you had in the Office of G-2 from
the time of your return from your duties as assistant military attache
in Moscow ; your respective duty assignments and title of each position.
Colonel Yeaton. From about the middle of May 1942 to the 30th
of June 1943, 1 was Chief of the E;ist European Section.
By June 1943 the sections had grown so large that they were re-
named branches. So on July 1, 1943, until August 31, 1943, I was
Chief of the Eastern European Branch.
On September 1, 1943, I was promoted to Chief of the European
Unit, which was known before that as a theater group and then known
as a unit.
On the IGth of June, when the whole of G-2 was reorganized, the
branches, which had been up to that time geographical units, were all
of a sudden, right in the middle of the war, reorganized into func-
tional units.
Mr. MiTc^HELL, Wlien was that ?
Colonel Yeaton. That was the middle of June 1944. And at that
time the records in every one of the branches, where they had been
immediately under the supervision of a branch chief and file clerk,
were all picked np and moved down in the basement in a large room
and put in one large room.
Mr. Mitchell. Under whose order was that reorganization?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1933
Colonel Yeaton. Under General Bissell's.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you know why that reorganization took place?
Colonel Yeaton. I do not, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did it strike yon as being rather odd that such a
reorganization should take place at that particular time, June 1944?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
I didn't agree with it in principle, because I think the geographic
set-up was the more workable one.
Mr. Mitchell. Did the other officers who were in G-2 at that time
feel that this reorganization was necessary, or did they agree one way
or the other, or disagree? Wliat was the majority opinion ?
Colonel Yeaton. The majority opinion among the branch chiefs
was that the reorganization was not well timed.
Mr. Mitchell. Was there a drastic shift in the officers in charge
of these various units at that time?
Colonel Yeaton. There was. The branqh chiefs became known as
specialists.
Mr. Mitchell. Specialists in what line ? Evaluation ?
Colonel Yeaton. In the line that they had been chiefs in prior.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever hear of an Alfred McCormack?
Colonel Yeaton. I have, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. lAHiat was has official position in G-2 ?
Colonel Yeaton. When I joined G-2 early in 1942 Col. Alfred Mc-
Cormack was in charge of what was known as the Special Branch.
Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was the Special Branch, if you are at liberty
to say here?
Colonel Yeaton. It had to do with evaluation of crytographic
material.
Mr. Mitchell. Did he receive intelligence and evaluate intelligence
reports in his official capacity ?
Colonel Yeaton. I wish you would clarify "intelligence reports."
If you mean military attache reports, the answer is "No."
Mr. Mitchell. Did he receive, or was he responsible for the trans-
mission of, any reports that may have been sent in by Szymanski
cablewise, or through any other means, to G-2 ?
Colonel Yeaton. Responsible for the evaluation ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Did yon ever hear of a T. Achilles Polyzoides ?
Colonel Yeaton. I have, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What was his position at that time ?
Colonel Yeaton. I am not sure. I would rather let the record show
it.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
How was liaison with the State Department conducted during 1942
and 1943, as far as your particular EE section was concerned ?
Colonel Yeaton. G-2 had a liaison branch that contacted the State
Department officially.
But the same thing was true with us as in all other departments,
there was, as the British say, an old boy liaison between departments
and like geographic branches. At that time. Ambassador Loy Hen-
93744— 52— pt. 7 8
1934 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
dei'son, I think, was in charge of the State Department Eastern Euro-
pean Section.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you know any of the State Department people ?
Did they ever come to G-2 or did you liave anybody specifically
assigned from your section or unit to have liaison with the State
Department ?
Colonel Yeaton. With the Eastern European branch of State, I did
the liaisoning myself.
Mr. Mitchell. Did the question of the missing Polish officers come
up ^
Colonel Yeaton. It did.
Mr. Mitchell. With whom in the State Department?
Colonel Yeaton. I think with Ambassador Henderson, who was in
charge at that time.
Mr. Dondero. Do you mean Loy Henderson ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have liaison with the office of OWI?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
]Mr. Mitchell. Was anybody from your staff assigned to OWI?
Colonel Yeaton. No, sir.
Mr. MiTCHELi.. Was there a section in G-2 that had liaison with
OWI, another section, or some other means?
Colonel Yeaton. Not that I know of, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
I have no further questions.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. May I have a question ?
Colonel, you just said a while ago that you knew and drafted the
cable asking Szymanski, and probably others, to make a report on
the Katyn massacre. As these reports came in, did you and your
fellow- workers evaluate these reports and come on to any off-the-
record conclusions as to who was responsible for that crime?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Konski. Could j^ou tell us what your conclusions were, to
the best of your knowledge, at that time, as these reports started to
come in?
Colonel Yeaton. My conclusions Avere the same as Szymanski's.
Mr. O'Konski. That the Russians committed the murders?
Colonel Yeaton. That is right, sir.
Mr. O'Konski. Was that the generally prevalent opinion around
your department, that it was the Russians that were responsible, as
these reports started to come in?
Colonel Yeaton. I can only si)eak for myself, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKK Did the Slate Dei)artment show a partieidar inter-
est in the nuirder of these Polish officers? That is, was their interest
jn this phase of international relations more keen than the average
observations in their visits with you?
Colonel Yeaton. I think the peak of interest came the 24 liours
following the German broadcast. Thereafter, the information on
those things came in, as you know, in small pieces, and we felt that
each little bit added another brick to the wall.
lint witliin itself it was only a matter of vital importance for the
record.
The reason I sent that telegram to Szymanski was I felt ])erfectly
certain that at some future date there would be an investigation, and
THE 5ATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1935
I was doing everything' I could at the time to see that my files were
>() complete that when that day came, my office certainly would not
})e subject to criticism.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. That is all.
Thank you, Colonel.
Mr. Sheehan. Colonel, you stated that you carried on the liaison
with the State Department yourself. Do you remember in 1942 or
1943, when the question of the missing Polish officers came up, whether
you gave any opinion to the State Department as to your opinion, as
you expressed it, that the Russians were guilty?
Colonel Yeaton. I did not give any official opinion ; no, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Unofficial ?
Colonel Yeaton. I undoubtedly expressed myself unofficially.
Mr. Sheehan. I would like to go back a little bit.
In your testimony here in the early part, when you stated that
wdien you were called into G-2 you were asked to prepare a documen-
tary project paper that you prepared on Russia, you said that at the
time Russia was the only country in which G-2 did not have the par-
ticular documentary knowledge; is that right?
Colonel Yeatox. So far as I know ; yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Did we have documentary knowdedge on England?
Colonel Yeaton. Oh, yes, sir. We have volumes on it.
Mr. Sheehan. And France?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, the xlrmy intelligence was in the
peculiar position of having documentary evidence and information
about every country in the world, including our close allies, except
Russia?
Colonel Yeaton. That is almost a true statement, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. It is a sort of reflection, I think, on Army intelli-
gence, with Russia being what it is, as big a country as it is, that
nobody ever bothered to find a lot of evidence about it and a lot of
security information.
Colonel Yeaton. We were trying, sir.
Mr. Dondero. I think Colonel, the reason why you did not get it is
that the Russians saw to it that you did not get it.
Colonel Yeaton. That is right, sir.
Mr. DoxDERO. I have just one question.
In what manner was the liaison relationship conducted between G-2
and State Department ? Was it by messenger, or by mail ?
Colonel Yea'jox'. By officer liaison.
Mr. DoNDERO. In other words, if you had documents to send over,
it was done by a person; is that right?
Colonel Yeaton^. That is right, sir; so that the document w^ould
be recorded out and in at the State Department, so that there would
be no question. If they raised the question, "We did not see the
document,'" we could point to the record and show where they had
received it.
Mr. DoNDERO. The State Department, I assume, had the same pro-
cedure ?
Colonel Yeaton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dondero. That is all.
Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question along those lines, Colonel.
1936 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
In other words, if any document was turned over to the Depart-
ment of State by your department, you had something in writing,
a receipt, to show that that actually was done ?
Colonel Yeaton. Out of my branch ; yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have anything to show that these reports
of Colonel Szymanski were turned over to the Department of State?
Colonel Yeaton. I do not, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. It has been admitted yesterday already that there
was nothing showing in the department wliich was of a nature to
indicate that the Van Vliet report was received in the Department of
State also.
Mr. Flood. I have listened to this thing for a couple of days, or a
day and a half. I would like to say that if there is any evidence, any
place, anywhere, anyhow, of any kind, that information was trans-
mitted to the Department of State, I would be as anxious to find out
as anybody else.
And I have tried hard to find it out. I cannot find a scintilla of
evidence that the State Department was apprised of this documentary
reporting from anybody.
I think it is about time we stopped this torturing every phrase to
try and establish that the State Department had this information.
Now, if they got it, I want to know. If they did not get it, let us
stop this business.
The Defense Department made a mistake or an error, deliberately
or inadvertently, in my judgment. These reports did not get to the
State Department.
Now, if they did, I want to see how they got there, who took them
there, and where are the receipts. The evidence, in my opinion, and
only in my opinion — I am only saying in my opinion — shows very
clearly that this information did not get to the Department of State ;
why, I do not know.
Now, let us find that out. We are wasting time, if there was
deliberate conspiracy, inadvertence, stupidity, negligence, or anj^-
thing else, in any of the various areas of the Defense Department,
if the reports should have gotten to the State Department, why did
they not?
Let us do away with this business of spending all week trying to
find out did the State Department hide this or conspire with the
Defense people to prevent these reports from getting there, or con-
spire with somebody to steal them or destroy them to protect Russia.
I think we have knocked ourselves out trying to prove that, and we
have not done so. If we have not, let us start on it right now and
prove it.
But if we are satisfied that it cannot be proved, let us stop this
whipping-boy business of the State Department and find out what
was wrong in the Department of Defense, if we can. If we cannot
find that out, let us stop this.
Mr. Machrowicz. I concur 100 percent with the Congressman.
I wanted to say that I would bo the first to criticize the De]iart-
ment of State for neiilectinc: to do soniethinii it should have done.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1937
But I have been looking in vain for one iota of testimony to show
that any of this information whicli the Department of Defense ob-
tained was turned over to the Department of State. If I am wrong,
tlie Department of Defense should liave an opportunity to present
such proof. If they cannot do so, let us forget it now. Let us not
Jvcep on sniping at somebody who quite obviously is not at fault.
Mr. Mitchell. Congressman Flood, I would like to bring you up
to date now, that Mr. Madden has appointed a subcommittee, consist-
ing of Congressman O'Konski, Congressman Machrowicz, and Con-
gressman Sheehan, to meet with the State Department officials tomor-
row to go over the files and any records they may have concerning the
missing Polish officers or the Katyn affair. They are going to do that
tomorrow morning.
I agree with your statement.
Mr. Flood. That is all right with me. If you want to go to the
Bureau of Mines or the Department of Aginculture, go ahead, but
let us get this thing cleaned up one way or the other. It is going on
like Tennyson's Brook, going no place.
Chairman INIadden. Let me suggest that although Congressman
Sheehan and Congressman Machrowicz, and Congressman O'Konski
are to investigate the records of the State Department, in which the
State Department stated they would be glad to cooperate in any way,
let me suggest that any other member of the committee that wants
to accompany them on this investigation is at liberty to do so.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Chairman, can I ask Mr. Facher whether
he can have that cable that we are talking about here this afternoon.
Mr. Facher. I will try, sir.
Mr. Machroavicz. You have been trying since March 14. That is
such a simple thing. It should take exactly 5 minutes, not 3 months.
I am a little bit tired of this "trying" and this informing witnesses
not to cooperate with the committee. I will bring that out if it is
necessary, too.
Chairman Madden". Will you have Mr. Shackelford come over here
this afternoon ?
Mr. Facher. Yes, sir.
(The following letter and cablegram are herewith placed in the
record by the counsel, John J. Mitchell :)
Department of the Army,
Office of the Department Counselor,
Washington, June 4, 1952.
Hon. Ray J. Madden,
Chairman, House Select Committee To
Investigate the Katyn Forest Massacre,
House of Representatives.
Dear Mr. Madden : I am inclosing herewith a copy of the telegram of Decem-
ber 19, 194.3, which your committee requested at the hearing held in Washington
this morning, .Tune 4. This telegram has remained classified because it contains
personal information concerning an individual member of the Army. As such
it was treated in confidence, in accordance with Department of the Army policy
to treat efficiency reports and similar personal information as confidentiai.
Upon assurance of your committee that the individual named in this telegram
has no objection to the information being made public, I have had the telegram
declassified.
Sincerely yours,
F. Shackelford, Department Counselor.
1938 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Headquarters
U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East
MESSAGE FORM
IN COMING
[Paraphrase]
No. 8623 for AMSME from WAR
DATE: Dec. 19, 1943.
RECD: Dec. 19, 1943.
DECD: Dec. 20, l&i3.
Cite WDGBI from Strong for Osmun Jicame. AMSME 9965.
Proposed by Szmanski in his draft dated October 30tli project of setting iip'
Joint Polish Intelligence Agency is disapproved. Reference the above radio
his visit to London is disapproved. Szynianski is being appointed Milo with the
Poles and is being relieved as AMA. Answering Jicame 58 Szyraanski is under
your control as far as Collection Intelligence is concerned. Regarding his im-
mediate future in that connection all decisions are up to you. As now operating
there is confidence here in the Jicame set-up. Szymanski should accompany
them, if and when Poles move into other Theatre and report to MID through
its representative in the New area. His work has been only satisfactory because
of small volume and much duplication of information previously received from
the Poles in the opinion of the Military Intelligence Department. Further-
more frequently expressed opinions show bias opinion in favor of Polish group
which is Anti-Soviet. Instruct him to avoid political involvement and recom-
mend you require him to concentrate on Liaison with Poles.
ULIO TAG
Classification Changed To Unclassified, Security Information.
Bv authority of The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Bv Date 4 June 19.52.
JICAME for ACTION. ( JA)
Distribution 1-AG, l-G-2.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think it is about time tlie Department of De-
fense slionld be instructed they have no rio-ht to interfere with wit-
nesses and tell them not to divulo^e information to the committee. If
there is any question about that, let us make that clear right now.
If anybody wants information on that, I will give it to them.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
We want to thank you for your testimony here this morningv
Colonel Yeaton.
Is there anything further?
Mr. Mitchell. I have nothing further of the colonel.
Chairman Madden. We thank you for your testimony, Colonel.
Boris Olshansky.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, this is Mrs. J. P. Feeley, an official
interpreter for the committee.
Will you kindly swear her in, please?
Cliairman Madden. Do you solemnly swear that you will interpret
the testimony to be given by the witness truthfully, so help you God?
Mrs. Feeley. I do.
(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman through the inter-
preter, as follows :)
Chairman Madden. Mr. Olshansky, will you raise your right hand,
please?
Do you solemnly SAvear that in the hearing now being held, you
will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help '
you God? I
Mr. Olshansky. I do.
THE KATYN FOREST AIASSACRE 1939
TESTIMONY OF BORIS OLSHANSKY (THKOUGH MRS. J. P. FEELEY,
INTERPRETER)
Mr. Mitchell. Will yoii state your full name for the record, please ?
Mr. Olsiiansky. Boris Olshansky.
Chairman Maddex. Will you kindl}'^ spell it out?
Mr. MncHELL. B-o-r-i-s 0-1-s-li-a-n-s-k-y.
Where were you born, Mr. Olshansky ?
Mr. Olshansky. I was born in Voronezh, U. S. S. R.
Mr. Mitchell. When were you born?
Mr. Olshansky. I was born on the 5th of August 1910.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you educated?
Mr. Olshansky. I was educated in Voronezh.
Mr. Mitchell. What schools did you attend ?
Mr. Olshansky. I attended high school in Voronezh and the State
University of Voronezh.
Mr. Mitchell. In what did you specialize at the state university?
Mr. Olshansky. In mathematics.
Mr. Mitchell. Where were you, Mr. Olshansky, on September 1,
1939?
Mr. Olshansky. In Voronezh.
Mr. Mitchell. What were you doing in Voronezh on September
1,1939?
Mr. Olshansky. I was associate professor at the Voronezh State
University, in the department of mathematics.
Mr. Mitchell. How long did you remain in this position?
Mr. Olshansky. I held this position for 2 years.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you enter the Russian Army?
Mr, Olshansky. In September 1941.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your rank and position in the Russian
Army ?
Mr. Olshansky. I was a staff officer of the armj' then, and I was a
major in the Engineering Corps.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman and the committee, the witness has
informed me that he would like to make a brief statement as to his
position and service in the Russian Army covering the period 1941
through 1946.
Will you make a brief statement covering your time and service in
the Russian Army for the ])eriod 1941-46?
Mr. Olshansky. From 1941 and until 1942 I was a staff officer in
the Southwestern Army,
From the summer of 1942 until 1943, I took part in the Stalingi'ad
operations, and from 1943 until 1944, I took part in Bielo-Russian
operations under Marshal Rokosovsky.
Then from 1944 until the end of the war, I was in the same opera-
tions under Marshal Zhukov, and he was with the Fifth Army then.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you leave the Russian Army, and where ?
Mr. Olshansky. I left the army after the war ended, and I stayed
in Berlin, Germany.
From 1946 until the end. of 1947 I was inspector of a section of
German people's education under Soviet military administration, and
besides, I was a teacher of the Russian schools in Berlin at the same
time.
;1940 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. When you say Russian schools, do you mean the one
that was established after the war ?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes. Those schools were established after the
war under Soviet military administration.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you know Professor Burdenko, or Dr.
Burdenko, who was the head of the Soviet extraordinary state special
committee to investif^ate the Katyn Forest massacre ?
Mr. Olshansky. My father was a doctor, and he was a good friend
of Professor Burdenko from 1919. From 1919 until 1923, Professor
Burdenko and my father were together in Voronezh.
After that Professor Burdenko left for Moscow, but he kept his
friendship with my father and my family.
My father died in 1929, but every time I visited Moscow I visited
Professor Burdenko. And Professor Burdenko helped me to finish my
education and he helped me financially.
I saw Burdenko before the war for the last time in 1936. From
1936, Professor Burdenko was personal physician in the Kremlin and
he was the physician of Stalin, too.
In 1939 Professor Burdenko had to join the party. Professor Bur-
denko Avas an outstanding scientist, and he was a member of the old
Union Academy of Sciences.
During the war, I met Professor Burdenko in 1944 in Gomel. I
was wounded then in the hospital, and Professor Burdenko was sent
there for inspection. At that time. Professor Burdenko was the chief
surgeon of the Red Army, and he had the rank of lieutenant general
of the Medical Corps, which was the highest rank assigned in the
Medical Corps.
As far as the Katyn massacre was concerned, I could not discuss
that problem in the hospital. I could not discuss the matter as there
w^ere too many strangers. So we just interchanged several sentences,
as far as my house was concerned.
I heard about the Katyn massacre from the Soviet press at the
beginning of 1944. I didn't have any doubts right from the beginning
that it was one of the Soviet tricks. My opinion was shared by many
officers of the army with whom I was very friendly. AVhen I got into
Poland with the army of Marshall Rokosovsky, I heard from the
Polish people the same opinion, and I developed a great desire to find
out the truth of that matter.
I left Berlin at the end of April 1946 for Moscow. I was traveling
to the assignment for 5 days, and I made it my point to visit Professor
Burdenko, wlio was sick at that time.
Mr. Mitchell. Where?
Mr. Olshansky. In Moscow.
At that time, Professor Burdenko was the president of the Academy
of Medical Science of the U. S. S. R.
Mr. Mitchell. This was in 1946?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes ; it was at the end of xVpril 1946.
Mr. ISIiTciiELL. 1946?
Ml-. Olshansky. 1946.
Mr. Mitchell. Proceed.
Mr. Olshansky. And Pi-ofessor Burdenko was a member of the
Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. At the time when I went to visit
Professor Burdenko, he was sick and he didn't take mucli part in any
activities. Professor Burdenko was 67 years old at that time. He,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1941
ipceived me at his apartment on Iverskoy-Imskoy Street in Moscow.
When I visited Professor Burdenko, he was wearing his general's
coat then and, to all appearances, it seemed that he was a well man.
Knowing that he was not feeling well, I did not want to prolong onr
conversation, which lasted, in all, 40 minutes. After ^everal sentences
of usual conversation, I asked him on the matter of Katyn.
Professor Burdenko answered that there was nothing to think about
it ; that Katyns existed and are existing and will be existing. Anyone
who will go and dig up things in our country, Eussia, would find a lot
of things, that we had to straighten out the protocol given by the
Germans on the Katyn massacre,
]Mr. Flood. By the German protocol, do you mean the German
report and conchisions on their investigation of the Katyn massacre ,*^^
is that what you mean ?
Mr. Olshanskt. Yes. It is the German report.
Mr. Flood. And the German protocol, the German report, concluded
that the Russians committed the crime ?
Mr. Glshansky. Yes.
Mr. Flood. Professor Burdenko meant by clearing up the German
protocol was that the Russians had to file some kind of a report
showing that the Germans did it ; is not that what you mean ?
Mr. Olshansky. There was a special commission established by
Burdenko.
Mr. Flood. To prove that the Germans did it ?
Mr. Olshansky, Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you go on about your conversation with
Professor Burdenko ?
Mr. Olskaxsky. I repeat the statement I made previously. He
said that Katyns are existing, and would be existing, if you would be
digging out in the country of Russia.
Now I repeat the words of Professor Burdenko, who later said,.
"I was appointed by Stalin personally to go to the Katyn place. All
the corpses were 4 years old."
And Professor Burdenko said. "For me, as a medical man, this
problem was quite clear. Our NKVD friends made a mistake." Such
were the words of Professor Burdenko, which proved what I sup-
posed before.
I did not ask him why he signed the protocol because for every
Soviet citizen it was obvious — he had to lose his head if he would
not have signed it. I left Professor Burdenko, and he wished me
all the luck in the West, as he mentioned it, and then I heard that
he died in November 1946.
Mr. Flood. This Professor Burdenko was the chief of the Russian
medical mission which investigated the Katyn massacre, was he?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes.
Mr. Flood. And this commission made an investigation at Katyn
and filed a report that the Germans committed the crime ?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes.
Mr. Flood. Professor Burdenko, as the chief of the Russian medical
mission, signed the report, did he not?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes.
Mr. Flood. Do you want us to believe now that in your conversation
with Professor Burdenko, as you have described it, do you construe-
1942 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Professor Biirdenko's conversation as a complete repudiation by
Professor Burdenko of the Russian report?
Mr. Olshansky. When Professor Burdenko signed the report he
knew that the crime was committed by the NKVD.
Mr. Flood. Did Professor Burdenko say that the Polish officers, in
his judgment, had been killed by the Russian NKVD?
Mr. Olshansky. He stated it himself, that in being a doctor
himself he didn't have any doubt at all.
Mr. Flood. Doubt about what ?
Mr. Olshansky. That the Russian NKVD conniiitted the crime.
Mr. Flood. That is all.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you go fi'om Moscow?
Mr. Olshansky. From Moscow 1 returned to my work in Berlin.
Mr. Mitchell. How long did you stay in the Berlin zone?
Mr. Olshansky. I was in Kai'lshorst from 1948, and after that I
escaped with my family and I became a political refugee.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you enter the western zone ?
Mr. Olshansky. I arrived in Regensburg to the American military
government, and I got protection from the American authorities and
the right for immigration.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you arrive in the United States?
Mr. Olshansky. I arrived in the States on January 2, 1952.
Mr. Flood. Did anybody promise you anything to come here to
testify?
Mr. Olshansky. Nobody promised anything, but I consider it my
moral duty.
Mr. Flood. Are you a voluntary witness, or were you subpenaed?
Mr. Mitchell. I will answer that. He is a voluntary witness, sir.
Mr. Flood. I have just one more question.
Is it not true that Professor Burdenko, or Colonel General Bur-
denko, the chief of the Medical Corps of the Russian Army, was also,
from time to time, the personal physician of Stalin?
Mr. Olshansky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Flood. That is all.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Sheehan ?
Mr. Sheehan. No.
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Mr. Flood. We appreciate your interest in these proceedings, Mr.
Olshansky, and we are grateful to you for taking the time to come
here and give us the advantage of this very important testimony.
Mr. Olshansky. I repeat again that it is my moral duty.
Mr. Flood. The committee will now recess, to reconvene subject to
call of the Chair.
(Thereupon, at 12: 10 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene
subject to call of the Chair.)
THE KATYN FOKEST MASSACKE
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1952
House of Representati\t:s,
The Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre,
Washington^ D. C.
The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 1301,
House Office Building, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman), presiding.
Present: Messrs. Madden, Machrowicz, Dondero, OTvonski, and
Sheehan,
Also present: John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select com-
mittee, and Roman Pucinski, chief investigator.
Chairman Maddex. The committee will come to order.
I might say that the hearings this week will terminate the investiga-
tions of the Katyn committee.
A year ago in September, Congress authorized the creation of this
special committee for the purpose of determining officially the guilt
of the nation responsible for the massacring of approximately 14,000
Polish soldiers and intelligentsia at the beginning of World War II.
This connnittee started hearings in October a year ago, and when
Congress reconvened in January we held hearings in Washington
•and Chicago in February and March, and in March the Congress
authorized our committee to go abroad and complete our hearings.
The members of tlie committee decided last June that it was essential
that we file an interim rej^ort as to the No. 1 purpose of the committee,
which was to determine the guilt of the nation committing these mas-
sacres.
The Katyn Massacre is the only international crime in world history
where two nations disputed the guilt. There have been a great num-
ber of international crimes in history, but the world always knew
the nation that was responsible, except in the case of the massacre of
the Polish soldiers and intellectual leaders at Katyn.
In order to file our report with the Congress before adjournment
last July, the committee decided to file an interim report dealing with
the guilt of the nation responsible for the massacre. In our report
which I have just mentioned, we unanimously decided that the testi-
mony revealed tliat the Soviet Government, beyond any doubt or
question wliatsoever, was responsible or guilty for the massacring of
these Polish soldiers and intelligentsia.
At the time this committee was created. Members of Congress were
very much interested in what happened to certain reports that were
filed immediately after the finding of these bodies at Kaytn. These
reports disappeared.
Also, there were a number of questions by the Members of Congress
at the time this resolution was on the floor of the House, regarding
1943
1944 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
the operation of the Nuremberg trials. That is tlie reason why we are
ho](lin<jj hearings here this weeK.
We have ah^eady had several witnesses in our former hearings
testify regarding these reports, but the witnesses that will be heard
this week will further elaborate for the information of the com-
mittee as to what happened to these reports.
Mr. Justice Jackson was very cooperative to volunteer testimony this
morning as to information regarding the Nuremberg trials.
I also wish to commend the members of the committee for the out-
standing work they have done on the hearings both here and abroad.
The work of the committee has been difficult and its success can be
attributed to the nonpartisan and diligent work of the committee
members.
After the hearings this week, the committee will complete its report
on the second phase of the hearings, to wit, the disappearance of the
files and testimony regarding Nuremberg. We will make our final
report to Congress before the end of the year on this phase of the
hearings.
I might further state that in the filing of our interim report, the
committee made four recommendations to the Congress of the United
States, which were unanimous:
No. 1, requesting that the President of the United States forward
the testimony, evidence, and findings of this committee to the United
States delegates at the United Nations.
No. 2, requesting, further, that the President of the United States
issue instructions to the United States delegates to present the Katyn
case to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
No. 3, requesting that the appropriate steps be taken by the General
Assembly to seek action before the International World Court against
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for committing a crime a^
Katyn which was in violation of the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations, and.
No. 4, requesting the President of the United States to instruct the
United States delegation to seek the establishment of an international
commission which would investigate other mass murders and crimes
against humanity.
Judging from the revelations and the testimony that this committee
has revealed regarding the Katyn massacre, I believe all members of
the committee and possibly all Members of Congress will cooperate
with the members of this committee to investigate other massacres and
violations of international law which have been committed in Korea.
I believe that every member of this connnittee would pursue the
work that ^ye have started to see if something camiot be done to arouse
world public opinion against international bi-igandry, barbarism, and
lawlessness of this kind.
If any othei- members have anything to say, we w^ill be glad to iiear
them. Otherwise, we can proceed with the testimony.
In order to finish the hearings this week, we decided to have hear-
ings today, wliich is Armistice Day. The commitfec and the peo])le
in the room will stand for a minute to pay tribute to the war dead.
(An interval of silence.)
Chairman Madden. Let me say that under the rule in the House of
Representatives, we do not wish to have photographs taken while the
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1945
witness is testifying. If any photographer here woukl like to take
pictures at this time, it is agreeable with the witness and also with the
committee.
Mr. Justice, is it agreeable with you to take some pictures now?
ISIr. Justice Jackson. Yes.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT H. JACKSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Chairman Madden. For the purposes of the record, Mr. Justice,
would you state your name and your title?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Robert H. Jackson. At the present time I am
associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. I was repre-
sentative and chief of counsel for the United States at the Nuremberg
prosecutions, at the international trial only.
Chairman Madden. Do you have a statement you wish to read ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes. I told your counsel that I would pre-
pare a statement, with dates as exact as I could get them, so that it
would be as accurate as possible. I have such a statement, which is
being handed to your counsel and, if there is no objection on the part
of the committee, it will be given to the press. It has not been dis-
tributed so far.
Chairman Madden. That is satisfactory.
Will you now proceed with your statement, please?
Mr. Justice Jackson. The guilt for the Katyn Forest massacre has
not been adjudged by the Nuremberg Tribunal, and inquiry into it is
not inconsistent with the position taken by the United- States prosecu-
tion at the Nuremberg international trial of Goering and others.
It was my responsibility to conduct the prosecution on behalf of the
United States. I am glad to inform you in detail concerning all
decisions and actions in reference to the Katyn atrocity and the reasons
which conduced to them.
The first step that seems pertinent was an agreement to divide pri-
mary responsibility for preparation and presentation of the case
among the prosecutors representing the four Allied Powers. This was
intended to fix on someone responsibility for covering each part of the
case, to avoid duplication, and to expedite a trial of unprecedented
complexity.
To the United States was allocated the over-all conspiracy to incite
and wage a war of aggression. The British were assigned the viola-
tion of specific treaties and crimes on the high seas. Violations of
the laws of war and crimes against humanity were divided on a
geographical basis. The French undertook crimes in western Europe,
and the Soviet prosecution was assigned the duty of preparing and
presenting evidence of crimes in eastern Europe — an area largely
in Soviet occupation, and to much of which the others of us had no
access. The geographical area thus assigned to the Soviet repre-
sentatives included Katyn Wood and Poland as Avell, but at that time
it was not known that the Katyn massacre would be involved.
The first proposal that the Nuremberg trial should take up examina-
tion of the Katyn massacre came from the Soviet prosecutor during
the drawing of the indictment. Preliminary drafts w^ere negotiated
in London at a series of conferences where I was represented, but not
1946 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
personally present. At the last London meeting, tlie Soviet prosecutor
included among crimes charged in the east the following :
In September 1941, 925 I*olish officers who were prisoners of war were killed in
the Katyn Forest near Smolensli.
Both British and American representatives protested, but they
finally concluded that, despite their personal disapproval, if the
Soviet thought they could prove the charge they were entitled to do so
under the division of the case.
Tlie indictment was brought to Berlin for final settlement and
filing, where I objected to inclusion of the charge and even more
strongly when, at the last moment, the Soviet delayed its filing by
amending the Katyn charge to include 11,000 instead of 925 victims.
However, it was in the Soviet part of the case and they had inves-
tigated Katyn; we had no opportunity to do so. In view of what
we knew of the over-all Nazi plan to exterminate inhabitants of
Poland, it did not seem unlikely that this was part of their program,
and the Soviet claimed to have adequate evidence of Nazi guilt.
While we did not feel justified in preventing the issue, we warned
the Soviet delegation that we did not have evidence to support the
charge nor time nor opportunity to investigate it and that, if it met
with denial or countercharges, we would keep hands off and leave
the entire contest to the Soviet and German lawyers.
The reasons for opposing inclusion of this charge and refusal to
participate in its trial were that to litigate that issue would conflict
in several respects with what I considered to be sound trial policy
for the first such case in history. It was not based upon any convic-
tion in my own mind about the truth or falsity of the charge. I
knew that the Nazis and the Soviets accused each other, that both
were capable of the offense, that perhaps both had opportunity to
commit it, and that it was perfectly consistent with the policy of each
toward Poland. Whatever the facts were, they had become overlaid
with deep layers of Nazi and Soviet propaganda and counterpropa-
ganda, and it seemed we could not at the international trial wisely
undertake or satisfactorily achieve the long task of separating truth
from falsehood. The chief reasons in support of that conclusion are
four:
First, responsibility for the massacre did not appear to be capable
of documentary proof or substantial corroboration. One of the basic
decisions on policy concerning the Nuremburg international trial was
that we should accuse only defendants whose guilt could be established
and should charge only offenses whose occurrence could be fully proved
or substantially corroborated by documentary evidence captured from
the Germans themselves.
Because this Avas the first internatioiuil criminal trial in history
and was held in the wake of war when passions were high, we did
not want any judgment that Mould rest solely on oral testimony of
witnesses whose interest, bias, memory, and truthfulness would always
be open to question. This required us to pass over many tempting
matters because evidence measuring uj) to tliis standard was not then
obtainable, llowevei', that policy was so far observed thai the tribu-
nal, in its judgment, said :
Tilt' rase, thcrefoi-e. a.yainsi the (IcfciHl.-ints rcsis in a l.-iriic nicasiin' in di>c-
iinicnts (if their own nuikin;:, the antlicnl icit\ of wliicli Ims not been ( lialienyed
except in one or two cases.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1949
We had tile diary of Hans Frank, the Nazi Governor-General of
Poland, acknowledged by him to be authentic, saying :
We must annihilate the Jews wherever we find them and wlierever it is
possible.
In August 1942 he wrote of Nazi manipulation of hunger rations
in Poland :
That we sentence 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be noted only mar-
ginally. It is a matter, of course, that should the Jews not starve to death it
would, we hope, result in the speeding up of the anti-Jewish measures.
We had written evidence of specific extermination measures, such
as the 75-page leather-bound official report by Major General Stroop
which recited the killing of men, women, and children of the Warsaw
ghetto to the exact number of 56,065, and set out the day-to-day
measures, including shooting, fire, explosion, and chemical extermina-
tion in the sewers, where the victims had taken refuge, accompanied
by photographs to prove the operation's efficiency.
We had the report by SS Brigade Fuehrer Stahlecker to Himmler,
dated October 1941, of the execution of 135,567 persons in Lithuanian
area.
We had a top-secret report, dated May 16, 1942, of the ghastly
details of the operations in the east of gas wagons for killing
undesirables.
We also had German protests, official, but not very high minded,
against such exterminations, in one instance of 150,000 to 200,000 Jews,
and in another instance of 5,000 Jews, because it was complained they
should have been spared for use as forced labor.
Some of the documents, intended to conceal crime, unconsciously
dramatized it. For example, a death book of the Mauthausen con-
centration camp recorded 35,317 deaths. During a sample period 203
persons died of the same ailment, heart trouble, died at brief and regu-
lar intervals, and, more astonishingly, died in alphabetical order.
Death came first to Ackermann, at 1 : 15 a. m., and reached Zynger at
2 p. m.
Oral testimony and affidavits were available from captured Ger-
man officials. One told of the official Gestapo estimate that the Nazi
extermination program had done away with 4 million persons in
concentration camps and that 2 million additional were killed by the
secret police in the east.
Another Nazi, General Ohlendorf, testified willingly, even boast-
fully, that he supervised execution of over 90,000 men, women, and
children in the eastern area.
The witness Hoess, in charge of Auschwitz extermination center,
swore that under his regime it exterminated 3 million human beings.
This was by far the largest and most atrocious of the atrocities com-
mitted against the Polish people.
Nor did we rest upon the documents which the fortunes of war
had placed in our hands when documents were procurable from other
sources. An example was the Nazi persecution of the church and
clergy, particularly vicious in Poland, which the Nazis documented
with the candor and thoroughness that they did persecution of the
Jews. It is doubtful whether, even if time were available to us, we
could have gathered evidence of the church persecution in Poland,
since any probable witnesses were in the area under Soviet control
93744— 52— pt. 7 9
1950 THE K.\TYN FOREST AIASSACRE
where Americans even then were rarely admitted, and we may doubt
the zeal of the Soviets to obtain proof on that subject. However, I
sought an audience with Pope Pius, and obtained from His Holiness
the Vatican documents in which detailed evidentiary material was
already collected, and which supported the charge of religious
persecution.
As to the Katyn massacres, we knew of no source to which we could
turn for such documentation. Extermination of these intelligent and
patriotic Poles who might become the leadership of the restoration of
Poland was provable by document to be consistent with the Nazi policy
toward Poland. Yet, while they had boasted on paper of the worst
crimes known to man, we found but one Nazi document that even
hinted at Nazi responsibility for the Katyn massacre, that being a
telegram reporting that the Polish Red Cross had found that German-
made ammunition was used in the killings.
A fourth difficulty entered into our reluctance to undertake the
Katyn murder charge as part of the Nuremberg trial. We were under
exceedingly heavy pressure to get along with the trial. A persistent
criticism in the American press during the trial was its long duration.
Of course, that is forgotten now.
Oral testimony from witnesses, subject to cross-examination by
several counsel, of course takes much more time than documentary
proof. Every word of testimony taken in the Nuremberg trial had
to be forthwith interpreted into three other languages. Every exami-
natio7i or cross-examination had to include any proper questions de-
sired by more than 20 lawyers representing defendants and 4 for the
prosecution, and these were trained in 5 different legal systems —
English, American, French, Russian, and German.
Therefore, in the interests of expedition it was necessary to forego
calling of witnesses so far as possible. You will best realize the extent
to which we aA'oided relying on oral proof when I remind you that
all 4 prosecutors at Nuremberg called only 83 witnesses to testify
orally on the whole case against the 20 individual defendants, and
these defendants, in addition to themselves, called only 61 witnesses.
You have already", according to your interim report, orally ex-
amined 81 witnesses on this 1 atrocity.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Soviet prosecutor, on
February 14, 11)46, opened tlie subject by presenting to the tribunal a
report by a Soviet extraordinary state commission of its investigation
of the Katyn crime. It recited testimony, including a good deal of
hearsay and medical data, as to the condition of the exhumed bodies.
On this, experts based opinions that the executions took place during
the period of (lei'man o('('u])ation and, theivfoi-e, that the Germans
were resj)onsible.
\h\ Stahmer, counsel for (ioering, made a ])r()nn)t request to call
Avilnesses to contradict the Soviet report, whicli occasioned some disa-
greement between the Soviet prosecutors and those rei)resenting Great
Britain and tlie United States. The Soviet lawyers took the view
that, since the court took "judicial notice" of the report of the ex-
traordinary commission as a state document, it could not be contra-
dicted. Under Soviet hiw it probably could not, but would be en-
titled to faith and credit — as a jndgnient, statute, or public act would
be here. Nevertheless, we thought that its nature was such that it was
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1951
clearly open to contradiction. Then the Soviet lawyers proposed, if
the subject were opened, to call 10 witnesses. The tribunal, however,
ruled that it would "limit the whole of the evidence to three witnesses
on either side, because the matter is only subsidiary allegation of fact.'"
Testimony of three witnesses for each was heard on the 1st and 2d
days of July 1946. What it was is a matter of record — I have cited
the record to you — and what it is worth is a matter of opinion.
At the conclusion, neither side was satisfied with its own showing
and both asked to call additional witnesses. The Soviet, especially,
complained that they had been allowed to call only 3 of the 120 wit-
nesses that appeared liefore the Soviet commission. The tribunal,
wisely, I think, refused to hear more of the subject.
The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abandoned the charge. The
tribunal did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn mas-
sacre. Neither did it expressly exonerate them, as the judgment
made no reference to the Katyn incident. The Soviet judge dis-
sented in some matters but did not mention Katyn.
This history will show that, if it is now deemed possible to estab-
lish responsibility for the Katyn murders, nothing that was decided
by the Nuremberg tribunal or contended for by the American prose-
cution will stand in your way.
Chairman JNIadden. Does that complete your formal statement, Mr.
Justice?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
And I may say that my files supporting this are open to your coun-
sel at any time, as I think he understands.
Chairman Madden. If you have any further comments to make be-
fore the members propound questions, you are at liberty to many any
comments you desire.
Mr. Justice Jackson. Thank ^ou, Mr. Chairman.
I think that tells the story of the situation, and I will be glad to
answer any questions that the committee wishes to ask about it.
Chairman Madden. Do any members of the committee have ques-
tions ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, may I just finish up one part of this
now ?
Chairman ]\Iadden. Proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Jackson, will you refer to part 5 of the Katyn
Forest JNIassacre Committee hearings held in Frankfurt, Germany,
page 1537, and will you read, please, the statement of Dr. Kempner?
Mr. Justice Jackson (reading) :
Count I, conspiracy, and count II, crimes a,u;ainst peace, were handled by the
United States and by the British. Count III, war crimes, and count IV, crimes
against humanity, were divided up accordinji' to seographical regions or dis-
tricts. The French handled the war crimes and crimes against humanity as far
as Western Europe was concerned. They were, so to siieak, sp<ikesnien, the
prosecuting spokesmen, for the French, for the Dutch, for the Belgians, and
other German-occupied western territories. The Kussians were in charge of war
crimes and crimes against humanity which were allegedly committed in the
eastei-n areas, and if I say eastern areas, I mean the Soviet Union, Poland, and
at the time they handled also Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Mitchell. Your prepared statement of this morning has satis-
factorily cleared up any doubt that might be in the mind of anybody
concerning that statement ; is that correct, sir ?
1952 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Justice Jackson. I think so.
Of course, there were crimes against Greece which were also in-
cluded in the eastern territory. We included some against the Lith-
uanians, Estonians, and the Baltic groups.
And while this division prevailed, it was not an absolute division,
for the reason that conspiracy to commit these crimes was the re-
sponsibility of the Americans, and in establishing the conspiracy, we
put in a great deal of evidence on those crimes ourselves, as I pointed
out.
We put in a great deal about Poland, although it was not in our
area on the crimes against humanity. It was in our area in the over-all
conspiracy charge.
So that it is a little difficult to say that a very exact division was
observed, because of the overlapping.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Counsel, for the record, I think you should
identify who Dr. Kempner is.
Mr. Justice Jackson. Dr. Kempner was a man who had been a Ger-
man lawyer and was in the employ, I believe, of the OSS. My staff
was not a staff that I hired. I borrowed the staff from other depart-
ments. I had no budget and I borrowed help. Dr. Kempner was bor-
rowed from the OSS and assisted us there throughout the trial.
He tlien took a part in the subsequent trials.
Mr. Mitchell. While participating, he was an American citizen,
was he not?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes ; I think that is the case.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you now refer to page 3 of your prepared
statement, Mr. Justice?
In paragraph 2 the statement is made that :
We would keep hands off and leave the entire contest to the Soviet and German
lawyers.
Now, there has been a great deal of talk that representatives of the
United States, members of your staff, in some way or other, by imjili-
cation or by assistance, tried to assist the Soviets in the proving of this
case. Do you, to your personal knowledge, know of any individual
who, in any way, participated in assisting the Soviets in proving this
case against the Nazis, that is, an American ?
Mr.Justice Jackson. That is a very difficult question to answer as
broadly as you have asked it.
Our captured documents were set up in a document room and our
captured documents were available to the Soviets and to the Germans.
For example, the document that the Soviets did use showing the tele-
gram about the German ammunition, that was an American-captured
document.
Our documents were available to both sides.
But that is the only document that we ever found.
Now, we did not permit the Soviets to go into our document room
and make their own selections of documents. If there was something
tliat bore on particularly their phase of the case, I suppose that some
of our people furnished them those documents.
Other than that, I know of no assistance. In fact, there was not a
^reat deal of even conferring between their staff and ours because the
Soviets are not very sociable, I might say. They hesitate somewhat
to be too much with us.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1953
Mr. Mitchell. Could you clear up for the record, please, the exact
function of General Mitchell, who was the executive secretary? I
believe it was he. Was he the American who was in control of mak-
ing arrangements for the lawyers to meet?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I cannot give you much information about
General Mitchell. He was not under my control and he was not on my
staff.
The tribunal, when it arrived, set up its own staff, and General
Mitchell was selected by somebody to represent, as general secretary —
I believe it was called — the tribunal. He did not in any way represent
me. He was not a lawyer, and I suppose any instructions that he had
came from the tribunal.
We had an American that I had asked to remain over there, Mr.
Willey, now Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, who had gone
over to help set up courts in that country. I asked him to come to-
Nuremberg to assist in the clerical work of the tribunal. The tribunal,
however, got General Mitchell and put him over all four of the repre-
sentatives.
Mr. JNIiTCHELL. Do you know, to your own personal knowledge,
whether any member of your staff' participated in the discussions
between the German counsel and'the Soviet counsel?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I could not say. I think they may have been
present as observers, or something of that sort, because we were much
concerned about not having a situation that would prolong this trial.
B'ut we took no part in any arrangements between the Soviets and the
Germans about it. We thought that was their fight.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, any memlier of your staff had no specific
instructions from you to participate in preparing the case one way or
the other ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Oh, no.
Mr. Mitchell. Xo further questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Machrowicz.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Justice, referring to the final paragraphs of
your statement, you state that :
The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abancioned the charge. The tribunal
did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn massacre * * *
That is based upon the fact that there were no findings made by the
tribunal; is that correct?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Since the question has been raised at various
times, I would like to have you give us your statement as to whether
it could have been possible, if proper testimony had been adduced at
the hearing, to convict the Soviets of the crime at the Nuremberg
trial, in view of the four power nature of that tribunal?
Mr. Justice Jackson. It could not.
Mr. Machrowicz. Will you explain why?
Mr. Justice Jackson. They had not been indicted.
And if you will inake reference to the very first page, you will see
that my authority was only to prepai'e and pi'osecute charges of atroci-
ties and war crimes "against such of the leaders of the European Axis
Powers and their principal agents and accessories as the United States
may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an
international military tribunal.''
1954 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. So it could not have been presented at the Nurem-
berg trial.
Mr. Justice Jacksox. It surely could not have been, nor was I at
liberty to negotiate on any such subject.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you at any time receive any instructions from
anyone in authority to treat the Katyn case in any other manner
than the other portions of the indictment against the Germans?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No. As a matter of fact, I received very little
instruction from anybody. The thing was a lawyer's job, and I had
no instructions. If I may be so blunt as to say so, I thought that
having once gotten me into it, there was a pronounced disposition to
leave everything to me. I will not say exactly that it was to "pass the
buck," but I was in charge of it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have with you the exchange of any cables
or other messages that Avere sent prior to the presentation of the Katyn
case between you and any other representative of the United States
Government ?
Mr, Justice Jackson. There was no cable that I know of, except
the cable that I referred to, from General Clay, which I do have here.
It is classified "Secret," and perhaps should not become a part of the
record. But I should be perfectly satisfied to have the committee
see it.
Mr. Machrowicz. May I ask whether you have any recollection of
receiving a cable from Ambassador Lane in Warsaw?
Mr. Justice Jackson. This, I suppose, originated with Ambassador
Lane.
Mr. Mitchell. Could the committee see that, please?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes, certainly.
It may be a paraphrase, and may not, I don't know.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is that dated December 16, 1945?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No; January 21, 1946.
Mr. Machrowicz. I would like to have you examine this exhibit
I have here, which purports to be a cablegi'am from Ambassador Lane
to Secretary of State Stettiiiius at Washington, with a cojjy to Berlin,
flustice Jackson, Nuremberg, bearing the date of December 16, 1945,
and I ask you whether you have a recollection of seeing that document ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I could not say whether I ever saw that or not.
1 certainly would not say that I did not. There was a vast amount
of material pouring in on us, and we had a number of people working
on different branches of the case. I surely would not say that it
might not have come to the attention of somebody in a responsible
position with me.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you remember any information received from
Warsaw or Washington which would give you advice, let us say,
similar to that contained in that cablegram?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That was consistent with our attitude, and
I have no recollection of any specific inference.
Mr. Machrowicz. You referred in your statement to statements
made by Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, and Colouel Szymanski.
I believe you referred to Colonel Szymanski, who had testilied before
this committee. Is that correct?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is Avhere I heard about it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read those statements?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No; I have not.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1955
Mr. Machrowicz. Have you read the statements of witnesses that
appeared to give testimony before this committee ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No. I have not had time to do so.
Mr. Machrowicz. You are aware, however, that these three, Colonel
Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, and Colonel Szymanski, did, prior u>
December 1945, make reports to the Department of the Defense in-
dicating Russian guilt for the Katyn massacre ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I am so informed now ; yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Looking in retrospect, would you not think, then,
that it would have been of assistance to you had you had those reports
in your possession at the time ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Of course, any information would have been
helpful. If we had had information of that kind, I cannot pass on
whether this would have been adequate, but if we had had adequate
information of Russian guilt, we would not have consented at all
to have it in. It would have strengthened our hand in keeping it
out immensely and probably would have resulted in the Soviets not
making the accusation.
Mr. Machrowicz. The point I wish to make is that you know now
that prior to December 1945 the United States Government did have
certain officials reports, namely, reports of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel
Stewart, and Colonel Szymanski, which very strongly indicated Soviet
guilt.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I understand they had such statements.
Mr. Machrowicz. Can you give us any reason that you might know
of why those reports were not made available to j'ou?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know where they were. You must
remember that communication at that time was very difficult. I do
not know where the reports may have been. I do not know what
their reasons may have been for not calling them to our attention.
Since we did not propose to go into the litigation of this issue,
they may have, knowing our attitude, thought they were not important.
I would not know what their reasons were.
Mr. Machrowicz. Referring to a remark contained on page 5 of
your statement, you state that the attitude of the Polish Government
in exile was that the case should not be presented at Nuremberg; is
that correct ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is what they concluded.
I will give you the photostats of the letter.
Mr. Machrowicz. "WHiich letter are you referring to? The letter
of the 12 Members of the Parliament ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Yes. I will give you photostats of that.
Mr. Machrowicz. General Anders did offer to testify if he was
requested to do so, by the tribunal ; is that correct ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I did not know of that until his book, as I
have said, I did not know that Stahmer, who was Goering's counsel,
had asked him to testify. I did know that Stahmer knew that these
conversations to which Anders was a party had taken place, because
the Germans filed with the tribunal a request for documents which
would show that they knew that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is there anything in these documents, Mr. Justice,
which would indicate that this communication from the members of
the Polish Parliament was sent to you as a result of instigation by the
1956 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
British authorities, or as a result of conference with the British
authorities?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No ; I do not think so. I do not recall any-
thing in it that would give that indication.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all, Mr. Chairman. .
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. DoNDERo. Mr. Justice Jackson, there is one thing in your state-
ment that caused me to raise my eyebrows, and I am sure you may be
able to help us on it.
It is on page 4, at the bottom of the page :
Second, if we were ever to depart from the policy of presenting documentary
evidence, tliis atrocity was not a suitable instance because we knew of no wit-
nesses who could supply oral proof to establish the identity of the perpe-
trators * * *.
Now, the Nuremberg trial took place in 1945 and 1946.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Mr. DoNDERo. There was presented to us — I will have to make this
statement to you — there was presented to this committee at Frankfurt,
Germany, what is known as a protocol or statement signed by 12
medical experts, representing at least 6 different governments of Eu-
rope, some of them neutral governments, to the effect that when the
graves of these men were discovered by the Germans they had invited
in these experts to make an examination of the bodies and to file such
statement as they saw fit.
These 12 did so at the grave site, and such statement is now known
as the protocol whicli was offered in evidence before our committee
and is now a part of the record.
Wlien we were in Euroj^e we called before us as witnesses some of
those 12, who were still living, and I recall the doctor from Denmark,
Dr. Tramsen, and Dr. Naville, from Switzerland, and Dr. Miloslavich,
of Yugoslavia.
It appeared that the other doctors who lived in the countries that
have since been taken behind the iron curtain have committed suicide,
or have died.
I do not have that statement before me, but it is dated as I recall,
in May of 1943, which would be more than 2 years before the Nurem-
berg trials.
They stated that in the protocol these Polish officers or intelligentsia
were killed, in their opinion, sometime in the autumn of 1989 or the
early part of 1940. At that time, the ground in which these bodies
were found was in possession of the Russians, and it is on Russian soil.
My question is : Did the tribunal of whicli you were a i)ait, have
before it any of that evidence either of that protocol or of the 12
doctors, representing some of the neutral nations, who made their
findings at the graves in 1948 ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. First, I would like to say that I was not a
part of the tribunal. I was a prosecutor before the tribunal.
However, we knew of that report. What the tribunal knew about
it I think Avas put in evidence by the Germans. That report was the
subject of the controversy. The Germans had their rej^tort signed by
the 12 doctoi-s. The Russians had theii- extraordinaiy commission re-
port, in which their doctors had looked at these bodies, not the same
bodies perhaps, but they had exhumed bodies, and they gave their ex-
pert opinions.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1957
Mr. DoNDERO. Was that last-named commission wholly Russian ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Now, at the request of the Germans, we located Dr. Naville, whom
I think you swore, and you will find in my statement at page 13, in
the fine print, Congressman Dondero, that the tribunal allowed him
to Goering, provided he could be located.
We found him in Switzerland, but he informed the tribunal that he
saw no use in coming as a witness for Goering. In other words, some
of these witnesses that may be available today were not going to help
Goering and his crowd. That was the attitude of General Anders.
That correspondence w^as conducted between Goering's lawyer and
General Anders, and he was not willing to come at their request.
We did not want to get into expert testimony. The Russians did
have an enormous number of alleged witnesses, and we would be there
yet if it called their 120 witnesses and the German witnesses.
The tribunal limited it to three on a side. That was not at our
request, although I may say I was greatly relieved when I found
that they had done it.
And I do not criticize them for it because, in the conditions of that
time, I do not think it would have been a profitable inquiry.
Mr. Dondero. Tlie court had been in session a considerable length
of time, I think 9 months, and it wanted to wind up its hearings and
disband.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Mr. Dondero. Now, I have one more thing.
You spolve of the German ammunition. Did the tribunal call be-
fore it any of the manufacturers of German ammunition to testify?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No. There was no request from the Germans
to do so.
You will fin.d all that I know about the German ammunition in the
fine print on note 20, on page 9. There was a letter which followed,
and we never found the letter. It may be in existence. ^"NHiat the
letter would have shown, we do not know.
Mr. Dondero. The reason for asking you that question is this:
There was presented to this committee in Frankfurt, Germany, the
head, or the president of the company that made the ammunition,
with his books, showing that firm had sold ammunition to the three
Baltic States, and also to Russia some years before World War II
had broken out. That rather indicated that even though it was
German ammunition that was used in the killing of these men, there
was an explanation as to how it got into the hands of the Russians.
They had purchased it.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That piece of evidence we did not regard as
of any significance to ourselves, because of the fact that so much
ammunition changes hands. You might find American-made guns in
the hands of some of these other people. You cannot tell by the gun
that is used who shot it.
Mr. Dondero. The reason why I am inquiring of you, Mr. Justice,
regarding that protocol of the 12 doctors, is that< this committee felt
if they could fix the time that these men were killed, they could also
fix the guilt.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right.
Mr. Dondero. And these doctors, some of them from neutral coun-
tries, signing this statement showing that they were shot either in the
1958 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
fall of 1939 or the cold months of 1940, up to May 1, indicated that
at that time Russia was in complete control of that part of her terri-
tory on which the graves were found. So that it made it almost
physically impossible for the Germans to have committed the crime.
Mr. Justice Jackson. If you fix the time of that crime, you fix the
responsibility. I fully agree.
Mr. DoNDERO. That was the opinion of this committee.
Mr. Justice Jacksox. But the difficulty, from our point of view,
about that, was that all that we had by which to fix the time was the
opinion of doctors, based on the condition of the bodies.
While I do not want to say anything disrespectful of a brother
profession, God save the man who has to prove his case by expert testi-
mony, because it is a terrible proposition.
The Russians had their doctors, too, and they called one of the
Gei'man doctors who testified.
Mr. DoNDERO. Was there anything submitted, Mr. Justice, in the
Nuremberg trial as to mute evidence found on the bodies of these men ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Except as is found in these reports.
Mr. DoNDERO. There were presented to this connnittee post cards,
letters, and other documents found in the ]X)ckets of these men. But
none of them bore a date later than May 1, 191:0.
JNIr. Justice Jackson. You had a great deal of evidence that we did
not have.
Mr. DoNUERo. That you did not have ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is right; a great deal of it.
Mr. DoNDERO. There is just one thing more, and that is at the bottom
of page 4 :
The Polish Government then in power at Warsaw kept a delegation at
Nuremberg which cooperated closely with the Soviet in all matters.
At that time, Mr. Justice, Warsaw was in complete control of the
Russian Government, was it not?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is correct.
Mr. DoNDERO. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. O'Konski. Mr. Justice, here is the conclusion of the conmiittee :
The evidence, testimony, records, and exhibits recorded by this committee
through its investigations and hearings during the last D months overwhelmingly
will show the people of the world that Russia is directly reseponsible for the
Katyn massacre.
And here is the significance :
Throughout our entire proceedings there has not been a scintilla of proof
or even any remote circumstancial evidence that could indict any other nation
In this international crime.
How many staff members did your division, or your office, have at
the Nuremberg trials ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. We had a very large number. I do not know
just what you wish to include in that. We had translators and inter-
preters. I never knew just what our staff consisted of because the
Army did a great many things in connection with it. But it was a
very large number.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Would that run into the thousands?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No. I thiuk that at its maxinuim, including
translators, people assigned by the Army to run mimeograph ma-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1959
chines — we had to make copies in four hmguages of everything that
was used in the tribunal — I think our American personnel at its
maximum was about 750.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. This committee was made up of seven members,
and we had one counsel and one investigator. We came to this
conclusion.
Now, since the conclusion was so obvious, is it not logical to assume,
then, that either one of two things happened at Nuremberg :
No. 1. Your staff did not make a conscientious effort to get the
evidence, or
No. 2. The evidence which was available at that time was deliber-
ately withheld from your people?
Is not that a logical conclusion after listening to the conclusion
of this committee?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No; that is not a logical conclusion, Mr.
OTvonski. You have used a great deal of evidence, if I rely on the
newspapers, that we could not have introduced. We could not call
a witness, for instance, who was masked so that his identity could not
be determined. We could not use that kind of testimony.
You may be entirely satisfied with evidence because you, no doubt,
know the man and know his history.
But I use that merely as an example of the availability of evidence
to a congressional committee that we could not have used in court
if we had found it. My staff was never instructed— and I take the
full responsibility for it — was never instructed to investigate this
atrocity, because, from the very beginning we told the Soviets, and
the Germans well understood it, that it was to be settled between
them.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. ]\Ir. Justice, I have one or two questions with refer-
ence to the Nuremberg trials and the Korean situation as we know
it today.
First of all, on page 6, I want to refer to two sentences in your
statement. No. 1 is :
We did not learn of any usable evidence in American possession.
No. 2 is :
I knew of nothing, at any time during the trial, of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel
•Stewart, or Colonel Szymanski.
In talking to Congressman Machrowicz a little while ago, you said
that if you had some of that evidence brought to your attention at the
trial you would not have permitted the Katyn phase of it to be put on
the indictment ; is that right ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. If that had been available to us before October
20 or the 18th — I have forgotten whether it wa.s the 18th or the 20th
that the indictment was filed — we might very well have kept this out
of the case entirely.
Mr. Sheehan. Is that 1945, or 1946?
Mr. Justice Jackson. 1945.
Mr. Sheehan. Did anyone from our State Department make any
attempt to give you a.nj evidence that they had about the Katyn situa-
tion, any material?
Mr. Justice Jackson. No.
1960 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. Did anybody in the Army Intelligence, G-2, make
any attempt at any time to give you an}^ evidence that the}' had i
Mr. Justice Jackson. I have recited to you exactly what they gave
us, the date that they gave it, and I liave it in my files available to
your counsel.
Mr. Sheehax. Permit me to be sj^ecific. I mean things like the
Van Vliet report, things which have disappeared that you could not
have had.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I never heard of the Van Vliet report until I
heard it was lost.
Mr. Sheehan. Then there was Captain Gilder, who gave a report to
G-2, who was a British ofHcer who went to Katyn and testified on this
report that the Russians were guilty. Did you ever get that report?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I never got that report.
Mr. Sheehan. Therefore, should not an attempt have been made by
our American officials in the State Department, the executive, or the
G-2, to bring to your attention all the evidence they had, such as
reports from military attaches, ambassadors, and so forth?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I am not prepared to criticize them.
Mr. Sheehan. It is not criticism; I just called it to your attention.
Mr. Justice Jackson. It would be criticism if I said they should
liave brought it to my attention, and did not.
You have to remember the conditions at that time. The Army was
closing up a war over there. I am not going to criticize the other
services.
If I had known of and asked for something and they had withheld it
from me, then I should criticize them. But the fact that they did not
bring something to my attention that now would appear to have been
useful to have had — you see, we had so much. We had over 100.000
documents that my staff screened out. We translated over 5,000 doc-
uments and put in evidence over 4,000 documents, making our
documentary case.
It is hard to say that they were under any criticism because they
did not produce it. That is a conclusion for the committee to draw,
and not for me to say.
Mr. Sheehan. I might only remark on that, Mr. Justice, that if we
waited for some of these documents to come from G-2 and the State
Department we would be in the same mess you fellows were in in
Nuremberg. We get Avhat we are looking for specifically, and we
fight for them.
Now, I will ask my other question.
As you can well see, the Nuremberg trials have had an effect on this
Katyn investigation, and our committee has gone on record rather
informally that the Congress should do something about the Korean
pro})lem, because we have found our American soldiers murdered in
much the same manner as tlie Polish soldiers were, with their hands
tied behind their backs and with a single bullet hole. Some of us
have concerned ourselves about the international military tribunal, the
l)recedent you men set up in London and Nuremberg. So that some of
the questions our committee is interested in come from that particular
angle, and I would like to phrase them to you in this way :
No. 1, I want to ask about the precedent that you set up at Nurem-
berg. When I say "you,'' I mean the Nuremberg trials, the Int.«i'-
uatioiial Militarv Tribunal.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1961
We have heard much in the hist couple of months and several years
of guilt by association, and you have personal feelings on that, I
assume.
However, in State Department Document 3080, you point out — and,
if you want, I will read it to you — that the purpose of the Nuremberg
trials was only to find certain organizations guilty so, by the same
token, you can then find a lot of individuals guilty.
Is that a good legal and moral premise ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is not the premise that I stated,
Mr. Sheehan. Just so that we may know the interpretation, may I
read 3^our direct quotation there '.
Mr. Justice Jackson. You can take thinks out of context.
Mr. Sheehan. No; I will read the whole paragraph. All right,
whatever you like.
This is document published by the State Department, No, 3080,
which was the stenographic record of the report of the London Con-
ference which set up the International Military Tribunal. Yon are
the author of this particular document, and the quotation I have here,
according to the document, is :
I have never thoii.sht of this as a permanent tribunal. The whole American
plan which was professed here was designed to reach a very large number of
people at a single trial, or. at most, perhaps a very few trials. That is the
reason we have tried to reach people through organizations. We have not
thought of it as a trial of Iri or .30 people, but we have thought of it as a trial
the result of which would affect thousands of people at least.
And in your direct testimony here you said you only heard from 13
oral witnesses.
Do you think this procedure of indicting a couple of organizations
and indicting all the people per se is a proper legal and moral thought?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Not if you put it that way. That is not what
we did ; that is not what we proposed to do.
I can explain it to you if you care to have the explanation.
Mr. Sheehan, Yes,
Mr, Justice Jackson. Certain organizations, such as the SS, the
SA, the Grestapo, were founded for certain purposes. Men joined those
well knowing their purposes. We did not propose to start out to
find each individual and have each individual try the question of the
character of his party.
That is one of the difficulties that is inherent in the present situation
in the United States in which in each individual case involving Com-
munists you are going over the same old material about the central
core of the party and its teachings and what they mean.
We proposed to put the organization on trial and ascertain its pur-
poses, its character, and have that declared. Anyone who showed any
interest in it should have the right to come in and make a defense
of the organization; but, once that had been found, the individual
could not thereafter say, "Well, it is true I joined it; I participated,
but it was an innocent organization."
But what he could say was, "It is true I joined it, but I had a gun
at my back," or "I was defrauded into it; I did not understand it."
But the central core of guilt or innocence of the party, the group
of the SA and the Gestapo, we proposed to dispose of in one trial.
And I think yon will find that was explained clearly throughout
those London proceedings.
1962 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Now, those proceedinfrs took place before we knew that the Control
Council was going to set up a denazification policy, which I had
nothing to do with. If we had known that, we would not have
bothered probably with the organizations, because the denazification
program went considerable farther, on paper, at least, than any pro-
posal that we made.
But the proposal was to try, first, the general purposes, plan, teach-
ings, and criminality of the organization as such, and then to allow
any individual to be heard as to why he participated in it.
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you.
That straightens that out, because it concerned me that you were
going to affect thousands of people by trying the organization.
Mr. Justice Jackson. It is very confusing. Discussions among
four men with different legal systems is very confusing.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. I am only reading from the record, and we like
to straighten this out because our committee is concerned about the
Nuremburg phase.
Another thing that concerns us and which you probably will be able
to straighten out is this : You stated in these London hearings, in Docu-
ment 3080, that you expressed grave doubts about the trial procedure,
and you went on to make it clear that the proposals were to be con-
tained, setting up the trial, in an executive agreement by the Presi-
dent as Commander in Chief.
Otherwise, you stated, the delays would occur because the agree-
ment would then have to be ratified by the United States Senate.
My question is : This idea of bypassing the Senate to get a commit-
ment on foreign agreements, was that set up to you as a matter of
policy that you had to follow, or was this your idea ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. How do you mean "set up to" me ?
Mr. Sheehan. Set up by executive agreement, the Nuremberg trial.
Mr. Justice Jackson. Certainly. That was the policy of the United
States, to w^ork this out by executive agreement.
Mr. Sheehan. And not to give in at all to the United States Senate ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. The resolution that Congress had had — I do
not recall what became of it — went farther than anything we proposed.
Mr. Sheehan. These are just personal questions.
Let me put it this way : Do you think that this idea of working out
all these things by executive agreements and bypassing the Congress
and the Senate are good for the country in the long run ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. In view of the cases that come before our
courts sometimes, I think I would rather not express an opinion on
the general policy of matters of that kind. It depends very much on
what it is.
Mr. Sheehan. All right. I respect your opinion.
The reason why I bring that up is because of this fact: We have
recently been apprised that a certain Chinese lurist who served on
the International Militarv Tribunal in tlie Far East crimes has
brouglit up something. His name is Mei Ju-so. He is accusing the
United States now of military crimes, germ warfare, et cetera, against
the Koreans and the Chinese. He has ])roposed publicly someday
to bring us to trial, if they are ever victorious, for these crimes.
Now, in view of the precedent that we have set up in the Nurem-
berg trials, after every war may not there be these wholesale trials
of both civilian and military personnel?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1963
Mr. Justice Jackson. I have answered that several times in this
way, Mr. Sheehan: What is new about the Nuremberg trials is not
that the conquered is executed by the victor. What is new about the
Nuremberg trials is that he gets a trial before he is punished.
And, a I am ever captured by tlie Soviets, I will thank God if I
get as fair a trial as we gave the Germans at Nuremberg. I do not
expect it, and I beg for it, because the tribunal acquitted a great many
of the people that we thought, on the face of what information we had,
were guilty.
But many of them were acquitted on some of the charges, and some
of them were acquitted on all of the charges.
I. have never heard even the Germans, even Lord Malmesbury,
criticize us for having trials. He said these trials were fair, and that is
what I would not expect if I got captured by the other side.
Mr. Sheehan. I am quite willing to agree with you.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not think we would wait for that.
Mr. Sheehan. There is one other thought I would like to have you
dwell on, if you will, and I think that perhaps I ought to read your
quotation from the report. This is your statement :
Now, it may be that we were mistaken in our attitude and philosophy and
that what Germany has done is right and legal, but I am not here to confess
the error, nor to confess that the United States was wrong in regarding this as
an illegal war from the beginning and in believing that the great crime of
crimes in our generation was the launching of a needless war in Europe.
In other words, from the document, apparently there was some
question as to whether or not you were right.
In view of the situation as we see it in Korea, and in view of the
results of the Nuremburg trials, would you care to make any com-
ment as to whether or not you think that, as of now, the Nuremberg
trials served a useful purpose ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. Of course, I am not entirely a disinterested
witness on that, you understand.
Mr. Sheehan. I realize that.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I think they did. I think that, had it not
been for the trials, you never could have had the collection of docu-
ments which exhibit the origin of that war as they do now.
These men in the dock had a chance to deny these documents and,
as the tribunal pointed out, there Avere almost none of them denied.
Then, too, we showed — and I think it is important to the future of
international law — that the lawyers representing four different sys-
tems of law can find common ground for settling a controversy by
judicial process instead of resorting to war.
I think that maybe in the long run the best thing that was accom-
plished is that, because heretofore it has always been thouglit that
you could not do that kind of thing.
Then, too, there is a store of documents that if they were properly
used, in my opinion — and it is my opinion you are asking for — if they
were properly used, would very greatly strengthen the position of
democracy in Germany. I think they have never been properly used,
brought to the attention of the German people.
I will give you one example only, because I do not suppose you want
to spend all day on this.
Mr. Speer, who was the Minister of Production, testified as to his
conversations with Hitler and with other of the hiffh Nazi officials
1964 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
after it was apparent that we w^ere going to take Germany. He tried
to get them not to destroy bridges, electric-light plants, and other
things, pointing out that the German people would be the ones who
would suffer if those things were destroyed.
He pointed out it was the German people who had to live there;
the rest of us did not. And Hitler's remarks about the German people,
that they were undeserving, I think is one of the most important assets
the United States and the other powers have for a free Gernumy
against the rising nazism, if it had been exploited.
Those things are at least available.
Then I think we established the principle that aggressive war is a
crime, and I am for that principle. I do not care whether the aggres-
sion comes from our side or the other. We cannot have a rule of inter-
national law that applies only one way.
I feel that a great deal was accomplished. But, as I say, I am an
interested witness, and there are those of distinction and ability who
disagree with me.
Mr. SnEEHAisr. Could you enlarge on the term "aggressive warfare" ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. By "aggressive warfare" as defined to the
tribunal, we could not get the Eussians to agree on a definition of it.
In the document which you have been quoting, you will find we spent
a good deal of time. We endeavored to adopt their definition as con-
tained in the Baltic treaties. But they did not want to adopt their
ow^n definition.
It was not very important to us for the particular purposes of
Nuremberg, because, in view of the documents that we had, Hitler's
instructions to his generals, and his conversations and speeches to
them in what he thought were private gatherings, his conduct was
aggressive by anybody's definition.
So, it did not become very important to us.
But we have never been able to agree on a definition of what con-
stitutes aggression.
Mr. SiiEpniAN. JNIy reason for asking that question, Mr. Justice, is
that it seems to me that North Korea, in view of the present situation
in Korea, certainly \jy any standards would be judged an aggressor,
and, I think, China, with all tlie assistance and everything she has
been giving to North Korea, there is the possibility of their being
judged aggressors.
Also the Ivussians, with their help in ai-ms and anununition and now
soldiers, tliey might be so judged.
Hut no nation has called anybody an aggressor except the North
Koreans. Yet we, by the terms of the j)hilosophy that you are ex-
])ounding, certainly would classify them as aggressors, and yet we
take no action to brand them to the world as aggressors.
You may or may not want to conuuont on that.
Mr. Justice Jackson. T think I would ratlier not couunent on that.
Mr. SiiKKHAN. That is all I liave, Mr. Chairman.
Chaijiuan AfAnnKN. ]\Ir. O'Konski.
Mr. OlvoNSKi. Would you consider the Russian unprovoked attack
upon Finland in 1939 as an aggression, Mr. Justice Jackson'^
Mr. Justice Jackson. I w^ould ratlier not pass judgment on that,
because I have never examined the documents, as 1 have in this case.
If you asked mo my offliand impression from what I read in the news-
pa])ers, my answer would be the same as yours. If you ask ni}' opinion
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1965
as one who feels some responsibility for his opinions on legal subjects,
I would say that I have not adequate information.
Mr, O'KoNSKi. The same thine; would apply in the case where
Kussia took over Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia before 1040, and the
same thing; would probably apply to the manner in which Kussia took
over half of Poland in league witli Hitler in September of Idod.
That may be neither here nor there, because under the regulations
and under the manner in which your high tribunal was established —
by "your," I mean the combined efforts of the four major powers —
you do not bring the charge, and I notice the United States was
allocated the over-all responsibility on conspiracy to incite and wage
a war of aggression. Tliaf was the American responsibility at the
Nuremberg trials.
Under the procedure, there was no way in which the LTnited States
of America, in meeting its responsibilities of this allocation of power,
could have brought the charge against Russia, of aggression against
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. There was no way
in which it could be done at Nuremberg, was there?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is true. But you will find, with reference
to Latvia, Estonia, and the Baltic States, that we refused to accede
to their description of them in the indictment. We had a consid-
erable rumpus about it because, from their description, the inference
was possible that they were a part of Soviet territory, as I guess they
are now, in fact.
And we refused to accept that. And we came near not being able
to file an indictment because of our disagreement about it.
Finally, in order to get on with the business, I let them file the
indictment, and I filed with it a statement that nothing in that indict-
ment could be construed as a recognition of anj^ claims of tlie Soviet
Union in any of those states.
So that there could never be a claim made that we had in any way
recogniz'^d the validity of Russian action in those states.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In the same manner, Mr. Justice, even if the various
agencies of the Government had given you all this evidence which
was available, that the Communists were responsible for the Katyn
murders, still you could not do anything about it even if you had
that evidence; is not that corrects You could not do anything about
it, under the procedure of the trial ?
Mr. Justice J.\cksox. We could not have proceeded against them.
What we could have done would be that with that strengthening
our hand, we could have insisted that it not be brought in at all. But
you would be in the same place you are today; you would not have it
settled.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Then I would like to have your comment on this,
Mr. Justice : If a nation has committed vast crimes against humanity
or has committed vast acts of aggression, be sure to get on the winning
side of the war, get a seat on the high tribunal, and you can never be
prosecuted for the crimes that you have committed.
In other words, suppose, in the closing days of the Korean war,
Russia should reverse itself and join us as an ally and then sit at the
table of the high tribunal. As long as they are on the winning side,
as long as they get a seat on the high tribunal, there is no way in which
they could ever be prosecuted for their acts, crimes against humanity,
or acts of aggression ; is not that right ?
93744— 52— pt. 7 10
1966 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know how you could ever prosecute
a prisoner that you cannot capture. Even in our own domestic society
you first have to get physical power over him before you can do
anything to him.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. The thing that worries me, Mr. Justice, is that, the
way the tribunal was set up a nation can go on. From our investiga-
tion there is no difference between Hitler and Stalin. I think that
your tribunal did a very good job in hanging the Germans who were
responsible for these acts against humanity.
But in our investigation all the way through, we found out that the
acts of genocide by the Communists are just as vicious as the acts of
genocide used by Hitler. They are of the same pattern, cut out of
the same cloth.
It seems to me that, according to the way the tribunal was set up,
Russia is going to be able to get by with its program of genocide and
never get to trial, because they have maneuvered themselves into the
position of being on the winning side and get a seat as a judge.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I will make a bargain with you, Mr. Congress-
man. If you will capture Stalin, I will try him.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I will ask for that job myself to be sure he hangs. I
wouldn't trust another Nuremberg trial.
Chairman Madden, Mr. Machrowicz.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Justice, apparently there has been some con-
fusion as to the position of the London government at the time of
these hearings. So there may be no misunderstanding, I would like
to read from the last paragraph of the letter you presented us, the let-
ter from the parliamentary group to you dated February 15, 1946.
That letter points to the fact that there is strong indication of Russian
guilt, and they state as follows :
These circumstances show that the fate of the Polish officers in the Russian
POW camps has not yet been fully elucidated.
The crime perpetrated upon them at Katyn, contrary to every feeling oi
humanity and violating international law and custom, does not only concern tlic
families of the victims. The entire Polish Nation is entitled to demand that
this tragedy be cleared up.
In view of these facts and circumstances, the undersigned would like to express
the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the tasks ol
the Nuremberg Tribunal. This case is of a special character and needs, in ordei
to be fully elucidated, to be examined apart and treated indeiiendently by an
international judicial body.
Would you not say that their position was that in view of the fact
that there is a strong indication of Russian guilt and in view of tlie
fact that the tribunal, as constituted at Nuremberg, could not possibly
find Russian guilt; that they did not consider that the proper tribunal
to try the case ? Is that a fair statement of their position ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is a fair statement of their position, and
that is what I understood their position to be, and I agreed with that.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Do any other members of the committee have
any questions ?
Mr. Sheehan. I have one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to get this on the record for our purposes, Mr. Justice.
When you and I were talking, you referred to that Soviet agreement
in 193;i, where they did agree with certain Baltic States about the
definition of crimes of aggression.
THE KATYN FOREST ]VL\SSACRE 1967
I think, for the purpose of our members here, I would like to read
the four things they did agree to as being crimes of aggression in this
] 933 agreement :
1. Declaration of war upon another state.
2. Invasion by its armed forces with or without a declaration of war of the
territory of another state.
3. Attack by its land, naval, or air forces with or without a declaration of war
on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state.
4. Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of another
state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in
its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all
assistance or protection.
That was the agreement that Russia signed in 1933 at a convention
for the definition of aggression signed at London by Rumania, Estonia,
Latvia, Poland, Turkey, the Soviet Union, Persia, and Afghanistan.
I merely relate that to the committee because, judging from the
conduct of Russia during the last 10 years, she has been guilty of every
single one of the acts of aggression, by her own definition.
Mr. Justice Jackson. That is the definition I tried to get adopted,
because, logically, if you were prosecuting persons for aggression, it
would be well to include a definition.
But, as I say, for our purposes, the failure to have a definition of
aggression was not serious because, under any definition of aggression,
Hitler's acts would come within it.
But they refused to accept as general the definition which they had
applied in these particular treaties.
Mr. SHEEHAiSr. As a matter of information, for our committee, Mr.
Justice — and in this I understand in your position on the Supreme
Court you may not want to talk to us except in an executive session —
but we were thinking actually of what we could do to bring this to
the attention of the world in the sense that, from the definitions as we
know them at Nuremberg, and from the regular practices of law, if,
on the basis of the findings of Katyn, if we could not still indict
Russia for aggression on the basis of the knowledge we have?
Of course, as you say, we did not have the prisoner. It is a question
of world opinion.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I gathered from joixr interim report that you
had done that. The difficulty is that you do not have the prisoner.
Mr. Sheehan. In your opinion, Mr. Justice, do you think it was a
worth-while gesture, or not ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I think that the exploration of this subject is a
thoroughly wholesome thing. That is one of the reasons why 1 co-
operated with your counsel, or tried to, and why I say that my files are
open. I am ready to give any help that I can in it.
Mr, Sheehan. Mr. Justice, I have one more question.
This, as I understand it, was turned in to the War Crimes Com-
mission at Nuremberg, and I was just wondering, from your stand-
point, do you have any idea of when this was turned over, the approxi-
mate date ?
I may first preface it with this remark : As I remember it, the origi-
nal indictment of the Katyn massacre, which the Russians put in the
indictment, was the fact that the men were killed in September of
1941, and it would seem to us that this document I have here Avould
more or less prove or lend a reasonable doubt as to the time.
1968 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
So if tliis document had been aA-ailnlile to you before the indictment,
or to your staif, it certainly shouhi have stopped the Russians from
})uttin<>; in a specific date in the indictment.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not know what the indictment is, so I
cannot say when it was received.
And I do not know I can do that by looking at it, because we had
a collection of over 100,000 documents and I did not see them all.
Mr. Mitchell. For the record, I believe this document w^as sent
by General Bissell when he was military attache at London, which
was after 1946 and after the indictment. I do not know whether it
reached the Nuremberg trials. It was returned.
Mr. Justice Jackson. It has the date on it, the 4th of August 194U.
I do not know Avhat that means.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I think I can help you on that.
Mr. Justice Jackson. This is a receipt by General Telford Taylor,
who was my successor, and he was not appointed brigadier general
until he was named as my successor.
This was not only after the indictment, but was after the interna-
tional trial was practically completed.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I think, in answer to that, Mr. Justice, you also,
wrote a letter after the trials to General Anders saying that you got
that, but it came too late. And even if that was not the case, there
was not anything that could be done about it because of the set-up
of the tribunal. It was not your responsibility to charge crimes
against humanity. That was a Kussian responsibility.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I remember writing to General Anders when
he sent me his book. So whatever you say is doubtless correct.
Cliairman Madden. Do any members of the committee have further
questions ?
Does counsel have any questions ?
Mr. Mitchell. No further questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Justice, speaking on behalf of the mem-
bers of the committee, we wish to thaidi you for coming here today
and giving us your testimony.
As I stated before, when tlie resohition was befoi'e the Congress,
a number of Members of Congress incjuired regarding the Nuremberg
trials. Your testimony has been very enlightening and valuable from
the standpoint of what this committee will submit to the Congress on
this i^hase of the hearings.
I might ask your opinion regarding the matter. If you care to
preS'ent it, we will be glad to receive it.
Our connnittee, especially when we were in Europe, ])ublicized the
testimony of the witnesses. There was testimony brought out by o"2
witnessses at Fi'nnkfurt and also exliibits were introduced nunibei"ing
into ()\('i' a Inindred.
This testimony was daily chronicled, ])rinted, aiul sent out over all
the free countries of Europe, by the daily newspapers and the radio.
It was conveyed to the people over there every day. Not only was it
presented to the free countries, but througli Ridio Free Euroj^e and
jilso the Voice of America, it was carried behind the iron curtain.
Just as an exani])le of wliat I am ))r()|>osiiig to ask, I might say this:
Two members of tlie counnittee visited Berlin. 'Jliere was a conven-
tion of tlie free jouiMialists of both Fastt'ni and Westei'U Europe in
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1969
Berlin at the time. Some of these journalists had escaped from behind
the iron curtain.
The comment of some of these journalists was that the facts that
were revealed by our committee while in Frankfurt brought to the
minds of millions of people in Europe, both ontside and behind the
iron curtain, a picture of the false propaganda which the Russians
had been circulating regarding the guilt for the Katyn massacre.
This testimony completely refuted all this propaganda that the Com-
munists had been circulating.
One journalist there in Europe had a reproduction of a broadcast
that went over the Warsaw radio a few nights before. This broadcast
tried to explain to the hundreds of people that had requested the reason
why the Russian Government did not answer our invitation to appear
before our conmiittee to give testimony on the Katyn massacre.
Testimony came to the committee that the bodies that were found at
Katyn were just a fraction of the massacres, barbarities, and genocide
that the Soviets had been inflicting on other captured countries.
By bringing out this testimony to the attention of the people in
Europe behind the iron curtain and also to the world generally, I think
our committee has contributed a great deal to world public opinion
that something should and must be done by the free nations about
international criminals.
And, of course, the enslaved people behind the iron curtain are
crying for some kind of termination to the atrocities and the genocide
that is going on today.
The members of our committee are going to follow through in the
next Congress in trying to persuade the United Nations to take steps
to terminate these atrocities, massacres, and barbarities that the Com-
munist government today is committing.
Mr. Justice, from your experience in the Nuremberg trials and as a
public official, would you have any suggestions or any comment you
would like to make to this committee as to what could he done in addi-
tion to what is already being done to try and create a world public
opinion to see if something could not be done to slow down the genocide
and the atrocities that are being committed ?
I might say that since the work of this committee started, we have
not heard much about atrocities in Korea. I think the work of this
committee has already slowed up the Communists on some of the
wholesale slaughters that had been going on in Korea.
Do 3^ou have anything you would like to state in the way of comment,
Mr. Justice, for the information of the committee, in that regard?
INIr. Justice jACKSOisr. I think in that respect that your effort is
very similar to the purpose that we sought to accomplish at Nurem-
berg: To pin responsibility where responsibility belongs, to make
known to the public these atrocities, to bring about a state of public
opinion in which war will not be the way to settle controversies.
I see nothing inconsistent there. I think you are working along
very much the same ultimate lines that we were. But you have a
particular incident on which you can focus the light, whereas we
were dealing with a more confused and larger situation growing out
of the whole war.
Mr. Mitchell. I have a statement, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Very well.
1970 THE KATYN FOREST JVIASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Justice, you referred to the masked man who
appeared before tliis committee. I think I will now have to reveal
what the committee instructed me to do on that. That masked man
is available today in the United States. That masked man, if this
case ever goes beifore the International World Court, will, I am sure,
stand before that World Court and testify.
We are not an official court. Consequently, the masked man testi-
fied in that fashion. He has a family ; he is disfigured . That was no
publicity stunt, or anything of that kind.
But I w^ant the record to clearly show that that individual, who
was the only eyewitness of this massacre, is available, and even if the
Soviets would like to join in the World Court at that time, I am
sure that he can be induced to talk to the world.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I do not want you to take my observations
as any reflection on your work, because I was answering a question
as to why we could not do these things, and it is quite plain that you
can take a gi"eat deal of evidence that we could not.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. This committee has traveled all over the world to
get that evidence. It is officially documented. This committee will
stand on that evidence before any international tribunal, and I am
sure tlie case will stand up.
That is a personal opinion.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan, do you have any further ques-
tions ?
Mr. Sheehan. Along the lines that the chairman brought out, as
to your opinion on the fact that we are trying to form or develop
world opinion, I would like to ask you this question, and as a legal
opinion, not a political opinion, if you may want to answer it:
Under the present set-up of the World Court of the United Nations,
does the world have any legal means of trying Russia for the atrocities
which we assume or allege she is guilty of today? Is there any way
that we could do it legally ?
Mr. Justice Jackson. I think that is a question on which I had
better not express an offhand opinion.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. The thouglit is, Mr. Justice, that, under the princi-
ples laid down at Nuremberg, of trying to prevent aggression, and as
the precedent is set up, will we have to wait until after, say, peace
is declared in the world to try the Communist nations in Korea, and
can the Nuremberg trials be used as a precedent?
Mr. Justice Jackson. You have to bear in mind that Nuremberg
was not something that we thought out as a matter of theory. We
were confronted with certain facts. We had as prisoners German
Goering, Ribbenti-o]), aud all of these men. They had been accused
of the worst tilings iniagina})le.
Tliere Avere tliree tilings we could do with them, one, we could just
let them go. And if you will remembei- the tenii)o of those times, you
know that that would have been impossible.
Another thing we could do would be to just execute them or other-
wise punish them, without trial. That always would go against the
conscience of the American people, in my opinion.
The only thing left to do was to give them a trial.
So that the Nuremberg trial grew out of the fact that you had the
prisoners, you had the charges, and, fortunately, we captured the
evidence.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1971
I do not know, to be perfectly candid with you how we ever would
liave come out if we had had to use oral testimony, because it is so vul-
lu'iable to attack. The great thing that saved the Nuremberg trial
was the capture of innumerable incriminating, authentic documents.
If you do not have those things, you are going to be greatly handi-
capped in any international trial, in my experience.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
Mr. Justice, we are indeed very grateful to you for coming here and
testifying. Your testimony is very valuable.
Mr. Justice Jackson. I shall be glad to be of any help that I can.
Chairman Madden. Because your prepared statement has many
footnotes for references which you did not mention when you were
reading the statement for the committee, we will accept your entire
statement at this point as exhibit 6. The photostatic copies of corre-
spondence from the Polish Government in exile in London which you
mentioned earlier as having received will be marked "Exhibit 7." The
ommittee will now recess until 1 : 30 p. m.
(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p, m.
same day.)
Exhibits 6 and 7 were received in evidence and follow :
EXHIHIT 6
The Katyn Forest Massacre and the Nuunberg International Trial
statement by Robert H. Jackson before Select Committee of House of Represent-
atives To Investigate the Katyn Massacre
The guilt for the Katyn Forest massacre has not been adjudged by the Niirn-
berg Tribunal and inquiry into it is not inconsistent with the position taken
by the United States prosecution at the Niirnberg international trial of Goering
and others.
It was my responsibility to conduct the prosecution on behalf of the United
States. I am glad to inform you in detail concerning all decisions and actions
in reference to tlie Katyn atrocity and the reasons which conduced to them.
The first step that seems pertinent ^ was an agreement to divide primary re-
sponsibility for preparation and presentation of the case among the prosecutors
representing the four allied powers. This was intended to fix on someone re-
sponsibility for covering each part of the case, to avoid duplication, and to
expedite a trial of imprecedented complexity.
To the United States was allocated the over-all conspiracy to incite and wage
a war of aggression. The British were assigned the violation of specific treaties
and crime on the high seas. Violations of the laws of war and crimes against
humanity were divided on a geographical basis. The French undertook crimes
in Western Europe, and the Soviet prosecution was assigned the duty of pre-
paring and presenting evidence of crimes in Eastern Europe — an area
largely in Soviet occupation, and to much of which the others of us
1 Earlipr steps incUided my appointment by President Truman on May 2, 1945. The
order defined the duty as follows :
'. . . preparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and war crimes against such of
the leaders of tlie European Axis powers and tlieir principal agents and accessories as the
United States may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial before an
international military tribunal." Exec. Order No. 9547, 10 Fed. Reg. 4961.
Also included was a conference of representatives of the four nations to reach prelimi-
nary undeistandings as to how, in view of tlieir different languages, systems of hiw and
methods of trial, they would proceed. The conf(>rence began in Eonf'on, June 23, and
concluded August 8, 1945, when an agreement was signed by the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the KeiJublic of France, subsequently adhered to
by nineteen other powers. Tlie minutes, proceedings, and agreements are published.
Ilnternaticnitl Conference on Military Trials, Dept. State Pub. 30S0.
I I sh;ill cite two i>fticial publications. One is the Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression series
of 11 volumes of the Niirnberg international trial documents in English (GPO). They
are cited herein as N. C. v<c A. The other is the official transcript of the nroceedings and
testimony. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, 42 volumes
in English except the documents, which are set forth in their original language. They
are cited as Proceedings.
The indictment is found I N. C. & A. 13 and 1 Proceedings 29.
1972 THE KATYX FOREST IVIASSACRE
had access. The geographical area thus assigned to the Soviet representatives
included Katyu Wood and Poland as well, but at that time it was not known that
the Katyn massacre would lie involved.
The first proposal that the Niirnberg trial should take up examination of the
Katyn massacre came from the Soviet prosecutor during the drawing of the
indictment. Preliminary drafts were negotiated in London at a series of con-
ferences where I was represented Imt not personally present. At the last Lou-
don meeting, the Soviet prosecutor included among crimes charged in the East
the following : "In Septeml)er 1941, 925 Polish officers who were prisoners of
war were killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk." P>oth P>ritish and Ameri-
can representatives protested, but they finally concluded that, despite their
personal disapproval, if the Soviet thought they could prove the charge they were
entitled to do so under the division of the case."
The indictment was brough to Bei'lin for final settlement and filing, where I
objected to inclusion of the charge and even more strongly when, at the last
monment, the Soviet delayed its filing by amending the Katyn charge to include
11,000 instead of 92.j victims. However it was in the Soviet part of the ca.se and
they had investigated Katyn ; we had no opportunity to do so. In view of what
we know of the over-all Nazi plan to exterminate inhabitants of Poland, it did
not seem unlikely that this was part of their program, and the Soviet claimed
to have adequate evidence of Nazi kuilt. While we did not feel justified in pre-
venting the issue, we warned the Soviet delegation tliat we did not have evidence
to support the charge nor time or opportunity to investigate it and that, if it met
with denial or countercharges, we would keep hands off and leave the entire con-
test to the Soviet and German lawyers.
The reasons for opposing inclusion of this charge and refusal to participate
In its trial were that to litigate that issue would conflict in several respects with
what I considered to be sound trial policy for the first such case in history. It
was not based upon any conviction in my own mind about the truth or falsity
of the charge. I knew that the Nazis and the Soviets accused each other, that
both were capable of the offense, that perhaps both had opportunity to commit
it, and that it was perfectly consistent with the policy of each toward Poland.
Whatever the facts were they had liecome overlaid with deep layers of Nazi and
Soviet propaganda and counterpropaganda, and it seemed we could not at the
international trial wisely undertake or satisfactorily achieve the long task of
separating truth from falsehood. The chief reasons in support of that conclu-
sion are four :
First, responsibility for the massacre did not api>ear to be capable of docu-
mentary proof or substantial corroboration. One of the basic decisions on policy
concerning the Niirnberg international trial was that we should accuse only
defendants whose guilt could be established and should charge only offenses
whose occurrence could be fully proved or substantially corroborated by docu-
mentary evidence captured from the Germans themselves. Because this was
the first international criminal trial in history and was held in the wake of war
when passions were high, we did not want any judgment that would rest solely
on oral testimony of witnesses wliose interest, bias, memory and trutlifulness
would always be open to question. This required us to pass over many tempting
matters because evidence measui'ing up to this standard was not then obtain-
able. However, that policy was so far observed that the Tribunal, in its Judg-
ment, said : "The case, therefore, against the defendants rests in a large measure
in documents of their own making, the authenticity of which has not been
challenged except in one or two cases." ^
Second, if we w(>re ever to depart from the policy of presenting documentary
evidence, this atrocity was not a suitaltle instance because we knew of no wit-
nesses who could supply oral proof to establish the identity of the perpetrators
that would meet the high standards of credibility required in a criminal trial.
Neither the American nor, as far as I have reason to believe, the British prosecu-
tors knew of such witnesses.
2 Tlioso nogotiations ure iinl)lisho(l in Alderman (and othors), Negotiating With the
Kussians (World Peace Foundation, I!),')] ), 49-98.
'■' N. C. & A., Opinion and .liidgnieiit 3.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1973
It was plaiu that we could not get such evidence from Polish sources. Atti-
tudes of Polish authorities at that time were conflicting, which confirmed my
opinion that we should not participate in the trial of the Nazi-Soviet dispute.
The Polish Government then in power at Warsaw kept a delegation at Niiruberg
which cooperated closely with the Soviet in all matters, including, as I under-
stood it, accusing the Nazis of the Katyn murders.
The Polish Government in Exile in London, on the contrary, was accusing
the Soviet. On February 15, 1946, eleven Senators and ten Deputies of the Polish
Parliamentary Group in London filed with me a letter and statement reciting
evidence on which they pointed to Russian guilt, concluding with this statement :
"In view of these facts and circumstances the undersigned would like to
express the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the
tasks of the Nuremberg tribunal. This case is of a special character, and needs,
in order to be fully elucidated, to be examined apart and treated independently
by an international judicial body." ■*
It also characterizes the Polish attitude at that time that General Anders,
while believing in Sm'iet guilt, refused the request of Goering's lawyer to help
him prove it — a quite understandable attitude in view of what Poland had
suffered at the hands of those who would benefit from his testimony. He said,
however, that he would be willing to give his information to the Tribunal "at
their express written and oflicial request." He did not know, nor do I, whether the
Tribunal was ever so advised. Certainly I was not. Only three years after the
trial, when General Anders published his book and thoughtfully sent me a copy,
did I learn these facts.'
On January 21, 1946, General Clay transmitted for my "strictly confidential
information from the Embassy at Warsaw" word that the Germans were not,
in the opinion of the Polish circles with which the American Embassy was in
contact, responsible for the Katyn deaths. There was no suggestion that this
opinion was supported by legal evidence. Apparently it was not, for Mr. Lane,
then American Ambassador at Warsaw, 2 years later published the information
then known to him pointing to Soviet guilt, but even then said, "The identity
of the perpetrators of the outrageous massacre of Katyn, contrary to all laws
of war and humanity, has never been definitely established. Perhaps it never
will be.""
We did not learn of any usuable evidence in American ijossession. Military
intelligence, on February 26, 1946, delivered to a member of my staff then in
Washington several documents, classified "Secret," including the German report
accusing the Soviet, two Soviet documents accusing the Nazis and a paper
labeled "Excerpts of conversations between Sikorski, Anders, Stalin, and Molo-
tov." The conversations referred to are substantially those published by Jan
Ciechanowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States, in 1947." None of these
were in condition to be useful as evidence. I knew nothing at any time during
the trial, of Colonel Van Vliet, Colonel Stewart, or Colonel Siemansky. We heard
nothing of any of the witnesses since claimed to have personal knowledge of the
crimes.
Third, we did not need to prove Nazi responsibility for tlie Katyn murder in
order to establish that the Nazi regime and individual defendants were guilty
of a conspiracy and a program to exterminate vast numbers of Poles. Poland
had been the scene and the Polish people had been the victims of many un-
believable barbarities which put to death much larger numbers of persons than
the Katyn murders. To make sure that the grievances of the Polish people, as
well as other Eastern peoples, were proved and proved beyond doubt, we did not
leave the matter wholly to the Soviet but, as a part of the American case, proved
by captured documents or by admissions of captive German officials the over-all
Nazi extermination program embracing many atrocities in Poland and affecting
the Polish people, as well as others in East Europe. Examples will indicate what
I mean :
* I am filinc; a photostatic copy of this pommnnication with the Committee.
"Anders, An Armv in Exile (1949), 82, 140. 295.
8 Lane, I Saw Poland Betraved (1948), 36-39.
' Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (1947), 66-69.
1974 THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE
We had the diary of Hans Frank, the Nazi Governor-General of Poland,
Acknowledged by him to he authentic, saying, "We must annihilate the Jews
wherever we find them and wherever it is possible. * * *" * In August 1942,
he wrote of Nazi manipulation of hunger rations in Poland : "That we sentence
1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be noted only marginally. It is a matter,
of course, that should tlie Jews not starve to death it would, we hope, result in
the speeding up of the anti-Jewish measures." °
We had written evidence of specific extermination measures, such as the 75-
page leather-bound official report by Major-General Stroop which recited the
killing of men, women and children of the Warsaw ghetto to the exact number
of 56,0G5 and set out the day-to-day measures, including shooting, fire, explosion
and chemical extermination in the sewers, where the victims had taken refuge,
accompanied by photographs to prove the operation's efficiency."
We had the report by SS Brigade-Fuehrer Stahlecker to Ilimmler, dated
October 3941, of the execution of lo.5,.567 persons in the Lithuanian area."
We had a top-secret report, dated May 16, 1942, of the ghastly details of the
operations in the East of gasivngons for killing undesirables."
We also had German protests, oflScial but not very high-minded, against such
exterminations — in one instance of 1.50,000 to 200,000 Jews " and in another
instance of 5,000 Jews " — because it was complained they should have been
spared for use as forced labor.
Some of the documents, intended to conceal crime, unconsciously di'amatized
it. For example, a deathbook of the Mauthausen concentration camp recorded
35,317 deaths. During a sample period 203 persons died of the same ailment — ■
"heart trouble" — died at brief and regular intervals, and more astonishingly,
died in alphabetical order. Death first came to Ackermann, at 1 :15 a. m., and
reached Zynger at 2 p. m.'°
Oral testimony and affidavits were available from captured German officials.
One told of the official Gestapo estimate that the Nazi extermination program
had done away with four million persons in concentration camps and that two
million additicmal were killed by the Secret Police in the East."
Another Nazi, General Ohlendorf , testified willingly, even boastfully, that' he
supervised execution of over 90,000 men, women and children in the Eastern
area." The witness Hoess, in charge of Auschwitz extermination center, swore
that under his regime it exterminated three million human beings.^^ This was
by far the largest and most atrocious of the atrocities committed against the
Polish people.
Nor did we rest upon the documents which the fortunes of war had placed
in our hands when documents were procurable from other sources. An example
was the Nazi persecution of the Church and clergy, particularly vicious in
Poland, which the Nazis had not documented with the candor and thoroughness
that they did persecution of the Jews. It is doubtful whether, even if time were
available to us, we couid have gathered evidence of the Church pei-secution in
Poland, since any probable witnesses were in the area under Soviet control
where Americans even then were rarely admitted, and we may doubt the zeal
of the Soviets to obtain proof on that subject. However, I sought an audience
with Pope Pius and obtained from His Holiness the Vatican documents in which
detailed evidentiary material was already collected and which supported the
charge of religious persecution."
As to the Katyn massacres, we knew of no source to which we could turn for
such documentation. Extermination of these intelligent and patriotic Poles who
might become the leadership of the restoration of Poland was provable by docu-
8 Doc. No. 2233-D-PS (USA exhibit 2S1), Entry of Dec. 16, 1941, pp. 76-77. 4 N. C.
& A. S91.
»Doc. No. 22.'^3-E~PS (USA 28.S). Entrv of An?. 24, 1942. 4 N. C. & A. 893.
10 Doc. No. 1061-PS (USA 275), 3 N. C. & A. 718.
" Doc. No. U-180 (USA 276), 7 N. C. & A. 978.
" Doc. No. .501 -PS (USA 288). 3 N. C. & A. 418.
" Doc. No. 3257-PS (USA 290). .5 N. C. & A. 994.
'» Doc. No. U-1.S5 (USA 289). 8 N. C. & A. 205.
'•"' 1 N. C. & A. 907.
'» Doc. No. 273.S-PS (USA 290). 5 N. C. & A. 380.
"4 Proceed iiisrs 811-:?.^>4.
" Doc. No. 3SfiS-PS (USA 819). 6 N. C. & A. 787.
"These documents, nnniliered from 3261-PS to 3269-PS, inchisive, are published in
5 N. C. & A., pp. 1009 to 1040, Inclusive.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1975
ment to be consistent with the Nazi policy toward Toland. Yet, while they had
boasted on paper of the worst crimes known to tuan, we found but one Nazi
document tliat even hinted at Nazi responsibility for the Katyn massacre, that
being a telegram reporting that the Polish Ked Cross had found that German-
made ammunition was used in the killings.""
A fourth ditHcuIty entered into our reluctance to undertake the Katyn murder
charge as part of the Niirnberg trial. We were under exceedingly heavy pressure
to get along with the trial. A persistent criticism in the American press during
the trial was its long duration. Oral testimony from witnesses, subject to cross-
examination by several counsel, of course takes nuich more time than docu-
mentai-y proof. Every word of testimony taken in the Niirnberg trial had to be
forthwith interpreted iTito three other languages. Every examination or cross-
examination had to Include any proper questions desired by moi'e than twenty
lawyers representing defendants and four for the prosecution, and these were
trained in live different legal systems — English, American, French, Russian, and
German. Therefore, in the interests of expedition it was necessary to forego
calling of witnesses so far as possible. You will best realize the extent to which
we avoided relying on oral proof when I remind you that all four prosecutors
at Niirnberg called only 33 witnesses to testify orally on the whole case against
the twenty individual defendants, and these defendants, in addition to them-
selves, called only 61 witnesses. You have ali-eady, according to your interim
report, orally examined 81 witnesses on this one atrocity.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Soviet prosecutor, on February 14,
1946, opened the subject by presenting to the Tribunal a report by a Soviet
Extraordinary State Commission of its investigation of the Katyn crime." It
recited testimony, including a good deal of hearsay and medical data, as to
the condition of the exhumed bodies. On this, experts based opinions that the
executions took place during the period of German occupation and therefore
that the Germans were responsible. Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering, made
a prompt request to call witnesses to contradict the Soviet report, which occa-
sioned some disagreement between the Soviet prosecutors and those representing
Great Britain and the United States. The Soviet lawyers took the view that,
since the court took "judicial notice" of the report of the Extraordinary Com-
mission as a state document, it could not be contradicted. Under Soviet law
it probably could not but would be entitled to faith and credit — as a judgment,
statute, or public- act would be here. Nevertheless, we thought that its nature
was such that it was clearly open to contradiction. Then the Soviet lawyers
proposed, if the subject were opened, to call ten witnesses." The Tribunal,
however, ruled that it would "limit the whole of the evidence to three witnesses
on either side, because the matter is only subsidiary allegation of fact." '"
Testimony of three witnesses for each was heard on the 1st and 2d days of
July 1946. What it was is a matter of record, and what it is worth is a matter
of opinion." At the conclusion, neither side was satisfied with its own showing
2" Telesrani addressed to the "Government of the Government General, care of First
Administrative Counseller Weirauch in Krakow." It is marked "Urgent, to be delivered
at once, secret" :
"Part of the Polish Red Cross returned yesterday from Katyn. The employees of the
Polish Red Cross have brou.sht with them the cartridge cases which were used in sliooting
tite victims of Katyn. It appears that these are German munitions. The caliber is 7.65.
Tliey are from, the firm Geco. Letter follows." Signed "Heinrich." Doe. No. 402-PS.
17 Proceedings 365.
So far as I know, the letter referred to was never found, but the prosecution staff
screened approximately 100,000 captured German documents, of which only 5.000 were
selected for full translation for use at the trial. It is impossible, therefore, to say that
such a letter is not in existence.
=ilt is USSR Doc. #54.
=2 March S. 1046, 9 Proceedings 3; May 11, 1946, 13 Proceedings 431; June 3, 1946,
15 Proceedinss 289-293.
23 17 Proceedings 273.
^ The verbatim testimony in English translation is found in 17 Proceedings 275 et seq.
A summary of the evidence will show its inconclusive character. It must be remembered
that the Smolensk area, including Katyn Wood, fell to the Germans on or about .July 17,
1941. If the Polish prisoners bad been executed before that, the Soviet must have been
responsible: if they were then alive and captured by the Germans, the Germans must have
been responsible.
The German defendants led with the witness Ahrens, Commanding Officer of the Signal
Regiment charged witli guilt in the Soviet report. He denied that Iiis regiment had cap-
tured any Polish prisoners from the Russians, denied there was any order to slioot Polish
prisoners, or that any were shot. He testified to exluiming the bodies in 1942. The weak-
ness of his testimony was that he did not arrive in the Smolensk territory until about the
second half of November 1041, while the Soviet claimed the executions had been consider-
ably earlier, and the commander he succeeded was not called.
The second witness was Bichborn, who also did not arrive on the scene until September
20, 1941. He denied that there were Polish prisoners taken or shot and said he would have
1976 THE KATYN FOREST RIASSACRE
and both asked to call additional witnesses. The Soviet, especially, complained
that they had been allowed to call only three of the 120 witnesses that appeared
before the Soviet Commission. The Tribunal, wisely I think, refused to hear
more of the subject."^
The Soviet prosecutor appears to have abandoned the charge. The Tribunal
did not convict the German defendants of the Katyn massacre. Neither did it
expressly exonerate them, as the Judgment made no reference to the Katyn
incident. The Soviet judge dissented in some matters but did not mention
Katyn.-''
This history will show that, if it is now deemed possible to establish responsi-
bility for the Katyn murders, nothing that was decided by the Niirnberg
Tribunal or contended for by the American prosecution will stand in the way.
Exhibit 7 — Letter From the Polish Government in Exile in London to Justice
Jackson
Polish Parliamentary Group
74, Cornwall Gardens, London, SW. 7
London, Fehriiary 15, 1946-
Mr. Justice Rorert J. Jackson,
Chief American Prosecutor, Nuremberg.
Sir: We have the honour to submit to your attention the enclosed copy of a
letter addressed by us to the members of the Parliaments of all democratic
Nations throughout the world.
We are, Sir,
Yours faithfully.
On behalf of the Polish Parliamentary Group,
A. Zalewski.
J. Godlewski.
Annexe.
known about it if eithor had occurred. His testimony was attacked by U. S. S. R. Docu
ment No. .3, dated Berlin, October 29, 1941, issued by the chief of the Security Police in
relation to prisoners of war in the rear of the army, which set up task force groups under
the leadership of an SS, leader. These irregular groui)s, not a part of the army, were the
usual execution teams. This witness told of an order to shoot certain prisoners of wai
which, he said, Field Marshal von Kleuge refused to carry out because of regard for th€
discipline of his troops.
The third witness was Gen. Oberhauser, in command of the area, who did not reach
there until September of 1941. He denied that there were Polish prisoners taken or shot
and denied that the regiment had weapons with which they could have been shot. This
closed the German case without accounting for the period from the fall of Smolensk in
the middle of .July to the beginning of September and with an admission that an execution
squad followed the army into that area.
The Russians took over and called the Deputy Mayor of Smolensk during the German
occupation, a professor at the University who served under a German Mayor. He testified
that there were Polish prisoners of war in the vicinity of Smolensk when the city fell to
the Germans, that he had a conference with the German Mayor in which he was informed
that a very severe regime should prevail with respect to prisoners of war. and that Polish
ones were to be exterminated, l)ut that it should be kejit a secret, and thereafter the Mayor
told him that the I'olish prisoners of war had all died. On cross-examination it was
brought out against his crediliility that he was not punished by the Russians for his ad-
mitted collaboration with the Germans, and not only remained at liberty but was a pro-
fessor at two Universities under Russian control.
They followed with a witness Markov, a Bulgarian doctor who had been a nw^mber of
the commission set up by the Germans to investigate the Polish mass:H're and which
charged responsibility to the Soviet. Alarkov gave details indicating ;in extremely super-
ficial examination of the graves and testified that he did not agree with the report but
signed it under German comi)ulsion. Ooss-examination brouuht out the weakness of his
testimony in that he was under the control of the Russians at the time of trial.
The last witness was Prosorovski, a medical legal expert of the Sovi(>t ITnion. Hi-s
testimony was entirely of the Ru.ssian examination of the trraves. and his conclusions that
the date of the execution as evidenced by the condition of the bodies must have been during
the German occup.ntion. During his examination, an American-captured document. No.
402-PS, Kxhibit V. S. S. R. nOT. was read into the case, being a telegram from Heinrich
stating that the employees of the Polish Red Cross had found cartridge cases used in shoot-
ing the victims of Katyn from which it ajipeared that these were German munitions of
caliber 7.(i.T. The testimony was that all of the deaths had been caused by bullet wounds
of 7.05 caliber.
Dr. Naville. one of your rommittee witnesses, was allowed to defendant Goerlng. pro-'
vided he could l)e located. He was found in Switz(>rland. hut he "informed the Tribunal
that he sees no use in his ocuning Iier(> as a witnesjf for Goering. * * * 10 Pro-
ceedings f!4S.
^•17 Proceedings ."71.
==« N. C. & A., Opinion and .Tudgment lOfi.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1977
An Appeal to Members of the Parliaments of All the Nations From the
Former Deputies and Senators of the Polish Parliament
74 Cornwall Gardens,
London, SW. 7, February 19Jf6.
To the Members of the Free Nations Parliaments.
Dear Sirs : The German war criminals at present on trial at Nuremberg are
charged witb tlie murder of about 11,000 Polish officers in the wood of Katyn
near Smolensk. In connection with this case the undersigned, former Senators
and Deputies in Parliaments of the Polish Republic, beg to point out certain
events and to make a number of I'emarks.
On September 17th 1939 Soviet Forces suddenly and unexpectedly invaded
Poland and attacked the Polish armies in the rear while these armies were in a
most difficult position, struggling against the Germans, overwhelmingly superior
in number and in material. In doing so, the Soviet broke the Pact of Non-
Aggression and other agreements, freely accepted by them and still in force as
between the USSR and Poland sucli as the Peace Treaty of Riga signed on March
18th 1921, The Kellogg Pact, The Moscow Protocol renouncing war as an in-
strument of national policy, signed on February 9th 1929, by Estonia, Latvia,
Poland, Rumania and the USSR, the Convention on the definition of the Aggressor
signed on July 3rd 1933, the Moscow Protocol of May 5th 1934, on the Prolonga-
tion of the Non-Aggression Pact till December 31st, 1945. These agreements
have been confirmed twice over, by an exchange of notes, on September 10th 1934,
and by a common communique of November 26th 1938, and finally the Pact
of the League of Nations was also binding in the USSR.
As a result of the Soviet attack, Polish resistance collapsed and a great number
of soldiers of the Polish army fell into Soviet hands. The Soviet autliorities
grouped the Polish officers in separate camps, the largest of which were those of
Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostaszkow. At the beginning of 1940 the camp au-
thorities informed the interned officers that these camps would be broken iip
and that the prisoners of war would return to their families in Poland. The
prisoners were again registered in great detail. From April to the middle of
May 1940 the Soviet authorities removed the officers from the camps in groups
numbering from 60 to 300 and transported them in unknown directions. At the
same time the prisoners correspondence with their families in Poland came to an
end. Whereas in the preceding months letters from them were received fairly
regularly, after that date they ceased to give any sign of life and they were
heard of no more.
After the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30th, 1941. and of
the Polish-Soviet military convention of Augiist 14th of the same year, when the
formation of the Polish army was undertaken in the USSR, out of the total of
15.000 officers taken prisoner by the Soviet, only 2.500 reported themselves to the
Polish recruiting centres. Of these, only 400 had been inmates of the camp of
Kozielsk. The absence of the remainder, known to have been removed to unde-
termined destinations, produced understandable anxiety among their country-
men. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Polish Ambassador in Kuybyshev,
and the general commanding the Polish Army in the USSR, addressed them-
selves to the Soviet authorities asking to be informed of the whereabouts of these
missing officers. The Soviet Government in the persons of the People's Com-
misar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, and his deputy, Mr. Vishinsky, answered
repeatedly that these officers had been released and should have reported them-
selves to the diffreut Polish military units. On December 3rd, 1941, in a con-
versation with Marshal Stalin at the Kremlin, General Sikorski raised the same
question and presented a list of 3,845 missing officers whose names had been
ascertained by the Polish authorities. Marshal Stalin repeated tlie explanation
given by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky and assured General Sikorski anew
that these officers had been released long since. In spite of these declarations
of the highest Soviet authorities not one of the missing officers ever made his
appearance and all investigations remained fruitless.
In April 1943 the Germans published the news that in the wood of Katyn
near Smolensk mass graves had been discovered containing the bodies of about
12.000 Polish officers. About 3,000 of them were identified and it followed from
the checking of lists that they were prisoners from the camp at Kozielsk. As is
well known, the German authorities did not hesitate to accuse the Soviet Gov-
ernment of their murder.
1978 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
AVhen the German armies in their retreat from Russia had evacuated the dis-
trict of Smolensk, the Soviet authorities formed a commission called upon to
deal vv^ith the Katyn case. This commission drew up an official report which
was published by the Soviet Government.
According to this report two witnesses, the Soviet camp commander. Major
Vietoshnikov, of the N. K. V. D., and the engineer in control of traflBc in the
Smolensk sector of Western railway lines, S. Ivanov, testified that the Polish
officers detained in the P. o. W. camps had not been evacuated in the timft
and that the camp had been captured by the advancing German army. Other
witiiesses, Soviet citizens, gave evidence that the Gei'mans murdered the Polish
officers in Katyn wood and buried them there.
The region of Smolensk having been occujiied by the Germans in July 1941, the
question occurs why the Soviet Government did not inform the foolish authori-
ties immediately after the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations, in the summer
of 1941, that many Polish officers, who were prisoners of war, had fallen into
German hands. On the contrary, the Soviet Government answered all inquiries
on this point over and over again, even as late as March 1942, with the assurance
that these prisoners of war had been released, in accordance with the concluded
agreement and should have reported themselves to the Polish military units.
These circumstances show that the fate of the Polish officers in the Uussian
P.o.W. camps has not yet been fully elucidated.
The crime perpetrated upon them at Katyn, contrary to every feeling of human-
ity and violating international law and custom, does not only concern the families
of the victims. The entire Polish nation is entitled to demand that this tragedy
be cleared up.
In view of these facts and circumstances the undersigned would like to express
the opinion that it would be ill-advised to include the Katyn case in the tasks of
the Nuremberg tribunal. This case is of a special character, and needs, in order
to be fully elucidated, to be examined ai)art and treated independently by an
international judicial body.
SENATORS
Ignacy Balin.ski, Croft House, Sudbury, Suffolk.
JozefGodlewski, 17, Cleveden Place, S.W.I.
Alexander Heiman Jarecki, 10"), Hallam Street, W.l.
Prof. Wojciecli Jastrzebowski, 41, Belsize Square, N.W.3.
Inz. Jerzv Iwanowski, 11. Dora Road, Wimbledon. S.W.19.
Tadeusz Katelbach, 112, Eton Hall, Eton College Rd., N.W.S.
Adam Koc, 46 East TOth Street, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.
Wanda Norwid-Neugebauer, Eton Hall, Chalk Farm, N.W.S.
Karol Niezal.ytowski. Hay Lodge, Peeble, Scotland.
Konstanty Rdultowski, Cairo, Egypt.
Stefan Rosada, 7. Glenorchy Terrace, Edinburgh. 9.
Dr. Konstanty Dzieduszycki. 1. Church Hill Place. Edinburgh, 10.
Stanislaw Jozwiak, 70. Clifton t-ourt. Edgware Road. W.2.
Kornel Krzeczunowicz. 14, Inverleith Row, Edinburgh.
Jerzy Paciorkowski, 184, l!e]siz(» Road, N.W.O.
Tadeusz Schaetzel. Ankara. Turkey.
Antoiii Zalewski, 8.1. Eaton Place, S.W.I.
P.ronisiaw Wanke. Rockcliffc l)y Dalbeattie, Scotland.
Marian Zyndram-Koscialkowski. 2:>, Greystock Court. Hanger Lane, W.fi
Prof. Wladyslaw Wielhorski, .l. White Hall Gardens, W.3.
Witold Zj'borski, "Featherstones", 11, Fairlawn Road, Lytham, Lanes.
AFTER KE(1<:SS
Chaii'inaii M.vdden. The committee will come to order.
T\w first, witness will be Mr. Elmer Davis. Will you take the stand.
Ml". Davis, and be sworn?
Do yon solemnly swear that the testimony yon will give in the hear-
ing before (he connnittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing^
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr, Davis. I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1979
TESTIMONY OF ELMER DAVIS, NEWS BROADCASTER AND COM-
MENTATOR, AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO., WASHINGTON, D. C.
Chairman Madoen. Mr. Davis, will you state your full name, please?
Mr. Davis. Elmer Davis.
Chairman Madden. And your address?
Mr. Davis. 1661 Crescent Place, Washington 9, D. C.
Chairman Madden. And your business?
Mr. Davis. News broadcaster and commentator for the American
Broadcasting- Co.
Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Mitchell, you may proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, for. the purpose of this hearing I
would like to have now read into the record by Mr. Pucinski, the
testimony taken by the congressional committee investigating the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. This is the testimony of Mr.
Joseph Lang, which was taken on August 5 in New York City.
Mr. Pucinski, will you proceed, please?
Mr. Pucinski. Yes. I am reading from page 387 of volume 991 of
the House committee hearings. This volume is from the Senate library.
The testimony is by Mr. Joseph Lang.
Mr. Machrowicz. What committee and what date?
Mr. Pucinski. This testimony was taken during a study and in-
vestigation of the Federal Communications Commission on Thursday,
August 5, 1943. The hearings were in New York City.
Now, this is the testimony of Mr. Joseph Lang, general manager of
radio station WHOM, New York, N. Y.
The question being propounded to Mr. Lang is by Mr. Garey, who
was the committee counsel for this committee, which was headed by
Congressman Cox.
Mr. Garey said :
Mr. Lang, did you ever have a meeting with Mrs. Shea, at which the question
of the policy that should be adopted toward Russia was discussetl?
Mr. Lang. I had a meeting with Mrs. Shea and Alan Cranston in my office.
Mr. Garey. We know who Mrs. Shea is, but I don't think this record shows who
Alan Cranston is. Will you tell us who Alan Cranston is?
Mr. Lang. Alan Cranston is head of the Foreign Language Division of the
Office of War Information.
Mr. Garey. And about when did this conversation take place?
Mr. Lang. I believe it was around the middle of May 1943.
Mr. Garey. And how did the meeting come about?
Mr. Lang. Mr. Cranston called me, I believe it was on a Monday, and asked
if he could meet with Mr. Simon and me regarding what he described as the
Polish situation. He asked if he could meet with us on the following Wednesday.
Mr. Garey. Where did the meeting take place?
Mr. Lang. At my office.
Mr. Garey. Who was present at the meeting?
Mr. Lang. INIr. Cranston, Mrs. Shea, Mr. Arthur Simon, myself, and I be-
lieve Mr. Fred Call, who handled public relations for the foreign-language
radio wartime control. This was a meeting not with us as individual station
owners but representing the foreign-language radio wartime control.
Mr. Garey. And Mr. Arthui' Simon is manager of the Bulova station in
Philadelphia, designed by the call letters WPEN?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Garey. And he was chairman of that foreign-language radio wartime
control committee?
Mr. Lang. He was.
Mr. Garey. Will you tell us what was said at that meeting, and by whom?
Mr. Lang. Both Mr. Cranston and :Mrs. Shea were concerned with the sit-
uation that had been developing between Russia and Poland in regard to the
1980 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
matter of boundaries, and the fact that Poland, I believe, through its Premier,
its Government in exile in London, had protested to Russia about the slaying
of these 10.000 Polish officers in Russia. And they were concerned as to how
the situation would he handled on different radio stations.
Mr. Garey. What did Mr. Cranston want you to do?
Mr. Lang. He asked us — when I say "us" I mean the foreign-; guage radio
wartime control — if we could straighten out the situation in Dei >>it.
Mr. Garey. What situation olitained there?
]\Ir. Lang. From what I could gather, it seemed that on the Polish programs
out there the Polish news commentators had tal<en a rather antagonistic atti-
tude toward Russia in this matter, and they felt that it was inimical to the war
effort find should be straightened out in some way.
Mr. Garey. And they wanted to know what you could do about getting the
program content on those Detroit stations to conform to their views on what
should be put over the air in the United States about t^e Russian situation?
Thnt is the sum and .substance of what Cranston was trying to get you to do?
Mr. Lang. I don't know that it was expressed that way. That was the
thought.
Mr. Garey. Is your answer to my question in the affirmative?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
IMr. Garey. Was the Office of Censorship represented at this meeting?
Mr. Lang. No ; it was not.
Mr. Garey. They had been invited to attend, but had reufsed to attend, had
they not?
Mr. Lang. I don't know that, sir.
Mr. Garey. They had failed to attend?
Mr. Lang. They were not present.
Mr. Garey. What did Mrs. Shea want you to do?
Mr. Lang. The same thing. They both expressed the same thoughts.
Mr. Garey. They wanted the gag put on any criticism of Russia, insofar as
critic'zing Russia's ambitions to establish a new Polish Frontier in the postwar
days was concerned?
Mr. Lang. Tliat seemed to be the gist of the talk.
Mr. Garey. And didn't they also want the gag put on any news concerning
the alleged killing of the 10,000 Polish Officers by the Russians in Russia?
Mr. Lang. That was not expressed. The thought was that if commentators
were to he permitted to express their own views, there was no limit to what
they could say. I suggested that if the situation were handled as I handled it on
my station, whereby commentators, both on Russian and Polish programs were
permitted to broadcast only the news as it came off the teletype, that would solve
the situation, because it wouhl mean that only news from the news services
would be broadcast, and not anyone's views.
IVIr. Garey. What was the result of the meeting?
Mr. Lang. Mr. Simon and I said we would get in touch with our committee
member in Detroit and talk to him and see if we could get the matter straightened
out.
Mr. Garey. And did you?
Mr. Lang. AVe did. We called ^Ir. James Hopkins.
Mr. Garey. Of what station?
Mr. Lang. WGBK, in Detroit. And we spoke to liim along these lines, sug-
gesting that his station, as well as two other stations, the call letters of which
I don't recollect, stick strictly to their authenticated news service, and not permit
any individual to express his individual views.
Mr. Garey. Wliat Ililde Shea and Cranston were doing, they were engaging
in the censorship of program content: weren't tliey?
Mr. Lang. I think you miglit put it that way. I wouVl say "Yes."
Mr. Gakey. Certainly. And the Communications Act of 1944 expressly forbids
tlie Federal Communications Commission to censor program content; doesn't it?
Mr. Lang. It does.
Mr. (Jakey. And the Office of War Information had no .iurisdiction in the matter
whatever ; did it? j,'
Mr. Lang. Tliat is right. i
Mr. MiTCiiKLL. Mr. Davis, at that time I believe you were lioad of '|
IliP DWT. Could you tell the (.'oiiiniittee when you took' over (he |
chnirmaiishi|) of the OAVT? |"
Mr. Davis. The l.'Uh of Juiu' 1042.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1981
Mr. Mitchell. Who was your predecessor in office ?
Mr. Davis. We had none. We were a combination of four preceding
agencies.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you explain to the committee how the OWI was
formed, if ''>Hi please?
Mr. DA^^P.' It was put together by a combination of what was then
the Foreign Information Service of the Coordinator of Information
under General Donovan, an organization which had previously been
combined with what later became the OSS, the Office of Facts and Fig-
ures, under Archibald MacLeish, the Division of Information of the
Office of Emergency INIanagement, under Bob Lorton, and the Office
of Government Eeports under Lowell Mott. They were all brought
in together into a new organization.
As I have said elsewhere, I felt like a man, at times, who had married
a four-time widow and was trying to raise her children by all of her
previous marriages.
Mr. Mitchell. Sir, where and to whom did you report as the head
of OWI ? What was the chain of command ?
Mr. Davis. President Roosevelt. If I may amplify, INIr. Counsel,
we reported only to the President for all operations. But on matters
of foreign policy we had to consult the State Department and conform
to their views.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee how the liaison
was conducted between these various other Government agencies,
which affected the war effort.
Mr. Davis. We had various people assigned to contact each of the
Government departments, and quite a number of people would con-
sult different officials in the State Department on different issues to
see what the Government policy was. With respect to major issues,
occasionally I had to take them up with the President. But he was
pretty busy, and I didn't bother him more than I had to.
Mr. Mitchell. Was there any kind of a Board or Commission
established for policy guidance for OWI ?
Mr. Davis. Well, there was theoretically such a Commission, and I
was directed to perform my duties after consulting it. It was set up
with appointees by the other departments, in such shape that it seemed
to me that its purpose was to keep us from ever doing anything much.
So, after two consultations with them in the first month that I held
office, I performed my duties according to the Executive order. They
never met again.
Mr. Mitchell. Then could you explain to the committee how policy
respecting the OWI was accomplished? How did you get your
directives of advice and consultation ?
Mr. Davis. Well, on foreign policy matters, as I say, we consulted
the State Department. On specific issues it was usually done by some-
body from our overseas branch calling up somebody in the State
Department who was concerned with that particular division. I had
frequent consultations with Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles, myself, on
general policies.
Mr. Mitchell. Was this on over-all policy, your consultations?
Mr. Davis. On the way we should handle certain matters in foreign
propaganda, so that we would conform to the foreign policy of the
United States.
93744— 52— pt. 7 11
1982 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
iMr. Mitchell. Then liaison was otherwise from desk to desk?
Mr. Davis. We had people who were especially associated with each
of the other departments, but with most of them our problem was
to see that the news they handed out was as fresh as possible and as
accurate as possible, and that there were not too violent conflicts
between the departments and what they said.
Mr. Mitchell. And the two individuals that you consulted for
over-all policy were Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles ?
Mr. Davis. On foreign policy only.
Mr. Mitchell. On foreign policy only ?
Mr. Da^ts. Yes.
]Mr. Mitchell. Now, could you tell the committee the exact purpose
or function of OWI ?
Mr. Davis. Well, it is all set forth in greater length and detail in
the Executive order, than I can now remember.
JMr. Mitchell. Briefly.
Mr. Davis. Its object was to tell the news as fully and as accurately
as we could to the people of the United States, a function in which we
were very much limited by the fact that we were only coordinators of
the new^s issued by the other departments, and also to inform foreign
nations, both hostile, friendly and neutral, about the policies and
business of the United States.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did you get the new^s coming in from over-
seas 'I What agencies furnished that to the OWI ?
Mr. Davis. We had a division called the Foreign News Bureau,
whicli obtained the reports of the Federal Broadcast Information
Service of all of the enemy broadcasts, and all broadcasts, to be sure,
but primarily the enemy broadcasts, which they would take and
analyze principally for the purpose of pointing out where the enemy
was telling a different story to one part of the world than to another.
They issued their reports on those broadcasts, and they were made
available to the press. That was the only news we obtained from
overseas.
Mr. Mitchell. Was your organization broken up in such a way
as to have individuals responsible country by country or area by area?
Mr. Davis. In our propaganda to those countries, yes. The infor-
mation that we obtained from abroad, as I sa}^, was only through
this one channel, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and was
analyzed by our own people and put out for availability to tlie press
here.
Mr. Mitchell, The subject matter being investigated by this com-
mittee concerns Katyn and Poland. Can you tell the committee who
was in charge of that operation in your Department?
Mr. Davis. Well, I don't know what you mean b}' "that operation."
Mr. Mitchell. The overseas broadcasts.
Mr. Davis. Well, that would be under the general direction of
Robert Sherwood, who was then the head of the Overseas Branch.
As to the people who were underneath him, there were quite a number
of them.
The policy was supposed to be laid down in Washington and fol-
lowed by our opei'ating staffs in various points around the world — New
York, Sail Fi-ancisco, the Southwest Pacific, London, Algiers, and so
on — although in Algici-s and in the Southwest Pacific, of course, we
were under military direction.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1983
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have as part of your organization a desk
or an individual who was responsible for reporting to the American
people, country by country?
Mr, Davis. No.
Mr. ^IiTCHELL. Responsible for reporting the news that came in ?
JNlr. Davis. No ; we did not.
Mr. Mitchell. You didn't have an area desk?
Mr. Davis. Not for reports to the American people. We had area
desks for propaganda overseas. But normally, we did not produce
much news for the American people. The great volume of news
printed in the American press and used on the radio at that time came
from the news services and special correspondents in foreign countries.
Mr. Mitchell. Then how can you explain what was read into the
record a few minutes ago about Mr. Cranston, who was a member of
.3"our staff, having this meeting in New York with members of the
Foreign Language Radio Wartime Control?
Mr. Davis. Well, I can't recall that I have ever heard of that episode
until it was read to me. But I should say that, in the first place, the
declaration made by the counsel of that commit tee seems to have been
contradicted by a statement of one of the broadcasters a little earlier,
that it was indicated that the news analysts or commentators on those
stations could handle the news the way they wanted to, but JNIr. Crans-
ton merely hoped that they would not handle it in such a way as to stir
up antipathy between two of our allies.
Mr. Mitchell. I cannot quite understand why Mr. Cranston's par-
ticular function fitted in with this capacity, since it was not the func-
tion of the OWI to handle news within the country.
Mr. Davis. Strictly speaking, he had no authority, and as I think
that excerpt makes clear, he made no attempt to impose any authority.
He merely suggested that as a matter of moving toward the winning
of the war, they should try to avoid stirring up trouble between our
allies.
Mr. Mitchell. But that was the function of the Office of Censor-
ship?
Mr. Davis. No. The Office of Censorship was supposed to tell them
what they could not print or what they could not broadcast. We
didn't attempt to do that, and I think that the excerpt read will indi-
cate that Mr. Cranston didn't attempt to do that.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I can't understand why Cranston was engaged
in that particular function of curtailing news within the United States.
The job of the OWI was outside, was it not ?
Mr. Davis. The job of the OWI was to provide Government news
inside the United States, not news from abroad. This was a function
which had been held over from one of our predecessor organizations in
an attemi^t to reason with some of the foreign language broadcasting
stations which at the beginning, immediately after Pearl Harbor, and
long before OWI — one or two of them, still had some persons of rather
f ascistic tendencies on their staffs ; and I believe that that work was
started then to try to persuade them to present their broadcasts so
as to contribute to the winning of the war. We went very much less
far in that direction than did George Creel who, by the simple ex-
pedient of getting hold of the man who controlled all of the advertis-
ing for the foreign language press, managed to get the foreign lan-
guage piess to say about what Creel wanted it to say.
1984 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. What was George Creel's function at that time ?
Mr. Davis. That was in the old war, it was substantially the same
as the one I had then.
Mr. Mitchell. But it had nothinfy to do with this one?
Mr. Davis. Oh, no. The previous one.
Mr. Mitchell. I still can't understand why, under the charter
of the OWI, any individual employed by the OWI would take it upon
himself, or else by policy direction, or in some way, to contact anyone
within the United States concerning broadcasts of news. Was it with-
in the charter ?
Mr. Davis, I should have to read the charter again to find out
whether that authority may have lain there. As I say, I didn't know
•about this situation. But, as I think this testimony will indicate, JNIr.
Cranston was merely talking to them by way of suggesting that they
try not to create too much disharmony among two of our allies. It
really did not attempt to give any instructions, and he did not propose
to tell them what to say. It is stated in there that the commentators
could say anything they liked.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, if I recall correctly, Poland was an ally at that
time.
Mr. Davis. What is that?
Mr. Mitchell. If I recall correctly, Poland was an ally at that
time i
Mr. Davis, I said "between two of our allies."
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I still can't understand why Cranston, in his
capacity in the OWI, would in any way — that was a function of some-
body else, wasn't it? Wasn't it? Was it a function of the OWI?
Mr. Davis. No ; it certainly wasn't a f miction of anybody else that
I can think of. I don't know whether it was properly a function of the
OWL As to why he did this, you had better ask Cranston. As I say,
I didn't remember this episode.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. We will have Mr. Cranston.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to have Mr. Pucinski read into the
record a broadcast that Mr. Elmer Davis made on May 3, 1943.
Chairman Madden. How long is it?
Mr. Davis. It is 15 miiiutes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mitchell. This is only concerned with the Katyn affair.
Chairman Madden. -All right.
Mr. Pucinski. Maybe we had better have Mr. Davis read it. It is
his exact words, and he will probably like to refer to it while you are
talking to him.
Mr. Davis. I appear to be quoting from myself on May 3, 1943. I
may say, Mr. Chairman, tliat I don't believe I have seen the scripts
of this broadcast since that date, but I have no doubt that it is correct
(reading) :
The Allied s((ueeze is on in Tunisia, and is going to be slow and hard. The
enemy is fighting with great skill and stubbornness, and dispatches from the
front report heavy casualties. This part of Tunisia will have to be taken hill
by hill, and every hill means a hard struggle. The critical jioiiit of the Hue is
the center, where the P.ritish First Army is pushing northeastward from Med.jez
el Hal). Here an advance of only a few kilometers will brin^- them into tint
country much easier for tank operations. The Germans realize that danger;
here their counterattacks are most persistent and vigorous. Nevetheless the
enemy is fighting a losing light. The Allied air forces and the British naval
forces are knocking oil" ships and i)laiu's on which the Axis must depend I'"i'
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1985
suitplies and reinforcements, and this with the steady pressure on the front will
eventually break the enemy down.
The Pacific was quiet last week, but the Russians started an offensive on the
southern end of their front across the straits from the Crimea. When the Ger-
mans retreated from the Caucasus they held on to some territory there which
they might use as a springboard for another drive against the Caucasus from it.
It seems doubtful if they can ever again put on a general offensive against
Russia.
Mr. Mitchell,. Will you go down now to the part about Katyn ?
Mr. Davis. I am reading it along as it comes, INIr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. Please start right there [indicating].
Mr. Davis (reading) :
But while the German armies are finding it pretty tough going, the German
piopaganda won a striking success last week when it succeeded in bringing
about a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the Polish Govern-
ment in exile. The way the Germans did this is a good example of the doctrine
Hitler preached in Mein Kampf, that it is easier to make most people swallow
a big lie than a little one. When the Germans had beaten Poland in September
1939, tlie Russians moved in and occupied eastern Poland, taking thousands of
Polish troops prisoners. In June 1941, when the Germans attacked Russia, they
overran all of this territory and have held it since. Now, almost 2 years later,
they suddenly claim to have discovered near Smolensk the corpses of thousands
of Polish officers, who, according to the Germans, were murdered by the Russians
I] years ago. In several respects, this story looks very fishy. At first the Germans
were quite uncertain about the number of killed. At one time the Japanese and
the Vichy French came up with a story of Rumanians murdered in Odessa, not
I'oles in' Smolensk. First they said 10,000, then 2,000, and then 5,000, before
finally deciding on 12,000. Rome and Berlin disagreed as to how they had been
killed. The remains must have been better preserved than is usual after 3 years.
The Russians were said to have tried hard to conceal the graves, yet they buried
every man in uniform with his identification tag. Suggestions of an investiga-
tion by the International Red Cross mean nothing, for the Germans control
the area. It would be easy for them to show the investigators corpses in uniform
with identification tags. There is no way the investigators could determine
whether these men were killed by Russians or by Germans, as they probably
were.
I might say, Mr. Counsel, that after the lapse of 9i/^ years, I am
convinced that they were killed by the Russians ; but this was a state-
ment made at the time, with the evidence then available.
The Germans are known to have slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Poles
after the fighting was over. If they found a camp full of Polish prisoners, when
they attacked Russia, it would have been the most natural thing in the world
for them to murder them, too — if not at the moment, then later, when they needed
the corpses for propaganda.
Remember that when the Germans invaded Poland, they told the world that
they had found the graves of thousands of German civilians massacred by the
Poles. Few people believed that story : It is all the more remarkable that any
Poles who remember it should believe this one, especially as its motives are so
obvious. The first motive is to distract the attention of the world from the mass
murders which the Germans have been steadily committing in Poland for 3i/^
years — murders by now so numerous that they look like a deliberate attempt to
exterminate the Polish people. Another purpose would be to arouse suspicion
and distrust between Russia and the rest of the United States, which would help
the Germans in two ways. Directly, it might hamper the prosecution of the
war we are all fighting against Germany. Indix'ectly, it might help to prop up
German morale at home. There is plenty of evidence among the German civilian
population — yes, even among the Army — that there is less belief that they can
ever win a decisive victory over all their enemies. But the German propaganda
has persuaded many Germans that any day now America and Britain might call
off the war, make a compromise peace, and leave Germany free to turn on Russia.
And of course, more people will believe that if there is trouble between Russia
and the other United Nations. Anything that creates division among the United
Nations, concerns every one of those nations — the United States included^
because we must hold together to win the war.
1986 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. I tliink that is enough, Mr. Davis. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to read a memorandum from the
Department of State dated April 22, 1943, which was approximately
8 days previous to the broadcast that Mr. Davis has just put on the
record.
In the upper left-hand corner of this memorandum is the stamp
of the Assistant Secretary of State, dated April 22, 1943, being the
stamp of Mr. Berle.
The first name from this memorandum has been deleted, in accord-
ance with the agreement with the Department of State.
At the request of Mr. Berle, So-and-So called to ask whether he had any objec-
tion to Stockholm air.ffram No. so-and-so heins given to the OWI, apparently for
the purpose of using information contained therein regarding German atrocities
against Jews in Poland in a propaganda campaign which OWI wishes to start
in order to counteract the German propaganda story regarding the alleged exe-
cution of some 10,000 Polish officers by the Soviet authorities. It is felt that
because of the extremely delicate nature of the question of the alleged execution
of these Polish officers, and on the l)asis of the various conflicting contentions
of all parties concerned, it would appear to be advisable to refrain from taking
any definite stand in regard to this question. Although it is realized that the
story emanates from German sources, and is being used by the German propa-
ganda machine in an effort to divide the members of the United Nations, it should
be borne in mind that whether the story is true or not, it is known that the
Polish Government has, without success, for the past year and a half been en-
deavoring to ascertain from the Soviet Government the whereabouts of some
S,000 Polish officers who, on the best of available evidence, were captured by the
Soviet forces in 1939.
In this connection, the Polish Government in the summer of 1942, specifically
asked the American Ambassador to Moscow to intervene with the Soviet Govern-
ment in an effort to cause the latter to release the S,000 Polish officers, who were
reportedly still being held by the Soviet authorities. According to the Polish
officials here, the Soviet authorities have never released one of the officers on the
list presented by the Polish Government. Furthermore, according to a telegram
of April 20, 7 p. m., from Berne, it appears that the International Red Cross
has agreed to send a delegation to Smolensk to investigate the German allega-
tions. It would appear, therefore, that until further and more conclusive evi-
dence is available, it would be Inadvisable for OWI to take a definite stand in
this regard.
Now, Mr. Davis, it is evident that the Department of State
Chairman Madden. Pardon me. Did you want that introduced as
an exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis. Is that a memorandum to me ?
Mr. Mitchell. That is just a straight memorandum setting forth
the State Department's policy at that time.
Chairman Madden. Identify it and mark it as an exhibit.
Mr. MrrciiELL. Yes, sir.
This is a memorandum setting forth the policy of the Department
of State, with respect to the massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn.
It is an unsigned memorandum, the original of which is in the Depart-
ment of State's files.
If you desire to see the original, sir, I will ask Mr. Ben Brown of
the Department of State to produce that.
Ml'. Davis. I trust you have had a certified copy made ?
Mr. Mitchell. This is a photostatic copy of it, sir.
Mr. Davis. All right.
Chairman Madden. Will you mark that as an exhibit and intro-
duce it?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1987
Mr. Mitchell. This will be exhibit 8A, Washington, D. C.
Chairman Madden. Do you want to have the portion of Mr. Davis'
broadcast marked as an exhibit and introduce it in evidence?
Mr. Mitchell. Let us do it in reverse. We will mark this as 8 and
this as 8A.
Chairman Madden. Exhibit 8 is Mr. Davis' broadcast and exhibit
8A is the State Department memorandum. Those documents will be
accepted in evidence as exhibits 8 and 8A.
(Exhibits 8 and 8 A were received and follow here :)
Exhibit 8 — Mr. Elmer Davis' Radio Broadcast of Mat 3, 1943
{Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 1873 dated June 21, 1943, from the Legation at Stock-
holm. Submitted as Enclosure 2 to Department on Embassy Despatch 1008, June
0, 1952.]
American Legation
Stockholm
COMMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PRESS
No. 51 Vol. II. May 3, 1943.
The Weekly War Survey
lu his weekly l)roadcast, the Director of the Office of War Information, Elmer
Davis, sixike as follows :
"The Allied squeeze is on in Tunisia and is going to be slow and hard. The
enemy is fighting witli great skill and stubborness, and dispatches from the front
report lieavy casualties. This part of Tunisia will have to be taken hill by hill,
and every iiill means a hard struggle. The critical point of the line is the
center wiiere the British First Army is pushing northeastward from Medjez
El Bab : liere an advance of only a few kilometers will bring them into flat coun-
try much easier for tank operations. The Germans realize that danger; here
their counterattacks are most persistent and vigorous. Nevertheless the enemy
is fighting a losing fight. The Allied air forces and the British naval forces
are knocking off ships and planes on which the Axis must depend for supplies
and reinforcements, and this with the steady pressure on the front will even-
tually break the enemy down.
"The Pacific was quiet last week, but the Russians started an offensive on
the southern end of their front across the straits from the Crimea. When the
Germans retreated from the Caucasus they held on to some territory there which
they might use as a springboard for another drive against the Caucasus this
suinmer. It seems doubtful if they can ever again put on a general offensive
against Riissia, but they may have enough force this summer for regional at-
tacks, and the Caucasus with its oilfields is perhaps the most probable target.
The present Russian attack seems aimed at breaking down that springboard be-
fore anybody can .lump oft" from it.
"But while the German armies are finding it pretty tough going, the German
propaganda won a striking success last week when it succeeded in bringing about
a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the Polish government in
exile. The way the Germans did this is a good example of the doctrine Hitler
preached in Mein Kampf, that it is easier to make most people swallow a big
lie than a little one. When the Germans had beaten Poland in September 1939,
the Russians moved in and occupied eastern Poland, taking thousands of Polish
troops prisoners. In June 1941 when the Germans attacked Russia, they overran
all this territory and have held it since. Now, almost two years later they sud-
denly claim to have discovered near Smolensk the corpses of thousands of Polish
officers, who, according to the Germans, were murdered by the Russians three
years ago. In several respects this story looks very fishy. At first the Germans
were quite uncertain about the number of killed; at one time the Japanese and
the Vichy French came up with a story of Rumanians murdered in Odessa, not
Poles in Smolensk. First they said 10,000, then 2,000 and then 5,000, before
finally deciding on 12,000. Rome and Berlin disagreed as to how they had been
killed. The remains must have been better preserved than is usual after three
years. The Russians were said to have tried hard to conceal the graves, yet
they buried every man in uniform with his identification tag. Suggestions of an
investigation by the International Red Cross mean nothing, for the Germans
1988 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
control the aroa. It would be easy for them to show the investigators corpse
in uniform with identification tags. There is no way the investigators couN
determine whether these men were killed by Russians, or by Germans as the;
probably were. The Germans are l<nuwn to have slaughtered hundreds of thou
sands of Poles after the fighting was over. If they found a camp full of Polish
prisoners when they attacked Russia, it would have been the most natural thing
in the world for them to murder them, too, if not at the moment, then later when
they needed the corpses for propaganda.
"Remember that when the Germans invaded Poland they told the world that
they had found the graves of thousands of German civilians massacred by the
Poles. Few people believed that story ; it is all the more remarkable that any
Poles who remember it should believe this one, especially as its motives are so
obvious. The first motive is to distract the attention of the world from the mass
murders which the Germans have been steadily committing in Poland for three
and a half years — murders by now so numerous that they look like a deliberate
attempt to exterminate the Polish people. Another purpose would be to arouse
suspicion and distrust between Russia and the rest of the United Nations — which
would help the Germans in two ways. Directly, it might hamper the prosecu-
tion of the war we are all fighting against Germany. Indirectly, it might help
to prop up German morale at home. There is plenty of evidence among the
German civilian population — yes, even among the army — that there is less belief
that they can ever win a decisive victory over all their enemies. But German
propaganda has persuaded many Germans that any day now America and Britain
might call off the war, make a compromise peace and leave Germany free to turn
on Russia. And of course more people will believe that if there is trouble between
Russia and the other United Nations. Anything that creates division among the
United Nations concerns every one of those nations — the United States included —
because we must all hold together to win the war. After the war, if the United
Nations continue to hold together in some sort of collective security system, there
will be less danger that any of the great powers may feel it has to safeguard its
individual security at the expense of its weaker neighbors. That is the only way
this issue can be treated — as one phase of the problem of world security.
Exhibit 8A — State Department Memorandum Which Bore a Ruhijer Stamp
Mark Indicating It Had Been Delivered to Me. Beele on April 22, 1943
Department of State.
Division of European Affairs,
April 22, J9',J.
memoranduji
of FC, at the request of Mr. Berle, called to ask whether Eu
had any objection to Stockholm's airgram No. A-lSl, April 5, 4 p. m., being given
to OWI apparently for the purpose of using information contained therein
regarding German atrocities against Jews in Poland in a propaganda campaign
which OWI wishes to start in order to counteract the German propaganda story
regarding the alleged execution of some 10,000 Polish officers by the Soviet
authorities.
It is felt that because of the extremely delicate nature of the question of the
alleged execution of these Polish oflicers and on the basis of the various con-
flicting contentions ol" all parties concerned, it would appear to be advisable to
refrain from taking any definite stand in regard to this question.
Although it is realized that the story emanates from German sources and is
being used by the German propaganda machine in an effort to divide the members
of the United Nations, it should be borne in mind that whether the .story is true
or not, it is known that the I'ollsh (lovernment has, without success, for the past
year and a half been endeavoring to ascertain from the Soviet (Joveriunent the
whereabouts of some 8,000 Polish oflicers who on the best avnilal>le evidence were
captured by the Soviet forc(>s in ID.'^O. In this connection the Polish (Jovernmeut
in tlie summer of 1942 specifically asked that the American Ambassador to
Moscow intervene with the Soviet Government in an effort to cause tlie latter
to release the 8,000 Polish oflicers who were? purportedly still being lH>ld by the
Soviet authorities. According to Polish oflicials here the Soviet authorities have
never released one of the oflicers on the list presented by tlie Polish Government.
Furthermore, according to telegram No. 2471, April 20, 7 p. m., from Bern, it
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1989
apiJears that the International Red Cross has agreed to send a delegation to
Smolensk to investigate the German allegations.
It would appear, therefore, that until further and more conclusive evidence is
available it would be Inadvisable for OWI to take a definite stand in this regard.
If, on the other hand, it is felt that it is imperative to counteract the German
propaganda it is suggested that such action should be limited to a campaign
liointing out that the American Government and the American people refuse to
allow German propaganda stories regarding the alleged execution of the Polish
officers to detract their attention from the many and continuing crimes which
have been committed by the German authorities since the beginning of the war.
In this connection OWI could repeat the many authenticated stories such as that
of Lidice and might even quote, without giving the source or stating that the
information has been completely verified, pertinent information from the attached
telegram from Stockholm. It is not believed that the information in this tele-
gram should be attributed as coming from official sources since in the last para-
graph doubt is thrown on the accuracy of the information reported.
As of possible interest in this connection there is attached a copy of the Polish
National Council's statement which follows in some way the line suggested for
OWI.
(Committee Note. — A copy of the Polish National Council's statement referred
to in the last paragraph of exhibit 8A appears as exhibit 21 on p. 678 of pt. 4 of
this committee's published hearings.)
Mr. Mitchell. Mr, Davis, you have told us previously that on over-
all policy and on high-level policy matters, you discussed those with
Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles. I would like to ask you now whether you
ever discussed this matter specifically at this time with the Department
of State or any official therein?
Mr. Davis. I don't remember. I may say,. Mr. Counsel, that this
was not one of the major issues that I had to deal with at that time,
from my point of view. To a Pole it was certainly the most impor-
tant issue in the world, but to me, as to the head of every department
or agency of Government, about that time ol year the principal ques-
tion was how his budget was- going to get through Congress, and that
absorbed most of my time. So whether I asked advice on this question
from either INIr. Hull or Mr. Welles, I don't remember. I don't recall
seeing this memorandum from Mr. Berle, although it is conceivable
that I might have. I don't know.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you think the records of the broadcast are avail-
able today — who prepared it for you? You didn't prepare it?
Mr, Dwis, Of course — I wrote my own.
Mr. Mitchell, Then you wrote that broadcast ?
Mr, Davis, Yes.
Mr, Mitchell, 'WHiere did you get the information concerning the
Polish situation at that time?
Mr. Davis. Do you mean the information in here [indicating ex-
hibit 8] ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes,
Mr. Davis. There doesn't seem to be much about the Polish situation.
Mr. Mitchell. I mean the propaganda,
Mr, Davis, A good deal of it was printed in the newspapers at the
time. Some of it may even have been in my broadcasts, I imagine
that the correlation of different stories told by different Axis Powers
probably came from recorded broadcasts by the FBIS wliich came
through our Foreign News Bureau.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, since there was a question of doubt at that
particular time, and since the International Ked Cross was becoming
involved in this, and since it was after the Polish-Soviet relationship
1990 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
was severed, wliy did you see fit at that time to take the stand yon
took in this broadcast ?
Mr. DA^^s. Because I beh'eved it at that time to be correct. It w:is
a matter of news. For a period of about 3 months I did a weekly
broadcast on an over-all survey of the war situation, which I even-
tually dropped because I could never be quite sure who was broad-
casting. It was not the executive branch of the Government of the
United States. That— if that would have been the case, I would have
had to have Presidential approval for all I said. It wasn't me, be-
cause I felt that in justice to other broadcasters I should not use.
even for background interpretation, any confidential information that
came to me as a result of my Government service. Some of that
confidential information I probably could have picked up if I had
been a reporter, by going around, so it was not as good as Davis
would have been normally, and it was not as authoritative as repre-
sentations of the Government of the United States. So about the
end of 3 months, I dropped it, but I was doing it at this time. This
was a matter of news.
With regard to the suggestion of Mr. Berle, as I say, I don't remem-
ber whether I saw it or not, but this was an issue which a news organ-
ization could hardly overlook. One of our difficulties with the De-
partment of State Avas that there was only the question of: AVliere is
the boundary line between policy and implementation of that policy
by propaganda? They could tell us, unquestionably, the general
line, but when they attempted to tell us how we could handle it in
propaganda overseas, they Avere dealing with something which very
often they didn't know very much about. I do not think any news
organization could have overlooked this. If I had not happened to
be broadcasting once a week at that time, I would undoubtedly have
had nothing to say about this domestically, as it was outside of our
field. But we were handling it in our foreign propaganda — we
couldn't overlook it. I mean that is a case where silence would be
about the worst ]jossible propaganda you could make.
At the time I made this broadcast, the evidence rested almost en-
tirely on the word of Josef Goebbels. a man whose reputation for
veracity was extremely low.
Now, it appears, with all of the subsequent evidence, that has be-
come available, that this was the one time he was right; but I had
no reason to believe so at the time. I have never been able to accept
the argument that I should have believed the story of the Propaganda
Minister of a Government with which the Goverinnent of the I"^nited
States was at war, without some corroboration.
Mr. Mitchell. But the Polisli Government in exile had alrciidy re-
quested the International Red Cross to investigate?
Mr. Davis. Yes, they had requested that; but, as I remember,. the
Commission of Physicians that finally went in there — was that ap-
pointed by the International Red Cross? I don't remember.
Mr. MiTciiElL. No.
Mr. Davis. That Avas a Gei-man group ?
Mr. Mitchell. The International Red Cross was prevented from
going in there because of the fact thai the Soviets refused to partici-
pate. Conse(iuently, the (Germans formed an International Medical
Commission. But Poland Avas an ally at tliat time. Poland had re-
quested at that time an International Red Cross investigation. Re-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1991
latioiLsliiiDS AYere broken off between the Poles and the Soviets on
April ^6 1043 Yonr broadcast is dated May 2. So there mnst have
been son'ie donbt or question. Otherwise the Polish Governn^nt
wouldn't have gone to the extent of asking for an International iied
Cross investigation. ■, , x i ^ t ^ i^ ^i .
Mr D WIS. Oh, there may have been some doubt, but 1 telt that as
at that moment the doubt should be resolved against the Propaganda
Minister of the enemy.
I mav say that that broadcast earned me three columns of denunci-
ation from 'the Daily Worker and also three columns of denunciation
from the Polish paper, or at least I was told it was denunciation. I
couldn't read it. At that moment both the Polish newspaper and the
Daily Worker knew of what I had said.
Ml'. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. INIr. Machrowicz?
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Davis, how long did you remain with the
Office of War Information ? When did you sever your relationship
with the Office of War Information ?
Mr. Davis. September 15, 1945.
Mr. Machrowicz. During the time that you were m the Office of
War Information, had you ever known of the reports of Colonel Van
Vliet and Colonel Stewart ?
Mr. Davis. Never, sir. As far as I can recall now, I never heard ol
those reports until they came out in the investigations of this com-
mittee.
Mr. Machrowicz. Those reports, which indicated Russian guilty
were never made known to you ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, how large a staff did you have in the Office
of War Information ?
Mr. Davis. Well, at the peak we had about 9,000 here and abroad,
5,000 Americans, and about 4,000 of what we called locals, chauffeurs
and interpreters, and things like that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did 3^011 have a so-called Polish Section ?
Mr. Davis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. How were these people selected?
]\Ir. Davis. A good many of them were there when I came. They
had come from the predecessor organization, the Coordinator of In-
formation. I don't remember who selected the man who was the head
of our Polish desk in Washington, Mr. Ludwig Krzyzanowski, but he
was a very sound man.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know the late Congressman John
Lesinski ?
Mr. Davis. I have had some correspondence with ]Mr. Lesinski.
Mr. Machrowicz, Was it at the time you were in the Office of War
Information?
Mr. Davis. No ; just recently — I mean 2 or 3 years ago.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you have a recollection that Congressman
John Lesinski, the late Congressman — I mean the senior Mr. Lesinski —
having warned you about the fact that there were several Commu-
nists in the Office of War Information?
Mr. Davis. I don't recall that. I recall that he made a speech in
the summer of 1943 which contained more lies than were ever com-
prised in any other speech made about the Office of War Information,
1992 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
and that is saying quite a lot. I may say that I have made that state-
ment to Mr. Lesinski before he died. I mean that I have not waited
until after he is dead. I told him so in writing when he repeated
some of those statements 2 or 3 years ago. I asked him where he got
the information, because that was a perfectly absurd speech to be
made by a Member of the Congress of the United States who knows
anything about American politics or the American news business.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, let me ask you w^hether you received any
warnings from the then Polish Ambassador to the United States,
iVmbassaclor Ciechanowski, warning you about the fact that there
were some Communist employees in the OWI ?
Mr. Davis. I received a great number of allegations from Mr.
Ciechanowski. I can't remember all of them now, but they were in-
vestigated, and, as I recall, there was no convincing evidence to
support them.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know Irene Belinska, who was in the
Polish Section?
]\Ir. Davis. I don't remember here.
Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, she was at that time one
of the members of the Polish Section in your office.
Mr. Davis. Was she here or in New York ?
Mr. INIaciirowicz. In Washington. She is the daughter of Ludwig
Rajchman, who was the first consul of the Polish Communist Em-
bassy in Washington in 1945. Rajchman engineered the surrender
of the Polish Government in exile's files to to the Polish Communist
Government in Washington. In 194:7, this same Miss Balinska re-
turned to Poland — she was then employed by the Office of War
Information — returned to Communist Poland and then came back to
the United States and is now with a Polish Communist publishing
house which publishes an anti-American newspaper. Did vou know
that?
Mr. Davis. She could not have been employed by the Office of War
Information in 1947, because we had folded up.
Mr. ]VL\ciirowicz. No, not in 1947. It was prior to that time.
Mr. Davis. I don't remember.
Mr. MachSowicz. You don't remember having been warned by
Ambassador Ciechanowski or by anyone else about the fact that she
w^as in your employ and that she was a Communist?
Mr. Davis. I don't remember. It may have happened. I don't
know ; it is a long time ago.
]Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know a Mira Zlotowski, who was in your
employ in 1945 ?
Mr. Davis. I don't recall. Mr. Krzyzanowski was the only man I
ever had much dealing with, as I say, as the head of our Polish desk
in Washington.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know Mrs. Zlotowski, the wife of Prof.
Ignatius Zlotowski, the coiniselor of the Polish Conununist Embassy
in Washington, who was denounced as a Communist by General Mo-
delski of the Polish Embassy, who had resigned? He testified before
the House Un-American Activities Connnittee that Mrs. Zlotowski
was a Communist agent.
Mr. Davis. I have no doubt of that.
IVIr. Machrowicz. You don't remember her being employed by the
Office of War Information?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1993
■' Mr. Davis. She may well have been. I don't remember. As I say,
the only man I dealt with Avas Mr. Krzyzanowski, who after he left us,
went to the United Nations. For 3 or 4 years the Polish Communist
Government tried to get him out of his job at the United Nations
because he was working for us. I don't know whether he is still
employed there.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you know a Stefan Arski, alias Arthur
Salman ?
Mr. Davis. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. For your information, he was also employed by
the Office of War Information in 1945. He is now in Warsaw, Poland,
and is editor in chief of the Communist paper Robotnik, which means
The Worker, tlie most outspoken anti-American organ in Warsaw. He
at that time was also an employee of the Office of War Information.
You have no recollection of him ?
Mr. Davis. No.
Mr. Machrowicz. You have no recollection of either Ambassador
Ciechanowski or Congressman Lesinski warning you about the fact
that these three persons were known Communists, and were in the
employ of the Office of War Information ?
Mr. Davis. I don't remember that Mr. Lesinski ever warned me
about anything, Mr. Cieclianowski, perhaps by his excessive number
of warnings, made me forget which particular ones he especially
spoke about.
Mr. Machrowicz. Would it refresh your recollection if I told you
that you told Ambassador Ciechanowski to keep away from that
matter ?
Mr. Davis. I don't know, but I do know that I was often tempted
to tell various of the representatives of the governments in exile to
stay out of our business, because almost eveiy one of them seemed to
think that it was our duty to carry out the policies of his government
and not those of the United States. There were only two exceptions
to that that I can remember, of the governments in exile, the Czechs,
that is, the good Czechs, Benes, and Masaryk and the Filipino Govern-
ment.
I will anticipate your next question. Mr. Hof meister, who was head
of our Czechoslovak desk in New York, after the Communists seized
power, became a Communist and is now, I believe, the Czechoslovak
Ambassador in Paris. But he showed no signs of that inclination
while he was with us that I ever heard of.
Mr; Machrowicz. You took that attitude, even though they had
warned you of the presence of Communist agents in the Office of War
Information ?
Mr. Davis. If I had taken seriously all of the stories about agents of
the Communists in the Office of War Information I would have had
nothing else to do but to fire the whole staff. We investigated every-
thing as much as we could, and we found that 99 percent of the allega-
tions were without foundation. I remember that at one time I re-
ceived a very serious warning in the summer of 1944 about some of our
people in Hollj^wood who were associating with a dangerous and sub-
versive character who at that time happened to be the chairman of the
Dewey comniittee in Hollywood, and who had also written the most
effective anti-Communist picture that was ever put on the screen.
1994 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr, Machrowicz. Do you have any doubt about the fact that these
three persons whom I have mentioned were actually Communists ?
Mr. Davis. I have no doubt that they are now. They may be band-
wagon Communists, like a lot of others who wanted to be on the
winning side.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think that in commenting on the testimony
taken before the House committee in 1943, you referred to the fact
that Mr. Cranston was only expressing his hope as to what these com-
mentators would say ; is that correct ?
Mr. Davis. Well, that was the way it sounded to me. Counsel for
the committee phrased it a little differently, but it seemed to me that
the testimony of one of the witnesses will indicate that it was as you
say.
Mr. Machrowicz. I will refer you to this question and answer :
Mr. Gaket. And they wanted to know what you could do about getting the
program content on those Detroit stations to conform to their views of what
should be put over the air in the United States about the Russian situation?
That is the sum and substance of what Cranston was trying to get you to do?
Mr. Lang. I don't know tliat it was expressed that way. That was the
thought.
Would you say that Mr. Cranston was right in trying to get any sta-
tion in Detroit — or any other station — to conform to the views on
Avhat should be put over the air?
Mr. Davis. No. What should be broadcast over the air in the
United States about the Russian situation?
Mr, Machrowicz. Yes.
Mr. Davis. No; that would be quite beyond our authority or quite
beyond my desires. But if you Avill look back a little further, you will
find that one of these gentlemen testified rather to the opposite.
Mr. Machrowicz. I am just referring to this particular question :
You would say that if he acted in the manner that has been described
here, he acted improperly ?
Mr. Davis. I think he acted improperly in that case, j'es — if he so
did.
Mr, Machrowicz. Did you at any time after your original broad-
cast in May 1943, broadcast any information indicating the receipt
of information showing Russian guilt ?
Mr. Davis. I don't remember.
Mr. Machrowicz. What information did you liave otlier than wliut
you have already said, upon which to base your belief as to tlie truth
of the contents of tliat statement of May 3, 1943 ?
Mr. Davis. Just what I have here, the conflicting stories told by the
various Axis Nations, and the general uiuvliability of Joseph Goeb-
bels.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, is it still your opinion, as expressed in that
bi'oadcast, that the request by the Polish Government for an impartial
Red Cross investigation was a maneuver, brought about by German
propaganda?
Mr. Davis. No. I except to that to the extent that the German
])i'()pagaiida, bringing in the whole story, touched off the chain re-
action. I am certainly not implying that the Polish Government was
responsive to German })ro])aganda ; but it was a very smart thing by
Joseph Goebbels, which brought an obvious reaction.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1995
Mr. Machrowicz. As I remember your broadcast, you indicated
that you thouofht tlie request of the Polish Government for an im-
partial investigation was a smart maneuver by the German propa-
ganda.
Mr. Davis. Well now, wait a minute. Let me see this. It says :
* * * German propoganda won a strikinj: success last week when it suc-
ceeded in bringing about a break in diplomatic relations between Russia and the
Polish Government in exile.
I don't think that that implies that the Polish Government was
responsive to German propaganda, as such; that the story that was
broken by German propaganda, which had not been broken before
then, was responsible for this, and that the refusal of the Kussians
to consider the International Red Cross investigation was responsible
for the breaking off of relations.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you don't believe — do you? — that the re-
quest by the Polish Government for an impartial investigation was
at all caused by German propaganda?
Mr. Davis. Oh, certainly not.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero ?
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Davis, there lias been handed to me, since I came
into the committee room at noon, a pamphlet which contains this state-
ment [reading] :
One of the greatest OWI scandals broke when Frederick Woltman published
his article entitled "A. F. of L. and CIO Charge OWI Radio as Conununistic."
Woltman's article appears in the New York World-Telegram of October 4, 1943.
It showed that the A. F. of L. as well as the CIO, the two great American labor
organizations, which nobody but the Comuuinists ever accused of being reaction-
ary, withdrew their cooperation from the OWI's labor desk because of the latter's
outspoken Communist attitude.
Do you want to comment on that ?
Mr. Davis, That is correct. We removed the man at the head of
the desk.
Mr. Dondero. Who was that man?
Mr. Davis. I have forgotten his name now, but I remember that it
happened.
May I ask what the pamphlet is, sir?
Mr. Dondero. Yes ; it is a ])ami)hlet entitled "The OWI and Voice
of America," by Julius Epstein.
Mr. Davis. That statement is correct, and we did remove the man.
We had to fire a few people now and then.
Mr. Dondero. How many, Mr. Davis, did you have to fire because
of their communistic attitude ?
Mr. DA\^s. I think it was about a dozen. We fired the head of
the Greek desk in Xew York because he violated a directive sent from
Washington about the liandling of the news of Greece. I have for-
gotten his name, but it happened. There were a few others here
and there.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Davis, can you tell us how vou were selected for
the OWI job?
Mr. Davis. Well, I was selected by the President. I don't know
how he came to the conclusion. New Yorker magazine was my
1996 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
original sponsor. I wrote to the editor afterward and told him that
he seemed to be the man who did it. He said that he was "delighted,"
because that was the second public-service campaign he had ever
conducted, both successful. The first one was to get the information
booth in the Pennsylvania Station moved to the middle of the con-
course. He seemed to think that these two achievements were of about
equal importance.
Mr. Sheehan. You stated in the beginning that you reported only
to the President?
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. Therefore, the President must have given you some
directives, or some ideas of what he wanted you to do, or what job
he wanted you to accomplish. Can you relate that ?
Mr. Davis. Well, Mr. Roosevelt was a pretty busy man. I didn't
bother him any more than I had to. I think it is fair to say that he
was not very much interested in propaganda, so that I didn't get very
many directives from him about specific matters.
Mr. Sheehan. What do you mean by "not verj- much interested in
propaganda"?
Mr. Davis. I don't think that he regarded it as of any major im-
portance. For example, I don't think that he attached anything like
the weight to it that President Wilson did.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, you just had a cursory talk with
him. The President didn't lay down any specific principles ?
Let's be specific. Did he say at any time the way in which you
should treat Russia or any of our otlier allies?
Mr. Davis. No ; not other than to
Mr. Sheehan. Then the whole policy of OWI was entirely within
your lap ?
Mr. Davis. We had to check with the State Department, as I say,
on specific issues; but, very often, we found that the Government
had no policy. When I say "very often" that is a little exaggeration,
but there were certain cases in which we found that the Government
had not decided on policy. We had to keep on presenting news to
and about certain countries, and there we just had to "roll our own."
Mr. Sheehan. The State Department, then, did not lay down any
policy for you at any time ?
Mr. Davis. Oh, yes; they did on various points, quite a lot of them.
Mr. Sheehan. To be specific, did they lay down any policy or ask
you to follow any particular line with reference to the treatment of
Russian news?
JNIr. Davis. No.
Mr. Sheehan. German news?
Mr. Davis. Well, naturally, we regarded German news with con-
siderable suspicion. We were at war with Germany, and what came
out of Germany was Avhat was permitted by Joe Goebbels. We didn't
have very much confidence in him as a news source.
Mr. Sheehan. I would like to get back to this talk about F. D. R.
It seems inconceivable to he that Mr. Roosevelt would have called
you in and would have said "Hero, Mr. Davis; you take over the OWI.
It is yours," with no specific instructions, or anything. It seems to
me that Mr. Roosevelt was a strong-enough-willed man that, if he
believed he did not Mant your pro[)agun(la, he would have put the
OWI out of existence.
THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE 1997
Mr. Davis. The propaganda agency had been in existence before
that. The problem when OWI was "formed was to unify the four
Government agencies that were then in existence. That was the prin-
cipal thing that I was concerned with.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you agree with Mr. Roosevelt that propaganda
wasn't worth much?
Mr. Davis. No; though I think that its value often has been over-
rated. Propaganda never won a war by itself. It can be an extremely
useful auxiliary to military operations, but it never w^on a war single-
handedly.
Mr. Sheehan. On the basis of your experience in OWI — and you
have probably followed its course since you left it — do you think that,
as a whole generally, they have done a worthwhile job ?
Mr. Davis. Whom do you mean ?
Mr. Sheehan. The propaganda agencies, the OWI and the Voice
of America ?
Mr. Davis. I do.
Mr. Sheehan. You think it has been effective with the people over-
seas ?
Mr. Davis. It has been about as effective as it could be.
Mr. Sheehan. That may be nothing.
Mr. Davis. Well, it is more effective than that. It has been very
valuable at times.
Mr. Sheehan. Do you think, in your own opinion, that we are
getting our money's worth for the large amount of money we are put-
ting into this propaganda ?
Mr. Davis. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Then, if you were a taxpayer, you would want to
continue the Voice of America ?
Mr. Davis. I am a taxpayer, Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Do you think it should be continued?
Mr. Davis. It should be continued. It may be, as some have said,
that a psychological-warfare program will crack the Communist front
in Korea. I very much doubt that. It will help, but it won't do it by
itself, in my opinion. However, it will help.
Mr. Sheehan. Now, this Congress — and I myself, having been
fortunate enough to be reelected — will have to face the fact that we are
voting some appropriations for the Voice of America. From what I
have seen and heard — and I am giving you my own personal opinion —
I am not too confident. I mean that it is big in size and it is a large
amount of money that is being spent. Someday we should have some-
one, an expert like yourself, resolve in our own minds that maybe
propaganda is in itself valuable. That I would not question. i3ut
whether we should have 9,000 employees and spend billions of dollars
are points that a man with your experience should be able to tell us
about, more or less "off the cuff."
Mr. Davis. I don't think there is any proposal — any informed pro-
■posal — to spend billions of dollars. Two or three amateurs have sug-
gested that we need billion-dollar programs. I do not think it is
worth an investment of billions, by any means, but I do think that it
is worth the investment of the money that is going into it now.
Remember that expenses are considerably higher than they were a
few years ago when I was operating. The Voice of America at present
93744— 52— pt. 7 12
1998 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
gets more money than the OWI ever had, but that is largely due to
the increase in costs.
Mr. SiiEEHAN. I don't have the facts, and that is why I am asking
you these questions.
Mr. Davis. I remember those statements, Mr. Sheehan, by outsiders ;
that is, about how we ought to pour billions of dollars into a great
campaign of truth. I do not believe you would get value received for
billions, but I do believe that, for the kind of money that is going into
it now, you do.
Mr. Shp:eiiax. For instance, one of the criticisms — and it will bear
investigation, because as it stands in my mind I do not have the exact
facts — is, for instance, that in the radio end of the Voice of America
at the present time there are more employees than the combined net-
works in America. It seems to me that the combined networks in
America are doing a wonderful job of news saturation and dissemi-
nation.
Mr. Davis. The combined networks operate in one language. The
Voice of America overseas probably operates in 40. That is one
difference right there.
They have to have relay stations abroad to pick up their short-wave
stuff and transmit it to medium waves, so that it can reach the audi-
ences. So, it is a far more expensive operation.
Mr. Sheehan. That is all I have.
Mr. DoNDERO. I have one more question.
Chairman Madden. ATr. Dondero.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Davis, how many people are employed by the
OWI — that has gone out of business — the Voice of America, today?
Mr. Davis. I don't know how many they have today. As I say, at
our peak, we had about 9,000 here and overseas. But that was when
we had some 30 oversea stations, and there were some 4,000 of those
who were local people, j^orters, chauffeurs, translators, and things
like that.
Mr. Dondero. Our investment in the Voice of America is about
$85,000,000 annually now. Do you understand that to be about
correct ?
Mr. Davis. Yes, sir; but, as I say, the costs have vastly gone up.
Then there are also certain things such as, for instance, wlien Luxem-
burg was liberated, our psychological warfare was partly OWI and
partly British. They liad the great advantage of Kadio Luxemburg.
But now Kadio Luxemburg lias been given back to Luxemburg, and
our people have had to build their own relay stations.
Chairman Madden. As a conunent, T might say this: I think that
the Voice of America and any medium to send truth behind the iron
curtain is a good investment. But, referring to some of the ridiculous
ideas of even some Members of our Congress on expenditures for
propaganda and truth, it has been revealed by the people over in
Euroi)e that our committee, through our testimony over there, put
the liussian proj)aganda nuichine on the defensive. Our conunittee'
will not cost the Amei-ican taxi)ayers ovei' $S0,000. Yet, when the
resolution was up on the iloor ol" (he House to i)erniit our conunittee
to go overseas, tliere were U)(i Members who voted against the reso-
lution. A great number of them thought the exi)enditure involved
was too nnich. We only won jjermission to go overseas by nine votes.
When you consider the millions of dollars that have been spent by
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 1999
Congress for propaganda, I do not think the opinions of some Mem-
bers of Congress are of very much value when you consider that our
resohition won by only nine votes.
Mr. Davis. If I might just offer a sort of supplementary paragraph
to that, propaganda has to have something to work on. The most
powerful propaganda is the truth; and the facts about this Katyn
business which your committee has brought to light will undoubtedly
be of enormous value to the Voice of America from now on.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Davis, were you warned through several dif-
ferent sources that you had Connnunists in the Office of War Infor-
mation ? One statement that you made was that in Mr. Lesinski's
warning, for example, there were more lies in that article than you
ever saw before.
Mr. Davis. That is correct.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Is it your contention that there were no Commu-
nists in the OWI ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir. But the statements made by Mr. Lesinski were
itlmost all demonstrably false. As I say, we found about a dozen, and
Ave fired them.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you recall a Mr. Peter Lyons?
Mr. Davis. I know the name.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Do you recall a Mr. Barnes?
Mr. Davis. Joe Barnes — certainly.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. AVhat was your estimate of Mr. Barnes?
Mr. Davis. I thought he was a very able man, but he was too much
addicted to what we called in the war "localitis." He was head of the
New York office, and it was eventually found desirable to remove him
because he didn't seem to be quite sufficiently in sympathy with the
policies laid down in Washington. But I never had the slightest
question about his loyalty.
Mr. O KoNSKi. I am quoting now from the labor report that we
had reference to. It says here [ reading] :
It developed that the labor broadcasting desk under Mr. Barnes, through the
OWI, had broadcast to Europe songs of the Almanac Sailors, who are virtually
the official songsters of the American Communist Party.
In other words, for a while there we actually had Communist songs
going out over the OWI.
Mr. Davis. I don't know about that, Mr. O'Konski. I would hesi-
tate to believe it without corroboration, because so many lies were told
about us. As I say, I didn't know anything about it, and I doubt
whether Joe Barnes knew anything about it. It is conceivably true,
but we did remove the head man.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. Did you know that the Ahnanac Sailors were
broadly proclaiming their anti-American attitude with such tuneful
songs as "Plow under every fourth American boy" ?
Mr. Davis. I can't remember that I ever heard of those singers
having their songs go out over the OWI.
Mr. O'Konski. In other words, you do admit, though, that the Office
of War Information did have Connnunist sympathizers?
Mr. Davis. Yes; we had a few, and we fired them when we caught
them.
2000 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Was the initiative in firing them started by your
organization or was it always by some outside pressure, such as the
CIO and the A. F. of L.?
Mr. Davis. It was almost always started by our organization. We
had our own security service, and when they found evidence against
somebody we threw them out.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is all.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Machrowicz. And you never heard, Mr. Davis, of any of these
people whom I mentioned ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir ; evidently not, because they didn't find evidence
sufficient to justify firing them at that time. As you say, no doubt
they are Communists now, but that was not necessarily true then. I
admit that we missed one or two.
Mr. Machrowicz. You caught 10, but you do not know how many
you missed ?
Mr. Davis. Well, as I say, I admit that we missed one or two. They
have since shown themselves to have become Communists. They are
not the ones that you mentioned. I prefer not to mention their names,
although I would be glad to give them to the committee in private.
We missed them only because they didn't show any evidence of
communistic activities at that time, but have shown them since. I
don't think there were very many.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Subsequently, since your connection with the OWI
and the unearthing of all of this evidence, conclusive as it was, and as
you now observe conditions, do you think that if you had to do it
over again you would have handled, say, for instance, the Katyn
story, in the OWI, as you did, knowing what you know now ?
Mr. Davis. Oh, no. You mean in the broadcast? No; certainly
not.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Would you have handled that broadcast in the
same way had you known the facts ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir. These reports, which seem to me convincing,
as far as I know, were never heard of by me until they appeared in
the hearings of this committee this spring.
Chairman Madden. Have you finished?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis, you have already told the committee
that the function of Alan Cranston was outside the scope of his
specific duties when he attended this meeting in New York and tried
to get them to conform ?
Mr. Davis. Well, if he did as you say. I think that if you will
read that you will find some conflict in the testimony about that.
Mr. MncHELL. All right.
I would like to place in the record now from the same set of hear-
ings— and I will ask Mr. Pucinski to read it — testimony concerning a
man by the name of Lee Falk. Do you know Mr. Falk ?
Mr. Davis. Well, I remember the name. I don't remember what
he did.
Mr. Mitchell. In OWI ?
Mr. Davis. I remember him as somebody in OWI; yps.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you proceed to read that, please, Mr. Pucinski?
Mr. Pucinski. I am reading from page 494 of the same testimony
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2001
as exhibit 2. This is from volume 991 of the House committee hear-
ings. This is testimony sworn to by Mr. Robert K. Richards.
Chairman Madden. Testimony before what committee?
Mr. PuciNSKi. The House committee investigating the Federal
Communications Cormnission, headed by Congressman Cox. This is
testimony sworn to by Mr. Robert K. Richards, Assistant to the Di-
rector of the Office of Censorship. Mr. Richards is rehiting a mem-
orandum that he had written immediately after a conference he had
with Sidney Spear, an attorney for the Federal Communications
Commission, at 2 p. m. August 25, 1942. I am just going to read the
part of Mr. Richards' memorandum which he prepared following
that meeting with Spear.
Mr. Spear is talking about a meeting that he had with Lee Falk.
I am quoting :
He related his experiences with Mr. Lee Falk of the Foreign-Language
Section, Radio Division, Office of War Information. He said that Mr. Falk
originally had taken on the job of removing unsavory personnel from foreign-
language stations, because he, Mr. Falk, believed such a job had to be done,
and no one else seemed to want to do it.
Mr. Spear told me the following : "We worked it this way. If Lee, meaning
Lee Falk, found a fellow he thought was doing some funny business, he told me
about it. Then he waited until the station applied for renewal of license. Say
the station was WBNX and the broadcaster in question was Leopold Hurdski."
there is a note here that Hurdski is a fictitious name being used just
for the purpose of illustration. I am continuing quoting :
Well, when WBNX applied for renewal, we would tip off Lee, and he would
drop in on Mr. Alcorn, the station manager. He would say "Mr. Alcorn, I
believe you ought to fire Leopold Hurdski." Then he would give Mr. Alcorn
some time to think this over. After a couple of weeks, Mr. Alcorn would begin
to notice he was having some trouble getting his license renewed. After a
couple of more weeks of this same thing, he would begin to put two and two
together and get four. Then he would fire Leopold Hurdski, and very shortly
after that his license would be renewed by the Commission. This was a little
extralegal, I admit, and I had to wrestle with my conscience about it, but it
seemed the only way to eliminate this kind of person, so I did it. AVe can
cooperate in the same way with you — meaning with the Office of War Censorship.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis, would you say that the function of Lee
Falk, as described therein, that is, in the congressional committee in-
vestigation, was within the scope of his duties at OWI ?
Mr. Davis. No, sir. If that is a correct report of what he did, I
would say that he exceed his proper field.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Mr. Davis, your handling of the Katyn story was
in conformity with the United States military and foreign policy at
that time, was it not ?
Mr. Davis. Well, I don't know that the military policy came into
it at all. This memorandum from Mr. Berle would suggest that they
wanted nothing said about it. As I say, for a news organization, it
was impossible to say nothing about it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. If it had not been in conformity with the over-all
policy at that time, you would have heard from him, would you not
have?
Mr. Daa^s. Well, I should imagine so. As I say, I heard about
it only from the Polish paper and the Daily Worker, neither of which
liked it.
2002 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKT. Tlie reason I mentioned that is because all of this
evidence started to pile up in the various divisions of our Govern-
ment. They were not correlated. There was a liush-hush policy on
the Katyn massacre all the way throufrh, so that at that time, even
if you liad tried to get the truth about the Katyn massacre, you
woidd have been unable to do so.
Mr. Davis, I certainly wouldn't have been able to get the critical
documents, the reports of Colonel Van Vliet and of these other people
because, as I understand, they were only available after the Oerman
collapse in 1945.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In our investigation, Ave found out that there was
no correlation between the various departments. It seems certain
that there were never any documents or any bit of evidence pinning
the crime on the Germans. It was just not available for anyone to
see. So you couldn't have spoken truthfully. The propaganda in
your broadcast were based very largely on the suspicion of Goebbels.
Did you ever have any suspicion about Stalin ?
But as you observe this whole picture now, don't you think — and
you do not have to comment on this if you do not want to — that the
over-all policy in handling the Katyn affair by all of the brandies of
the United States Government who were concerned, was very badly
handled?
Mr. Davis. I don't think they had much evidence until May or
June of 1945, and the Van Vliet report. Wliat happened after that
I wouldn't know, because at that time we were principally concerned
with the Japanese war. Then I went out of office on the 15th of Sep-
tember of 1945.
Mr. SiiEEiiAx. May I sa^^ that in the belief of our committee, the
Voice of America followed the policy of hiding the Katyn affair until
pretty nearly 1950, although the documents were there.
We understand that there was not much use made of them in the
Voice of America.
Mr. Davis, The OWI could not have concealed that after Septem-
ber 1945 because after that we did not exist.
Mr. Sheeiian. I said the Voice of America.
Mr. Davis. Whether any division of our office ever got the Van Vliet
report, I don't know. I very much doubt it. I do so, because, if some-
body had gotten it, I would have been told.
Chairman Madden, Are there any other questions?
Mr. Davis, we are grateful to you for coming up here today,
Mr. Davis, Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Madden, The next witnesses will be Joseph Lang and
Arthur Simon,
We will hear Mr, Joseph Lang first. Will you come forward, Mr.
Lang, please?
I will ask the photographers to take their pictures now, in conform-
ance with the rules.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH LANG, JENKINTOWN, PA.
Chairman Madden, Mr. Lang, do you solemnly swear that the testi-
mony you are about to give the committee will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Lang. I do.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2003
Chairman Madden. Mr. Lang, will you state your name and address^
please, for the reporter?
Mr. Lang. Joseph Lanrr, Jenkintown, Pa.
Chairman Madden, Mr. Lang, what is your business?
Mr. Lang. I am in the broadcasting business.
Chairman Madden. ^Vliere are you employed now? For whom?
What company?
Mr. Lang. I am vice president of radio station WIBG in Philadel-
phia.
Chairman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Lang, where were you employed in May 1943 ?
Mr. Lang. I was vice president and general manager of radio sta-
tion WHOM, New York City.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you present this afternoon when the testimony
was read into the record from the congressional investigation of 1943 ?
Have you read it?
Mr. Lang. I have read it.
Mr. Mitchell. Then you are familiar with that statement?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. IMiTCHELL. Do you now state before this committee that the
statements contained therein are true ?
Mr. Lang. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. That Mr. James F. Hopkins was contacted in
Detroit?
Mr. Lang. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. That Mr, Alan Cranston and Mrs, Hilda Shea visited
your office?
]Mr. Lang. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. xVnd that present at that meeting was Mr. Simon?
Mr, Lang. Yes ; that is true.
Mr. Mitchell, And that no member of the Office of Censorship was
present ?
Mr, Lang, They were not.
]Mr. Mitchell. And that the substance contained therein, that is,
what you have read from the congressional hearing — and since you
were the witness, you should certainly know what you said — is defi-
nitely true ?
Mr. Lang. That is correct,
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any questions?
Mr. OTvonski?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Tn this conversation that you had, Mr. Lang, did
any conversation develop along these lines — that these foreign-lan-
guage stations are on a temporary license, and that if they didn't con-
form, somehow it would be made known to them through the Federal
Communications Commission that the renewal of their license might
be endangered? Did any conversation or hints ever develop when
you were meeting with these people about getting these foreign-lan-
guage stations to conform with OWI policy ?
Mr. Lang. I would say actual conversations took place encompas-
sing words like those. But we all knew in the foreign-language field,
since there were so many people suspect of different leanings, whether
they were Fascists, Fascist leanings or Communist leanings, that we
2004 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
were held on the string, you might say, until a lot of these things could
be cleared up.
As far as hints go, I wouldn't say there were hints ; but it was gen-
erally known and discussed among station owners, or station man-
agers, that that was the situation.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now, you are in the radio business as I am. Sup-
pose you owned a foreign-language station and somebody hinted to
you that as long as you had John Jones as an announcer or as a news-
caster on your radio station you might run into a little difficulty in
getting your license renewed. As a radio-station operator, how long
would it take you until you would fire that announcer or newscaster ?
Mr. Lang. Well, frankly, Mr. O'Konski, there isn't any such thing
as a foreign-language station. These are American stations broad-
casting in foreign languages.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is right. I will correct the record.
Mr. Lang. I could not be intimidated by any such talk or threat.
I have been in the broadcasting business since 1928. I have attended
a great many hearings before the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. In my estimation, the owner or the licensee of a radio station
is the sole person responsible for that license, and it is up to him
to use his own best judgment as to whether the person should be fired
or not. I know that when it came to a final analysis, no governmental
agency could take a license away from a station because, in their judg-
ment, they saw fit to keep a person on who might be inimical to the
country's interests or the country's security. If he was, that would
be a case for the FBI, and that is the way I judge matters like that.
Mr. O'Konski. That was true in your case. But take some of these
stations that are barely hanging on economically, having a hard time
making ends meet. If it was generally hinted to them almost by any-
body, that they would run into difficulty in getting their license re-
newed as long as they had this person commenting on the news, what
do you think most of those owners would do? Would they run the
risk of antagonizing the Government agency or would they call in the
commentator and say "I am sorry, but my business is in jeopardy, and
I cannot take the chance. I will have to dismiss you."
Mr. Lang. I don't know whether I can answer that. In other
words, I would be just venturing an opinion, when you ask me what I
think the}^ would do.
Mr. O'Konski. Yes ; I understand.
Mr. Lang. The only thing I can really state definitely is what I
would do.
Mr. O'Konski. That is right.
Mr. Lang. I suppose they would be very much tempted to take the
easiest wav out, and to let the person go, if they felt that their license
was in jeopardy.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Mr. Machkowicz. INIr. Lang, as the result of the conference you
had with Mr. ('ranston, did you contact Mr. Hopkins, Mr. James F.
Hopkins, of Station WJBK, in Detroit?
Mr. Lang. Yes; I did.
Mr. Macjiuowicz. Wliy did you contact him?
Mr. Lang. Because Mr. Cranston and IVIrs. Shea called me from
Washington to arrange this meeting, saying that they would like to
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2005
iret tlie foreign language, or rather, the Polish situation straightened
(lilt in Detroit, and asking me whether I could help.
Mr. Machrowicz. "What did they tell you about the so-called foreign
language situation in Detroit?
Mr. Lang. That the Polish commentators were — I don't remember
the exact language — but they used the colloquial expression — "going
haywire" and making comments on a great many subjects that they
felt were not in line with what our general thinking should be.
Mr. Maciirowtcz. Did they specificall}' refer to the Katyn
massacre ?
Mr. Lang. The two subjects mentioned were the Katyn massacre
and — yes, they did refer to that.
Mr. Maohrow^icz. So that Mr. Cranston objected to the commen-
tator on Station WJBK making comments indicating Russian guilt
for the massacre ; is that correct ?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. And he wanted you to put a stop to that?
Mr. Lang. Well, he couldn't ask me to put a stop to it, because I had
no authority. I was chairman of the foreign language committee of
the National Association of Broadcasters and we had no power, as an
industry committee, a voluntary industry committee, we had no power
to discipline anyone. We simply tried to have our programs in the
national interest. Mr. Cranston asked me what my ideas were on it,
and I said that I would apply the same procedures and rules that I
had used there, and had used for a good many years, that is, that I
would only permit to be broadcast in these foreign languages at a
critical time, the dispatches we got oif the services that we subscribed
to. At that time they were the Associated Press and the International
News Service.
The reason for that was that I felt that they were checked at the
source. We received them by teletype in our station. Frankly, there
was more reliability to those reports, more reliability than we could
ascertain by checking ourselves, for which we had no facilities.
On the other hand, if we permitted people to comment on matters,
they were giving their own versions, their own reports, and I didn't
know where those ideas were coming from.
Mr. Machrowicz. In other words, what Mr. Cranston wanted you
to do was to use your good efforts to try to convince Station WJBK
in Detroit not to permit these comments, which would indicate Russian
guilt?
Mr. Lang. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And wasn't that a form of censorship ?
Mr. Lang. Yes ; I would suppose you could call it that.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was that not contrary to the spirit of the Federal
Communications Act ?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you did call Mr. Hopkins ?
Mr. Lang. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. Wliat did you tell Mr. Hoplrins ?
Mr. Lang. I told him that I thought — I didn't suggest any way to
run his station. I told him what I was doing, and thati thought that
would be a course to pursue which would satisfy the public in getting
proper news without having it slanted; thatI had used that method,
and that I felt it very satisfactory.
2006 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Wliat did Mr. Hopkins tell you ?
Mr. Lang. As I recollect — I do not remember his exact words — he
said that he would think it over, and, naturally, make his own de-
cision, as he was the owner of that station.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all.
Let me ask this. Mrs. Shea was definitely not representing the poli-
cies of the Federal Communications Commission. What she did, she
did on her own ?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Chairman Madden. Are there any further questions ?
You may proceed, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. MiTCHEix,. Mr. Lang, in an interview conducted by the commits
tee staff in September of this year with Mrs. Shea, the following ques-
tion was asked :
Unless Mr. Lang is not telling the truth or unless he is confused, or unless the
regulation is not corrected, it would appear that you were really not exploring.
You had your mind pretty well made up. From what he said earlier, you were
concerned about the boundaries, the question of boundaries between Poland and
Russia ?
to that Mrs. Shea replied :
I would like to repeat, I would like again to repeat that Mr. Lang is quite
mistaken in saying that I .ioined with Mr. Cranston in the recommendation
that any station could take any position on this Polish-Russian controversy.
Would you like to comment on that, please? Did she join with
Cranston ?
Mr. Lang. Well, the fact that she was at that meeting, whether she
said a w^ord or not, would certainly indicate to me that she was in
agreement with what Cranston thought and expressed to me.
Mr. Mitchell. Was your license up for consideration at that time?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Was she present, then, in that capacity, that is, in
connection with your license, or was she there on tliis Katyn-Polish
question ?
Mr. Lang. Well, she was there, as I understand it, to accompany
Mr. Cranston. I don't know what her official position was. She
had no official position, as far as I was concerned, except that they
Mere both interested in this situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Did Cranston have anything to do with the granting
of licenses ?
Mr. Lang. No.
Mr. Mitchell. Why do you think that Cranston was at that meet-
ing, other than for that Katyn affair?
Mr. Lang. I do not know.
Mr. Mitchell. Is Mrs. Shea correct in her statement tluit she did
not participate in this dicussion?
Mr. Lan(}. Well, she was certainly there, and, as far as I am con-
ceined, that is participating in a discussion. I don't recollect any
exact words, but anyone who was present had to participate in the
discussion.
]\Ir. MrrciiKLL. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Cliairman Madden. Are there any further questions?
Thank you, Mr. Lang, for ai)pearing as a witness.
Chairman Madden. Arthur Simon, please.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2007
TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR SIMON, FOREST HILLS, N. Y.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Simon, do you solemnly swear that the
testimony you are about to give the committee will be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Simon. I do.
Chairman Madden. Will you state your name, please, Mr. Simon?
Mr. Simon. Arthur Simon.
Chairman Madden. And your address?
Mr. Simon. 7714 One hundred and thirteenth Street, Forest Hills,
N. Y.
Chairman Madden. And your business ?
Mr. Simon. I am a special representative for the Radio and Tele-
vision Daily, a publication that covers the radio and television news
of the industry.
Chaiiman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Simon, you have been present this afternoon
and heard the discussion of the meeting held in New York in May,
1943, have you not ?
Mr. Simon. I have.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you participate in that meeting in New York?
Mr. Simon. I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you subscribe to the statements that have been
made here by Mr. Lang?
Mr. Simon. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you subscribe to the statements that were made
in that congressional hearing?
Mr. Simon. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. Can you shed any further light to this committee
on that particular meeting that was held in New^ York?
Mr. Simon. No ; I don't believe I can add any more to it with two
exceptions, namely, that also present was a Mr. Fred Call, who handled
publicity for the committee, and who came in at the latter part of the
meeting, and a program director who was called in by Mr. Lang dur-
ing the course of th.e meeting.
Mr. Mitchell. What did the program director have to say there?
Mr. Simon. He was asked by INIr. Lang how he ha-ndled his news
broadcasts, and he repeated in substance the fact that he just took it
off the new^s tickers and gave it just as it came off those tickers.
Mr. Mitchell. And when you were present there at that meeting,
were you participating in the discussion of the Katyn affair, or were
you participating in the discussion of Mr. Lang's license?
Mr. Simon. It concerned the Katyn affair and the boundaries be-
tween Eussia and Poland, both subjects.
Mr. Mitchell. AVhen you were present, was his license discussed?
Mr. Simon. No ; it was not.
Mr. Mitchell. When you were present at this particular meeting,
the sole subject of conversation was the Katyn affair and the Polish
boundary question ?
Mr. Simon. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. And Mrs. Shea was present?
Mr. Simon. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Did she have any comments to make that you can
recall ?
2008 THE KATYN FOREST RIASSACRE
Mr. SiiyiON. I just recall her concurring in Mr. Cranston's state-
ments. To the best of my knowledge, she joined in that conversation,
1 know she was present from the beginning to the end.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Chairman JVIadden. Are there any questions?
Mr. Machrowicz. I have one question.
Mr. Simon, didn't you consider this request of Mr. Cranston as an
attempt to gag the radio commentators ?
Mr. Simon. I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. Didn't you consider that to be a violation of the
spirit of the Federal Communications Act ?
Mr. Simon. I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is all I have.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero ?
Mr. DoNDERo. No questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Mitchell, you may proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Simon, did you ask Mrs. Shea what she was
doing there ?
Mr. Simon. No. To the best of my knowledge, I did not. She ap-
peared with Mr. Cranston. They were both there together.
Mr. Mitchell. Did she give any justification for her reason for
being there?
Mr. Simon. No. There was no justification, outside of the fact
that she concurred in Mr. Cranston's statement. I recall no other
reason for her being there, except to be with Mr. Cranston when this
discussion was taken up. She was there, as I understand it, represent-
ing the Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Mitchell. Woud you call her presence there indirect intimi-
dation ?
Mr. Simon. In my opinion?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mr. Simon. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Are there any other questions ?
Thank you for appearing to testify, Mr. Simon.
Mr. James F. Hopkins.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES E. HOPKINS
Chairman Madden. Mr. Hopkins, will you raise your right hand
and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Mr. Hopkins. I do.
Chairman Madden. There will be a 5-minute recess.
(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing
was resumed.)
Chairmnn Madden, The committee will come to order.
Mr. Hopkins, you have been sworn, have you not?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes.
Chairman Madden, And did you give your name and address?
Mr. Hopkins. James F. Hopkins,. Detroit, Mich.
Chairman Madden. Your street address?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2009
Mr. Hopkins. 15865 Rosemont Road.
Chairman Madden. New York City ?
Mr. Hopkins. Detroit.
Chairman Madden. Wliat is your business ?
Mr. Hopkins. I am the president of the Michigan Music Co., the
franchise holder for Muzak in Detroit and president of tlie Herrans
Valley Broadcasters, radio station in Ann Arbor.
Chairman Madden. Did you formerly own a radio station?
Mr. Hopkins. I was the manager and part owner of WJBK, Detroit.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Hopkins, have you been present this afternoon
when the testimonj^ of Mr. Joseph Lang and Mr. Arthur Simon was
heard ?
Mr. Hopkins. I have.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you concur in the remarks or the statements that
ihey made under oath ?
Mr. Hopkins. I do.
Mr. Mitchell. You were contacted by Mr. Joseph Lang ?
Mr. Hopkins. I was.
Mr. Mitchell. On the subject matter of Katyn?
Mr. Hopkins. I was.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you speak a little louder ?
Mr. Hopkins. I was.
Mr. Mitchell. You heard me ask Mr. Elmer Davis about an indi-
vidual by the name of Mr. Lee Falk. Could you shed any light on the
type of activities that Mr. Falk was engaged in, when you were the
part owner of WJBK?
Mr. Hopkins. I talked to Mr. Falk at one time in Washington rela-
tive to the foreign-language personnel. Another time he came to De-
troit and suggested that I discharge certain individuals.
Mr. Mitchell. Wliat was his method and way of doing that ? Be-
cause he was with the Office of War Information ?
Mr. Hopkins. I didn't take him too seriously and told him so in
so many words, and that I didn't want any part of him.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why do you not get the names of the persons he
wanted to have removed ?
Mr. Mitchell. Could you give us the names of the individuals he
wanted removed ?
Mr. Hopkins. One of them was Leon Wyszatycki.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain what position Mr. Wyszatycki
had in your station at that time ?
Mr. Hopkins. He ran one of the Polish hours broadcasting over
WJBK.
Mr. Mitchell. Why did Mr. Falk want him removed ?
Mr. Hopkins. He didn't give me any concrete reasons. He just
said he thought we should get rid of him.
Mr. Mitchell. Did he mention the Katyn affair ?
Mr. Hopkins. No ; I believe this was before the Katyn affair, if my
recollection serves me properl3^ It was before that.
Mr, Mitchell. Did you have in your employ at that time a Mr.
Marian Kreutz ?
, Mr. Hopkins. Not in my employ. He was broadcasting over the
station, but was actually in the employ of Mr. Wyszatycki.
2010 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. Coukl you explain the connection between you and
Mr. Kreutz at that time ?
Mr. Hopkins. Well, only that the station made rules as to what
could be or could not be broadcast in light of the fact that we were
waging a war.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any direct contact Avith Mr. Marian
Kreutz ?
Mr. Hopkins. If I insisted he be discharged for one reason or an-
other, he would come to the office and we would see if he would
straighten it out. In that regard, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Was he ever discharged ?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. When? Do you recall?
Mr. Hopkins. I can't give you the exact time.
Mr. Mitchell. ^Vliy?
Mr. Hopkins. We felt that he was more interested in broadcasting-
actual concrete news, whether that story had the proper etfect on the
Polish audience or not, and we were concerned on whether the stoi-y
would in any way curtail the war efl'ort of the Polish segment of the
population of the area.
Mr. IVfiTCHELL. Was Mr. Kreutz ever suspended from the air?
Mr. Hopkins. I think he was, for several days, but not for any
lengthy time.
Mr. Mitchell. Did yon, yourself, suspend him or could you tell us
how the suspension was accomplished?
Mr. Hopkins. Well, inasmuch as he was not working for me, but
working for Leon Wyszatycki, I would have to call him in and tell
him to do the dirty work.
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Wyszatycki rented an hour from you ; is that
correct ?
]\f r. Hopkins. No ; it wasn't — he was actually a representative of the
station, but an individual contractor.
Mr. Machrowicz. But he had the right to employ radio com-
mentators ?
Mr. Hopkins. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. And he employed Mr. INIarian Kreutz as a
connnentator?
Mr. Hopkins. Within certain dictates of the station : that is cori-ect.
Mr. Machrowicz. And then you received your call from whom?
Mr. Hopkins. From Lang.
IVfr. Machrowicz. Stating that the nature of the broadcasts of Mr.
Kreutz Avere not satisfactory ?
Mr. Hopkins. No; not necessarily that.
INIr. Machrowicz. What did they tell you about his broadcasts?
Mr. Hopkins. He told me that there Avere certain stories breaking,
and that it Avas a geneial consensus of the group that he has named,
he in no Avay implicated himself, in Avhat he said but that it Avas gen-
erally felt tiiat perha])s the broadcast of this story Avould create such
a feeling among the Polish people that it Avould detract from their Avar
elloi-t.
Mi-. Machrowicz. Mr. Kreutz Avas known in the coimnunity, was he
not, foi' his violent anti-(\)minunist feelings?
Mr. Hopkins. Well, he may have been, but I, of course, can't speak
or understand Polish, so I can't tell you that.
THE IvATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2011
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know that you had been receivino coni-
pLaints from certain Conniiunist grouiDS in Detroit ?
Mr. HoPKixs. I didn't hear you, sir.
Mr. Mactirowicz. You received complaints about the nature of his
testimony from certain Polish Communist groups in Detroit?
Mr. HoPKixs. Yes: I think I did. I remember a couple of them.
Mr. Machrowicz. The Connnunists objected to the way he com-
mented on certain news events ?
Mr. Hopkins. That is probably substantially true, but I can't re-
member the exact nature, apparently.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then these people that called you took it upon
themselves to censure his broadcasts ?
Mr. Hopkins. They tried to, they would never get by with that,
Mr. IMachrow^cz. They succeeded in getting him suspended.
Mr. Hopkins. No ; I don't think they did.
Mr. Machrowicz. He was suspended.
Mr. Hopkins. That is right.
Mr. Machrowicz. Why ?
Mr. Hopkins. I had a full-time employee, an attorney, by the name
of Morris Luskin, whose business it was to check over his opinion on
the effect of certain stories that were proposed to be broadcast. And
it was on his recommendation that Mr. Kreutz was suspended when
he was suspended.
Mr. Machrowicz. You were interested in maintaining good, proper
connections w^ith the Federal Communications Commission?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes, sir.
IVIr. Machrowicz. And when you knew the Federal Communica-
tions Commission was interested in having this man suspended you
thought it would be good policy to suspend him ?
Mr. Hopkins. No ; that is not true.
Mr. Machrowicz. You knew they objected to the nature of the
broadcasts.
Mr. Hopkins. That who objected?
Mr. Machrowicz. The Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Hopkins. No ; I didn't.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, when Mr. Simon or JNIr. Lang called you,
they told you they had talked to Mv. Cranston.
Mr. Hopkins. I never heard of Cranston up until today or yes-
terday.
Mr. Machrowicz. What did Mr. Simon tell you?
Mr. Hopkins. I didn't talk to Simon.
Mr. ]\L\chrowicz. Mr. Lang. What did Lang tell you?
Mr. Hopkins. Lang and Simon and myself, and a few other station
managers, were affiliated in the foreign-language group, who tried to
keep the foreign-language broadcasts clean and aboveboard and to
further the effort of the war. When Joe called me and told me that
he had had a meeting with the group, and I don't think he — he may
have told me but if he did tell me who he had met, I don't remember,
but he did tell me he met with a group, and the culmination' was as I
have stated, that this story would perhaps serve the war effort better if
it was not broadcast.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read the translations of Mr. Kreutz'
broadcasts?
2012 THE KATYN FOREST IVIASSACRE
Mr. Hopkins. Not all of the time. Mr. Luskin did, as a rule.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you read the translations of those which
were considered as somewhat objectionable?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes ; I think I did.
Mr. Machrowicz. What did you find objectionable in them, if
any
Mr. Hopkins. Well, if a story went out in Detroit, claiming that
the Russians had murdered X number of thousands of Polish officers
and soldiers, it certainly would turn the, naturally, Polish audience
against one of our allies.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was that objectionable, if the facts were true?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes, and no. As far as the war effort is concerned,
and the winning of the war, it might have had a material effect, and
an adverse one. After all, the thing had occurred, as bad as it was,
as atrocious as it was, the very fact that the story should be told, you
can't compound an evil, and that would be exactly what happened.
If the Polish people were in any way thrown away from furthering
the war effort, no good would be done. Certainly the fact that they
knew it couldn't bring the people back to life that had been murdered.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then you felt that the news, even if it may be
true, of Russian guilt, should be withheld from the Americans of
Polish descent?
Mr. Hopkins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you felt that it was proper because if such
news, even if true, was disseminated, the person who disseminated it
should be suspended?
Mr. Hopkins. I didn't say I suspended him on that cause, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. What did you suspend him on ?
Mr, Hopkins. I can't tell you. That was 8 years ago or 10 years
ago.
Chairman Madden. Any further questions?
Thank you for appearing here as a witness, Mr. Hopkins.
Marian Kreutz. Will you be sworn, Mr. Kreutz ? Do you solemnly
swear the testimony you give before this committee shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Kreutz. I do.
TESTIMONY OF JAN MARIAN KREUTZ. DETROIT, MICH.
Chairman Madden. State your name.
Mr. Kreutz. Jan Marian Kreutz, 11558 La Salle Boulevard, Detroit,
Mich.
Chairman Madden. What is your business ?
Mr. Kreutz. I am a radio news commentator, foreign language,
Polish.
Chairman Madden. In the city of Detroit ?
Mr. Kreutz, In the city of Detroit, emploj'ed now by Station
WJLB, where I am a coordinator of a Polish program and a radio
news commentator.
Chairman Madden. Proceed.
Mr, Mit('iiell, Mr. Kreutz, have you been present at the hearings
this afternoon held in this room ?
]Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir.
Mr, Mitchell, You are fully aware of the subject matter under
discussion ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
2013
t f^Z^J^t^^^^l Polisl. commentator in Detroit in May
Its, when the Katyn affair first became known i
Mr. IvREUTZ. Yes, sir. . -iA7TT»Tr. ia
Mr. Machrowicz. At that time you were with btation WJiiiv, is
it correct?
Nil- Kreutz. That is correct.
Mr'. Machrowicz. Was it within the province or the scope ot your
ties to make comments on news events?
Mr Kreutz Well, I had been advertised as a news commentator,
ilrit naturally I should have the right to make some comments.
Mr. Maciirowitz. Did you make any comments on your station
at ive to the Katyn massacre? t n fi „f
Mr Kreutz. In reference to the Katyn massacre, I would say that
followed in this order : First broke the news given by the (jermans,
d we ^ave that news without any commentary, with one exception,
at we^aid this is an enemy source. Of course, the news was too
uesome and really didn't lend itself to any commentary, ihen, a
w days after, we had this Russian note to the Polish Government
cer the Polish Government asked for this Red Cross investigation.
■ that time we gave the Russian view on it, and naturally followed
th the Polish view which we took from the Polish telegraph agency,
lat Avas the third service we employed. We employed Associated
-ess, and I believe the International News Service at the time, and
■3 Polish Telegraph Agency, which is PAT.
Mr. Maciirowitz. Explain what the Polish telegraph agency is;
erated by whom ?
Mr. Kreutz. That is, or rather it was, an ofticial press agency ot the
olisii exiled government, operated from New York, just like, let s
^, Russian Tass that operates from New York.
I^lr. Machrowttz. Then what happened? Did you make any fur-
"er comments on it ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, we didn't have time to make many comments,
^ause it was a matter of just 10 days when we got through with
lOse three phases of it. We had news from Mr. Hopkins, through
y program manager, or program director, that we were supposed to
op using the PAT, to use only Associated Press and International
jews Service, and in such a way cut off all the news about Katyn.
Mr. Machrowitz. Was that specifically mentioned to you ?
Mr. Kreutz. That was definitely said to me, that that Katyn story
id to be out.
Mr. Maciirowitz. What happened after that?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, after that we tried our best. We asked Mr.
opkins if it was possible to use, let's say, press articles from American
•ess, or maybe from the Polish press, so he said, "Well, if those arti-
js had been published already, naturally you can use it." I mean, he
du't say this to me, he said" that to the program director. I want
at to be understood. So, as far as w^e were referring to Katyn, we
ere trying to take up these stories from the Polish Daily News in
etroit, or some other articles that we could find in American press.
Well, it turned out to be very unsatisfactory because the station,
:obably in a few weeks, I don't remember exactly the dates, objected
?aiii and said, "No more articles from any press because this is still
Iking Katyn," and by that time we started also picking up from
03744— 52— pt. 7 13
2014 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
the press articles on the Polish boundaries that was the controvei
that came later on. Generally speaking, this censorship fight on a
off was going on for over 2 years, and finally in 1945 the day afi
the United States Government recognized Warsaw communistic
gime, we had already come to a point where the station had put
monitors on our broadcasting. In other words, there were always t-
copies of the broadcast. One copy went to me and one copy to t
station. If I deleted anything or if I went with a few words o^
the copy, the monitor would cut off my voice from the air. In otl
words, it was a foolproof proposition.
Well, by that time, we couldn't say anything and I was afraid tl
I couldn't stand any more withholding any real truth and inforn
tion from my listeners, because after all a Polish commentary is a lit
different, probably, than American commentary. We have to ha
listeners, otherwise we can't stay on the air. And if we can't U
about the Polish question, then we won't have any listeners, becai
they can pick up any general news from somewhere else.
So on that day, the day after the Warsaw regime was recognize
I managed to put in one sentence inside of my broadcast. I just sa
"Due to the existing censorship on the station, I am not going to t?
any more on this microphone," and I just got up in the middle of t
broadcast and walked out from the studic and I never returned to t
station again. That was the end of the fight.
Mr. Macheowicz. Then you were not suspended ?
Mr. Kreutz. Oh, in the meantime yes, we had three suspensio
liemember, that was a span of time of about 2 years. I had been si
pended three times. I have been informed by Mr. Wyszatycki tl
Mr. Hopkins, James F. Hopkins, told him on a certain day, I do
remember tlie date, that because of the fact that I didn't keep exaci
to the censorship orders I couldn't go on the air. I was never out i
a few days like Mr. Hopkins said. I think he just forgot the exr
terms. Usually about 10 minutes before broadcast I was told "J
right, you can go on again."
I think this was usually after a long conference between my direct(
between Mr. Konstantynowicz who was another director on that st
tion, and Mr. Hopkins. They usually prevailed on him that he shou
keep me on. But it wasn't pleasant to go on the air when you didi
know 10 minutes before if you were going on the air.
]Mr. Machroavicz. You know that there have been a number
complaints to your station from the Communist groups in Detr(
with regard to your broadcasts ; is that right ?
Mr. Krkutz. Yes, I know about that, and I don't know if th
should go inside these hearings here, but I have got a personal feelii
that the person that was actually monitoring ni}^ connnentary nui
have been a member of the Communist Party in Detroit. I thii
it must have been monitored by somebody outside the station fro
this bunch on Chene Street, from the Communist Party. This is, '
course, only my private opinion.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Were the suspensions ever for any other reasc
other than your attitude against the Communist Govermnent?
Mr. Kreutz. No. All the suspensions were on account of eitb
Katyn, either Polish boundaries, or the Polish relations. That w:j
entirely on the account of those questions. I
THE KATYN' FOREST MASSACRE 2015
Chairman Madden. I might make an announcement. I have re-
ceived inquiries regarding tlie program for today and tomorrow. The
committee has three more witnesses today, and tomorrow morning the
committee will meet at 10 o'clock, and we will have, as the first wit-
ness, Ex-Ambassador William Standley, former Under-Secretary of
State Sumner Welles, Mrs. Mortimer, John Melby, and Averell Harri-
man. We will meet at 10 o'clock in the morning.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Over this station, where you were employed, were
there any broadcasts in a Russian language during that period?
Mr. Kreutz. No ; I don't believe so. But there has been a half-hour
program, I think it was between 5 : 30 and 6 in the evening
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is what I Avant to ask you now. Were there
any broadcasts over this station by well-known pro-Soviet or pro-
Communist groups ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, certainly there were. I was just trying to men-
tion that. Between 5 : 30 and 6 I believe in the evening, there was a
program they called it in Polish Promienie Prawdy, which was Eay of
Truth.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Coming from the pro-Communists ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, the only people that talked on that program
were well-known Communists.
Mr. OTvoNSKi. Well-known Communists?
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. Now let me ask you this question : Were they told
and called in like you, and were they told to lay off of mentioning or
commentating on the Katyn thing or on the Polish-boundary question,
or did they have free sway ?
Mr. Kreutz. I would say in this way : For a long time they didn't
have any trouble at all because they were giving the Russian point
of view on Polish questions.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And they had no trouble at all?
^ ]\Ir. Kreutz. They didn't have any trouble in putting that point of
view over.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They weren't called in and told 10 minutes before
they went on the air that they could go on, no censorship ?
Mr. Kreutz. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Ol^ONSKT. They could tell the Russian side of the story, and
blame it onto the Germans, and they had no trouble.
Mr. Kreutz. This is right. At the end of the period afterward, I
may mention, they had been taken off the air but that was, I believe,
around 1945.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They were taken off in 1945 ?
Mr. Kreutz. Yes.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. I remember that, because I spoke in Detroit in 1945
and they were still on.
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoKSKi. And they took me to task for denouncing Yalta as
the crime of the ages. I remember that distinctly. But doesn't it
seem rather incredible to you that you, here, a good American, trying
to tell the truth, trying to defend another ally far more glorious than
the Russian ally, who made far more sacrifices than the Russian ally,
that here you are trying to come a little bit to their defense and you
2016 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
were closely scrutinized and censored, but at the same time those that
went on the air to pronounce pro-Soviet lines had no trouble at all ?
Doesn't that seem rather incredible?
Mr. Kreutz. That was quite incredible at first. We just didn't
loiderstand why all this censorship happened. Afterward, we came
to the conclusion there must have been a strong Communist influence
somewhere in Washington, because we knew it was coming from
Washington somehow.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now let me ask you another question. A statement
was made here a little while ago that one of the reasons why they
insisted on censoring you was because they were afraid of the effect
that the truth would have on the Polish population, particularly in
Hamtramck, which is about 95 percent Polish.
Mr. Kreutz. That is true.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Do you go along with that line of reasoning, that
if the Poles knew the truth that they would stop in their war effort,
they would quit their factory jobs, they would quit their defense jobs,
they would quit volunteering, quit dying and bleeding for their coun-
try ? Do you think that is a correct estimate of the Polish population ?
Mr. Kreutz. I think that is all wrong, and as a matter of fact I
remember talking to Mr. Hopkins on it many times during these 2
years that we ai-e talking about between 1943 and 1945. As a journalist
I had been a foreign correspondent for a newspaper in Warsaw, and
I had been trained to get information and give the information to
the people, and to believe that if the people get the information and
the truth, they will always get to the right conclusions.
Now, in this case our program has been very strongly anti-Nazi
before this Katyn question happened, and it remained anti-Nazi
until the end of the war. My commentary with that prog'ram was
in the same way. But when we found out that the Russian ally had
killed so many Polish officers, we thought that this is something that
should be given to the people, because this would not stop anybody
from working for the war effort, I couldn't believe it, anyhow. That
was Mr. Hopkins' contention.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You are so sure of the weakness of that argument.
When the Polish Army was reorganized in Russia, General Anders
and all of the leaders of the Polish Army, they knew that those Polish
officers had disappeared, didn't they?
Mr. Kreutz. They definitely knew it.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And still thev fought on the side of Russia, didn't
they?
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'Kc^nski. Wlien they were sold down the river at Yalta and
stabbed in the back, thev still fought, didn't they?
Mr. Kreutz. They still fought.
]Mr. O'KoNSKT. Even when tliey knew they were handed over to
Russia they still fouglit, didn't they?
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. When England was being invaded with German
bombs, you heard of the Polish air brigade, didn't you, that saved
London ?
Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. They served on the side of Russia.
Mr. Kreutz. They definitely did.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2017
Mr. O'KoNSKi. The Polish Army fought in Normandy alongside
Russia as an ally, didn't they?
Mr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Even after they knew that their officers were mas-
sacred, they knew that hundreds of thousands of their people disap-
peared, they still fought alongside Russia as an ally, didn't they ?
INIr. Kreutz. That is right.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And then they come over here and they say that
the reason why they censored you was because they were afraid of
what Polish reaction might be if they learned the truth about Katyn.
Doesn't that seem rather thin ?
Mr. Kreutz. I believe that this was the Communist line handed
over to the station managers, because the station managers usually
didn't know anything about the Polish politics or about Russia or
about actually anything outside the United States.
Mr. O'KoxsKi. "Well, is it very significant that you were censored,
and the pro-Communist line was not censored? It is incredible.
That is all.
Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Kreutz, were you ever questioned by any of
our Government officials from the Federal Communications Com-
mission ?
Mr. Kreutz. No ; I never had any contact with them. I don't know
why, but they never asked me anything.
Mr. Sheehan. "Were you ever questioned by any members from
the Office of War Information, OWI?
Mr. Kreutz. No.
Mr. Sheehan. In your discussions, you said you had discussed some
of these matters with Mr. Hopkins.
Mr. Kreutz. That is right,
Mr. Sheehan. Did you discuss them with him personally ?
Mr. Kreutz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you have any particular arguments with him
about it ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, there were a few occasions when he called up a
meeting of all of the Polish broadcasters and newscasters, and he tried
to tell us that — for example, I can say here on one of those meetings,
and it must have been in 1944, 1 think, or maybe even 1945, after Yalta,
he said, "Well, the Polish goose is cooked forever, and so why don't
you forget it and why don't you stop worrying about Poland."
That was the beginning. Naturally after that we had a very heated
discussion and I just walked out of the office. But that was about the
way it was discussed.
Mr. Sheehan. In these suspensions that you talked about, what do
you mean by suspensions ?
Mr. Kreutz. Well, in other words as I said my program director
would call me up and say, "Kreutz, you are not going on the air today."
You know, it takes a few hours to prepare that material. I would say,
"Why," and he would say, "Well, Mr. Hopkins objects to it."
I would say, "I will come down to the station and see what is going
on."
I would go down to the station and try to prepare material, and wait
until about 10 minutes before broadcast and sometimes 5 minutes, and
they would come in there and say, "O. K., you can go on the air; we
settled the matter with Hopkins."
2018 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. Maybe you can help me on this. Didn't we ask Mr.
Hopkins whether he had any connection with the so-called firing of
Mr. Kreutz, and he said he had nothing to do with it ?
Mr. Machrowicz. He said Wyszatycki did the firing.
Mr. Sheehan, I think we ought to get Hopkins back and see if he
gave this gentleman instructions, because he tells us he talked with
Hopkins directly about it, and Hopkins censored the program and
stopped him.
Mr. Mitchell. Only after he was suspended or dismissed, only after
he was dismissed on one occasion.
Mr. I^EUTZ. Not even then. I talked to Hopkins only on certain
conferences when he called up the whole staff and started to talk on
the Polish question. Then I started to discuss the Polish question,
because I was the one to talk about it. On suspensions and those things,
whatever Mr. Hopkins was doing he was doing through Mr. Wyszatycki
the way it was being done.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Hopkins led me to believe that he had nothing
to do with it.
Mr. Mitchell. No ; he said he went through the program director.
Mr. Sheehan. But according to this gentleman's testimony he in-
structed the program director what to do.
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. And Mr. Hopkins didn't say that. He led us to be-
lieve generally that the program director did this, is that right ?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. I stand corrected. I would like to ask one more
question. You said that you used the AP and UP releases with refer-
ence to the Polish situation. Were they the American AP and UP
releases or those coming from Moscow ?
Mr. Kreutz. No, the American releases. Naturally the news was
from Moscow in it, because on the Polish questions all of the news was
coming from Moscow or from Tass.
Mr. Sheehan. Well, for the members of our committee Henry
Cassidy brought out, when we questioned him some time ago, when he
was the head of the AP there, that the dispatches they sent from
Moscow were completely censored. They were only allowed to send
from Moscow what the Russian Government permitted. So then, when
you, as a news broadcaster or radio broadcaster, were sending out dis-
patches from Moscow, you were reading only what the Communists
permitted to come out, because Cassidy specifically told us that any-
thing the Russians didn't like they didn't permit to come out. So you
were reading censored dispatches.
Mr. Kreutz. Actually, if I may say, on the Katyn question in par-
ticular, anythinij that would come from Moscow on AP or UP or Inter-
national News Service, would be purely a Russian propaganda, some-
thing I couldn't use for the Polish people because they wouldn't believe
me.
Mr. Sheehan. Yet that is what they wanted to have you use.
Mr. Kreutz. Yes. But the people wouldn't believe me.
Mr. O'Konski. One more question : The witness, Mr. Hopkins, that
we had on the stand seems to be a very upright and fine, honornble
man. In his defense I want to ask you this question : Do you think that
he or his people under him who censored you did it of their own voli-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2019
tion, or do you think that pressure was put on them from some outside
source, that they were extremely worried about it?
Mr. Kreutz. I would answer that in two ways : As far as Mr.
Hopkins is concerned, I am quite certain that he was sick with all of
that proposition, that he simply didn't know enough about the political
issues, that there had been some pressure from outside on him, and
he was doing it only under duress. That was the definite impression
that I had. He wasn't happy with it. But, if we come to Mr. Luskin,
who was mentioned by JMr. Ho])kins, I would say that I would have
some doubts as to tlie fact, if he liked it or not.
Mr. O'KoNSKi, But as far as the ownership of the station was con-
cerned, you are convinced that in all respects and he appeared so, no
question about it, he is honorable and upright and that it was a great
pain on his part to have to do what he did, and very likely he did it
because he wanted to stay in business?
Mr. Kreutz. There is no question about it.
Chairman Madden. Any further questions? I wish to thank you
for testifying here, Mr. Kreutz.
Is Mr. Simon still in the room ? Mr. Simon ?
TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR SIMON— Resumed
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr. Simon, the Federal Communications Com-
mission had special investigators, did it not?
Mr. Simon, That is correct.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you know of your own knowledge whether
any of these special investigators questioned the foreign language
commentators, investigated their background ?
Mr. Simon. To the best of my ability, to the best of my knowledge, I
believe that they did.
Mr, Machrowicz. What do you know about their investigating the
commentators of Polish origin?
Mr. Simon. Well, I think Mr. Lang probably would have been in a
better position to talk about the Polish announcers. I think he had
some controversy with the Polish programs. As far as Polish pro-
grams are concerned, I think Mr. Lang is here and he would be better
qualified to talk about that than I would.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, can we have Mr. Lang take the stand ?
Chairman Madden. Mr. Lang ? Is Mr. Lang here ? Will you take
the stand, Mr. Lang.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH LANG— Resumed
Mr. Machrowicz. Without the preliminaries, what do you know
about the Federal Communications Commission investigators ques-
tioning Polish commentators ?
Mr. Lang. I remember that in New York they questioned the Polish
people very, very thoroughly.
Mr. Machrowicz, With what in mind ?
' Mr. Lang. As expressed to me by one or two members who came
back, who would talk about it, they seemed to want to find out just
what their attitude would be if a Polish-Kussian crisis came about.
2020 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
They tried to find out whether they had any leanings toward being
pro-Russian.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, in other words, would you say that they
wanted to have commentators who would be friendly or unfriendly tc
the Polish regime in Warsaw, the so-called Soviet-dominated
regime ?
Mr. Lang. That would be a very difficult question for me to answer
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In these meetings you had, Mr. Lang, w^as there
any concern shown over pro-Communist broadcasts in the United
States ? Was that subject ever brought up ?
Mr. Lang. No ; I don't think it was.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Just anti-Communist broadcasts?
Mr. Lang. That is right. That is right. I might cite an experi-
ence— you may stop me if it is not relative — I had an organization that
bought some time called the International Workers Order, who bought
some time on the Polish programs, and who I thought were a fra-
ternal and social order, as their name implies. They went on twice, on
a Sunday afternoon period. But it was so filled with pro-Communist
material that I had to reject them and break their contract and take
them off the air, because it was so biased that it was ridiculous. In
other words, as I say, I put them on the air thinking they w^ere going
to broadcast and propagate their social benefits, if one belonged to
their order. But there was no criticism to any great extent that I
recollect of any procommunism.
Chairman Madden. That is all. Thank you.
Casimir Soron.
Will your raise your hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear
that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. SoRON. I do.
TESTIMONY OF CASIMIR SOEON, BUFFALO, N. Y.
Chairman Madden. If you wi]\ just sit down, Mr. Soron, and state
your full name.
Mr. SoRON. Casimir Soron.
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mr. SoRON. U6 Middlesex, Buffalo, N. Y.
Chairman Madden. And wdiat is your business, Mr. Soron ?
Mr. SoRON. I have two businesses, one is broadcasting, buying time,
I am a program director on Station WXRA, and I own a furniture
store in Buffalo.
Chairman Madden, Proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr, Mitchell. Mr. Soron, have you been present this afternoon in
this hearing room ?
Mr. Soron, Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Have you heard all of the testimony that has been
given ?
Mr. Soron. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have you state briefly what your
position was in 194;5, and the years following.
Mr. Soron. In 1943 I was employed by radio station WBNY in
Buffalo as ])rogram director and commentator,
Mr. Mitchell. What language was that in?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2021
Mr. SoRON. Polish radio program.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you state briefly for this committee what hap-
pened to you in the course of your engagement in that work ?
Mr. SoRON. Before being on the radio I used to be a newspaperman
in Detroit for 8 years, with Polish, and I knew how to read news
and how to commentate on it, you see. When I read the news about
Russia striking Poland — well, I was commentating exactly the way
it was, you see. And then when there was this Katyn case I told
the public openly that everything indicates that the Russians did it
because there are facts here and there that show that nobody else
could do it.
Now, the owner of the station, Mr. Albertson, told me a few times
1 should stop talking like tliat, because he had instructions from
Washington, he told me, that they don't like it. Now, that was
going on for a few months. Then finally he told me, in fact, he
showed me a letter from Washington, that they wrote to him, you see,
that this has to be stopped, you know, because I am talking against
our allies.
Finally, you see, he gave me 2 months' notice to continue the pro-
gram. I had a big business there. I had about a $60,000-a-year
business.
Mr. JNliTCHELL. Were you removed from the air ?
Mr. SoRON. I was removed from the air.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell the committee when you were removed
from the air?
Mr. SoRON. I was removed — he gave me notice by the end of 1943,
and I stopped broadcasting early in 1944.
Chairman Madden. Do you know who this letter was from?
Mr. SoRON. Well, I really don't remember. It seems to me it was
from the Radio Communications Commission, but I am not sure. I
believe he told me it was from the Radio Communications Commission.
Chairman Madden. Did you see the letter yourself?
Mr. SoRON. Well, he showed it to me, you see, but I am not sure
whether that was from the Radio Communications Commission.
Mr. Mitchell. Is Mr. Albertson still alive?
Mr. SoRON. Yes ; he owns the station.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you think he would have that letter in his pos-
session today?
Mr. SoRON. I imagine he would ; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.
Chairman Madden. Any questions ?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Were there any pro-Communist broadcasts over the
station that you were on by any pro-Communist organizations ?
Mr. SoRON, On the same station? No, sir; I don't believe there
were any.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Were there any over any other station of foreign
language in the Buffalo area ?
Mr. SoRON. Not that I remember.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. It is very possible that Buffalo would not have very
much of a Communist cell among those people. It is quite different
in Detroit. I am not casting any reflections on my good brother liere.
You didn't have the problem over there, so that wouldn't apply.
That is all.
2022 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. Would you be in a position to find out whether
or not this person has that letter ?
Mr. SoRON. Well, I wouldn't be in a position because we parted
very badly with Mr, Albertson on account of that.
Chairman Madden. You what?
Mr. SoRON. We parted in a bad way, you see.
Chairman Madden. What is Mr. Albertson's address?
Mr. Mitchell. I believe I have it.
Chairman Madden. All right. Are there any further questions?
Thank you for testifying here.
Chairman Madden. Mrs. Hilda Shea. If you will be sworn, Mrs.
Shea. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give be-
fore this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and notliing but
the truth, so help you God ?
Mrs. Shea. I do.
TESTIMONY OF MRS. HILDA SHEA, WASHINGTON, D. C. .
Chairman Madden. Mrs. Shea, please sit down. What is your
present address?
Mrs. Shea. 4000 Cathedral Avenue.
Chairman Madden. Washington?
Mrs. Shea. Washington, D. C.
Chairman Madden. And what is your business?
Mrs. Shea. I am a housewife now.
Chairman Madden. A housewife?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Chairman Madden. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a letter I re-
ceived from Mrs. Shea after the invitation I extended on your behalf
for her to appear before this committee. The letter is from the
Westchester, Washington, the date November 8, 1952. It is addressed
to me as chief counsel of this committee :
Dear Mr. Mitchell: Before talking to you in yoiu- office, I had not reread,
since 1944, the testimony that I gave in that year l)efore the select committee
appointed by the House of Representatives in the Seventy-eighth Congress to
investigate tlie Federal Communications Commission. This testimony was given
on April 18, 19, and 20, 1944, and api)ears at pages 30&1-3059, 3063-30S8, 3083-
3119 of the official report of the hearings of that committee. On rereading my
testimony I find, as might be expected, that my recollection in 1944 was much
clearer about the events that happened in 1943 than it is now, and the reading
of the transcript has refreshed my recollection on several points that you asked
me about in our informal conference. If there are any inconsistencies between
what I lold you in our informal conference and my testimony before the House
committee in 1944. and to the extent that my testimony before that committee
covers details of which I no longer have an independent recollection, I believe
that the testimony is to be regarded as a more reliable source of information
because it was given at a point of time much closer to the events which I was
discussing. While I shall be glad to assist the committee in any way I can,
I am inclined to thiidv that I am not now in a position to add anything to the
testimony that I gave to the House committee in 1944, because 1 find that with
the passage of time my recollection on many of these events has l)ecome vague.
I assume that you know my prior testimony, but in the circumstances I thought
I should like to call it to your attention.
Sincerely yours,
Hilda D. Shea.
Mr. O'Konski. May I make just one remark. One of my prior
statements where I made the remark concerning INIr. Shea, I was con-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2023
fused with names. It was not Mr. Shea I meant, it was Mr. Cranston
I meant. So will you correct the record.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Shea, when did you first enter Government
employment?
Mrs. Shea. March 1934.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. Where were you employed at that time, and in
what position ?
Mrs. Shea. At the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, as an
assistant attorney, I believe.
JNIr. Mitchell. How long were you there at that agency ?
Mrs. Shea. From March 1934 to July 1935.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your next employment ?
Mi's. Shea. At the Resettlement Administration, until I believe
January 1936.
INIr. Mitchell. In what capacity were you employed at that agency ?
Mrs. Shea. As an attorney.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your next position in Government serv-
ice?
Mrs. Shea. I then went to the National Labor Relations Board, as
an attorney.
Mr. Mitchell. How long were you at the National Labor Relations
Board?
Mrs. Shea. With the lapse of about 9 months, I was there until the
fall of 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. You were employed as an attorney ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What Government agency did you go to in the f aU
of 1942?
Mrs. Shea. The Federal Communications Commission.
]\Ir. Mitchell. What was your employment there, as an attorney?
Mrs. Shea, Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was responsible for your employment at the
FCC ?
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny appointed me, I believe.
Mr. Mitchell. Who was the counsel when you reported there?
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny, Charles Denny. '
Mr. Mitchell. You have been present in the hearing room this
afternoon during the course of the testimony that has been taken
here today ?
Mrs. Shea. I arrived in the middle of Mr. Davis' testimony.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Davis' testimouA^?
Mrs. Shea, Ye.s, about 2 o'clock,
Mr. MiTCiirXL. Then you have been here through a majority of the
testimony and practically all of it. Do you deny having attended
that meeting in New York that was referred to by Mr. Lang and Mr.
Simon ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You have heard the comments that they had to make
this afternoon. Would you like to make a statement in that con-
nection ?
Chairman Madden. In what connection? Be more specific on it.
Mr. Mitchell. They have said that you were present at this meet-
2024 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
ing in New York when a.license of Mr. Lang, although up for renewal
at that time, was not discussed at the meeting. Weren't you attending
that meeting as an attorney for the FCC ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee how you came
to attend such a meeting ?
Mrs. Shea. I was employed at the time as head of the Foreign
Language Studies Section in the Law Department of the FCC, and
part of my job, as I understood it, was to work in liaison
Chairman Madden. Could you speak a little louder, please? We
can't hear you.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. With my opposite numbers in other agencies
handling similar problems. I am a little puzzled at this point on how
far afield to go. Do you want my version on what happened?
Mr. Mitchell. I want to know si:)ecifically. Did you know Allen
Cranston ?
Mrs. Shea. I had met Allen Cranston as head of the foreign lan-
guage problems in the OWL I knew him in that capacity.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have many conferences with Allen
Cranston ?
Mrs. Shea. Very few.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you explain to the committee how you came
to attend this meeting in New York with Allen Cranston ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. Mr. Cranston called me and said that he had
been informed by letter from the OWI oflice in Detroit, that a broad-
caster in the Polish language on a station there was upsetting the
Polish population by pro-Kussian broadcasts, and asked me whether,
as a lawyer in the field, I knew of anything that might be done about
it. I told him that the FCC itself had no power to do anything in a
situation of that kind, and that the Office of Censorship in Washing-
ton had expressed no interest in problems of that kind, and the one
group that might be of any assistance if it cared to be on a purely vol-
untary basis was the radio wartime control, headed by Mr. Simon and
Mr. Lang.
Mr. Cranston then called them and made an appointment and I
went along as an observer for the FCC.
Mr. Mitchell. Why did you go along as an observer for the FCC
when it was not a problem or in any way connected with the FCC,
which you have just stated to the committee?
Mrs. Shea. Well, I just told the connnittee that the FCC is with-
out power to interfere in anything that is said by a broadcaster on
the air. But it is interested in knowing what he says, and in how
the station handles problems of the kind for purposes of evaluating
the stations' use of its license. And so, I was instructed to go as an
observer, purely, but not to put forward any views or suggestions.
Mr. MrrcHELL. Who instructed you to go to that meeting?
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you present this problem to Mr. Denny in such
a way tJiat lie thoroughly understood it at that time?
Mrs. SiiEA. I don't believe I am in a position to say whether he did.
He seemed to. He generally is very able to understand things.
Mr. JMitchell. Did he have access to the German propaganda
broadcast on Katyn at that time?
Mrs. Shea. I don't know, sir.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2025
Mr. Mitchell. They came in and they were monitored right within
the FCC. FBIS, wasn't that under FCC ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. I think matters of Mr. Denny's knowledge
ought to be referred to Mr. Denny. Tlie record shows that before the
conference I had asked Mr. Denny's permission to go, and the per-
mission was expressly given. That is on page 2802, of part 3 of the
House committee record.
I^Ir. Mitchell. Page 2802?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Do you refer to the record of the committee to
investigate the Federal Communications Commission?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Shea, notwithstanding your statement, you will
recall we had that informal talk in my office, at that time you made the
following statement to me. Well, 1 asked you this : "How did yon
come to get into this meeting in New York?" "Mrs. Shea: In New
York?"
I said, "Yes, in May of 1943 with Cranston."
"Mrs. Shea : Well, Lang's license was up for renewal. We were
inquiring about the type of material that was going out over his
foreign-language radio programs. The held staif was doing a study
on it, and I believe I went up there in connection with that study."
Now, this afternoon two witnesses appeared here who specifically
stated that there was no discussion concerning the license at this par-
ticular meeting. Could you explain that, please ?
JNIrs. Shea. Yes, sir. When you questioned me a few weeks ago I
had forgotten, as I stated in the letter that you read into the record,
this whole Katyn incident, and it was only after I read the record
that I recalled those details. However, while I was in New York on
that occasion I was at the New York offices of the FCC and I did talk
over with them pending cases.
Mr. Mitchell. You knew at the time that this meeting was set up
by Cranston that this did not concern the licensing of Mr. Lang, the
purpose of the meeting that Cranston arranged.
Now, Mr. Elmer Davis this afternoon, when he testified here, said
that he thought that Allen Cranston was outside the scope of his duties.
Mrs. Shea. Well, I can't comment on the scope of Mr. Cranston's
duties.
Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that you should have inquired
about the scope of his duties at the time when he brought this to your
attention ? You were an attorney employed by the FCC then.
Mrs. Shea. I was concerned with the scope of my duties, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Don't you think that you should inquire about the
scope of an individual's duties that 3^011 are going to go into a con-
ference with, if he has the power to do that? You are an attorney.
I always like to know what an attorney is going to do who accom-
panies me, or what the individual does, has he got the power to do
it, or has he not got the power to do it.
Mrs. Shea. Do you wish to know what assumption I made at the
time?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Mrs. Shea. I don't recall. I was questioned by Mr. Cranston as to
whether the FCC had any power to do anything about his problem.
2026 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
My answer was unequivocably no. He said "Well, who might?" I
said "Well, if the radio wartime control wants to do anything about
it, perhaps it will."
Mr. Mitchell. All right, then, why did you go near that meeting
at all is what I would like to find out definitely.
Mrs. Shea. Well, I can answer that question.
Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute until I tell you something.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. You had investigators at that time who were em-
ployed in the field for that specific purpose of finding out if the radio
stations were conforming with their licensing arrangement. You
were an attorney, you were not an investigator. You went along on
this particular meeting, after having tokl Cranston that this was not
within the scope of the FCC's functions. I would like to know why
you decided to do that.
Mrs. Shea. Well, I went along partly because I had a problem,
described here in the record, which was also without the scope of the
Commission's power, and I raised that problem with Mr. Simon and
Mr. Lang as well. Our field people in Texas had reported that the
war-bond drives and so forth, were using the slogan "Remember the
Alamo," and the persons of Mexican extraction were very incensed by
this reference to a past unfortunate incident.
Mr. Mitchell. But that wasn't raised at this particular meeting?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir, at great length. Mr. Simon so testified at
length. The State Department had written us about it.
Mr. Mitchell. Where did Mr. Cranston fit in with that particular
j)roblem ?
Mrs. Shea. Not at all, sir. After Mr. Cranston had talked about
the Polish problem, I said, "Here is another problem that you people
at the wartime control could do something about if you wished to," and
left it there.
It was a purely voluntary matter. As a matter of fact, as far as I
know the control did nothing about it, and we did nothing about it.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you participate in this discussion on the Katyn
or the Polish situation in Detroit, the radio station there during this
meeting, you specifically ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you realize at that moment that by your pres-
ence there you were in the position of lending support to Cranston's
position ?
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Mitchell, I did not think so, and may I tell you why ?
Mr. Mitchell. Go right ahead.
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Lang, as he just told you on the stand, was not an
ordinary broadcaster. He was very well acquainted with the scope of
the authority of all of the agencies in AVashington, working on the
matter, and had sliown complete independence of judgment and action
all the way through. And he did in tliis case. He was not a man to
be intimidated and I don't believe he was intimidated. He testified
he was not intimidated.
Mr. Machhowicz. Let me see if I understand your situation cor-
rectly. Mrs. Shea, as an attorney you had advised the Federal Com-
munications Commission that they had no authority to censor editorial
comment?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2027
Mr. Machrowicz. And that is your opinion ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you told them also that the only body that
could do that would be the foreign-language wartime control?
Mrs. Shea. In effect, yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. So then, since Mr. Cranston, or Mr. Denny,
M^anted to do something about it, and couldn't do it legally, you sug-
gested meeting with the Federal foreign-language radio wartime con-
trol and do indirectly what you couldn't do directly?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir. We were unable to handle the matter, so we
passed it on, openly, and without any color or pressure, to a group that
could handle it if it wished to.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, your desire was to control or to censor these
editorial comments, and you knew you couldn't do it, so you suggested
a meeting with the foreign-language radio wartime control ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Is that not what you told us before ?
Mrs. Shea. My desire was to get the problem off my desk, into the
hands of the group that could act on it if they wished to.
Mr. ]\Iachrowicz. And in order to see that it would be acted upon
by them, both you and Mr. Cranston went to a meeting with that
committee ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir; we went there or I went there — I can only
speak for myself — in order to call the matter to the attention of that
body.
Mr. Machrowicz. Call it what you may. But now I notice you
have a copy of the volume of the hearings of the committee investigat-
ing the Federal Communications Commission. I wish you would open
that book to page 3076. Do you have that page ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. There, if you note, you identified a letter that
was sent out on the week of May 24, 1944, as a result of that conference
you and Mr. Cranston had with the foreign-language radio wartime
control. Am I correct ?
Mrs. Shea. Would you read the question again, please, sir?
Mr. Machrowicz, As a result of the conference that you and Mr.
Cranston had with the members of the foreign-language radio war-
time control, this letter was sent out, which I am about to read. If
you will follow me, I will ask you if it is correct :
It is urgently recommended by the ofRcers of the foreign-language radio war-
time control that news and war commentators be requested to cease, immedi-
ately, the broadcasting of editorial or personal opinion.
Am I correct in that ?
Mrs. Shea. That is what the letter says ; yes.
Mr. Machrow^itz. That is what the Federal Communications Act
says you cannot do, so you passed it on to the foreign-language radio
wartime control to do what you couldn't do legally yourself; am I
right?
Mrs. Shea. That is your view of it, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Machrowicz. Well, you are asking them to cease immediately
the broadcasting of editorial and personal opinion, and you say
further this is especially hazardous in the Russian, Polish, and Croa-
tian situation ; right ?
Mrs. Shea. Sir, this isn't my letter.
2028 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Macheowicz. But that is the letter that resulted from the con-
ference you and Mr. Cranston had with the members of the foreign-
language radio wartime control after you advised the FCC that they
couldn't do this veiy thing legally; am I right?
Mrs. Shea. This is the letter that went out after that conference,
sir ; yes.
Mr. Maciirowicz. And that was after you advised the Federal
Communications Commission they coukbi't do that very thing legally.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, you have referred to page 2802, previously
in your testimony. What is that, on page 2802 ? Is that the letter ?
Mrs. Shea. No; this is part of the testimony of Mr. Denny, the
General Counsel.
Mr. Machrowicz. You referred, in your testimony a while ago, to
a commentator in Detroit who was known for his pro-Communist
comments ; is that right ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was his name Mr. Novak?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. And you knew about the fact that he was a pro-
Communist commentator ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. He never was suspended was lie i
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Congressman, the immediate matter that occasioned
Mr. Cranston's calling me, and my subsequent course of action in this
connection were the broadcasts of Mr. Novak. He was the commenta-
tor in Detroit who was complained about by the local Detroit office of
the OWI, and the question that was put before the radio wartime
control was precipitated precisely by Mr. Novak's broadcasts.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you consider his comment as derogatory to
the best interests of the United States ?
Mrs. Shea. As I testihed, this was Mr. Cranston's j^roblem. Mv.
Cranston put the question to the i-adio wartime control. I did not
participate in that part of the discussion at that meeting.
Mr. Machrowicz. But you do know that Mr. Novak was the pro-
Communist commentator ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Now, I will refer to that very page that you testi-
fied to, page 2802, Mr. Denny's testimony. I will refer you to what
was said then, "No specific complaints against Novak's alleged com-
munism were ever received by the Connnission in Washington.''
Do you find that in the third paragraph on the page ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz (reading) :
No specific complaints against Novak's alleged conimnnisni were ever received
by the Commission in Washington. The Commission's field representatives who
were apprised of the general situation in the Detroit area reported nothing in
Novak's program —
that is, the pro-Communist program —
which could be considered propaganda detrimental to the war effort, or other-
wise contrary to the public interest of the United States.
Is that correct?
Mrs. Shea. As far as you are reading, sir, yes.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2029'
Mr. IMACiiROWicz. That is Mr. Denny's testimony, is it not ?
Mrs. SiiEA, Mr. Denny goes on to testify further on that.
Mr. Machrowicz (reading) :
However, in any event there was no occasion for a Commission investigation
of Novalv's alleged communism.
There was evidently some reason to investigate the acts of Mr.
Kreutz, who was anti-Communist, but there was no occasion for a
Commission investigation of Novak's alleged communism. It was a
matter of public knowledge that Novak had been fully investigated
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Communist affiliations.
He had been indicted on December 11, 1942, in proceedings for de-
naturalization. Is that correct ?
Mrs. Shea. That is the testimony ; yes, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. You didn't think it was hazardous or your Com-
mission didn't think it was hazardous to the best interests of the United
States to permit a pro-Communist commentator to continue his broad-
casts in Detroit, but you thought it necessary to send letters to the
various radio stations warning against commentators who were anti-
Communist ?
Mrs. Shea, Mr. Congressman, the letter of Mr. Lang which you
previously read was occasioned precisely by Mr. Cranston's calling
Mr. Novak's broadcast to the attention of the radio wartime control.
.Vnd may I point out that ]\Ir. Denny's testimony goes on to say, "Mr.
Novak's program was canceled in February 1944."
Mr. Machrowicz. But that was by no action of the Federal Com-
munications Commission or by the foreign-language radio wartime
control, was it?
]Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. But the broadcasts which were anti-Communist
were censored and suspended because of action of the Federal foreign-
language radio wartime control.
Mrs. Shea. No, sir. I must disagree, sir.
jNIr. Machrowicz. You heard the testimony of these two gentlemen
that testified this afternoon ?
Mrs. Shea. They testified, so far as I followed their testimony, that
INIr. Lang's letter suggested a policy to the stations of curbing editorial
comment by both pro-Soviet and pro-Polish commentators, and that
whatever action was taken against people who failed to follow the
recommendation was taken exclusively by the station owners, not the
Commission.
Mr. Machrowicz. After a little prodding by the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, right.
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you agree with ]Mr. Denny's statement that
Mr. Novak, the Communist —
Mr. Novak's programs could not be considered propaganda detrimental to the
war effort or otherwise contrary to the public interests of the United States?
That is the third paragraph of page 2802,
Mrs, Shea. Mr. Denny is simply summarizing here the results of
analyses made of Novak's programs.
Mr. Machrowicz. Of course, in his opinion, the Communists like
Mr. Novak were much less dangerous than anti-Communists like Mr.
93744— 52— pt. 7 14
2030 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Kreutz, who tried to point out the Russian <Tuilt of the Katyn
massacre.
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Kreutz is a radio personality I had never encoun-
tered before, sir ; and I hesitate to testify at all on whether Mr. Denny
knew of him or what he thought of him. I can't.
Mr. Machrowicz. Have I misstated Mr. Denny's analysis of Mr.
Novak's broadcasts.
Mrs. Shea. Well, I think the statement speaks for itself.
Mr. Machrowicz. I think so, too.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Now, this report that my colleague read from, Mr.
Denny's report, did you have anything to do with the compiling of
that report?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir ; I compiled part of that material.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. You did?
Mrs. Shea. Yes.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Are you positive, in your statement, that whenever
you were confronted with a question of what can the FCC do about
these broadcasts, are you positive in your statement that you always
said as far as the FCC was concerned you were powerless ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. I am very glad to hear that, because if it isn't that
would be very bad.
Did you have anything to do with the drafting of that letter that
Mr. Machrowicz read?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir ; nothing whatever.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, your contention is that your posi-
tion in this entire matter was one of representing the legal arm of the
FCC, of that branch, and whenever you were confronted with the
question of what can you do about this objectionable commentator or
that objectionable commentator, your answer was always that as far
as the Commission was concerned under the Federal Communications
Act of 19.34, thev are powerless to do anything about it?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And to your knowledge, Mrs. Shea, you don't know,
do you, of any attempt that was ever made by the FCC by you or
any other employee to use the FCC to browbeat these radio station
owners who discharged what they considered to be objectionable
people?
Mrs. SiTEA. No, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. That is your contention?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir ; that is.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to interrupt for a mo-
ment. Will you refer
Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. Let the Congressman finish.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Go ahead.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you refer to part 1 ? You have it there, I be-
lieve. Page ()03. I would like to start reading for the members of
the committee. Mr. Richards is testifying before the same House
committee investigating the FCC, page 603 :
Mr. Howard was the hoad of tlie press section of censorship at that time. He
had some discussions with the Office of War Information with refiard to censor-
ship. I am not familiar with tlie discussion except that it toolc place on the basis
of whether Office of War Information was getting into our field, or whether we
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2031
-were getting into their field, and wliat the relationship should be under the
agreement we had reached.
Mr. Garey, the counsel to the committee, resumed reading, and he
had this to say :
Mrs. Shea called to ask whether or not it was true that this Office had relaxed
its censorship requirements among foreign-language stations by withdrawing
our request for English translations. I told her we had, after consultation with
Mr. Jack, of our censorship operating board. In reconstructing our conversation
from that point, I am relying on notes, and there mitiht be some slight error
but the general idea is as follows : Mrs. Shea said : "If you are not to ask the
managers of radio stations to examine the material on their stations, what curb
will there be on opinions expressed by some of these foreign-born broadcasters?"
I told her that in censorship we did not recommend any restrictions on expres-
sion of opinion, as long as such opinion did not cloak facts which would cross
codes. I reproved her mildly for suggesting that there should be such censor-
ship, and she said maybe she didn't mean opinion, maybe she meant propaganda
or the Government line. "Who," she asked, "is going to force these managers to
see to it that the propaganda on their stations follows the right pattern?"
"Somebody else, not us," I said.
This is a member of the Office of Censorship talking, who had
written this memorandum :
She said that there was a definite shadow zone in censorship which went
beyond the definitions contained in our codes, and some supervision should be
exercised in this zone "for the good of the war effort and for the good of the
people." I held stoutly to our function as censors for security. This bit had
the melody if not the lyrics of the score that the Office of War Information sang
to Mr. Howard.
"What would you think," Mrs. Shea asked, "if we in the Federal Communica-
tions Commission undertook to censor programs in this shadow zone." I told
Mrs. Shea I thought she would want to mull that over a long time before she
took definite action, because this office was charged with censoring. She then
rephrased her hypothesis. "What if we should merely suggest to station
managers that they should maintain only English ti'anslations in order to guide
properly the propaganda output of their stations?"
"That is coming pretty close to dictatorship in radio."
That is a comment by the counsel.
I told Mrs. Shea that suggestion from the Federal Communications Commission
might be unfortunate since it would countermand this office request, but that I
wouldn't presume to advise her on what the Federal Communications Com-
mission should do, beyond the fact that it should leave censoring to us. Mrs.
Shea said the Federal Communications Commission would not attempt to censor,
it would merely encourage managers to take fuller cognizance of their own re-
sponsibility. She asked me to think it over for a couple of days and see if my
mind changed. I assured her it wouldn't, and she recommended she check my
opinion by talking it over with Mr. Ryon.
Mrs. Shea, it seems that you were terribly interested as an attorney
for FCC in the censorship problem during the course of these hearings
that we have been quoting here. Now, Mr. Machrowicz has asked you
was Mr. Novak removed from the air, in Detroit, the pro-Communist?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Was he removed ?
Mrs. Shea. He was removed.
Mr. Mitchell. When?
Mrs. Shea. His contract was canceled
Mr. Machrowicz. You mean his contract was canceled and wasn't
renewed, is that right ?
2032 THE KATYN FOREST AIASSACRE
Mrs. Shea. On page 2803 of part 3 of the House committee record,
Mr. Denny testified that —
on February 7, 1944, the management of the station WJBK canceled its contract
with the Kay of Truth program.
That was Novak's program. Novak then sought a court injunction
against this action, and he failed to get judicial relief. He also asked
the Commission to intervene and the Commission replied that the
matter was outside its jurisdiction.
Mr. Mitchell. But the thing that this committee is trying to find
out is this : that the subject matter referred to the Polish commenta-
tors who were also our allies at that time, who were anti-Connnunist.
They seemed to be the ones that were having the difficulty, not Novak.
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I am sticking strictly on Polish. I am not speaking
of Italian or anything else.
Mrs. Shea. Mr. Denny's testimony, if you will read on page 2803 to
2804, and my testimony at the time — I can't testify on it from present
recollection — my testimony at the time was that in point of fact the
pro-Polish commentators continued very actively to present their
point of view in many instances.
Mr. Mitchell. And under very difficult conditions.
Now, why were you so specifically interested in the censorship policy
when you as an attorney for the FCC shouldn't have been in that field,
as Mr. Machrowicz pointed out from the statement of ^Ir. Denny, and
as you, yourself, have admitted when you talked to Cranston about it.
You said, "That isn't our i^roblem." Yet here is a memorandum to an
official committee of Congress, quoting members of the Office of Cen-
sorship.
Mrs. Shea. The memorandum from which you read was a memo-
randum, I believe, bv Mr. Richards?
Mr. Mitchell. That is correct.
Mrs. Shea. After numerous inaccuracies and personalities, he con-
cluded with one of the few accurate statements in the memorandum,
reasserting my recognition of the limitations of FCC authority in
the field.
Mr. Mitchell. What are you reading from? What page?
Mrs. Shea. House committee hearings, page 604 :
Mrs. Shea said the Federal Communications Commission would not try ta
censor. It would merely encourage managers to take fuller cognizance of tlieir
own responsibilities.
Mr. Mitchell. And that was in the line of duties?
Mrs. Shea. My duty was to make int^uiries as to whether managers
were exercising their licensing powers in the public interest.
Mr. Mitchell. Their licensing powers, that is correct?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir. I mean their licenses, excuse me.
Mr. IVIiTCiiELL. Their licenses.
Mrs. Shea. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, if I am correct in this — and maybe I am not
thoi-ougldy familiar with the operations of the FCC, 1 understand
that they have field offices for that specific job. I understand that they
also had investigators for that particular job.
Mrs. Shea. Do you moan the FCC?
Mr. MrrcHELL, The FCC.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2033
Mrs. Shea, May I-
Mr. Mitchell. And. they had monitoring stations.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir. May I amplify that statement? The prob-
lem under discussion in this memorandmn was specifically whether
station managers should require English translations of foreign-
language progi-ams and monitoring of the programs, so they could see
that their submitted scripts were adhered to. Now, that is a pro-
cedural problem, not related to the substance of the broadcast.
Mr. Mitchell. I know.
Mrs. Shea. And our inquiries as to whether the managers were
doing that, I think, were well within the scope of our authority.
Mr. Mitchell. As to procedure?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Not as to substance ?
Mrs. Shea. No, and that is not censorship.
Mr. Mitchell. As to procedure.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. That was your sole scope.
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. The commentator always files his broadcast, right,
Avhat he is going to talk about on the air? It is filed? It is just as
these Polish commentators had to file theirs ? If they complied with
what they filed, then they were in line, as far as the FCC is concerned.
That is procedure, as I understand it.
Mrs. Shea. Well, that was one of the questions we inquired into.
Mr. Mitchell. What that commentator had to say didn't make any
difference to the FCC ; correct?
Mrs. Shea. Precisely.
Mr. Mitchell. But yet all afternoon w^e have been getting at the
point that these Polish commentators were having their difficulties,
they were suspended, they were taken off the air, all because of this
meeting in New York.
Now, let me ask you a question : Wliy wasn't the Office of Censorship
present at that meeting in New York ? Were they invited to attend
that meeting in New York with Simon and Lang, Cranston and your-
self, by you? Did you invite them to attend? You?
Mrs. Shea. I don't remember precisely whether I invited them to
attend, but the record is clear that they were invited, and the Wash-
ington group refused to go.
Mr. Mitchell. Why did they refuse to go ?
Mrs. Shea. Well, I don't believe I am the person to answer that
question, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, didn't you extend the invitation to them?
You must have gotten a reason why they didn't want to go,
Mrs. Shea. I don't recall extending it. The invitation was extended,
but just now I can't recall who extended it,
Mr, Mitchell, No further questions.
Mr. Sheehan. Mrs. Shea, these meetings that we have reference to
over here, particularly the one that we have discussed most, the one
in New York, was that meeting initiated by the OWI, or was it initi-
ated by the FCC ?
Mrs. Shea. By Mr. Cranston.
Mr. Sheehan. He was with the OWI ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
2034 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. SiiEEHAisr. In other words, the FCC had nothing to do with ini-
tiating that particular meeting, is that correct?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. It was at the invitation of the Office of War
Information ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. That clears up a lot of things. Did you personally
have any hand in fixing the FCC policies in this respect, or were you
told to go and attend that meeting as a legal representative of that
division of the Federal Communications Commission? In other
words, was your attendance at that meeting of your own volition or
were you instructed to go by a higher authority in the Federal Com-
munications Commission ?
Mrs. Shea. I called Mr. Denny's office, and he authorized me to go.
Mr. Sheehan. After you were invited by the Office of War Infor-
mation to go to that meeting?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. And you got his authority to go ?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you, Mrs. Shea have any personal feelings of
your own pertaining to, well, particularly the Polish-Russian contro-
versy over Katyn ? Did you have any personal feelings in that matter
at ail?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Did any of your feelings ever come into that matter,
any of the decisions that you had to make when this matter came up?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. It was purely on your standing, legal standing, rep-
resenting the Federal Communications Commission?
Mrs. Shea. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. Now, this meeting that was finally called, in New
York, was that the result of OWI just calling the meeting, or was that
meeting called as a result of some complaints that they were receiving
over certain broadcasts?
Mrs. Shea. The local office of OWI wrote Cranston saying that it
had come to their attention that the Poles in Detroit were being upset
by this acrimonious controversy.
Mr. Sheehan. That clears up a lot of things for me.
Again, as far as you know, Mrs. Sliea, there definitely was not any
FCC threat to hold the license-renewal proposition, which is the blood
stream of the radio industry, as fas as you know there was no attempt
to scare them into thinking that their license would not be renewed,
if they did not conform ? You don't know of any such thing ?
Mrs. Shea. That is correct.
Mr. Sheehan. Well, did you have a feeling in these feelings that
have been outlined, Mrs. Shea, tliat probably the OWI was going
too far afield in its attempt to censoi- these broadcasts? That will
have to be conjecture on your part. Did you, anywhere down the
line, as these things developed, you yourself being a leo;al repre-
sentative of that division of FCC, get an inkling that somewhere down
the line they were trying to exert too much pressure down the line
of censorship? Did that feeling ever occur to you in the develop-
ments that transpired ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2035
Mrs. Shea. Actually I had little contact with the OWI. My
predecessors had worked more closely with them. I saw Mr. Cran-
ston very few times, and had barely a nodding acquaintance with him.
Mr. Sheehan. Did you at any time get the feeling that probably
the OWI, with your presence at this meeting representing a certain
legal division of the FCC, didn't you get the idea that probably, un-
knowingly to you but purposely known to them, the fact that they had
you there, that they could hold over their heads that you were repre-
senting the FCC, although you openly were not in any way connected
and you told them that you had no legal authority ? But didn't you
get the idea that with your very presence there that probably the OWI
was using you as a handle to whip these people into line? Did you
get that impression ?
Mrs. Shea. Well, I might have felt that had the persons involved
not been Mr. Lang and Mr. Simon. They had so repeatedly demon-
strated their complete immunity from intimidation of any kind,
particularly from the FCC.
]\ir. Machrowicz. May I ask you, were there any attempts of
intimidation ?
Mrs. Shea. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. How could they show immunity from intimida-
tion if there were no attempts of intimidation?
Mrs. Shea. The Cox committee hearing shows that there were
several disagreements on policy between the FCC and the Wartime
Control, and the OWI, and the Wartime Control, and that Mr. Simon
and Mr. Lang stuck to their position and carried it through every time.
Chairman Madden. Is there anotlier witness?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; there is one, but I would like to put just one
other statement in.
Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. Is there another witness after
this one ?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; just one.
Mrs. Shea is in Washington. We can recall her if we want to. I
would like to put Mr. Richards on now.
Chairman Madden. Well, Mrs. Shea, you stand by just for a little
while, and we will have Mr. Richards' testimony. If there are no
further questions of Mrs. Shea, she can stand by.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Richards, will you be sworn. Do you soL-
emnly swear the testimony you shall give before this committee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Richards. I do.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT K. RICHARDS, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Chairman Madden. State your name, please, your full name.
Mr. Richards. Robert K. Richards.
Chairman Madden. Where do you live, Mr. Richards?
Mr. Richards. 3458 Macomb Street NW., Washington.
Chairman Madden. What is your business ?
Mr. Richards. I am assistant to the president of the National Asso-
ciation of Radio and Television Broadcasters.
Chairman Madden. All right, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. What was your position during the wartime years f
2036 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Richards. Well, during most of them I was in the Office of
Censorship as the assistant to the Assistant Director in charge of
broadcasting.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the Office of Censorship ?
Mr. Richards. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore you had a great deal of business or work,
then, between the FCC and the OWI ; is that correct?
Mr. Richards. Yes, yes ; of course.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you briefly state — I know it is already in the
record of the congressional committee which investigated the FCC
in 194.3, l)ut I would like you to briefly summarize for the committee
the difficulties that the Office of Censorship had to the extent where the
problem had to be referred to the Attorney General.
Mr. Richards. Well, you carry me back pretty far, Mr. Mitchell, but
I will tell 3^ou as my memory serves me about the specific problem we
encountered, some of which has emerged in testimony I have been
able to hear this afternoon. The OfKce of Censorship was established
by Executive order of the President, and his wartime power as the
censor over domestic communications was passed along by Executive
order to the Director of Censorship, Mr. Price, who in turn delegated
such actions as he wished to delegate to various staff members. Censor-
ship was established under Mr. Price's direction, and the advice of
our policy-control board, domestically, among the press and the broad-
casters as a voluntary effort. We established voluntary procedures
for stations, for example, to follow, areas in which, as unit identifica-
tion of ships sailing, the security of the Nation could be violated.
Broadcasters were asked to voluntarily observe these guidepoints.
Mr. Mitchell. That was the code.
Mr. Richards. That was the voluntary code of wartime practices.
In the course of establishing this system among the broadcasting sta-
tions of the country, we had one specific problem that was peculiar
to broadcasting, I guess, because we were dealing with about, 150 to
200 so-called foreign-language broadcasting stations employing as
many as 35 or 40 different languages. The committee may even be
interested in knowing that one of those languages we encountered was
Cajon, and it was pointed out to us that it wasn't a foreign language
and they didn't have an alphabet. We set up these special controls
i-n the case of foreign-language broadcasting stations. In the course
of operating this vohmtary system we did encounter, if I may use the
term, an inclination on the part of other executive agencies, and I
ascribe no idterior motives to them, to invade the area of censorship
which properly was vested in the Office of Censorship. We felt this
was dangerous, not that we were jealous of our authority, but most of
us being out of the public media we were zealous about what would
happen to that authority after the war was over. Among the agencies
where we encountered this, and I believe your record in the select-
conunittee investigation reflects this, were the OWI and the Federal
(]omnuinications Connnission. As a matter of fact, at one time, the
situation reached a point where Mr. Price, as Director of tlie Office
of Censorship, asked Mr. Ryan, as assistant in charge of broadcasting,
who in turn asked Mr. Bronson and me to find out what was going on,
and if there was an invasion of censorship and if we were sacrificing
our responsibility to some other agency, to stop it.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2037
We did investigate it, and again I say, ascribing no motives, we did
encounter an interest on the part of the Other agencies in censorship,
and it was stopped, in an agreement between INIr. Price and Mr. Davis,
and certainly in agreement between Mr. Price and the Commission.
Mr. Mitchell. Could you give us then a few specific ilhistrations,
not too elaborate, but just one that you can recall, where the occasion
was necessary to go to the extent of getting the Attorney General to
rule, barring these other agencies from the field of censorship ^
Mr. Richards. Well, yes. Again this is going back quite a way, and
I think the record in the select-committee investigation would be
more accurate than my recollection. But I recall that at least one
foreign-language broadcaster, I believe his name was Andre Luotto,
w^as either removed from the air or his reputation was apparently
somewhat damaged, as a result of the enthusiasm of people employed
by agencies other than ours to enter into a consideration of the type
of broadcasting that was going on the air.
By that, I mean opinion, the opinions that were being expressed.
I think that is one specific case. Doubtless there are others. They
must be available to you.
Mr. Mitchell. Did a member of the Office of Censorship attend
this meeting in Xew York with JNIr. Simon and Mr. Lang^
Mr. Richards. Well, if I am thinking of the same meeting tluit you
have been discussing here, no.
Mr. Mitchell. Were they invited to attend, do you recall ?
Mr. Richards. It is my recollection we were invited to attend ; yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you recall why you did not attend ''i
Mr. Richards. Well, yes. We felt that it wasn't properly within
the scope of our activity to discuss what should be done about a com-
mentator, expressing an opinion on the air. unless that opinion con-
tained facts endangering the security of the Nation.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, the primary duty of censorship was in
the Office of Censorship ; it rested in the hands of your organization.
That was determined.
Mr. Richards. Absolutely ; definitely.
Mr. Mitchell. Therefore, this particular meeting in New York,
to which the OC was invited, but which no member of the OC at-
tended was — Did you hear all of the testimony this afternoon here?
Mr. Richards. I came in toward the end of Mr. Lang's testim.ony,
I believe.
Mr. Mitchell. All right. In your opinion, on recollection today,
it was in the field of censorship, Ijecause it concerned comments by a
Polish commentator?
Mr. Richards. Well, any time you use any method to stop freedom
of speech, it enters into the area of abridging it, and that, I presume,
constitutes censorship, yes. In other words, it was our assumption,
gentlemen, that taking a man off the air was censorship as much as
putting a blue pencil on his copy.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to read for the record, page 612 of the
committee investigation, part I, Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Garey is talking to you.
Chairman Madden. When was this letter sent?
2038 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Mitchell. This memorandum is dated May 15, 1943 —
Now, you received from Mr. Bronson a memorandum dated May 15, 1943, on
the further talk he had with Mrs. Shea, did you not?
Mr. Richards replies, "Yes, sir."
Mr. Garey. That memorandum is dated May 15, 1943. It is addressed to Mr.
Ryan and Mr. Richards, and it is from Mr. Bronson. The subject is, Now My
Week Is Complete. It reads : "Up until 3 : IG p. m. today there had been some-
thing lacking in the week's activities, and then the phone rans and it was Mrs.
Shea, attorney for the FCC. She asked if I was retaining my figure — personal
item — and then went on to inquire if we would be interested in the latest wrinkle
between the Office of War Information, Federal Communications, and the Foreign
Language Radio Wartime Control. I assured her I was the kind of a person
who was interested in just an average wrinkle, but one like that was most
intriguing. She went on to say that the Federal Communications Commission
(herself), the Oflice of War Information (Mr. Cranston), and the Foreign Lan-
guage Radio Wartime Control Committee (Mr. Simon and Mr. Lang) had met
in New York last Wednesday for a cozy little chat on what to do about the
broadcasters coming to blows over the Russian-Polish situation. It was agreed
in this event that the foreign-language broadcasters would read only the news as
received in the stations, via the recognized news printers, and not allow any
commentary on this topic. She wanted to know if I had been asked to attend
would I have gone."
Evidently they didn't, I am sorry.
"I said that most likely I would have, or that someone from this Office would
have done so, but I supposed the parties involved assumed it was a discussion
that did not involve censorship, therefore we weren't asked. Mrs. Shea rallied
quickly by saying that it was Mr. Cranston who put out the invitation. I later
learned from Mr. Ryan that we had been invited to send a representative but
had declined. Mr. Ryan said Mr. Cranston had asked us to attend but due to
pressure of other work, and the unlikelihood that the meeting would concern
censorship, no one from this Office went. Then she said that she recalled seeing
a letter by Mr. Price or Mr. Ryan urging the controversial issue should be treated
quietly and not ballooned up, as it were. (She is referring here to the Russian-
Polish impasse, I believe.) I said I was unfamiliar with such a letter, and then
she said Mr. Marks at her elbow had just advised that the letter was signed by
Mr. Ryan and would be in Mr. Ryan's files. She then said that she siipposed
Mr. Simon's outfit was putting out something about the New York office and
was that all right with us. I said this office was not concerned with it since we
had no part of the meeting, unless the bulletin crossed into censorship problems
or quoted or inferred that we were a party to such a release. In the latter
event, it should be submitted here. She said she didn't know just how the Foreign
Language Radio Wartime Control Committee went about such things, and we
both rambled along about what we didn't know. She then said that our relations,
Government agencies involved and broadcasters, should be more formalized so
that we would all know what was going on. Having had the feeling now for 9
months that I was trying to watch the entire field of play through a knothole, and
a sturdy oak knothole at that, I agreed, as we have agreed to such things before.
She then hung up on our mutual pledges of cooperation. Two minutes later at
3 : 31 she called back to say she had forgotten something."
That was on another subject matter other than the Polish-Russian
situation.
Now, that letter in the record definitely shows that, (1) no member
of OC went to the New York meeting; (2) the reason for not going to
that meeting was because no censorship problem was supposed to have
been involved.
Now that you have heard the testimony of this afternoon, and par-
ticularly that of Mr. Kreutz — did you hear his testimony?
Mr. Richards. I was here, but I didn't hear it very well. I was in
the back of the room. But I think I sot it.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2039
Mr. Mitchell. "Would you say that the subject matter was within
the scope of censorship or within the scope of FCC and OWI ? I am
asking for an opinion.
Mr. Richards. Well, I would say it is my opinion it was not within
the scope of censorship. Others would have to speak as to whether or
not they thought it was within their scope.
Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions.
Chairman Madden. Any further questions ?
Mr. Machrowicz. It is your opinion that the section of the FCC
attempting to control the commentaries on this matter was strictly
improper, irregular, and outside of their jurisdiction, is it not?
Mr. Eichards. Yes, sir. Of course the Communications Act forbids
censorship.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is right. And that was your impression at
this time?
Mr. Eichards. It was certainly our impression that that was their
intent, and that they shouldn't do it. It was our proper responsibility.
Mr. Machrowicz. Can you see anything that was outlined here,
other than an attempt to intimidate these broadcasters ?
Mr. Eichards. I have testified to that at some length before, Mr.
Congressman, and I think that my answer is evident in the record that
was previously made at the time.
Chairman Madden. Thank you for your testimony.
We will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 5 : 25 p. m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a. m., Wednesday, November 12, 1952.)
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1952
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre,
Washington, D. G.
The committee met at 10 a, m., pursuant to call, in room 1301, House
Office Building, Hon. Ray J. Madden (chairman) presiding.
Present: Messrs. Madden, Machrowicz, Donclero, O'Konski, and
Sheehan.
Also present : John J. Mitchell, chief counsel to the select commit-
tee, and Roman Pucinski, chief investigator.
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order. Will you
proceed, Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of today's hearings
before the committee is to put forth the documentation of the records
that were in the Government agencies on the subject of the Katyn
massacre and \\\^ missing Polish officers.
You will recall that yesterday Mr. Jackson said that if sufficient
documentation had been available at the time of Nuremberg, the case
would not have been brought up at Nuremberg. At least the hands of
the United States Government, namely, Mr. Justice Jackson at that
time, would have been able to prevent it or would have been strength-
ened.
Now, through the cooperation of the Department of State, the com-
mittee has had made available to it all of the records that have been
in the file since early 1942. This morning we have as the first witness
former Ambassador William Standley, a retired admiral of the United
States Navy.
At the time that Admiral Standley was Ambassador, he had con-
ferences with Maj. Joseph Czapski and General Anders, and he had
instructions from the State Department to assist the Polish cause.
Admiral Standley, in the opinion of the committee staff, having
carefully read all of the documentation, predicted
Chairman INIadden. Let him testify. That will be his testimony.
Mr. Dondero. Let him take the stand.
Chairman ]NLvdden. I should think that the witness himself, if he
desires to refresh his mind, can refer to the letters. We can then
introduce the letters in evidence ; and, if the witness desires to refresh
his mind, we will be glad to submit the letters to him.
Mr, Mitchell. Call the first witness, please.
Chairman ISIadden. Admiral Standley.
2041
2042 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. STANDLEY, UNITED STATES
NAVY, RETIRED, CORONADO, CALIF.
Chairman Madden. Admiral, will you raise your riglit hand and be
sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
give the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God ?
Admiral Standlet. I do.
Chairman Madden. Admiral, for the record, will you state your
full name, please ?
Admiral Standley. William H. Standley.
Chairman Madden. And your address, please?
Admiral Standley. 862 G Avenue, Coronado.
Chairman Madden. California?
Admiral Standley. Yes, California.
Chairman Madden. What is your capacity now ?
Admiral Standley, I am an admiral on the retired list.
Chairman Madden. Will you proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Standley, will you please tell the committee
what date you reported to Moscow as the Ambassador for the United
States ?
Admiral Standley. I think it was the 14th of April 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you, at this time, like to make a statement
-to the committee of your knowledge of the missing Polish officers and
the Katyn massacre, stating what efforts you made and what instruc-
tions you may have had, sir? A brief statement, if you wish.
Admiral Standley. Of course, the committee will recognize that
this situation occurred some 10 or 11 years ago and that, naturally,
my memory is rather deficient in the facts of the case. I have told
your counsel that I had made a complete statement concerninj}: my
relations with the Polish situation, including the Katyn Forest
nmrder, and that it was published in the Naval Institute Proceedings
of October. That statement, that article in the Institute contains a
complete notation of my connections with the Polish situation in
Moscow and the Katyn Forest murder.
Chairman Madden. Admiral, October of what year?
Mr. Mitchell. This year.
Admiral Standley. That was October of this year, the current
Now, naturally, my association or connection with the Polish situa-
tion began even before I was named as the future Ambassador to
Moscow. When I went into Moscow with the Beaverbrook-Harriman
mission in September, 1941, the Polish situation was being discussed
there then, and I became cognizant of the general situation, the fact
that the Russians had seized a great many Polish soldiers when they
invaded east Poland and had taken some 10,000 Polish officers.
The effort was being made then to locate these Polish officers
especially.
When I was named as Ambassador to Pussia in the latter part of
1941 and when I was confirmed, I was immediately importuned by
many agencies or many individuals who were interested in the 10,000
Polish officers, that is, in their location and in whether or not thoy were
alive, and everything concerned with them.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2043
As soon as I arrived in Moscow — I had received a briefing before I
left Washington as to the questions I should take up. Even before I
made my report to Mr. Kalinin, the President of the Soviet Union,
I received a message from the State Department advising me that I
was not to take up any of those questions that I had previously been
briefed upon, a message which I didn't understand, and about which
I protested immediately.
But that left me in a position where I couldn't take up the Polish
question on my first interview with Mr. Molotov.
Chairman Madden. Who gave you those admonitions or instruc-
tions?
Admiral Standley. They were general instructions and briefing
from various individuals in the State Department. I think Mr. Sum-
ner Welles was one of them, the Secretary himself. There were various
other officials. I can't now recall just who they were, but they were
from various individuals in the State Department.
So, as I say, I could not and I did not take up these Polish questions.
INIy first interview with Mr. JNIolotov and my first interview with
Mr. Stalin — I would like to refresh my memory from this article — ■
the first occasion when I took this matter up was in an interview with
Mr. Stalin some time in April 1942. At that time I told Mr. Stalin
of the knowledge I had of the missing Polish officers.
Well, let me go back. Even before that, on my way into Moscow,
on arrival at Teheran, I found that there were 28,000 Polish soldiers
that had been evacuated with their families and children from Russia.
I ins])ected this camp with their children and with their people in it,,
and observed the terrible condition that these people, and particularly
the children, were in. They were in all stages of malnutrition, some
of them practically dying. It was a terrible situation, indicating the
conditions under which the Poles had been existing, particularly the
women and children, in Russia.
As I say, my first interview with Mr. Molotov in which I mentioned
this was some time after the 14th of April. Then I advised him of my
knowledge of the situation and of my interest in the Polish situation.
No satisfaction whatever was obtained from Mr. Molotov at that
time, and there was only a casual mention of the fact that I was
interested in the Polish question, and that I came from the United
States Government, whicli was also interested in this question of tlit
situation and location of these Polish officers.
At that tim.e the interpreter, Mr. Pablov, advised me that Mr.
Molotov had a question which he wished to take up wdth me, and that
it was the desire of the American Government to set up in Moscow
an American officer as liaison between the Russians and the Poles.
Mr. Molotov expressed the view that he saw no reason for such liaison
as the naval attaches and the military attaches were there and that
the Poles had their own liaison. I knew nothing of the question, so
I did nothing about that.
As you will recall, the Government had been evacuated to Kuibyshev,
and the representatives there were Mr. Vyshinski and Mr, Lozovski,
Mr, Molotov had gone to Kuibyshev, but had returned to Moscow.
]Mr, Stalin had never gone to Kuibyshev, but had remained in Moscow.
So we had to start our negotiations with the seat of government in
Moscow or rather in Kuibyshev, and then go up to Moscow to get
2044 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
the answer because Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Lozovski never made any
decision on anything. So we had to go to Moscow to get your answer
from Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stalin. That necessitated trips back and
forth.
When I went down to Kuibyshev, I met Dr. Kot. Dr. Kot at
that time was the Polish Ambassador or Minister, I think " « \vas, to
the Soviet Government. Immediately began a contact with tiit r^olish
representative in regard to the missing Polish officers and me: From
then on there was almost a constant conversation between ir. Kot
and myself as long as he stayed there — Mr. Kot, the Polish repre-
sentative, and the Ambassador.
My next contact with the Russian authorities was on May 27, 1942,
when I went to see Mr. Vyshinski. My conversation at that time with
Mr. Vyshinski was along these lines : That our Government was con-
cerned with the welfare, situation, and location of these officers and
was very anxious tliat there should be friendly relations between the
exiled Polish Government in London and the Russians, and I urged
that there should be close cooperation and a greater effort on tlie part
of the Russians to conform to the agreements they had made with the
Poles in regard to the release of Polish officers and men.
There was an agi-eement at that time in regard to the release of these
officers in order that they could serve under General Anders in the
war effort. The 28,000 Polish soldiers that had been released, the
troops that had been released and that I had found in Teheran later
served with General Anders in the Italian campaign ; and there was an
understanding that more of these officers and men should be released.
My efforts in the beginning were to obtain further cooperation with
the Polish Government. Then later I souglit an interview with ISIr.
Molotov in the Kremlin.
Mr. Machrowicz. What was the reaction of Mr. Molotov and of INIr.
Vyshinski at that time to your requests?
Admiral Standley. As I expressed it then and as I have quoted,
Mr. Vyshinski was silent for a long time while looking doAvn at his
hands folded on the table before him. The color flooded into the thin
face. Finally he looked around at me and said, 'T will present your
views to my government."
Later I had an interview with Mr. Molotov, and I presented tlie
same views to Mr. Molotov. Mr. INIolotov made a long statement in
reply. It was, in substance, that the Polish question was a very diffi-
cult question to deal with, that to evacuate these women and
children
At that time our Government had a proposition to evacuate these
Poles from Russia and relieve the Russians from taking care of theuT
and sending tliem down somewhere in Africa, North Africa, or some-
where else. That was part of my interview with Mr. Molotov at this
time.
Mr. Molotov's reply was in substance as follows : "If we had evacu-
ated the Polish women and children in the beginning, it would have
been all right. Put to evacuate them now would give the Germans
the idea tliat we couldn't take care of them. It would create a dis-
turbance, and we just feci that we are not in a position now to evacu-
ate these women and children and soldiers."
Chairman Maddkn. Will you pardon me. Ambassador. I hand you
a telegram dated Moscow, July 5, 1942, to the Secretary of State,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2045
Washington, signed "Standley," and ask if that is the telegram that
you sent to Washington as of that date ?
Admiral Standley. That is the telegram.
Chairman Madden. I will ask the reporter to mark it as exhibit 9
and insert it at this point into the record.
(The document referred to was marked exhibit 9 and follows :)
Exhibit 9- -Tf'^.egram From Ambassador Standley to the Departments of State
-i)
jr [Paraphrase of telegram]
Moscow, July 5, 1942.
Secret art of State,
Washington.
In describing to Molotov the Polish evacuation project, I expressed the sincere
hope of the U. S. Government that the Soviet authorities would allow the
evacuation of the Polish women and children concerned. I based this on the
opinion of the U. S. Government that the women and children in question could
be taken care of more easily in a country where there was no lighting in progress,
and also on the fact that the evacuation of these women and children would
make it unnecessary for the Soviet Union to feed and care for them.
This was not a simple evacuation question, Molotov said, which would not
be an important matter. The question involved was really a fundamental problem
affecting the basic relations between the Soviet Union and Poland. He added
that the question might have been satisfactorily disposed of if this group had
been evacuated along with the first group, although there was no certainty that
this would have solved the matter, since there were always difficulties where
Poles were concerned. A second evacuation could create added difficulties and
instability among the Poles in the Soviet Union, and unfriendly comment against
the Soviet Union among the Poles in that part of Poland which was occupied
by Germany, as well as in the world in general, inasmuch as it would most
certainly be said that the Soviet Union was not able to feed and care for the
Poles in question and therefore had to send them to Africa. Molotov said that
during his recent visit to London he had suggested to Sikorski that an attempt
be made to better the situation of the Poles in the Soviet Union, but he did not
elaborate to me about how this should be done. Molotov said, however, that
the Poles could and would be fed by the Soviet Government. He stated that
he would bring our interests in the matter to the attention of his government.
Later Molotov referred to the general Polish question with a certain animosity,
saying, in effect : "Since there are many too many contradictory elements con-
cerned in Polish politics, there is always trouble whenever Polish questions arise."
Some of these elements are conducting policies unfriendly to the Soviet Union
in contradiction to the policies of the London Polish Government. Molotov said,
and even the sternest measures failed to subordinate these elements to Soviet
law. Although other elements wished to foster friendly relations with the
Soviet Government, and tried to do so, it is in general impossible to reconcile the
two groups.
My impression on leaving was similar to that I received when I last discussed
Polish matters with Vyshinski, namely, that the Soviet Government has a purely
political view of this whole question, and that it is not influenced by considera-
tions of humanity. It is displeased and even irritated when another power takes
an interest in Soviet-Polish relations.
( Signed ) Standley.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Ambassador, if you have no further com-
ment, I will ask you to identify a message from Secretary of State
Hull to you of August 19, 1942.
Admiral Standley. This is a portion of a telegram. I would like
to say that this covers an interview which comes later on.
Mr. Mitchell. The Ambassador says that he has some further com-
ments to make apropos exhibit 9.
Chairman Madden. All right; proceed, Admiral.
Admiral Standley. In the succeeding months after this interview
with Mr. ]\Iolotov, my notes show that the Polish situation in con-
93744— 52— pt. 7 15
2046 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
nection witli the Polish military units and civilians still in Russia
steadily worsened. When the Nazis and the Italians became estab-
lished in Egypt that fall and almost stabbed into Alexandria,
threatened the whole Middle East, the Russian Govermnent agreed
to allow three divisions of Poles and members of their families to
leave Russia for the Middle East.
The Polish military authorities were trying to obtain the release
of 10,000 officers whom they needed badly, but were rejjeatedly ]Hit
off. No reasons or excuses were given. General Anders and Dr. Kot
were not informed. That is hearsay ; I can't testify as to that.
I w^as informed that General Anders and Dr. Kot were not informed
that the Germans had captured the prison camps before the Poles
could be evacuated or that they had been transferred to other camps
or indeed anything at all as far as the Polish authorities could learn.
These officers had suddenly and completely disappeared from the
face of the earth. That was shortly after my interview with Mr.
Molotov.
Chairman Madden. x\bout what date was that. Admiral?
Admiral Standley. My interview with jSIr. jNIolotov was after July.
That was about August, I think, 1942. It was after my interview
and after that telegram that I sent in regard to my interview with
Mr. Molotov.
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, I would like to ask you this : Do you know
who made the decision to forget the idea of having Colonel Szymanski
go to Moscow as the liaison officer?
Admiral Standley. The decision came through a telegram from the
State Department. I don't know who made the decision.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Standley. A telegram of that kind ahvays came, of course,
from the State Department; so, I presume the Secretary of State made
the decision.
Chairman Madden. Admiral, we will mark this exhibit 10, and I
will ask the court reporter to insert exhibit 10 at this point in the
record.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 10" and is as
follows:)
ExHIltIT 10
POUTION OF ]\Il<:SSAGE FKOM SkcKETARY OF STATE HUI.T. TO THE AmKKIOAN
Ambassador at Kuibyshev of August 19, 1942
* * * On instructions fi-om the Polisti Government, tlie I'olish Amhassjidor
in Washington lias asked tlie I'residenfs intei'veiition witli the Soviet Gov-
ernment in or<l(M' to effect an improvement in I'olisli-Soviet relations. * * *
* * * Referring to the hope which he expi'essed on several occasions that
the Soviet Government would tind it jiossihle to interpret as liberally as cir-
cumstances would permit its agreements with the Polish Government, the
Ambassador iiarticularly mentioned the desire of the Polish (Jovernment to
restart recruitinii of its nationals in Russia for the Polish armed forces and
filKo to tlie f/r.s-//T for the rrlcdsr of some fire to rif/lit tlioiiKiiu<] J'olifih officcru
who are reported still lieJtl Inj the Sloriet authorities. * * *
* * * You are therefore authorized to raise witii the Soviet authorities
the ([uestion of Soviet-Polish relations. You should point out that this Gov-
ernment liojies liiat the spirit of collaboration evidenced jji (he removal to the
Middle East of additional Polish divisions may be promoted to the utmost and
that there will I)e found for the various prol)lems mutually beneficial solu-
tions. ♦ ♦ *
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2047
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, you have told us that they were
forming the Polish Army in Russ'ia at that time. Can you tell us
something about the formation of that army that you may have
found out from your discussions with General Anders and Dr. Kot?
Admiral Standley. My onlj^ information in connection with that
was very general. I have no detailed knowledge of the military set-
up or organization except through my conversation with Dr. Kot.
Now, I would like to inject there as part of this, before I get to
that message, what was happening in the interim. The Polish
situation, as I stated, was definitely worsening, as was the ques-
tion of the Polish representatives receiving Polish supplies that Avere
being sent in for the Polish citizens into Murmansk and into Arch-
angel. The Soviet authorities eventually seized those officials and
finally got rid of all of them, and there was no oiie there to repre-
sent the Polish interests in receiving goods that were sent in for the
Poles.
Our rejiresentative there endeavored to take that over, but he
eventually found that the problem Avas one that he couldn't handle.
So that was part of the situation.
The Polish situation was worsening up to the time this message was
sent. Then I have this message in August 1942, when I received the
dispatch that you have just read. I have quoted here extracts from
that dispatch. ^ Shall I read that?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir, if you please.
Admiral Standley. In August 1942, I received a dispatch from
our State Department, the conclusion of which may be paraphrased as
follows. I am not quoting, but rather paraphrasing. [Reading:]
The question of Polish-Soviet relations may be bi-ought up at your discretion
with the Soviet authorities. While the United States Government does not
wish to interfere in-this matter, you may point out it nevertheless hopes that
the splendid collaboration shown in transferring additional Polish divisions to
the ^Middle East may l)e furthered to the maximum. It is also hoped that solu-
tions whii-h are mutually beneticial may be found for the various problems under
discussion.
At the same time, it is realized tliat only direct negotiations between the two
governments involved can effect a solution of some of these extremely compli-
cated problems.
That is the end of the paraphrase.
Chairman Maddex. "Will you proceed, Mr. Slieehan.
Mr. SnEEiiAx. Ambassador, just to get the situation straight, as
I understand, when you left Washington from Moscow you were
given insti'uctions to be concerned with Polish affairs. After you
got to Moscow, as you said, you got instructions not to pay any atten-
tion to Polish affairs.
Admiral Staxdley. It didn't mention Polish affairs specifically.
Mr. SiiEEHAX. The missing officers?
Admiral Staxdley. When I was being briefed I was given infor-
mation on matters that I should take up, and the- Polish question
was one of them. "When I got to Moscow and before I submitted my
credentials in Moscow, I received a telegram from the State Depart-
ment saying that I was not to take up any of these questions that
I had been briefed on before I left. -They didn't mention the Polish
question specifically.
2048 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Sheehan. Then in 1942, accorcling to the telegram that yon
jnst read, you o:ot instructions to go forward with the Polish qi'u's-
tion ; namely, the Polish officers ?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. Now, did they give you any information as to why j
they were interested n the Polish officers at that time? Was it for
humanitarian reasons or was it for military reasons?
Admiral Standi>ey. They w^ere interested both from the standpoint
of the military as well as because of the humane reason of getting the
Polish citizens out.
Mr. Sheehan. In other words, we had now reached a position
where we needed the Polish divisions and thereby needed the officers
to man the divisions; is that right?
Admiral Standley. That is as I understood the message to me;
yes.
Now, in order to get that message across, I sought an interview with
Mr. Lozovski, and I met Mr. Lozovski on September 9, 1942.
Mr. Machrowicz. Will you explain who Mr. Lozovski is?
Admiral Standley. JNIr. Lozovski was one of the Soviet Foreign
Office representatives in Kuibyshev. As I previously stated, Mr.
Vyshinski and Mr. Lozovski remained in Kuibyshev as the repre-
sentatives of the Soviet Government. So, I sought an interview with
Mr. Lozovski, which was granted on September 9, 1942.
In that interview, as I stated in the paraphrase, our Government
stated that they did not want to interfere. Mr. Lozovski came right
back and said, "'Tliis is the best thing that the American Government
could do."
In furthering the purpose as expressed in that paraphrased message,
I still pressed the question of the status of the Polish relief and that of
the 180 Polish officers that had been delegates and who had been
arrested in Murmansk and Archangel. Mr. Lozovski again came right
back bluntly and said, "This work can be carried on by. the remaining
delegates in a perfectly satisfactory manner. There were too many
delegates in the first place. We can't have a bunch of hostile Poles
running all over the Soviet Union unsupervised."
Again I expressed to Mr. Lozovski the hope that they could collabo-
rate with us further.
Chairman Madden. I will ask the reporter to mark this document
^'Exhibit 11", and I will ask the admiral if he can identify it. It is
a message from the Secretary of State.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 11" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit 11
Portion of Message from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassadob
AT Kuibyshev, Dated September 5, 1942
Mr. Willkie was requested by the President to consult with you and Mr. Hender-
son and then express to Stalin the American Government's hope that all efforts
will he made to effect an improvement in Polish-Soviet relations. * * *
The Polish Ambassador today asked whether there had been any representa-
tions for the release of "3,400" I'olish otficcrs who are reportedly still held by the
Soviet authorities in Arctic areas. .You may make these representations to-
gether with Mr. Willkie or separately. * * *
Mr. Mitchell,. Admiral, can you tell us something about what tran-
spired at that time? How did Mr. Willkie get into this picture?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2049
Admiral Standley. As I stated in that message which I recognize
as one received from the State Department, Mr. Willkie arrived in
Moscow witli his statf, I think, on September 17. I immediately took
Mr. Willkie to call upon Mr. Molotov. At that meeting Mr. Molotov
was asked to arrange for a meeting of Mr. Willkie and Mr. Stalin, to
which he agreed. As we were leaving, Mr. Willkie said to Mr. Stalin,
"How will I be informed of that meeting ?"
Chairman Madden. Not to Mr. Stalin ?
Admiral Standley. To Mr. Molotov, "How will I be informed of
that meeting?"
Mr. Molotov replied, "You will be informed through the American
Embassy."
I waited for some time. In the meantime Mr. Willkie's plans had
been made so that he could visit certain plants, and one morning we
were to go out to visit an aircraft battery. Before leaving — I had left
Eddy Page behind ; Eddy Page was my State Department represent-
ative who spoke Russian fluently — I said to Eddy, "I am going to
accompany Air. Willkie to this aircraft battery, and, if they have not
heard anything about Mr. Willkie's interview with Mr. Stalin, I want
you to make an appointment for me to see Mr. Molotov, because I don't
understand the delay. When a special representative from a foreign
government arrives here and asks to see Mr. Stalin, I don't understand
why there is this delay."
So, I went over to Mr. Willkie's residence, the residence that is kept
there for Americans. They had a guard at the door, a Russian who
spoke English. When I went in and asked Commander Peale, who was
Mr. Willkie's brother-in-law and who had accompanied him, whether
Mr. Willkie had received any word about a visit with Mr. Stalin,
Commander Peale replied "No."
But the man at the door had said, "Oh, yes, Mr, Willkie has informa-
tion. He is going to see Mr. Stalin tonight."
That was the hrst I had heard of Mr. Willkie's visit to Mr. Stalin.
Later I understood that this meeting was arranged by Mr. Joe Barnes,
who accompanied Mr. Willkie, and through some of the Reds over
tliere, the reddest of the Reds, Mr. Omanski, and Mr. Lozovski and
some of those other Red Russians. They had arranged for this meet-
ing with Mr. Willkie.
So, I promptly telephoned Page to never mind, that the meeting
had been arranged. On the way out I said to Mr. Willkie, "I under-
stand that you have received an invitation to call on Mr. Stalin. You
remember that you were informed that you would get that information
through the Embassy, but I have received no information about it, Mr.
Willkie. I wonder if you had anything to do with this interview?"
His reply was, "No, I had nothing to do with it."
Then I said, as this had been arranged for Mr. Willkie entirely
without my knowledge, "I presume that I am not supposed to go with
you ? "
Mr. Willkie said, "That is correct. You are not supposed to go."
I said, "Well, Mr. Willkie, I am going to make some inquiries about
that, because I can't understand how the Ambassador has been by-
passed here by a special representative, and I want to know why."
"Oh," he said, "Admiral, you mustn't do that. I think you are a big
man, but, if you do that I think you are a little man."
2050 THE KATYX FOREST MASSACRE
I give you that because that in a sense describes my rehitions with
Mr. Willkie durinfr his time there. He entirely bypassed me, and later
on he went to see Mr. Stalin. They brought Mr. Barnes and Mr. Coles
in and had their pictures taken together, from which, of course, the
Ambassador was excluded. Their whole attitude there was one to dis-
credit the American representative in the Soviet Union. Those were
really my relations with Mr. Willkie while he was there.
Now, after that interview^, Mr. Willkie was leaving the next morn-
ing at 4 o'clock to go to the front. So, about 11 o'clock at night he
called me up and asked if he could come back and tell me what Mr.
Stalin had said.
I said, "Well, Mr. Willkie, it is too late now. You are going to
leave at 4 o'clock. Tell me when you come back."
So, when he did come back he came over and gave me some informa-
tion and then told me that he had received some other information
which was so secret that lie couldn't even tell it to the American
Ambassador.
As a result of this whole episode of IMr. Willkie, I asked the State
Department to bring me home for consultation in that the situation
had gotten sort of out of hand and I felt that I needed some evidence
of confidence in the representative from the President of the United
States if I were to remain in Moscow. So, I came home for consul-
tation.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you come home, sir?
Admiral Standley. I left there in September of 1942. I am sorry.
That should be October 10, 1942. I came home then, I went back
in January and reported back on January 6, 1943.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce
this document.
Mr. DoNDERO. While the Chairman is looking that over, may I ask
the admiral Avhether all of this took place in Moscow or in
Kuibyshev ?
Admiral Standley. It was mostly in Moscow. You are getting
me into a long story, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DoNDERO. Don't blame the chairman. It Avas me that asked
the question.
Admiral Standley. Oh yes, you. Mr. Dondero.
iNIr. Willkie's controversy, or rather the controversy with Mr.
Willkie started before he even got into ^Moscow. When he arrived
in Turkey I received a message from ^Ir. Willkie stating that he did
not w^ant to go to Kuibyshev but that he did want to come to Moscow.
He wanted to come dii-ect to see Mr. Stalin. I replied that the seat
of government was in Kuibyshev.
Mind you, I had already made application for visas for Mr. Willkie
to enter, and I had told the Ivussiau authorities of his coming. They
had made plans and had arranged for him to visit state farms, collec-
tive farms, factories, and had arranged quartei's for him in Kuibyshev.
So I replied to Mr. Willkie that the seat of government was in
Kuibyshev and that there was the proper place for representatives
of foreign governments to make their entry, stating that ''The Soviets
have made plans for your visit here, and unless you have instructions
which are contraiy to those I received when 1 obtained your visas,
1 insist that you come to Kuibyshev."
So Mr. Willkie then came to Kuibyshev, under protest.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2051
Chairman Madden. This is off the the record.
(There was a brief statement off the record.)
Chairman Madden. I will hand yon exhibit 7.
Mr. DoNDERo. Jnst a moment. Admiral Standley, I have one qnes-
tion. What was the purpose of Mr. Willkie's visit to Moscow or
to Kuibyshev^ Was it a visit on the part of a representative of
the Government or was it a personal visit of his own?
Admiral Standley. Do you want my opinion or the statement made
by the State Department?
Mr. Dondero. I want whatever is the fact.
Admiral Standley. There are two facts. There are the facts made
by the State Department's message when it came in. The other facts
are my opinion based on what happened while he was there. Now,
which do yon Avant?
Mr. OTvoNSKi. Tell us both.
Mr. Dondero. Whatever the truth is.
Admiral Standley. The State Department stated — and, of course,
this is 11 years ago and my memory may be a little bit faulty — but,
in effect, the State Department said, "Mr. Willkie is contemplating a
visit to the Middle Last to mingle among the people and see for
himself and get for himself information from the people as to their
attitude toward the war effort. In that connection Mr. Willkie would
like to visit Moscow, and I request that you obtain visas for Mr.
Willkie to enter Moscow."
Then it continued: "'Mr. Willkie was my opponent in the last cam-
paign. Mr. Willkie received a large number of American votes. But
Mr. Willkie is now interested in getting on with the war effort, and
I feel that this visit will further the war effort. So I would like
you to furnish every opportunity for Mr. Willkie to accomplish the
purpose for which he is coming there."
Now, that was practically the statement on the basis of which he
came. He was a special representative of the President. That is the
way he was spoken of.
Mr. Willkie came to Kuibyshev under protest, as it were. We made
a trip up the river. I took him about 50 miles up the Volga River to
a state collective farm, and so forth. At that time Mr. Willkie was
talking about the second front practically everywhere he went.
Nearly everyone he spoke to would come right back, ''Mr. Willkie, how
about this second front?'"
Now, after I had insisted that Mr. Willkie come to Kuibyshev, he
acquiesced and came to Kuibyshev. But he said in his message,
"There will be no interviews and no press releases from Kuibyshev."
When it came to the newspaper boys, the only one who came down
was Shapiro. Eddy Gilmore didn't come and none of the other ne^N-s-
paper boys came. Apparently they had the idea that Mr. Willkie was
going to Moscow. So as long as they didn't come, INIr. Willkie
obviated the question of the press release by saying that there would
be no press releases from Kuibyshev.
Later on, as was the custom at that time whenever a special repre-
sentative of the President came, as Mr. Willkie was, when they had
completed their mission, Mr. Stalin gave him a Kremlin banquet. It
was at this Kremlin banquet that one of the representatives of Mr.
Willkie, after we had left the banquet room and had gone out into
the smoking room and were sitting around the table — and at that table
2052 THE KATlTsT FOREST MASSACRE
was Mr. Stalin, Mr. Willkie, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vershilov, General
Bradley, and myself, and one other whose name I can't recall now.
Mv. Coles and Mr. Barnes were sitting over at another table. One
of them pointed over and said, "There is the next President of the
United States."
From the events that happened there it was my opinion that Mr.
Willkie was over there furthering his political fences rather than
primarily for the Government's interests. Now, that was my personal
view of the situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, may I now introduce exhibit 12 ?
Chairman Madden. Yes.
Mr, Mitchell. This is a portion of the message from the Ambas-
sador at Kuibyshev dated September 10, 1942.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 12" and follows:)
Exhibit 12
Portion of Message from the American Ambassador at Kuibyshev Dated
September 10, 1912
* * * On a number of occasions I have, as instrncted. taken up with Soviet
authorities different Polisli problems such as tlie evacuation of cliiidren, recruit-
ment for the army, the release of five thousand to eight thousand Polish ofiicers,
relief, and the question of moving soldiers together witli their fanulies from
Tashkent to Iran.
As instructed, I liave said that my government did not desire to interfere in
Polish-Soviet relations Early in July, I reported that Molotov was considerably
irritated when I spoke of the Polish question. Yestei'day wlien I again s;iid my
government did not wish to interfere in Soviet-Polish relations Mr. Lozovski
remarked, "that is the best tiling for it to do."
* * * It is my judgment that Mr. Vv'illkie or other representatives should
approach the Premier in a firm and frank manner and as a party iu interest
and not apologetically. The attitude might be expressed that the friction which
has developed between officials of the two governments, i. e., Polisli and Soviet
in the Soviet Union is distressing to our government and that friction of this
kind between allies will be detrimental to our cause and will profit Hitler; that
the President therefore wants it frankly stated that our government hopes both
parties will make every effort to resolve their problems generously and in a
friendly manner, realizing that knowledge of the dispute in the hands of the
Axis will be a valuable weapon; that a review by l)oth parties of the problems
can, the President is confident, lead to an understanding provided there is present
a spirit of good will and mutual confidence. * * *
Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, that message is from you, dated
September 10, 1942. Did Mr. Willkie approach the Premier in a firm
manner?
Chairman Madden. Wait a minute. You might ask the admiral
if that is the message he sent ?
Admiral Standley. Yes; that is the message I sent.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, did Mr. Willkie approach the Premier, by
whom I assume you mean Mr. Stalin, in a firm and frank manner,
and as a party in interest and not apologetically, to your knowledge?
Admiral Standley. I have no knowledge of Mr. Willkie's attitude
when he approached Mr. Stalin because I was not there. Later, before
I\Ir. Willkie left, and in an effort, as I told him, to be put into the
I)ositi()n of knowledge of the questions which he had taken up with
^Lr. Stalin so that I could carry on, I asked him what had developed,
Avhat had happened between him and Mr. Stalin.
The answer that I got was that "I have told you some of it, but
the rest of it is so secret that I can't even tell you."
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2053
So I ^ot very little information from Mr. Willkie about what hap-
pened between him and Mr. Stalin.
Mr. DoNDEKO. Mr. Chairman, unless the visit of Mr. AVillkie can
be connected up with the Katyn massacre, it seems to me that the
whole matter ouf^ht to be expnniied from the record. I cannot see
the slightest relevancy between Mr. Willkie's visit — and this is no
reflection on you, Ambassador — but unless it can be connected up
so that it is in some way associated with the Katyn massacre, it has
nothiuir to do with the picture at all, and ought to be stricken from
this record.
]\Ir. Machkowicz. Mr. Chairman, I disagree. I think we should
have the entire picture. A lot of this nuitter may have no direct
bearing on the Katvn atFair, but it certainly has an indirect bearing;
and I don't see how we could get a complete picture without having
the Willkie incident in the record.
Mr. DoNDERO. Unless you can associate it in some way, I shall
ask
Mr. Maciirowicz. It has already been associated. The matter of
the missing Polish officers was at issue at this time.
Mr. DoxDERo. That miglit have been an issue at that time, but what
did Mr. Willkie have to do with it?
]\[r. Maciirowicz. I think it has already been established that the
question of the missing Polish officers was an issue that was dis-
cussed at the time, and the messages between the American Ambas-
sador and the Department of State indicate that. I see no reason
why the fact that it hapj^ened to be Mr. Wendell Willkie should
mean that that should be excluded from the record. With all of the
rest of it included, that would give us a very incomplete picture.
Mr. Dondero. Well, I still insist that there is the question of rele-
vancy. The subject of Mr. Willkie's visit there had nothing to do with
the Katyn massacre at all. He was not a representative of the
Government.
Mr. Machrowicz. Oh, yes: he was a representative of the Gov-
ernment.
Mr. Dondero. I did not so understand.
Mr. Machrowicz. Was he a representative of the Government,
Admiral ?
Admiral Staxdley. I have so stated, that is, that he represented
the President of the United States and was so treated.
Chairman Maddex. Admiral, does this testimony that you are pre-
senting lead up to the Katyn controversy or the Katyn" question in
any way?
Mr. Mitchell. Did you discuss the Polish situation with Mr.
Willkie?
Admiral Staxdley. Yes; I discussed the Polish situation with Mr.
Willkie and the ett'orts that I had made. I discussed that with him.
Chairman Madden. I think the admiral should proceed.
Mr. MiTCHEix. IVIay I have this document marked as ''Exhibit 1-3"?
Admiral Staxdley. I would like to add, gentlemen, that Mr. Will-
kie's visit and the fact that he had entirely bypassed the American
Ambassador made it difficult for me to continue the discussions in
regard to the Polish situation.
Mr. Machrowicz. That is with regard to the missing Polish officers ?
2054 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Admiral Standley. Yes; with regard to the missing Polish offi-
cers, because I did not know what Mr. Willkie had said to ^Ir. Stalin
and what Mr. Stalin, in turn, had said to Mr. Willkie.
Mr. DoNDERO. Did he mention that subject to you?
Admiral Standley. I asked him in rejiard to it, and he stated in
regard to the Polish question, "I have other matters that are so secret
that I can't tell you about them."
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would now like to introduce ex-
hibit 13.
Admiral, this is a report from the Ambassador in Moscow regard-
ing Mr. Willkie's conversation with Stalin concerning the Polish
situation.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 13" and follows:)
Exhibit 13
Report Fhom the American Ambassador at Moscow Regarding Mb. Willkie's
Conversation With Stalin Concerning the Polish Situation
Mr. Willkie called at the Embassy on September 25 (1942) and informed the
Ambassador that he had taken np the Polish qnestion with Mr. Stalin along the
line that had been indicated in the Department's telegram of September 10,
pointing out particularly that it was in the conmion interest of the United Nations
that there should be the maximum cooperation and the least possible cause for
friction between the different nations fighting against the Axis, that Mr. Stalin
had asked specific questions in regard to the Polish complaints but that he had
replied that he did not wish to argue the details of the case. Mr. Stalin finally
said that he would be willing to discuss the Polish qnestion with Polish officials
with a view towards ironing out existing difficulties.
Mr. Machrowicz. When you refer to the Polish question, you refer
to the question of the missing Polish officers, do 3^011 not?
Admiral Standley. I couldn't say definitely that I did, but, as a
matter of fact, the Polish officers were always in the foreground.
Mr. Maciiroa\^cz, That was the most im]>ortant i')roblem that caused
the differences between the Polish Government and the Russians?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Chairman Madden. I believe the admiral's testimony is apropos.
Mr. DoNDERO. If tlie admiral states, as he now states, that it had to
do with the missing Polish officers, I iiave no objection. I just wanted
the thing straightened out. That was all.
Admiral Standley. It had so nnich importance that innnediately
upon Mr. Willkie's leaving I asked to be sent home for consultation
because the situation, as a result of Mr. AVillkie's visit, had developed
to the point that I felt I could no longer remain there without further
evidence that the Dei)artment had confidence in me and wanted me
to continue.
Ml'. DoNDERO. There is one question I Avant to ask. Did you discuss
this Polish question — and I refer to the missing Polish officers — with
Stalin up to that time?
Admiral STANDLt:Y. I don't think I CA'er discussed the Polish quevS-
tion with Mr. Stalin. It was always with Mr. ]\Iolotov. I don't recall
that T ever discussed it Avitli Mr. Stalin.
Mr. DoNDLKo. Now, at the time you discussed it with Mr, Molotov,
was a inaii by the name of Beria, who was the head of the secret police
of Ivussia, present, or any other officer of that organization?
Admiral Standley. Not obviously present, but many times they
are present when you don't know about it.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2055
Chairman Madden. What do you mean by that, Admiral?
Admiral Standley. Well, you ahvaj's ha Ye somebody around when
you ai'e in Russia. There are ahAays some NKVD boys around. Some-
times, though, 3'ou know where they are, and sometimes you don't.
So I can't say when they were there.
Chairman Madden. You mean that they were concealed some place i
Admiral Standley. Yes, probably concealed or in a room where
they could hear. That is one of the conditions in the Soviet Union as
has been described by Bedell Smith, by Kirk, and by everybody else.
The American Ambassador is always followed by the XICVD boys.
Mr. MACHROA\acz. Now, Admiral, one matter that we are particu-
larly interested in is to know whether or not the Department of State
or the Department of Defense or any other o-overnmental agency had
information in 11)42, 1943, and in 1944 regarding the missing Polish
officers. I want to ask you in connection with that whether you, on
P^bruary 7, 1942, transmitted to the Department of State a report by
Major Czapski witli regard to these missing Polish officers.
Admiral Standley. 1 was not in Moscow at that time. I was not
there at that time. I was in Washington.
Chairman Madden. Show this to the admiral and see if he can
identify it.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Can you identify that photostatic copy?
Admiral Standley. No, sir.
Mr. Machrowicz. Who was your predecessor ?
Admiral Standley. Ambassador Steinhardt.
He maj' not have been tliere, because Steinhart came out and the
counselor was Walter Thurston, and he might have been charge
d'affaires at that time. I am not sure.
Mr. Mrjx'HELL. Admiral, when did you report to Moscow as the
United States Ambassador?
Admiral Standley. In April 1942. It was April 14 I presented my
credentials and became the Ambassador. I presented my credentials
to Mr. Kalinin of the Soviet Republic and became the Ambassador.
Mr. Mitchell. Wlien you were being briefed by the Department
of State officials, as you told us this morning, before you went over
there, I assume that would be in February 1942, since you reported
in April of 1942?
Admiral Standley. I cannot recall just the date that I was con-
firmed here, but I was confirmed by the Senate here before I reported
to Moscow, and I remained in Washington here until February 1942.
Mr. MrrcHELL. But you were being briefed by the State Depart-
ment officers as to what your functions and duties were going to be,
were you not?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you ever shown this message at that time?
Admiral Standley. I do not recall ever having seen any messages
of that kind.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, this is an official State Department
document dated February 7, 1942, with no signature. It comes from
the Foreign Service of the United States of America, American
Embassy, Moscow, U. S. S. R., February 7, 1942, subject, "Trans-
mitting memorandum concerning Polish prisoners of war in the
Soviet Union."
2056 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
We have already received the information contained in this docu-
ment on the record in our hearings. The import of this whole thing
is that before Admiral Standley went to Moscow, this was in the files
of the Department of State.
Chairman Madden. Admiral Standley could not identify it.
Mr. Mitchell. He said he never saw this before he went over there.
Certainly a man who was going to. represent the United States
Government
Chairman Madden. I would like to have that identified if you want
it in the record here.
Is that already in the record ?
Mr. JNIlTCHELL. No.
Chairman Madden. If you can identify it we will submit it for the
record.
Mr. Machrowicz. IVIr. Chairman, may I suggest that probably we
have Mr. Brown, of the Department of State, identify this instrument,
and then Admiral Standley can continue his testimony. That will
save a lot of time.
TESTIMONY OF BEN H. BROWN, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
Chairman JNIadden. Mr. Brown, will you state your full name,
please ?
Mr, Brown. Ben H. Brown, Jr.
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mr. Brown. 3501 North Edison Street, Arlington, Va.
Chairman jMadden. ^h\j we have the capacity in which you are
acting here ?
Mr, Brown. I am Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Con-
gressional Relations.
Chairman Madden, Will you raise your hand and be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and noth-
ing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Brown. I do.
Chairman Madden. You may submit that copy to Mr. Brown,
counsel.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Brown, will you kindly identify that document
for the committee, please ?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, this is a photostatic copy of a dispatch
from the American Embassy in Moscow, dated February 7, 1942,
I am identifying this on the basis of my knowledge of the original
of this document in the Department's files, and the fact that it was
on niy instruction that this document was photostated aiul the photo-
static copy turned over to the committee.
Chairman Madden. What is that document?
Mr. Mitchell. Whose signature appears on that document?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I will have to look at the original of
the -document to determine whose signature appears on it. I would
assume it was the charge d'affaires or the Ambassador at the time.
Mr, Machrowicz. As far as this committee is concerned, I do not
think it is tremendously im])ortant who signed the document. The
fact is that on February 7, 11)42, the l)ei)artment of State did receive
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2057
from the charge d'affaires or the Ambassador at Moscow a letter
transmitting a report by Major Czapski concerning these missing
Polish officers; is that correct?
jVIr. Brown. No, sir. The date stamp on this document shows that
it was received in the Department of State on April 13, 1942, at some-
thing after 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Now, the document was dated
February 7, but the date of receipt was April.
Mr. Machrowicz. But in April 1942 the Department of State would
have in its possession Major Czapski's extensive report regarding these
missing Polish officers; is that not correct?
Mr. Brown. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Madden. Will you mark that as an exhibit and receive
it in evidence. Counsel?
Mr. Mitchell. This is exhibit 14.
(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit 14" for identi-
fication and is as follows:)
Exhibit 14 — Letter and One Enclosure Forwarded to United States State
Department by American Ambassador to Moscow on February 17, 1942,
Detailing Search fob Polish Officers
The Foreign Service of the United States of America
American Embassy,
Moscoiv, U. S. S. R., Fehruary 7, 19^2.
No. 11.
Subject: Transmitting nu-moranduni ciJiiceiiiing Polish prisoners of war in the
Soviet Union.
The Honorable the Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation prepared by this office
of a memorandum on Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union which was
handed to me by its author, Jozef Czapski, a captain in the Polish Army in the
Soviet Union. Captain Czapski informed me in strict confidence that not only
had Stalin promised the Polish Ambassador that the Polish officers concerned
would be liberated but that he had given the most solemn assurance to this
effect to General Sikorski. Captain Czapski came to Moscow in an effort to
obtain the implementation of these promises but has been unable to obtain any
further information as to the whereabouts of these prisoners. He thinks it pos-
sible, however, that some of them may be imprisoned on Franz Joseph Island
and as it would be impossible to bring them back from there before the month
of June, there is a slight possibility that the Soviet authorities are withholding
any information until such time as they can actually release the prisoners. As
illustrative of the attitude taken by the Soviet authorities on this question,
Captain Czapski told me in the strictest confidence that two officers of the
Polish army in the U. S. S. R. were suddenly arrested in Kuibyshev and re-im-
prisoned without notice to the Polish Embassy or Military Authorities. The
Polish Embassy has been unable to secure their release despite the most strenu-
ous efforts. The Soviet authorities have merely stated that the officers in ques-
tion are believed to be pro-German. Captain Czapski said he thought the real
reason for their arrest was the fact that they were members of the Polish Bund.
Captain Czapski, who was himself a prisoner of war, said that he had been for-
tunate in being imprisoned in a camp where the prisoners received relatively
good treatment. He said that the reason for this special consideration was the
desire of the Soviet authorities to prepare a nucleus of Poles who would be fa-
vorably disposed toward the Soviet Union and would be useful to the Soviet
Government after the war, possibly for intervention in Polish internal afCairs.
He said that while he had no direct evidence he suspected that similar tactics
were being used with respect to German prisoners of war. Some support to this
theory is furnished by the recent visit of American correspondents to a Soviet
2058 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
prison camp near Gorky, where the German prisoners receive a more liberal
ration than the citizens of Moscow, although it cannot be said that the conditions
of life there would be likely to win adherents to the Communist Regime.
Respectfully yours,
(Committee Note. — The signature on this document was deleted by the State
Department. See previous testimony.)
[Translation]
Aide M]6moike Concerning Missing Polish Prisoners of War
The prisoners of war concentrated at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow in
the year 1939-40 (April-May) amounting to over 15,000 men, of which 8,700
were oflBcers, have not returned from their captivity and the place where they
were located is absolutely unknown with the excei)tion of 400 or 500 men, about
3 percent of the total number of prisoners of war at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and
Ostachkow who were freed in 1941 (most of them having passed through the
camp at Griazowietz).
THE CAMP AT STAROBIELSK
The prisoners arrived at the camp of Starobielsk from the thirtieth of Septem-
ber to the first of November 1939. At the beginning of the liquidation of the
camp, about April 5, 1940, the number of prisonA's of war amounted to 3,920 men,
aside from the generals and colonels who lived apart. In this number there
were some dozens of civilians for the most part judges, lawyers, and civil ser-
vants, and about 20 officer candidates (Podehorazy). All of the rest were
oflSeers of whom at least 50 percent were regular officers, 8 generals, more than
100 colonels and lieutenant colonels, nearly 250 ma.lors, about 1,000 captains,
nearly 2,500 lieutenants and sublieutenants distributed among all branches of
the service ; among others, 380 of the most outstanding doctors of Poland, some
university professors, etc.
Kozielsk and Ostachkow were similar prison camps and were liquidated about
the same time and in the same manner as Starobielsk.
OSTACHKOW
When the liquidation of this camp began on April 6, 1940, there were a total
of 6,570 men, of which 380 were Polish officers, in addition to Polish frontier
guards and frontier regiments.
LIQUIDATION OF STAROBIELSK
On the fifth of April 1940 liquidation was announced and the first group, 195
men, were sent from Stai'obielsk. The Soviet commander. Colonel Berejkow,
and the commissar, Kirehin, assured our camp directors that the camp was in
process of final liquidation and that everyone would be sent to centers of depart-
ure from which all would be sent to their own country, the Russian side as well
as the German (none of them were sent).
They were sent from the fourtli of April to the twenty-sixth of April in groups
of from C5 to 240 persons. On April 25, after the customary lecture, more than
100 persons were to leave. There was read a special list containing the names
of 63 persons who were ordered to hold themselves completely apart during the
departure at the station.
After this there was a pause between the twenty-sixth of April and the second
of Miiy. On the second of May 200 more were sent by little groups of 8, 11, 12
(my own departure took place in a group of 16) and the rest were sent. This
group in which I found myself was taken to Pawlichtchew Bor (Smolensk Oblast)
and we there met the '"spt'cial group" of 63 persons. We were accordingly 79
otficers of Starobielsk all freed in 1941 (including some otlicer candidates
"Podehorazy"). If we add to tins number the oliicers sent from Starobielsk
individually during the winter of 1939-1940 ((Jeneral Jarnuszkiewicz, Colonel
Koc, C^olonel Gielgud-Aksentowicz, Chaplain Tyczkowski, Colonel Szymanski,
Captain Rytel, Lieutenant Evert) and who have been freed, we have all together
86 out of 3,920, (I little over 2 j)ercent of the total ntinifjrr of prisoners of
Starobielsk.
The li(iuidati(m of the camps of Kozielsk and Ostachkow was carried out in a
similar manner.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2059
In the camp of Pavvlichtchew Bor there were about 200 officers from Kozielsk
and about 120 persons from Ostachkow (police, subofficers, and some officers and
civilians) . The ratio between the number of men that came to Pawlichtchew and
the total number of prisoners in the camps of Kozielsk and Ostachkow differed
little from those I have cited for Starboielsk.
THE CAMP OF GRIAZOWIETZ NE^Ul VOLOGDA
After a stay of a month at Pawlichtchew the whole camp, amounting to about
400 persons, was transferred from Pawlichtchew to Griazowietz, where they
remained from April IS, 1940, to the time of their liberation (on July 2, 1941, a
group of 1,250 officers and soldiers interned in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
arrived at Griazowietz). According to our information the camp of Griazowietz
is the only camp existing in the U. S. S. R. after June 1940, in which the officer
prisoners of war were in the majority, which was liquidated in September 1941.
It will soon have been six months since the day of the proclamation of the
armistice of Polish prisoners on the twelfth of August 1941. The Polish army
in the U. S. S. R. is constantly receiving, whether by groups or individually,
officers and soldiers of the Polish army who had been arrested on the spot or at
the time of their passage of one of the frontiers after September 1939 and who
now are free to come to us from Siberia, from Kolyma, from Workuta, Komi,
ASSR, from Karagande, from all Russia, but contrary to the solemn promises
given to our Ambassador by Stalin himself in November K)41, categoric promises
of Stalin given to General Sikorski on December 4, 1941, to search for and deliver
to us the missing prisoners and soldiers of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostachkow,
tJiere is not a single prisoner of war of Starobielsk, Kozielsk, Ostachkow (aside
from the group named above) who has returned. Not a single cry for help has
come to us from them. Having questioned thousands of compatriots who came
from camps and prisons all over the Soviet Union, we have no news whatever of
their location apart from vague rumors, usually carried third hand, such as:
that six to twelve thousand officers and subofficers were sent to Kolyma in 1940 :
that more than five thousand officers have been concentrated on Franz Joseph
Island and Nowaya, Zemlya ; that transports have been sent to Tschukotka,
Kamtschatka ; that 630 prisoners of Kozielsk are located ISO kilometers from
Piostraya Dreswa (Kolyma) ; that on the thirtieth of August 1941, 150 men in
tattered officers' uniforms were seen on the banks of the Gari north of Soswa
( tributary of the river Ob) : that Polish officers were sent to islands in the north
in large barges containing 1,700 to 2,000 men each and that three of these b:irges
were sunk. But none of this information is completely certain although tliat
concerning the northern islands and Kolyma seems the most probable.
Can it be that the solemn promises of Stalin himself would not allow us to
hope that we shall at least know where our prisoners of war companions are
and if they have perished where that took place? It is more than improbalile
that the heads of the N. K. V. D. should not know where these 15, 000 men are.
During our stay at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow (19:>9-1940) lists of
prisoners of war were made many times on special paper with numerous and
detailed printed questions. These papers were sent to the places of detention
of the iirisoners everywhere. To them were added the records of numerous
examinations on the past, tlie political views, etc., of each prisoner. Verified
photographs were added to the documents, and papers of each prisoner were kept
in a special dossier "Dielo," which included such documents as the officer's
certificate, passport, etc.
The point to which these registrations were made with care is shown by a
detail : many Polish officers received all of their papers in December 1941,
documents which had been taken from them at Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and
Ostachkow two yeai'S earlier.
THE OFFICERS
The dav of the beginning of the liquidation of the camp of Starobielsk,
April 5, 1940 :
The number of prisoners, all officers except some dozens of
civilians, and about thirty candidate officers (Podchorazy)
amounted to 3, 920 persons.
The number of prisoners of Kozielsk the day of its liquida-
tion, April 3, 1940, was 5,000 officers 4, 500 officers.
The number of prisoners at Ostachkow the day of its liquida-
tion was 6,570 of which 380 officers.
Total S, SOO
2060 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Subtracting the dozens of civilians at Starobielsk we have
at least 8, 700 officers.
There have returned to the Polish army some 3(K) officers of
Griazowietz (ex-prisoners of Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and
Ostachkow) and some dozens of prisoners sent from prisons
where they had been held individually after Starobielsk,
Kozielsk, and Ostachkow, in all not more than 400 oflScers.
Accordingly the officer prisoners of war who have not returned
from the camps Starobielsk, Kozielsk, and Ostachkow
amounted to the figure of 8, 300 oflScers.
All the officers of the Tolish Army in the U. S. S. R. of which the
number amounted to 2,300 more or less on January 1, 1942, are with the
exception of the group of 400 officers mentioned above not as prisoners
of war but political prisoners arrested after the campaign of 1939 as well
as those interned from Lithuania, Estonia, and I^atvia.
This note sets forth the status of the officer prisoners of war not liberated.
With regard to the soldier prisoners of war not liberated, the question cannot be
described in such a precise manner. According to official Soviet information
(Krasnaya Zvezda, September IS, 1940), on the Ukraine front alone the Soviet
army took 181,223 soldiers and more than 4,000 under officers prisoners. The
soldiers have been partially sent back, the rest having been held in work camps
in Komi, A. S. S. R., in Siberia, in the DonBass, in Soviet-occupied Poland, in
Kazakstan, and in all the prisons of the U. S. S. R. A part of these men have
been liberated and have formed the cadre of our army in the U. S. S. R. Another
part not being able to be received in the army drifted toward the south seeking
their families exported to Kazakstan. A large part have perisiied in work camps
as well as being freed from cold and from hunger.
Accordingly, it is only the prisoners of war of Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and
Ostachkow, for the most part officers, that we have been able to determine in
exact figures. In enlarging the cadres of our army in the South, the need for
these officers becomes more and more pressing. We lose in them the l^est that
we had of military specialists, men of character, and patriots. In increasing our
army the quality of the army is tied to this question of the disappearance of
our best cadres of officers, to say nothing about how much more difficult this
makes the creation of confidence in our army towards our Soviet allies, con-
fidence so necessary for the decisive moment when our army goes into action
again.
JozEF CzAPSKi, Captain.
Moscow, January 29, 19'i2.
Mr, Brown. Is that all for me at this time, sir?
Chairman Madden. That is all, Mr. Brown. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OP WILLIAM H. STANDLEY— Resumed
Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, we have now reached the point in your
career as Ambassador where you asked to be called home as a result
of the visit Mr. Willkie made.
Could you tell us what happened, briefly, in Washington, at the
time you came back, which I believe you stated was October 1942?
Admiral Standley. When I returned to Washington, I reported,
of course, directly to the State Department and then had an inter-
view with the President. I reported to the President virtually what
I have told this committee about ]\Ir. Willkie's activities over there.
TluMi I told the President that I had asked to be recalled because of
the situation Mr. Willkie left me in, and that if I returned to Russia
I must go back with increased prestige and evidences of that.
And I told him three tilings that must hapj)en to indicate that
evidence. One was that my naval attache, who was a captain, should
be made an admiral ; that my military attache should be made a gen-
eral, and that General Faymonville, the representative of Lend-Lease,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2061
should be directed to report to the Ambassador and not act independ-
ently, as lie had been doing.
Those things were accomplished before I went back.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you are telling the committee this
morning that all of your requests were granted by the President; is
that right?
Admiral Standlet. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell, And that you then returned in your official ca-
pacity ?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Xow, during your conversation with the President,
was the subject matter of the missing Polish othcers discussed?
Admiral Standley. I cannot recall generally, but I did discuss it
with the President. I cannot remember in detail what the discussion
was, but it was, in general, along the lines that I have indicated to the
committee here. I informed the President of the situation as it had
developed up to that time.
Mr. Mitchell. In October 1942?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, will you proceed to tell the committee what
happened upon your return to Moscow, confining it to the Polish
question ?
Admiral Standley. When I returned to Moscow, I found that Dr.
Kot, who had informed me before I left that he had asked to be re-
called, had been recalled as the Polish representative, and that Dr.
Homer had been assigned as the Polish representative in Moscow.
Upon my return, Mr. Romer made the usual call, and he seemed very
much pleased because he felt that the Polish situation had improved,
and he felt encouraged and felt that he was going to accomplish some
results in connection with that question.
Then IMr. Homer informed me that on subsequent visits the attitude
of Mr. Molotov seemed to stiffen again, and then the Polish question
became again a sore point and became quite a question of controversy.
Later on Mr. Romer brought a message which stated that their
Polish Government in London had been informed that the British
Ambassador and the American Ambassador would receive identical
notes, which they were supposed to present to the Soviet Government.
And in due time, I think in about a week, those messages were re-
ceived and the British Ambassador and myself made appointments
to see Mr. Molotov.
We did not go together on this occasion, and when I went into the
office — we had appointments and mine was after the British Ambas-
sador's— as I went in, the British Ambassador was coming out. And
the British Ambassador stated :
I have talked with Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish situation. I have urged
that they withhold their statements in regard to the Polish situation and not
make it public.
And, of course —
he said —
I did not have much success. I hope you will have better success.
That was in connection with the note that the Soviet Government
was going to make in regard to the breaking of relations with the
Polish Government.
93744 — 52— pt. 7 16
2062 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. We have here now a document wliich should be
marked as the next exhibit.
Mr. Mitchell. That will be exhibit 15.
Chairman Madden. Wait just a minute. I think the admiral lia.d
something further to say.
Admiral Standley. I had gotten ahead there.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think you had. I would like to bring you
up to the point.
I have here a paraphrase of a telegram from Moscow, dated April
26, 1943 ; which I would like to introduce at this point as exhibit 15.
(The document referred to Mas marked "Exhibit 15" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit 15
[Paraphrase of telegram from Moscow]
Moscow, April 26. 1943.
Seceetaey of State,
Washington.
Two. I called on Molotov at his request this afternoon. As I arrived Clark
Kerr was leaving and he said in passing "see if you can persuade him to delay
the publication of the note. This is madness — I have been trying for the past
hour but I am afraid I was not successful."
Molotov told me of a mesHUfie of April 21 addressed to Churchill and to Presi-
dent Roosevelt concerning Polish-Soviet relations. He said that in the absence
of the President and of Air. Hull this message ivas given to Mr. Welles on the 2Jfth.
The message, he said, was almost identical to the note which he was "forced"
to give last night to Ambassador Romer. The message was sent to the President
to explain the position of the Soviet Government in the present controversy, and
he felt certain that the Soviet position would be understood by the American
Government. After reading the note Molotov said, in reply to my question,
that no answer to Stalin's message had been received from the President. I
said that the President's absence would account for the lack of a reply, and
added that I was certain the President would be greatly disturbed at this devel-
opment. When informed that the note would be published this evening, I said
that, speaking without instructions, I was certain the American and British
Governments were exporing the question of Polish-Soviet relations in an attempt
to find a solution which would make unnecessary a rupture in relations. I added
that I sincerely hoped that publication of the note could be held up long enough
to permit a complete examination of the question.
(Signed) Standley.
Chairman Madden. That will be received as exhibit 15.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you acknowledge having sent that message,
Admiral ?
Admiral Standley. Yes. And tliat brings me back. I had gotten
ahead of that in ni}^ testimony.
As I stated, Mr. Romer found tliat conditions Avere worsening as
he wont along, and eventually, on A])ril 11^, 194;), came the break.
And at that time, Mr. Goebbels, the German representative, had an-
nounced tlie finding of these 5,000 or 8,000 Poli.sh officers and that they
had been murdered by the Russians.
At that time it was announced that the Polish Government in exile
had requested the International Red Cross to investigate this murder
to determine who had committed the nnirder, whether it was the Rus-
sians or the Germans.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2063
My next knowledge in connection with that was when Mr. Romer
•came into my office the next or following day and asked to see me.
He made this statement :
Mr. Ambassador, I would like to get your advice. I was called for an appoint-
ment with Mr. Molotov last evening, at which time I was presented with a letter
of such tenor that after I had read it I handed it back to Mr. Molotov, and I said,
"Mr. Molotov, that letter is couched in language which no ambassador can re-
ceive," and I refused to receive it. And I left the ofBce.
He continued, "About 12 o'clock, between 12 and 2 o'clock last
night" — I think he told me about 12 o'clock —
a messenger rapped at my door in the hotel, and when he opened the door he
presented me with a letter from the Russian Foreign Office. And the messenger
left. When I opened the letter, I found it was the identical letter that he had
given me in the afternoon, with no change whatever in it. It was the identical
letter.
"So," he said, "I came over to ask what you would do about it."
I first said to Mr. Romer, "Have you seen the British Ambassador?"
"Yes."
"Probably," I said, "it will be no use for me to tell you what I would
do, but if you asked me, if it was my case, I would take that letter
back to the Kremlin gate and say to the messenger that it was the
identical letter I had refused to receive, and I could not receive it and
was returning it, evidently it had been sent to me by mistake."
As I anticipated, Mr. Romer did not take my advice. He referred
the matter to the Polish Government, and so that was the breaking of
relations, and in a short time JVIr. Romer left IMoscow for home.
Chairman LIadden. At this time I will have the next document
marked "Exhibit 16," which is entitled "Private and Confidential
Message of Premier Joseph V. Stalin to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt."
The docmnent will be received for the record.
(The document referred to w^as marked "Exliibit 16" for identifica-
tion, and is as follows :)
Exhibit 16
Marshall Stalin's Personal Letter to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt
(Note in panel in upper right hand corner states the message was
received in the State Department "about 3 p. m., April 24, lols")
The recent conduct of the Polish Government towards the Soviet Union is
regarded by the Soviet Government as absolutely abnormal and contrary to all
rules and standards governing relations between allied countries.
The campaign of calumny against the Soviet Union, initiated by the German
fascists regarding the Polish officers they themselves slaughtered in the Smolensk
area, on German-occupied territory, was immediately taken up by the Sikorski
government and inflated in every possible way by the official Polish press. The
Sikorski government, far from taking a stand against the vile fascist slander
of the Soviet Union did not even see fit to ask the Soviet government for in-
formation or explanations.
The Hitlerite authorities, after perpetrating an atrocious crime against the
Polish officers, are now engaged upon an investigation farce for the staging of
which they have enlisted the help of certain pro-fascist Polish elements picked
up by them in occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler's heel and where
honest Poles dare not lift their voices in public.
2064 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
The governments of Sikorski and Hitler have involved in these "investigations"
the International Red Cross which is compelled to take part, under conditions
of a terroristic regime with its gallows and mass extermination of a peaceful
population, in this investigation farce, under the stage management of Hitler.
It should be clear that such "investigations," carried out, moreover, behind the
Soviet Government's back, cannot inspire confidence in persons of any integrity.
The fact that this campaign against the Soviet Union was launched simul-
taneously in the German and the Polish press and is being conducted along similar
lines does not leave any room for doubt that there is contact and collusion between
Hitler, the enemy of the Allies, and the Sikorski government in the conduct of
the campaign.
At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding their blood in the
bitter struggle against Hitlerite Germany and straining every effort to rout the
common foe of all liberty-loving democratic countries, the government of Mr.
Sikorski, pandering to Hitler's tyranny, is dealing a treacherous blow to the Soviet
Union.
All these circumstances force the Soviet Government to infer that the present
government of Poland, having fallen into the path of collusion with the Hitler
government, has actually discontinued relations of alliance with the U. S. S. R.
and assumed a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union.
In view of these circumstances, the Soviet Government has come to the conclu-
sion of the necessity for breaking relations with the present Polish government.
I deem it necessary to inform you of the above and trust that the Government
of the United States will realize the inevitability of the step which the Soviet
Government has been compelled to take. •
April 21, 1943.
Chairman Maddex. This next document will be marked "Exhibit
17" and received for the record. It is a message from President Roose-
velt to Stalin, dated April 26, 1943.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit IT" for identifica-
tion and is as follows :)
Exhibit 17 — Message Feom President Roosevelt to Stalin, Dated April 26. 1943
I have received your telegram while on my Western inspection trip. I can well
understand your problem, but I hope in the present situation you can find means
to label your action as a suspension of conversations with the Polish Government
in exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic relations.
It is my view that Sikorsky has not acted in any way with Hitler gang, but
rather that he made a mistake in taking the mutter up with the International
Red Cross. Also, I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and means
of getting the Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in
the future.
Let me know if I can help in any way, especially in regard to looking after
any Poles you may desire to send out of Russia.
Incidentally, I have several million Poles in the United States, very many of
them in the Army and Navy. They are all bitter against the Nazis, and knowl-
edge of a complete diplomatic break between you and Sikorski would not help
the situation.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the admiral a
question.
Admiral, is this message from Stalin to President Roosevelt the
one that was referred to in your dispatch when Molotov told you about
it April 21?
Admiral Standley. I never saw that message. Mr. Stalin told me
about it.
Mr. Maciirowicz. Did you see that message, Admiral ?
Admiral Standley. No.
Mr. Maciihowicz. Now, I am going to ask you. Admiral: In your
relations with the Polish representatives in Moscow, did you find a
desire on their ]iart to find a way out of the situation with the Russian
authorities ? Did they seem to be acting in good faith ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2065
Admiral Standley. Do you mean the Polish authorities?
Mr. Machrowicz. The Polish authorities.
Admiral Standley. Oh, yes.
IVIr. Machrowicz. Was there any indication that they did not act
otherwise than in good faith i
Admiral Standley. Not the slightest. On the other hand, there
seemed to be every effort of the Poles, Mr. Kot and Mr. Romer, to
get along, and to solve the problem.
Mr. ]VIachrowicz. Was there anything that you found in your rela-
tions with xVmbassador Kot, Ambassador Romer, and the others,
which would indicate to you that the desire of the Polish Government
to ask for an International Red Cross investigation was instigated by
the Germans?
Admiral Standley. No. The only information we got about that
came over the radio. We got this word over the radio, and then we
got the news in regard to Mr. Romer's relief.
Mr. Machrowicz. Your impression, based on the negotiations and
the discussions you had with Ambassador Kot and Ambassador Romer,
was that this was an independent request to the Polish Government,
with which the Germans had nothing to do; is that correct?
Admiral Standley. That was the impression we had at the time.
Mr. Machrowicz. Did you see anything in this action of the Polish
Government which would give any reason to ask the President to have
them act with more common sense in the future ? Was there anything
tliat was not in conmion sense in requesting the International Red
Cross to make an investigation?
Admiral Standley. Not that we could see at the time. There was
no particular reason why they should not ask a neutral agency to
investigate, as long as there was a dispute.
Mr. JVIaciirowicz. Did it not appear to you that it was, on the con-
trary, acting with common sense in the case of a controversy between
the Russians and Germans, both of whom were equal enemies of the
Poles, that the Polish Government wanted an unbiased organization
like the International Red Cross to investigate?
Admiral Standley. That is how it appeared to u.s there, that the
Polish Government was acting in good faith in endeavoring to get
an honest solution of the controversy.
Mr. Machroavicz. Then, of course, you disagree with the former
President's statement that they did not act with conmion sense in
asking such an unbiased investigation?
Admiral Standley. I do not know whetlier I would agree with
that or not.
Mr. Dondero. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. Dondero. Before you proceed further let me ask: Did the
Polish representatives at all times contact you in regard to the effort
they made with the Russian Government to find these Polish officers?
Admiral Standley. I could not say that they contacted me in
regard to, or informed me of every occasion, but they were continually
discussing the Polish question with me.
As a matter of fact, our relations with Minister Kot were very
friendly. He was a great bridge player, and we played bridge back
and forth continually.
2066 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
At these bridge tables we would discuss these questions. Of course,,
they are not a matter I can recall, but I know we were constantly
discussing the Polish question.
Mr. DoNDERo. When you speak of the Polish question or Polish
problem. Ambassador, you really mean these missing Polisli officers,,
do you ?
Admiral Standley. Yes. That AA'as the problem.
Mr. DoNDEUo. Now, there is something about which you have
aroused the curiosity of all members of this committee.
Did you at any time after Willkie's visit to Europe learn what was
the supersecret information that he had which you did not have?
Admiral Standley. No. At least, if it came to me, it came to me in
a way that 1 did not know it was information through Mr. Willkie.
Mr. DoNDERO. That is all I have at this time, Mr. Chairnum.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski.
Mr. O'Konski. I have one question. Admiral, referring to this
break that finally came between Russia and the Polish Government,
that was not a surprise to you, was it^ In other words, were you
not of the opinion that Russia's attitude, considering the situation
and the way they had to be babied by everybody with regard to even
talking to the Poles, was it not your opinion that eventually the
break would come, and that if it had not been on this incident of the
Red Cross, that they would have found some other incident because
of the plan they had set? Eventually the'break would have to come
and they had it in mind. It was just a question of falling upon the
first opportunity to do it with grace; is that right? Is that your
opinion ?
Admiral Standley. Would you state that again ?
Mr. O'Konski. This break that finally came between the Polish
Government and the Russian Government was scheduled to come for
a long time, was it not? In other words, if Russia had not found this
particular incident as an excuse to sever relations with the Polish
Government, they would have found some other excuse because it was
definitely in their plan to eventually sever relations, was it not?
Admiral Standley. That was not in our minds in JNIoscow.
Mr. O'Konski. It was not ?
Admiral Standley. No. We did not anticipate a definite and final
break between the Poles and the Russians.
Chairman Madden. Our next document will be marked "Exhibit
No. 18." It is a telegram to the Secretary of State from Ambassador
Standley, dated in Moscow April 28, 1943.
That will be received for the record.
(The document referred to was marked as ''Exhibit No. 18" for iden-
tification and is as follows: )
Exhibit 18
[I'araiihrase of telegram from American Ambassador in Moscow to Department of StateJ
Moscow, April 28, 19^3.
SKCBErrAKY OF STATE,
Washington.
For thk Tuksidknt and thk SKCiuorAUY — Stx^Hicr.
In my conversation \vitli IMolotov wliifli took pliK'o at ."> o'clock on the clay
prior to tiio rect'iii't of the I'resident's message to Stalin. I want you to know
that I requested him very earnestly during almost an hour to hold up publi-
cation of the Polish note until after the I'resident could reply to Stalin's uies-
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2067
sage. The President had been absent from Washington, I exphiined, and I
expressed the earnest hope that if pul^Iication could be dehiyed for even two
or three days so that the President could communicate with Stalin, this might
have an important bearing on the unfortunate developments. However. INIolo-
tov was as intransigent as I am informed he had been earlier with the British
Ambassador. Later I learned that the note bad been read at about the^same
time to the Chiefs of Mission in Kuibyshev and had been released to the
press.
I realize now that intercession on my part or on the part of the British Am-
bassador could not have helped, since the Kremlin policy was set before my
interview with Molotov. It would seem, from what I can gather here, that
hopes for reconciliation were apparently destroyed with the publication today
in Izvcstiya of an article by Wanda Wasilevskaya, the so-called chairman of
the Union of Polish Patriots, editor of Wohia Polska and incidentally the
wife allegedly of Kornechuk who was recently appointed Vice Commissar of
Foreign Affairs. "The Polish Patriots are against the (lovernment of General
Sikorski" was the title of this article, which held strongly that the Polish
Government in London, a left-over from Rydzsmigly's "Government of Poland's
September defeat," was not chosen by the I'olisli people, did not represent them,
and is presently controlled by Hitlerite elements. The Army leadership under
General Anders is accused of anti-Semetism, Chauvanism, anti-Sovietism, and
even cowardice for "refusing to fight and withdrawing its forces from the Soviet
Union." The diplomatic representation in the Soviet Union of the Sikorski
Government are accused of robbing the Polish exiles of both supi)lies and money r
and the links of the Polish Government with Berlin are said to be as clear as
its imperialistic intentions toward Soviet territories. The article concludes
that the Polish Patriots Union has asked for the organization in the Soviet Union
of Polish imits "which would proceed to the front to fight shoulder to shoulder
with the Red Army rather than sitting for moutlis in tents." A fuller summary
of the article is being telegraphed.
It may be noteworthy that whereas at first the foreign corre.spondents here
had to use the phrase "suspension of relations." later Soviet censors allowed
them to call the development a "break" or "rupture" in relations. However, it
is the con.sensus here that the article mentioned above has now closed the door
definitely to any rapi>roachment between Moscow and the present Polish
Government.
Standley.
Mr. MiTCHELi.,. Do you acknowledge having sent that telegram?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
]\Ir. Mitchell. Could you explain to the committee what went on
at this time ^ It is evident from this telegram that the breaking off
of relations had a more important meaning behind it since it looks like
they were trying to form another Polish Government. Could you
explain that to tlie committee, please?
Admiral Standley. I think that that could be explained by what
actually happened, because when these relations were broken off, the
Russian Government set up a Polish representative government in
Moscow.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Plans for setting up that kind of government just
do not happen overnight. Where did they find this Wanda Wasilew-
ska and where did they find these other people ?
In other words, this thing must have been planned long before they
even broke diplomatic relations with the real Government of Poland.
Do you not feel that way : That they must have been planning for it
for quite some time, otherwise how would they have all these people
ready ?
Admiral Standley. You know, hindsight is one thing and foresight
is another. You are asking me what I thought at that time. At that
time I did not have the belief or feeling that the rupture was
imperative.
2068 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. But now, subsequent developments convince you, do
they not, Admiral, that this thing was planned long beforehand?
Admiral Standley. At the present time, with hindsight, I would
say "yes" ; there is not any question but that that was the plan.
Cltairman Madden. Admiral, I will present to you exhibit 19,
headed, "Paraphrase of telegram, Moscow, April 28, 1943," addressed
to tlie Secretary of State at Washington, signed by "Standley," and
I will ask counsel to have you identify it.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 19" for identifica-
tion and is as follows :)
Exhibit 19
[Paraphrase of telegram, from American Ambassador in Moscow to United States State
Department]
Moscow, April 28, W.'/S.
Secretary of State,
WasJiivffton:
Accordinff to many qualified oliservers here, there may be formed in the near
future on Soviet soil a '"Free Polish Government" which would hold that it alone
represented the real Polish people in Poland occupied by Germany and not the
"reactiimary" emigree Polish circles abroad. This "Free Polish Government"
would be an offspring of the Union of Polish Patriots and as such a satellite of the
Soviet Government. I am not convinced that these observers are right although
it is quite possible they may be. In the lirst place, I doubt whether the realisti<'
Kremlin has forgotten its unsuccessful attempt at the b^uinning of the Finnish
War prematui'ely to publicize and organize the Terioki Government. Jn the
secofid place, there do not appear to be any Polisli leaders here who irould hare
sufficient stature to make siteh a (jovernntent popular. It would appear more
likely tliat there will be formed here an organization similar to the French
National Committee in London. We should in any event be prepared, I think, for
some move of this sort whether it be in the form of a conunittee or of a Free
Polish Government, and we should realize that an organization of this kind on
Soviet soil must be completely under Soviet domination. In addition, a develop-
ment of this kind is possible in the case of any Slavic or bordering country outside
the 1041 Soviet fi-ontiers whi<-h does not agree to the policy of the Soviet Union.
Within tlie Soviet Union can be found the nucleus of any European Government
and especially of those governments in which the Soviet Union has strategic or
geographic interests.
We may, it seems to me, be faced with a reversal in European history. To
protect itself from the influences of P.olshevism, Western Europe in 1918 at-
tempted to set up a cordon sanitaire. The Kremlin, in order to protect itself
from the influences of the west, might now envisage the formation of a belt of
pro-Soviet states.
(Signed) Standley.
Mr. MrrciiELT.. Admiral Standley, this message, is dated April 28,
194e3. Do you recall having sent that?
Admiral Standeey. I recall having made that rather military esti-
mate of the situation; yes.
Mr. Machrowicz. Admiral, I want to compliment you. I think
you were very prophetic in your statement there. I think the facts
proved to be exactly as you prophesied at that time.
Admiral Standeey. Thank you, sir.
Mr. MrrciJEEL. Now, Achniral, could you briefly sununarize the rest
of your tour of duly in INIoscow and apjiioximately the time that you
were sncceeded in the position, and by whom?
Adinii-al St-andeev. I would like to give you in summary, give the
committee, soi-t of a ])icture ol" what happened there when the German
broadcast claimed the finding of these 10,000 Polish ofUcers in the
Katyn Forest near Smolensk.
THE KATITST FOREST MASSACRE 2069
Mr. Mitchell. Please do.
Admiral Staxdlet. Two days after this, radio Moscow broadcast
an indignant denial of the Nazi charge. "At last," it said, "these new
German lies reveal the fate of the Polish officers whom the Germans
used for constructive work in the Smolensk area."
The next day, Tass explained that these Polish prisoners had been
captured alive by the Germans during the Red Army retreat from
Smolensk in the summer of 1941, and information which combined the
efforts of the British. American, and Polish Governments has been
unsuccessful in extracting from the Soviet GoA'ernment until that day.
The Poles were wild. They knew that many of their officers had been
removed from the three prison camps in April 1940. If the Soviet
Government knew that they had been captured by the Germans in
1941, why had the Russians let the Poles hunt and hope for almost 2
years ?
Ambassador Romer urged caution. The Polish Government in
London proceeded cautiously.
On April 17, the Polish Cabinet issued a statement, of which I
obtained a rather poor translation. If you will bear with me, I will
read that rather short statement :
There is no Pole who is not deeply shocked by the information loudly pro-
claimed by German propaganda of the discovery near Smolensk of the huge
graves filled with corpses of massacred Polish officers missing in the U. S. S. R.
and about their execution. At the same time, the Polish Government, in the name
of the Polish nation, refuses to permit the Germans to promote discord among
the United Nations by shifting that crime in self-defense to the Russians. The
hjiiocritical indignation of the German propaganda will not conceal from the
world the cruel crimes committed by the Nazis against the Polish nation.
Then that statement went on into a list of a long series of crimes,
and so forth.
Now, that was the attitude that was presented to us over there,
and the committee should realize that sitting over there we were rather
also behind the iron curtain and we did not know very much about
what was going on except in messages we got that came through from
the State Department. We had no general news, no general broadcast,
or anything of that kind. So we were in a way sort of blanketed, too.
And many of these things that possibly happened on the outside, we
had no way of knowing.
Mr. Machrowicz. Admiral, j^ou mentioned there that the Russians
suddenly announced the fact that these Polish officers were taken
prisoners by the Germans and killed bj^ them. I am going to ask you
a question.
In the course of your various talks with Molotov, Stalin, and others,
did they at any time give you any inference that these Polish officers
became prisoners of the Germans ?
Admiral Standlet. No, not the slightest. I never received any
information as to the location or disposition of these Polish officers.
Mr. Machrowicz. The first time the story came out that they were
taken prisoners by the Germans was after German discovery of the
graves; is that not correct?
Admiral Standley. Yes, sir.
And let me give you this instance. While I was being briefed in
Washington, a lady came in and she said, "I am the wife of an officer
who was taken out of Poland by the Russians, and I have not heard
2070 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
from him. Tliey tell me lie is dead. I don't believe he is dead. lam
jtriviii*^ you this letter to present to this officer when you hnd him,''
I took the letter with, of course, rather a hopeless feelino;. And a
year and a half later, or a year later, I was informed that a civilian
wanted to see me. When he came in and I asked him his name, he
^ave me his name, and I reached down into' the di'awer and pidled out
this letter from his wife and handed it to him.
This man was a doctor. 1 think he was from Lithnania. Tie had
been taken prisoner and he had been sent to prison u}) in Siberia, and
they had an outbreak there of some sort and they released this doctor
in order for him to aid the sick and disabled. And as a result of his
efficient work, they released him, and he came into my office on his way
home. I tried to ^et him to tell me about his story and I <2;ot nothing-
out of him. lie refused to talk, to say anything. But I asked him if
there were any Polish officers in this camp, and he said, "No, there
were none."
That was really the only positive information I <>ot.
In connection with that investigation — this I am telling you is in-
formation that came to me there — the liussians held an investigation
of this murder case when they took over Smolensk again on the way
back, and they invited various people down there.
Now, two newspapermen, William W. N. White and Lauterbach,
the men who were over there with Eric Johnston, were invited down
there. Mr. White was rather anti-Connnunist and said that the testi-
mony given there would not convince a British or an American jury.
Mr. Lauterbach, on the other hand, who had received quite a few
favors from the communistic government, said that the testimony
given there was all convincing that the Germans did the work.
C^hairman ISIadden. Mr. Dondero.
Mr. DoxDERO. Achniral, at that time, did Mr. Ilarriman's daughter
also go with that grouj) to see the graves ?
Admiral Standley. I have been informed that she did.
Mr. Mitchell. You were not stationed there at the time ; were you ?
Admiral Standley. I was not there at the time ; no.
As a final summing up, as my summation there — -well, I will give
you this information. It may be of use. You might say it is hearsay.
But last week, in Coronado, the admiral who was my naval attache
in Moscow at the time we were discussing this very problem — I had
then received the letter from the connnittee — stated to me at that time
that it was the impression of the people in INIoscow that the Kussians
had committed those nuirders. That was at the time the Katyn Forest
broke. So, finally, when I left there, I had this question in my mind.
I stated in regard to this, in summing up, that there were a few
questions that remained unanswered.
First, if the Polish officers were captured alive by the Germans in
December of 11)41, why were not the 1^)1 ish officials told at once ? Why
was the cpiest of the Polish military authorities foi- theii- lost officers
allowed to continue for over '2 years ^ Would the uniforms and boots
be in such excellent condition after 2 years in Russian prison camps?
Why were there so many letters and documents dated February and
March 11)40, and only a few dated in 1941? Why were the news dis-
patches from Moscow so peculiarly censored by Narkomandil — that is
the censorshi]) — that all the corres[)ondents' doubts of German guilt
wei-e eliminated from the dispatches?
THE KAT^-N FOREST MASSACRE 2071
Those were my last reactions to this Katyn Forest murder.
Mr. DoxDERO. I might say to you, Admiral, that one statement does
not quite agree with the evidence we received in Europe. The last
date of any letter or post card or newspaper found on the bodies of
these men was May 1, 1940.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Admiral, your suspicions have been verified because
this connnittee, after making a thorough investigation, has come to
the uiumimous conclusion that there is not one iota of evidence any-
where to prove that anybody but the Russians did it.
Admiral Standley. I was just going to add one other thing.
The testimony I have given is from the best of my recollection and
taken from extracts from an article I have written in the Naval Insti-
tute. These notes were taken from stenographic notes made at the
time of the interview.
For instance, I would go to see Mr. Stalin. I would come back and
sit down innnediatelv and make stenographic notes of my interview.
The information I got and have given you here is from those steno-
graphic notes. And, of course, they are only extracts. The notes are
complete and I have them for reference if anybody wants to use them.
kSo, as I say, in addition, I have made a complete report. I have
written a story, and a mainiscrii)t is completed of my entire regime in
Moscow. Maybe it will be published, maybe not ; I don't know. But
the complete story of Mr. Willkie is in that. So if anybody wants to
read it, get my booii.
And as I sum up these remarks, I conclude with this : There is a
lesson. Let my fellow citizens beware that they never be caught like
the Poles, between the upper and the nether millstones.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Madden. Do you have any questions, Mr. Sheehan?
Mr. Sheehan. No questions.
Chairman Madden. Mr. O'Konski ?
Mr. O'Konski. You were there. Admiral, when the graves were
discovered by the Germans; were you not?
Admiral Standlet. Yes.
Mr. O'Konski. You were there when the Soviet Government broke
relations with the Polish Government; were you?
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. O'Konski. That was a very critical time, and it involved,
evidently, the murder of somewhere between ten and fifteen thousand
Polish officers.
Admiral Standley. Yes.
Mr. O'Konski. Now, Admiral, was there any honest effort by your
superiors here in Washington to hnd out who really was guilty of
this massacre by asking you, or was there, in your opinion, an obvious
attempt to hush it up because it was too hot to handle and to lav hands
off?
Admiral Standley. The reasons back of no request — I could not
even offer a suggestion — but I received no intimation that I would look
for that.
Mr. O'Konski. How long were you there after the graves were
discovered?
Admiral Standley. That Mas in April, and I left there in October
1943. That is about 7 months.
2072 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. O'KoNSKi. And you were our representative there, our highest
representative there?
Admiral Standley. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Durin<>: all that time you received no communication
whatever from your superiors in Wasliington askino; you to send some
kind of report to find out which side is telling the truth ; no attempt
whatever was made to ask you?
Admiral Standley. None whatever.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did not that seem rather strange to you?
Admiral Standley. No, because the situation was so turbulent other-
wise that I would feel that any effort of our Government to inject
themselves into it would just muddy the water so nuich more.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, at that time, your impression is
that, from the standpoint of your superiors, Soviet friendship, even
if they were criminals, meant more to them than finding out who
murdered 15,000 Polish officers?
Admiral Standley. I think that is somewhat true. But take this
situation : The way we felt there, when Mr. Homer left, taking his
departure, the British Ambassador and myself went to the depot to
see him off and presented going-away presents to Mr. Romer as in-
dicating where our sympathies lay.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Did you leave the service voluntarily. Admiral ; that
is, that particular post at Moscow?
Admiral Standley. Yes; and then again, no. Do you mean leave
the Ambassador service?
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In Moscow ; yes, sir.
Admiral Standley. Yes. I submitted my resignation. The last
words I said to the President -when I left, going back, as I left the door
in the White House, I said, "Mr. President, you got your fingers
burned with Mr. Willkie ; don't do it again."
And when I got word that Mr. Joe Davies was coming in with a
secret letter which I was not to know about, I sent in my resignation,
and it was accepted in October.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. The reason I ask that is that the history of ambas-
sadors at that time was that those that evidently knew what was
going on, ])articular]y Governor Earle and Bliss Lane and a few
others, did not last very long; and I wondered if you went the way of
all those who knew what was going on at that time.
So, I am glad to hear it was the way it was.
Admiral Standley. No. I submitted my resignation.
If you recall, there was an upheaval there in my relations with the
Russians when I made the announcement to the press that tlie Russians
wei-e not informing their ]:)eople as to the receij^t of Red Cross relief
supi)]ios and lend-lease su])plies. Tliat created an ujihoaval, and I
think the ])ress in the United States and I think Mr. Sumner Welles,
wlio was i)i'()bal)ly here, thought 1 should be relieved at once.
Mr. O'KoNSKT. In regard to the lend-lease negotiation, here we were
giving Russia billions of dollars' Avorth of land-lease, and do you
know if an effort on our part was made, by our representatives in Gov-
ernment, to use that more or less as a weapon to get the Russians to
treat the Poles a little more kindly rather than just having our Presi-
dent say "Well, if you don't want the Poles in Russia, let me know,
we will take care of thenr'?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2073
Admiral Standlby. No. As far as I know, that effort was not in
evidence.
You see, I was there with the Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission, who
forced the lend-lease on them.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They forced it on them?
Admiral Standley. We practically forced it on them ; yes, sir.
Then they received the lend-lease and we were giving them the lend-
lease in an effort to further the war effort. As far as I knew, it did
not have anything to do with the Polish situation.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. They were not very anxious to take it; were they?
What do you mean when you say "we practically forced it on them?"
Admiral Standley. Their attitude was one of rather not wanting
to accept help from the outside. They had four meetings with them.
In the first meeting, they went in and they came back, and Mr. Harri-
man and Mr. Beaverbrook said: "I wish we would have had the
agreement ready for them to sign, and I think he would have signed
last night."
They had another meeting with Mr. Stalin and said : "Oh, my God ;
we don't know what we are going to do now. We don't know what to
give him to get him to agree."
The third night they came back and said : "Get your papers ready.
It is all over. We are going to sign the agreement the next morning."
And this was done.
We left in a gale of wind on Saturday. No pilot in our country
would take to the air in those conditions, but we went out. Every-
body got airsick. It was a terrible storm. The reason for it — and
the reason, as we realized afterward, that Mr. Stalin agreed to take
lend-lease and got rid of us — was the fact that the Germans had
started their attack on Moscow 2 days before, and he wanted to get
us out of there in order to avoid the embarrassment of having us
stranded.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. In other words, they played like the bride, hard to
get, because they knew they would get more ?
Admiral Standley. Maybe that was it. But I think their desire
to get us out in a hurry was the reason Stalin finally agreed.
Mr. Sheehan. Admiral, in your reference to Mr, Willkie and Mr.
Davies, apparently there were many instances when the President by-
passed you as Ambassador to get to other people in Russia,
Admiral Standley. That is right.
Mr. Sheehan. And they never let you know what was happening?
Admiral Standley. Some parts. The secret letter Mr. Davies
brought over, Mr. Davies told me that the President felt it would
be better if I was not there when he presented the letter. And I not
only did not see the letter to know what was in it, but I was not there
to see when the letter was presented to Mr. Stalin.
And the telegi^ams you just read here, is the first time I have ever
seen those telegrams, which Mr. Stalin sent to Mr. Eoosevelt and
Roosevelt sent to Stalin, showing you how I sat in the dark behind
the iron curtain.
Mr. Sheehan. Only, of course, I realize that both Mr. Willkie and
Mr. Roosevelt had a lot in common, both being the so-called barefoot
Wall Street lawyers. It would seem to me that as a Republican,
we have been screaming for the last 20 years about Government by
cronj, and I think we have had also international diplomacy by
2074 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
crony, from tlie looks of things, where individuals worked for the
President, reported to him. and the rest, even the State Department
many times did not knoAV what was going on.
Mr. Machkowicz. Mr. Sheehan. do you want to add Mr. John
Foster Dulles to that group ?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
Mr. MACHROwrcz. Would both of you gentlemen?
Mr. Sheehan. You must remember all this time Poland was an
ally of ours. We were supposed to be. fighting for them. Jimmy
Byrnes points out that when he was at Yalta. Mr. Roosevelt, instead
of being an advocate for the Polish cause was an arbiter, trying to
settle the dispute by giving away what we had little right to give.
Mr. DoNDERO. I would like to suggest to the chairman that it is
past noon.
Chairman Madden. Is there anything further?
Now, Admiral, on behalf of the committee, we want to thank you
for coming here today. You came a long way to testify, and your
testimony has certainly been very valuable to this committee. Since
it has be^n in operation over a year, this committee has been trying
its best to bring out all the facts regarding the Katyn massacre and
some of the incidents leading thereto. Your testimony has been
highly valuable, and we wish to thank you for your inconvenience
in coming here to testify.
Admiral Standi^ey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Madden. We are, unfortunately, a little behind our
schedule.
Ambassador Welles, could you be here at 1 : 30?
Mr. Welles. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INIadden. Thank you.
Ambassador Welles will go on at 1 : 30 as the next witness.
(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 p. m.,
this same day.)
AFTER RECESS
Chairman Madden. The committee will come to order.
I would like to make this announcement for the information of
some of the news reporters. Last summer, before the committee filed
its interim re])ort on the first phase of the Katyn hearings, we set
ui> in our re])ort the following.
The first ])haso of tlie Katyn hearings was to establish the guilt of
tlie nation resj)()nsible f(n" the massacre, and the second pliase was
primarily to comi)]ete testimony regarding the facts and circumstances
leading up to and concerning the disa})pearance of certain reports,
documents regarding the Katyn massacre. I will set that out by
I'cading the two ])araa'rn]ihs as they were ])i'inted in our interim
repoi't, to wit :
Fully awiire llicu that this was the first neutral committee ever otficially au-
(liorized by any finverunieut to iuvestiiiate llie Katyn massacre, tliis eoiMiuiUee
divided its investigation into two pliases :
(1) Assemltle evidence which would detcrniini' (he suilt of the country re-
si(onsil)le for the mass murder of these I'olish Army officers and intellectuals;
in the Katyn Forest.
(2) Kstahlish wliy the Katyn massacre with all of its ramihcatioiis never was;
ad<M|ualely revealed to the Ameiican people and to tlie rest of the world. Tlie
(•(Uiniiittce likewise included in lliis jiliasc an dfort to deteniiiuc wh> this cr!iuc
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2075
was not adjudicated iu the Nuremburg trials — where it should have been settled
in the first instance if the Germans were guilty.
Now, the reason for this second phase is that when our resohition
was authorized by Congress, a great number of the Members of our
Congress inquired as to whether or not the committee would go into
the phase of the hearings as is set out in part two of our investigation.
That is the reason for the hearings tliis week.
I will ask ^Ir. Sumner Welles to take the stand, please.
TESTIMONY OF HON. SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE, OXON HILL, MD.
Chairman Madden. Will you be sworn, please. Do you solenmly
swear that the testimony you are about to give the committee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Welles. I do.
Chairman Madden. Sit down, Mr. Welles, please. Will you state
your name.
Mr. Welles. Sumner Welles.
Chairman Madden. And your address ?
Mr. Welles. Oxon Hill, Md.
Chairman Madden. And your present capacity?
Mr. Welles. Author, writer.
Chairman Madden. You are a former ^Vmbassador and Under
Secretary ?
Mr. Welles. I am a former Ambassador to Cuba, and later As-
sistant Secretary of State and then Under Secretary of State from
May 1937 until the latter part of the summer of 1943.
Chairman JNIadden. You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. INIiTciiELL. Mr. Welles, when did you first enter the diplomatic
service of the United States ?
Mr. Welles. In 1915.
Mr. Mitchell. You have held successive posts all over the world;
is that correct ?
Mr. Welles. That is right.
]\Ir. Mitchell. You became Under Secretary of State on what day ?
Mr. Welles. I think it was May 26, 1937.
Mr. IMiTciiELL. And you remained in that position how long, sir?
Mr. Welles, Until July 1943.
Mr. Mitchell. What did you do after July 1943 ?
Mr. Welles. I then wrote a column for the newspapers and wrote
several books.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, from July 1943 until the present
time, you have been an author?
Mr. Welles. In private life, yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Were you present in the hearing room this morning
when Admiral Standley, former Ambassador, testified ?
Mr. Welles. I was.
Mr. INIiTCHELL. You heard all of the exhibits that were read into
the record at that time of the communications that went back and
forth between Washington and Moscow at that time ?
Mr. Welles. I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro-
duce this document as exhibit 20.
2076
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Chairman Madden. This document will be marked "Exhibit No.
20." It is a letter from Mr. Sumner Welles to the Presideiit of the
United States,
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 20" a^ , joii,^
Exhibit 20 — Letter From Under Secretary Sumner Welles to • '' > .
Roosevelt
•1-1 a ' '
.1.0 . fil t %
'l^.a Wilts House.
LEnclosure No. 1 to Exhibit 120]
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2079
of Polieh forces, particularly to Iran or to the Middle East, I think
(Jpv.prni «^\'orski became as disconsolate as Dr. Benes must have been
JNow , . onths of his life since he made the same attempt without
was i\v .' " 11-
C^- . ,,,4^fer in that connection to a message that was read this
morning which I myself have not previously seen. It was a message
addressed by President Roosevelt to Mr. Stalin. I think the refer-
ence in that message, if I may dare to interpret, that President Roose-
velt made to Sikorski's attempt with regard to the Katyn massacre
was not that it showed lack of common sense in its objective but m
its method.
It seems to me that what the President deplored was the fact that
General Sikorski had not taken him or Prime Minister Churchill
into consultation before taking the step w^hich otherwise would seem
to be altogether well-advised. At that time there was no League of
Nations ; there was no United Nations.
There was no international body of any kind except the International
Red Cross that could be regarded as respectable, impartial, and inter-
national in its character ; and it seemed to me that General Sikorski's
idea was altogether well taken. However, what the President re-
gretted was that what had been taken precipitously was without prior
consultation with the other two govermnents that had been working
so closely with him to better the relations between the Soviet Gov-
ernment and the Polish Government in exile.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you care to proceed ?
Mr. Machrowitz. In connection with that, may I ask a question,
Mr, Welles. Would you consider that the action, whether it was
ill-advised or not, was such an action that would justify the severing
of relations between Poland and Russia ?
Mr. Welles. Decidedly not. And it seems to me that the point
that was brought out in the testimony this morning is altogether
sound, that is, that that step was merely a pretext for a policy that had
been determined upon some time before.
Mr. DoNDERO, Mr. Welles, may I just add my view as to what the
chairman said. "Wliat we want to know from you as Under Secretary
of State of this Nation is what you know took place in regard to the
Katyn massacre from 1939 up until 1943. That is the point.
Mr. Welles. Unfortunately, without having refreshed my memory
by going all through the memoranda that are on file in the Department
of State and some of which I had hoped to see this morning, it would
be quite impossible for me to go into it in any detailed way. There is
very little I can add to what has been brought out this morning.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that the
position taken this morning with reference to this development of
the breaking of the Polish-Russian relationship was of long standing?
Did you say that position was unsound ?
Mr. Welles. No ; I said quite the contrary, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Sheehan. That it was sound?
Mr, Welles. What I said was that what was brought out this
morning seemed to he entirely correct, that the severance of relations
on the basis of the attempt of the Polish Government to get the Inter-
national Red Cross to make a survey and an investigation was merely
a pretext for a policy that had already been determined upon by the
Soviet Government some time before.
2080 THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE
Mr. Machrowicz. Mr, Welles, would you say that if General Si-
korski had consiilted the United States Government at the time, the
United States Government would have agreed to the request for an
investigation by the International Red Cross ?
Mr. Welles. I am quite certain that the President would have re-
garded it sympathetically, and insofar as I myself was concerned I
most certainly would have urged it.
Mr. Maohrowicz. Do you feel that the British Government would
have done so ?
Mr. Welles. I am quite sure of it.
Mr. Machrowicz. Then what harm was there done in making that
request ?
Mr. Welles. Simply that it afforded the Soviet Government the
opportunity for breaking relations, which otherwise could conceivably
have been averted for at least a while.
Mr. Machrowicz. You just stated that they had planned severing
relations anyway sooner or later. It was just a question of finding
some pretext.
Mr. Welles. I said that that had been brought out clearly this
morning, but unfortunately we were not aware of that at the time.
Chairman Madden. Mr. Welles, you mentioned the assassination
of General Sikorski. Could you elaborate on that somewhat?
Mr. Welles. I have always believed that there was sabotage. You
will remember, Mr. Chairman, that he was brought down in the plane
just as he was taking off from Gibraltar. The plane crashed. There
had been two or three incidents of that kind before. I remember that
when General Sikorski came to the United States the year before, his
plane, in taking off from Montreal, had crashed when it was only
about 100 feet above the ground.
To put it mildly, it would seem to be a coincidence.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. Was it not generally conceded that both Molotov
and Stalin had certain commitments that they had made to General
Sikorski and that they knew that if he were out of the way they could
jDossibly get around them?
Mr. Welles. I don't know whether it is generally conceded or not,
but it is certainly conceivable.
Mr. Sheeiian. Mr. Secretary, in your position in the State Depart-
ment, were you informed of the fact from various of our Ambassadors
that Russia was contemplating this breaking off of Polish relations?
Mr. Welles. Not that I recall ; no.
Mr. Sheeiian. On May 2, 1943, there was a telegram to the Secre-
tary of State from Ambassador Winant in London, who ])ointed out
that as early as January 16, 1943, when Russia declared all Poles to
be Russian citizens, that was the beginning of this break-off. The
Ambassador in London wired on April 21, 1943, pointing out that the
British Foreign Office felt all the time that this was motivated by Rus-
sian desires to reinforce and give expression to her territorial
expansion.
In other words, our Ambassador sends information in. Who does
it go to ? Who follows through on it ?
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE 2081
Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly we all of us realized that
the situation was deteriorating rapidly, but an innnediate break of
relations of that character w^as not evident.
Mr. Sheehan. Well, it seemed to our Ambassadors and our military
attaches, who were sending in information to the Secretary of State
and to the Under Secretary, that these things should be called to your
attention because the mere fact that Russia was going to break off rela-
tions with one of our allies, Poland, was not a small matter. That was
quite a significant matter,
Mr. Welles. We were doing everything in our power to avert it.
I was aware of that.
Mr. DoNDERO. Mr. Welles, when did the item of the Katyn massacre
first come to the attention of the State Department, if you can recall?
Mr. Welles. There again, Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to say that I
would have to refresh my memory by looking at the files ; and I have
not been given that opportunity.
Mr. DoNDERO. Can you fix it reasonably as to year or month?
Mr. Welles. Well, I think that what was brought out this morning,
Mr. Congressman, by Admiral Standley makes that very clear.
Mr. O'KoNSKi. When this atrocity was announced to the world first
by the Germans, was there any concern in the State Department to
have liaison, for instance, with G-2 of our military service and other
branches of the service that could get some information on it ? Was
there any honest effort on the part of the State Department to pin
the responsibility of the crime, or was the policy one of being fearful
that it might further antagonize the Russians and that we had better
not take the chance ?
Mr. Welles. No ; I don't think that was the case. I think that at
the beginning we were rather definitely confused as to the responsi-
bility for the crime. Certainly there is nothing in the history of the
Nazi government nor of the Nazi authorities which would have put it
beyond them to undertake such a massacre because I must remind
you that the facts came out very slowly and that by the time I had
left the Department of State — and I have forgotten whether that was
late July or early August 19-i3 — very little had yet leaked out.
Mr. O'KoNSKL Did the State Department, to your knowledge, send
any request to neutral countries like Switzerland and Sweden and
Spain, and we had connections with the Vatican? They had infor-
mation on this. Was any attempt made by your Department to get
information from them on t 
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Open Library
American Libraries
TV News
Understanding 9/11